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Chapter 7: The Slovak question and the Slovak answer: Citizenship
during the quest for national self-determination and after 185
7.1 History of Slovak citizenship 186
7.2 Current regulations of acquisition and loss of Slovak
citizenship 193
7.3 Current political debates and reform plans 198
7.4 Statistical trends (acquisition of Slovak citizenship since
1993) 203
7.5 Conclusions 205
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Czechoslovakia/
the Slovak Republic 207
Felicita Medved
Chapter 8: From civic to ethnic community? The evolution of Slove-
nian citizenship 213
8.1 History of citizenship policies 213
8.2 Basic principles of acquisition and loss of Slovenian
citizenship 221
8.3 Current political debates 228
8.4 Statistics 231
8.5 Conclusions 233
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Slovenia 235
Part IV: Mediterranean post-imperial states
Eugene Buttigieg
Chapter 9: Malta’s citizenship law: Evolution and current regime 245
9.1 Historical background 245
9.2 Current modes of acquisition and loss of citizenship 251
9.3 Statistical developments 257
CONTENTS 7
9.4 Conclusions 259
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Malta 260
Nicos Trimikliniotis
Chapter 10: Nationality and citizenship in Cyprus since 1945:
Communal citizenship, gendered nationality and the adventures of
a post-colonial subject in a divided country 263
10.1 History of nationality policy since 1945 264
10.2 Modes of acquisition and loss of citizenship 271
10.3 Current debates: The challenges of gender equality, migration,
Europeanisation and reunification 279
10.4 Statistical developments since 1985: The ‘politics of numbers’ and
the ‘numbers game’ 281
10.5 Conclusions: Charting out the ‘nationality policies’ 283
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in the Republic of
Cyprus 284
Zeynep Kadirbeyoglu
Chapter 11: Changing conceptions of citizenship in Turkey 293
11.1 History of Turkish citizenship law 293
11.2 Modes of acquisition and loss of Turkish citizenship 300
11.3 Statistics 302
11.4 Conclusions 305
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Turkey 306
List of contributors 313
8 CONTENTS
Tables
Figure 1.1 Estonian citizens and stateless persons in Estonia, 1992-
1.5.2005, per cent of the whole population
Figure 1.2 Naturalisation in Estonia, 1992-2005, persons naturalised
per year in thousands
Table 2.1 Changes in ethnic composition of Latvia’s population
Table 2.2 Citizens and non-citizens of Latvia
Table 2.3 Residents of Latvia on 1 July 2005 (by ethnic origin)
Table 2.4 Children of non-citizens and stateless persons born after
21 August 1991 who were granted Latvian nationality
Table 2.5 Numbers of naturalisations in Latvia per year
Table 2.6 Ethnic origin of applicants for naturalisation in Latvia
Table 2.7 Age of applicants for naturalisation in Latvia (1 February
1995-31 December 2005)
Table 3.1 Ethnic composition in Lithuania in 1923 and 1992
Table 3.2 Acquisitions of Lithuanian nationality, 2002-2004
Table 3.3 Deprivation of Lithuanian nationality, 2002-2004
Table 3.4 Restoration of Lithuanian nationality, 2003-2004
Table 4.1 Foreigners granted Polish nationality by means of the
‘conferment procedure’ in 1992-2004 by (former)
nationality
Figure 4.1 Acquisitions of Polish nationality via the conferment
procedure, by year of acquisition
Table 4.2 Repatriation visas to Poland in 1997-2003, by repatriates’
previous country of residence
Table 5.1 Number of (re-)naturalisations and terminations of
nationality in Hungary, 1985-1994
Table 5.2 Distribution of nationality law cases in Hungary, 1998-
2004
Table 5.3 Ratio of naturalisation decisions in Hungary in 2002
Table 6.1 Conceptual scheme of Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on the
Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship of the Czech
Republic
Table 6.2 Naturalisations (excluding Slovak nationals) in the Czech
Republic, 1993-2005
Table 6.3 Number of Slovak and other nationals acquiring Czech
citizenship from 2001-2005
Table 6.4 Slovak nationals who acquired Czech citizenship by
declaration (Section 18a of Act No. 40/1993 Coll.)
Table 6.5 Former Czechoslovak nationals who (re)acquired Czech
citizenship by declaration under Act No. 193/1999 Coll.
Table 7.1 Number of persons who acquired citizenship of the
Slovak Republic (1993-2005)
Figure 7.1 Czechs and other foreign nationals who acquired
citizenship of the Slovak Republic in 1995-2005
Table 7.2 Refugees and asylum seekers in the Slovak Republic
Table 8.1 Admission to Slovenian citizenship based on
supplementary and corrective initial determination rules
(art. 40, 1991, art. 19, 2002) and on standard provisions
for naturalisation by country of origin, 25 June 1991-31
December 2005
Table 8.2 Regular and facilitated naturalisations by groups of
persons in Slovenia, 1991-2005
Table 8.3 Regular and facilitated naturalisations in Slovenia per
year, 1991-2005
Table 8.4 Reasons for granting exceptional naturalisations in
Slovenia
Table 8.5 Exceptional naturalisations in Slovenia per year, 1991-
2005
Table 8.6 Release from Slovenian citizenship per year, 1991-2005
Figure 9.1 Number of naturalisations and registrations in Malta,
1990-2004
Table 9.1 Acquisition of Maltese nationality by registration for
1998-2004 according to the grounds for registration
Table 10.1 Acquisitions of Cypriot citizenship by categories from
1985 until 31 December 2003
Table 11.1 Automatic acquisition of Turkish citizenship, 1990-2004
Table 11.2 Acquisition of Turkish citizenship through a decision of
the authorities, 1990-2004
Table 11.3 Loss of Turkish citizenship by a decision of the
authorities, 2000-2004
Table 11.4 Previous loss of citizenship by those who have reacquired




In recent years there has been a growing interest in comparative re-
search on citizenship policies in major countries of immigration, both
overseas and in Europe. However most comparative studies are limited
in geographic scope to a small number of already well-researched coun-
tries. The present volume looks at countries that are rarely included in
these studies. It presents the results of the Citizenship in the new Mem-
ber States and Turkey conference, held in Vienna from 30 June to 2 July
2005. This conference was organised within the framework of the EU-
funded network of excellence IMISCOE (the acronym for international
migration, integration and social cohesion in Europe), or to be more
precise, within the thematic cluster of this network that focuses on citi-
zenship and is coordinated by Rainer Bauböck.
Why concentrate on the ten new Member States and Turkey? There
are various reasons for this choice. The initial idea for analysing the na-
tionality regulations in this particular group of countries originated in
another EU-funded project called NATAC (The acquisition of national-
ity in EU Member States: rules, practices and quantitative develop-
ments). NATAC provides the first strictly comparative analysis of the
rules and practices regulating the acquisition and loss of nationality in
the fifteen ‘old’ EU Member States. Unlike earlier, similar studies, it
was not limited to country reports but used a new methodology that fa-
cilitates the comparison of the regulations across countries. The results
of this project are published in two volumes (Bauböck, Ersbøll, Groe-
nendijk & Waldrauch 2006). Volume 1 contains comparative reports
with chapters on the modes of acquiring and losing nationality, the sta-
tistics on nationality, the trends in nationality laws and the statuses of
denizenship and quasi-citizenship in the fifteen states. Volume 2 sup-
plies specific background information on the historical and political
evolution of the nationality legislation in each individual country, struc-
tured according to a common grid in order to facilitate comparative
analyses.
The present volume complements the analyses carried out in the
NATAC project. It provides a first comparative overview of the national-
ity regulations in the ten new Member States that acceded the Eur-
opean Union on 1 May 2004. We have added Turkey to our sample of
countries for several reasons. First, it shares a number of similarities
or historical connections with the two new Mediterranean Member
States (Cyprus and Malta). Second, Turkey is by far the largest source
country of immigration into the old fifteen EU countries and its recent
citizenship reforms provide insight into the interaction between send-
ing and receiving country policies. Finally, including Turkey as an ac-
cession candidate to the EU in our sample allows us to study the on-
going impact of enlargement on concepts and policies of citizenship.
This book represents a first attempt at adapting the methodology de-
veloped in the NATAC project to these countries. The country reports
included in this volume are structured according to a common grid
that is similar to the one used for Volume 2 of the above mentioned
publication. Each chapter contains a historical outline of nationality
policy since 1945 that provides a broad overview of developments with
special emphasis on important reforms, breaks from basic principles
of nationality acquisition and loss and regulations for special groups of
people (e.g., an ethnic diaspora). Subsequently, the authors summarise
the basic principles of the most important current modes of acquisition
and loss of nationality in their respective countries. A third section
looks at current political debates and any changes planned for the fu-
ture. Finally, the reports present the statistical developments since
1985, describe which modes of acquisition and loss of nationality are
dealt with by the available statistics and explain important breaks in
the numbers of acquisitions and loss of nationality in their country.
Like the country reports gathered for the NATAC project, the reports
included in this volume do not primarily aim at a legal comparison but
concentrate on the historical and political background of current regu-
lations for the acquisition and loss of nationality. A further question
guiding our research was the impact of the EU and other international
bodies on the evolution of these regulations.
Nevertheless, this book on citizenship in the new Europe is a publi-
cation in its own right with a very specific focus. The concepts of na-
tionality and citizenship in the eleven countries under discussion in
this volume generally differ quite strongly from those prevalent in Wes-
tern Europe. By and large, citizenship in these countries is still closely
linked to an ethnic interpretation of nationality, transmission to subse-
quent generations is exclusively based on descent, there is greater hos-
tility towards multiple nationality, and greater emphasis is laid on citi-
zenship links with ethnic kin-minorities in neighbouring countries and
expatriates. Indeed, emigration has played a more important role for
recent citizenship reforms in these countries than immigration. Yet, a
few among them are already experiencing another transition, from a
sending country to a transit country and finally to a receiving country
of new immigration. Moreover, eight of these countries have also un-
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dergone a transition from communist to democratic rule. A final fun-
damental contrast with the old fifteen EU Member States is that none
of these countries has enjoyed continuous independence within the
present state borders for more than 60 years. In addition to dealing
with individual acquisition and loss of citizenship, these countries
therefore had to resolve the puzzling problems of initial collective citi-
zenship determination for large populations in the context of state re-
storation, of new establishment after partitioning or secession or of
geographic relocations of borders. Again, this has sometimes implied a
return to ethnic roots and the exclusion of long term residents and
their children for political reasons, such as the restrictive access to Es-
tonian and Latvian citizenship for Russian immigrants who settled
there after 1940.
The introductory chapter by Andre Liebich provides a comparative
analysis of nationality regulations in the post-communist states. Since
this does not apply to three of the countries included in our study we
will briefly summarise their commonalities and differences here.
Citizenship in Cyprus, Malta and Turkey has been shaped by distinct
historical trajectories. Cyprus and Malta are both former British colo-
nies, but the impact of British rule on the development of nationality
law in each of them differs strongly. Before becoming a British colony
in 1878, Cyprus had been a part of the Ottoman Empire, which based
its rule on the ‘millet’ system, defining belonging and identity through
membership in one of three self-governing religious communities
(Muslim, Christian and Jewish).1 The subjects’ relation to the state was
mediated by these communities rather than a direct personal relation
as entailed in the concept of citizenship. This model fitted very well
into the British tradition of colonial indirect rule. It was therefore not
abolished but only modernised by the British colonial authorities. Until
recently an ‘ethno-communal’ concept of belonging has influenced the
concept of nationality, and only with the accession of Cyprus to the
European Union has a trans-communal type of citizenship started to
develop (see Trimikliniotis in this volume).
In Malta, religious uniformity had already been coercively estab-
lished by the Knights of St. John in the Middle Ages. The Ottomans
failed to conquer Malta in the sixteenth century and after a short
French interregnum, Malta had been under British control since 1814.
In the nineteenth and twentieth century the major internal dividing
lines had been neither religion nor ethnicity, but class, reflected in a
polarised British-style two-party system. Within this framework of an
ethnically and religiously homogeneous post-colonial state, a descent-
oriented understanding of nationality has promoted the inclusion of
emigrants and their offspring, whereas foreign citizens face high bar-
riers for naturalisation (see Buttigieg in this volume).
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In Turkey, after 1869, the millet system was gradually replaced by
the concept of a personal relationship to the state, although in practice
ethnicity and religion continued to be dominant criteria for access to
nationality in the late Ottoman Empire. Since the 1920s, however, a se-
cular understanding of nationality has replaced the millet system.
Since becoming a major sending country of economic migrants to
Western Europe, Turkey’s nationality legislation has been strongly in-
fluenced by the desire to allow emigrants to maintain their ties to Tur-
key. External citizenship has thus gained in importance. Responding to
the flow of remittances from Western Europe and to racist violence in
Germany in the early 1990s, Turkey has offered a quasi-citizenship sta-
tus to its former nationals while at the same time promoting dual na-
tionality (see Kadirbeyoglu in this volume). This policy shift parallels
developments in other major sending states, such as India, Mexico and
Morocco and confronts receiving states with the need to coordinate
their citizenship policies with those of migration source countries.
Turkey’s external citizenship policies highlight a major lesson to be
drawn from the analyses presented in this book. All states still regard
the regulation of acquisition and loss of their nationality as a core mat-
ter of national sovereignty and self-determination. However, the effects
of nationality policies cannot be fully internalised within the respective
polity. International migration and shifting international borders both
create contexts in which each country’s laws and policies inevitably im-
pact on other states. These external effects of nationality and citizen-
ship are enhanced through the common citizenship of the European
Union and its attached rights of free movement between Member
States. In such an environment, efforts of coordination between na-
tional policies and agreement on common norms should be in every
country’s interest.
Vienna, June 2006
Rainer Bauböck, Bernhard Perchinig, Wiebke Sievers
Note
1 The millet system is also still echoed in nationality legislation in Greece, where
belonging to the Orthodox Church is a decisive factor in the process of ‘definition’ of
Greek nationality (cf. Christopoulos 2006).
14 PREFACE
Bibliography
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Introduction: Altneuländer or the vicissitudes of
citizenship in the new EU states1
Andre Liebich
Altneuland is the title of a novel written over a century ago by the Zion-
ist leader Theodor Herzl. The old-new land Herzl had in mind was Pa-
lestine but the term seems to me to be apposite for the lands with
which this paper is concerned, the former communist states that have
recently joined the European Union. As I shall try to argue, from the
point of view of our concern here, namely, the issue of citizenship,
these countries display a peculiar blend of antiquity and novelty which
may justify a certain claim to distinctiveness.
In this paper, I therefore propose to look at the preconditions and
conditions of citizenship in the new EU Member States through the
prism of ‘old’ and ‘new.’ Applying these terms, I shall first consider the
specificities of East Central European statehood; I shall then look at
the evolution of principles of political membership, and finally, I shall
consider the efforts to incorporate the past into the present citizenship
provisions.
1 New states and old concerns, or why there is not much
plural citizenship in the Altneuländer
When the First World War broke out, less than a century ago, not a sin-
gle one of the eight new post-communist members of the EU enjoyed
statehood. Three of these countries (Slovenia, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia) have only become states in the last fifteen years (though Slo-
vakia had a brief and not very happy experience as a state during the
Second World War). Of the five other states (Poland, Hungary, Lithua-
nia, Latvia, Estonia) only one (Hungary) has enjoyed uninterrupted
statehood since 1918 and, in the case of the Baltic states, their stateless-
ness in this period has lasted longer than their statehood (annex 1).
To be sure, at least two countries, Poland and Hungary, have long
been acknowledged, even when absent from the map and even by such
sceptics as Marx and Engels, as one-time historic states (Rosdolsky
1986; Connor 1984). Other countries, notably Lithuania and the Czech
Republic, might make weaker claims to a distant statehood in a more
or less misty past. The contrast with the situation of the ‘old’ fifteen
EU Member States could not be more striking. Although the ‘old’ EU
does also number three countries which only arose after the First
World War (Finland, Austria, Ireland) and one whose existence was in-
terrupted (Austria), twelve of the fifteen old EU countries have known
uninterrupted statehood for periods running from well over a century
(Germany, Luxemburg, Italy, Belgium, Greece) to many hundreds of
years (United Kingdom, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Den-
mark, France).
I would suggest that the recent and discontinuous statehood that
characterises the new EU states has broad implications for political atti-
tudes and identity. The Hungarian public intellectual, Istvan Bibó, has
spoken of the ‘distress of the small states of Eastern Europe’ by which
he means ‘anguish at the perspective of the disappearance of one’s
own people and country’ (Bibó 1991[1946]: 13-69). This anxiety is
based on the historical realities noted above but it is re-enforced by de-
mography. Though there are smaller states in the old EU, some of the
new Member States are very small indeed (Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania together are smaller than Belgium or Portugal) and all
of them combined, excepting Poland, have a smaller population than a
middle sized EU Member State like Spain. Even Poland, whose popula-
tion is larger than all the other new EU adherents put together, is itself
only about the size of Spain. And, as if to underline that in East Cen-
tral Europe even thirty eight million nationals does not spare one from
brooding on the survival of the state, Poland’s hymn still begins, some-
what ominously, ‘Poland has not yet perished while we are alive.’
The fragility of statehood in East Central Europe drives all these
countries in the direction of a state-reinforcing overcompensation. The
preambles to their constitutions or other foundational documents (an-
nex 2) evoke ancient genealogies and historical continuities. Moreover,
the Baltic states’ insistence on the legal fiction of uninterrupted state-
hood, despite a half century of statelessness, leads them to adopt con-
stitutional and legislative dispositions that transform a fixed date into a
marker of timelessness. Legitimacy, apparently, reposes, at least in part,
upon antiquity and continuity and the search for these is a serious task
(Liebich 1995: 313-318).
One would imagine that such tenacious attachment to a recent and
therefore tenuous statehood would find reflection in the philosophy
and provisions regarding plural citizenship (Liebich 2000: 97-107).
One could advance the hypothesis that fragile states with unstable bor-
ders might accept or even favour plural citizenship to reflect the varia-
bility of the historical conditions they had experienced. One could also
put forward the proposition that such precarious states would be reluc-
tant to dilute or share attributes of statehood by tolerating plural citi-
zenship for its citizens.
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In fact, it is the latter proposition that holds more strongly. All the
post-communist states considered here, with the exception of only
Hungary and Slovakia, are reticent about authorising their citizens,
especially their naturalised citizens, to carry another passport. This reti-
cence is subjected to pressure in the opposite direction, especially from
émigrés who are keen on maintaining or re-establishing formal ties
with their country of origin without giving up membership in their
country of adoption. The result is a considerable amount of incoher-
ence. For example, an Estonian citizen may not be a citizen of another
country; any Estonian citizen who acquires another citizenship by birth
must renounce either that citizenship or Estonian citizenship. The
same law, however, states that no person may be deprived of Estonian
citizenship acquired by birth.2 In the well documented case of Poland,
the only state considered here that has not adopted a new citizenship
law since the fall of communism, the relevant formulation is ambigu-
ous. It states that a person who is a Polish citizen under Polish law
cannot at the same time be recognised as a citizen of another state.
This provision was interpreted restrictively in the communist period
but is now applied more liberally (see though Lodzinski 1998: 161).3
Arbitrary application of the prohibition on plural citizenship was also
the rule in Czechoslovakia after 1949. Today, in the Czech Republic
‘there is a long list of discretionary exemptions from the requirement
to renounce one’s [previous] nationality’ upon naturalisation (Baršová
in this volume). The upshot of the matter throughout the area appears
to be a continued tendency towards formal rejection of the principle of
plural citizenship, though with varying degrees of severity and consis-
tency (annex 3).
The two exceptions to such prohibition, Hungary and Slovakia, con-
firm the first hypothesis presented above according to which states
may accept plural citizenship as a reflection of their historical experi-
ence. These two countries authorise plural citizenship with (virtually,
in the case of Slovakia) no reservations. The Slovak provision that re-
nouncement of former citizenship is ‘in favour’ of naturalisation is so
weak a formulation as to be self-negating. If one were to search for the
causes of their exceptionalism in this regard, one would have to take
account of the fact that these two countries show particular concern for
their diasporas and that they have also known a sudden change of bor-
ders (Hungary) or status (Slovakia) leaving a number of their nationals
outside the state.4 In historical terms, it might be noted that Hungary
was not always open to plural citizenship – indeed, at the time of the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy it specifically excluded dual citizenship
with Austria – and that Slovakia, long integrated into Hungary, might
be expected to have based some of its own conceptions of statehood on
the Hungarian example.5
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There is, clearly, a tendency towards relaxation of the injunctions
against plural citizenship. One might imagine that such relaxation
would be by way of compensation for the strict refusal of these coun-
tries to countenance anything in the order of federal arrangements or
even regional autonomies (annex 4).6 In fact, this is not the underlying
reason for greater tolerance of plural citizenship. Rather, pressure
stems from the desire to prove their eurocompatability by following
European trends, as evidenced by the most recent European Conven-
tion on Nationality (1997), which encourages plural citizenship as
much as earlier conventions discouraged it. Above all, the element re-
ferred to above, émigré pressure in favour of plural citizenship is be-
coming ever stronger. First, as a consequence of the fall of commun-
ism these countries have reconciled themselves with their historical
émigré communities, just as these communities abroad have recon-
ciled themselves with their countries of origin. Second, these countries
are producing a significant new wave of emigration. Part brain drain,
part cheap labour, stimulated by globalisation as well as by EU enlarge-
ment, this new emigration is even more interested in maintaining ties
with its home country than were its predecessors.
To date, the move in the direction of plural citizenship has not occa-
sioned sweeping changes in citizenship laws. States have abrogated the
communist era bilateral conventions on elimination of cases of dual
nationality (for Hungary and Poland see Gál 2002: 748 and Górny et
al. 2003: 15, 18-21; the country reports published in this volume con-
firm that this is the case elsewhere). This should be seen as a rejection
of a communist heritage rather than endorsement of plural citizenship.
Only Lithuania has specifically removed the clause in art. 1 of its 1991
and 1997 citizenship laws that stated, ‘A citizen of the Republic of
Lithuania may not at the same time be citizen [sic] of another state, ex-
cept in cases provided for in this law.’7 In some cases (Latvia, Slovenia)
restrictions on plural citizenship now apply only to those who choose
to naturalise into the citizenship of the country concerned and there-
fore concern immigrants rather than emigrants. Inasmuch as immi-
gration (initially, at least, from the East) may be expected to become an
evermore frequent phenomenon in the new EU states, pressure will
mount to remove these restrictions as well.8
2 Old categories and new principles, or how ethnicity has
trumped other grounds of citizenship
The classic distinction between civic and ethnic conceptions of citizen-
ship, as well as that between citizenship founded upon ius soli and ius
sanguinis, apply to the countries under discussion here too.9 Interest-
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ingly, what might be considered the more enlightened variant of citi-
zenship, civic citizenship (or, at least, a prototype of civic citizenship),
as well as the more progressive principle of membership, ius soli, be-
long to these countries’ past rather than to their present. We may note
in passing that the latter point also applied to Germany before the
1999 citizenship reform that introduced ius soli (see Fahrmeir 1997;
Massfeller 1953).
In the two countries of the area under discussion that have the
strongest state tradition, Poland and Hungary, a medieval conception
of political citizenship prevailed well after it had disappeared else-
where. In both countries, as in some other parts of Europe, the noble
or equestrian estate was seen as constituting the nation, that is, the po-
litically enabled and active part of the population. If ‘citizenship in
Western liberal democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal privi-
lege,’ (Carens 1987: 252) then feudal privilege may well be the medie-
val equivalent of citizenship. The originality of the Polish and Hungar-
ian cases was that this estate, largely made up of the landowning gen-
try or even the landless petty nobility, though still only a small
minority, comprised a far broader section of the overall population than
it did, for example, in Western Europe.10 Here, as in pre-modern Wes-
tern Europe, estate identity overrode linguistic or ethnic criteria. In the
vast multiethnic entities that were the Polish and Hungarian king-
doms, referred to as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the
Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen, social status thus trumped the
multitude of potentially competing blood connections. The Polish
szlachcic (noble or gentleman) was proud to declare himself ‘natione
polonus, gente ruthenus (or lituanus)’ thus affirming that Polish politi-
cal identity was compatible with Ruthenian (that is, Ukrainian, in mod-
ern terms) or Lithuanian primordial ties. As these terms may recall, a
neutral dead language, Latin, was the political lingua franca of this
class well into the eighteenth century in the case of Poland and into
the middle of the nineteenth century in Hungary (Walicki 1994;
Bárány 1990: 201).
Estate membership in Poland and Hungary implied important politi-
cal prerogatives. In Hungary the crown was theoretically elective; in Po-
land it was effectively elective until the disappearance of the Polish
state, the Commonwealth or First Republic, in 1795. The electorate
consisted of the noble estate, making its members citizens in the mod-
ern understanding of the term and imparting dignity to the notion of
political membership.11 In spite of huge disparities of wealth and
power, members of the noble estate cultivated a formal equality to such
an extent that in Poland all titles of nobility were outlawed (Davies
1982: 239ff). In both countries as well as in Bohemia, Diets made up
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of members of the nation met regularly, deliberated vociferously, and
exercised power to various degrees (Schramm 1996).
In Bohemia, the estate system proved weaker and decayed earlier
than in Hungary and Poland. As in these two countries, the estate sys-
tem here did not originally differentiate among ethnic or linguistic
identities, in this case, between Germans and Slavs. It cultivated a Bo-
hemian ‘land patriotism [...] the patriotism of our aristocracy’ (Sayer
1998: 57ff). Only in the wake of the seismic events of 1848, did Bohe-
mian and local identities change into ethnic ones. Bohemians and Bud-
weisers became Czechs or Germans, to quote the title of a recent study
which emphasises that ‘ethnicity was only one form of nationhood
among several in Habsburg Central Europe, yet one that came to domi-
nate the others’ (King 2002: 10). However, in Bohemia, territorial-
based identity remained strong. During the First World War, Thomas
Masaryk originally founded his case for Bohemian independence on
the state rights of the historic Kingdom of Bohemia. He put aside this
argument only when he saw that it did not impress British decision-
makers, indifferent to antiquarian constitutional niceties in countries
other than their own. He also downplayed it as he realised that it did
not further the project of uniting Slovakia to the Czech lands in a fu-
ture Czechoslovak state (Agnew 2000; Galandauer 1993).
The territorial demarcation of political membership, intimately con-
nected to citizenship based on ius soli, was firmly anchored elsewhere
in East Central Europe as well. From the early Middle Ages, the Hun-
garian comitat gave local territorial content to the principle of gentry
self-government (Bak 1990: 66; Holub 1958). After 1848 the comitat
remained a fundamental and prestigious administrative unit. The Pol-
ish Dietines, assemblies of local gentry, were the effective units of gov-
ernment in pre-partition Poland from the fifteenth century to the late
eighteenth century (Davies 1982: 323). Polish exiles after 1830, having
abandoned the now obsolete idea of a Polish gentry nation, defined the
Polish nation in territorial terms, as consisting of all those who lived in
the territory of Poland before the first partition of 1772 (Kukiel 1955;
Liebich 2004). Restoration of the Polish state within these borders was
still the demand of Polish activists at the time of the First World War.12
Finally, until 1918, throughout the whole territory of the Austro-Hun-
garian empire (with the partial exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina), Hei-
matrecht (indigénat, pertinenza), an original form of communal citizen-
ship, was the basic building block of state citizenship (Redlich 1907).
This institution, which deserves the attention of historians of citizen-
ship, appears to have survived unto the present day only in Switzer-
land.13
The Allied and Associated Powers, victors in the First World War,
had fought, purportedly, for the rights of small nations and for the
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principle of national self-determination. Their objective was the crea-
tion of national states, that is, states which were, if not ethnically
homogeneous, at least responsive to the aspirations of ethnic nations
in East Central Europe. In setting down the rules for acquisition of citi-
zenship in the successor states, however the victorious powers resorted
to territorial criteria. Anyone habitually resident (in the case of former
German or Russian territory) or possessing communal Heimatrecht (in
the case of former Austria-Hungary) within the new frontiers of a state
was entitled to that citizenship. The solution did not preclude citizen-
ship conundra for individuals who were not of the majority ‘race and
language’ and who did not possess or could not prove present or past
Heimatrecht in their state of residence – for example, some Hungarians
in Slovakia (Napier 1932). This was perhaps the last time that a territor-
ial principle predominated over ethnic criteria in determining citizen-
ship in the countries with which we are concerned. Henceforth, terri-
toriality, like social status in an earlier period, became a criterion of the
past and ethnicity took the lead in regards to citizenship.
Already in the post-First World War peace treaties the victors were
obliged to make concessions to the principle of ethnicity, at least as an
alternative criterion for the determination of citizenship. The treaties
allowed for a right of citizenship option. In the case of the Treaty of
Versailles with Germany, individuals could determine their citizenship
not only on the basis of habitual residence but also by virtue of their
place of birth, on condition that their parents were domiciled in that
place at the time of their birth. As one commentator stated, ‘it [was]
impossible that there be any question of race or language [italics in ori-
ginal]’ in setting criteria for optants ‘since Poland counts masses of
Jews among its nationals [ressortissants] speaking a special jargon, and
more than one third of the citizens of Czechoslovakia are of the Ger-
man language’ (Brustlein 1922: 35). In fact, race and language were
precisely the criteria applied for the successor states of the Habsburg
empire: Individuals having Heimatrecht anywhere in the former Aus-
tro-Hungary could choose, instead of the citizenship of the state in
which their commune now lay, the citizenship of the state where the
majority of the population was made up of people speaking their lan-
guage and was of their ‘race.’ In a sort of counterpart to the Treaty of
Versailles’ provision that citizenship could also be based on one’s place
of birth in addition to one’s current place of residence, the Treaties of
Saint Germain and Trianon allowed citizenship to be claimed on the
basis of an earlier Heimatrecht just previous to one’s current Heima-
trecht (Subbotitch 1926; Brustlein 1922).
One is tempted to see in the differential dispositions with regard to
Germany and Austria-Hungary an expression of the different percep-
tions of these two countries, Germany being seen as governed by more
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civic and Austria-Hungary by more ethnic considerations. Confirma-
tion of such an approach might be sought in the fact that the Treaty of
Versailles does speak of Czechoslovaks (art. 85) and Poles (art. 91) who
are German nationals but it does not define a Czechoslovak or a Pole,
unlike Trianon and Saint Germain which specifically evoke ‘race and
language.’ It may be simply the logic of Heimatrecht that leads in this
direction. As Heimatrecht replaces birth place and encourages the cult
of a ‘petite patrie’ or a spirit of subjective belonging it may be expected
that Heimatrecht-based citizenship on a state scale would edge away
from a strictly impersonal basis of citizenship, such as birthplace, and
seek out other criteria for belonging.
Since 1918 the prevailing conceptions of identity in all the countries
in question have led them to look toward ethnic criteria in defining
those entitled to citizenship.14 These ethnic criteria do not, as a rule,
appear explicitly in citizenship laws themselves, though they often lin-
ger just beneath the surface. They do appear, however, in Slovenian
and Hungarian citizenship laws where the schedule of residence re-
quirements for naturalisation goes from ten and eight years respec-
tively to one year for ethnics (Kovács and Tóth in this volume; Medved
in this volume). Formally, the governing principle of most citizenship
laws is descent without reference to ethnicity, though in the case of the
Baltic states with a strict time reference. Rules for naturalisation in
these citizenship laws generally follow well-established criteria familiar
to students of citizenship everywhere. The underlying concept of citi-
zenship can be found, notably in ancillary documents, that attempt to
establish a quasi-citizenship or a special connection with co-nationals
abroad. For example, Lithuania’s citizenship law (2002) provides for a
certificate of indefinite ‘retention of the right to citizenship’ for pre
June 1940 Lithuanian citizens as well as ‘persons of Lithuanian des-
cent’ – the term is unspecified – residing abroad.
The most famous recent case of such an attempt at quasi-citizenship
– ‘fuzzy’ citizenship as one scholar has called it – is that of the Hungar-
ian Status Law of 2001 (Fowler 2002). This measure provoked an enor-
mous storm in the states concerned, the countries of the Hungarian
diaspora. The question was examined by international bodies, notably
the Venice Commission and the Council of Europe. The Hungarian
Status Law was finally adopted in significantly modified form, having
served as a reminder of the passions that issues of citizenship can
arouse (see Kántor, Majtenyi, Ieda, Vizi & Halász 2004).
The Hungarian Status Law provides a certain number of advantages
to its beneficiaries. When in Hungary status holders enjoy the same
cultural and educational benefits as Hungarian citizens, as well as sub-
sidised travel, and some social security and health service benefits.
They can work for up to three months a year in Hungary without re-
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striction. The Law provides additional advantages to Hungarian tea-
chers living abroad (not just teachers of Hungarian but those teaching
in Hungarian) and subsidies to families abroad that send their children
to local Hungarian schools. State subsidies are guaranteed for Hungar-
ian-language institutions and for Hungarian community organisations
abroad.
The Hungarian Status Law is not unique. Poland attempted to pro-
mulgate similar legislation but the initiative failed or stalled for bureau-
cratic and internal political reasons.15 Slovenia has adopted a Resolu-
tion on the Position of Autochthonous Slovene Minorities in Neigh-
bouring Countries and the Related Tasks of State and Other
Institutions in the Republic of Slovenia (1996). This mostly concerns
support for Slovene minority organisations abroad; it does not attempt
to define an expatriate Slovene. Slovakia, however, has adopted a full-
fledged Law on Expatriate Slovaks (1997). The beneficiaries can reside
in Slovakia ‘for a long period’ and can be employed – apparently, for an
unlimited period – without working permit and without permanent re-
sidence status. They receive assistance ‘to maintain their Slovak iden-
tity,’ wherever they may be. There is some alleviation of provisions gov-
erning social security contributions and elderly expatriates receive tra-
vel subsidies within Slovakia
Why did the Hungarian status law provoke a storm abroad whereas
there does not appear to have been any such adverse reaction to the
corresponding Slovak law? The answer seems to lie in the respective
definitions of prospective beneficiaries. Significantly, and perhaps para-
doxically, the Slovak law has not caused international concern because
it defines its beneficiaries in ethnic terms whereas the Hungarian law
is vague on ethnic requirements and precise on territorial conditions.
Slovak expatriate status may be granted to an individual without Slo-
vak citizenship who has ‘Slovak nationality or Slovak ethnic origin and
Slovak cultural and language awareness.’ Slovak ethnic origin is ob-
tained if at least one ancestor ‘up to the third generation had Slovak
nationality.’ ‘Cultural and language awareness’ depends on ‘at least pas-
sive knowledge of the Slovak language and basic knowledge of Slovak
culture or declaring himself/herself actively for the Slovak ethnic [sic].’
I do not propose to ponder the ambiguities of the expression ‘declaring
[oneself ] actively for the Slovak ethnic.’ Rather, let me cite, for pur-
poses of comparison, the definition contained in the Hungarian Status
law: ‘This Act shall apply to persons declaring themselves to be of
Hungarian nationality, who are not Hungarian citizens and who have
their residence in the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic or the
Ukraine and who have lost their Hungarian citizenship for reasons
other than voluntary renunciation’ (art. 1.1). Simply declaring oneself to
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be ‘of Hungarian nationality,’ as certified by a recognised Hungarian
community organisation abroad, is sufficient to obtain the ‘Certificate
of Hungarian Nationality’ provided for in the Status Law. Note also that
by referring only to persons of Hungarian nationality rather than Hun-
garian ancestry or descent the Status Law might be seen as thinking in
terms of a state of affairs that disappeared in 1920.
Underlying the difference in reactions provoked by the Hungarian
Status Law and the (non) reaction to the Slovak Expatriate Law, is his-
torical experience. For almost a millennium, Hungary, even when its
own sovereignty was impaired, dominated the Danubian basin and out-
lying areas. All or parts of the countries mentioned in the Status Law
belonged to the Crown of Saint Stephen. For centuries, the Hungarian
nobility – the Hungarian nation in the feudal sense, as we have seen
above – owned and governed these territories. After having long ma-
gyarised local elites, in the nineteenth century the Hungarian state also
launched a sweeping campaign of general Magyarisation. The Slovaks
have been, in contrast, a dominated nation par excellence (dominated,
in fact, by Hungarians). The subjects of the Slovak Expatriate Law are,
above all, Slovak emigrants in America and elsewhere. The law also
concerns Slovaks in the Czech Republic – the largest minority in that
state since the dissolution of Czechoslovakia – as well as the small, and
much assimilated, Slovak minority in Hungary, sometimes invoked by
Bratislava to counter Budapest’s complaints about treatment of the
Hungarian minority in Slovakia.
The overwhelming importance of history in determining reactions to
the respective status and expatriate laws is confirmed by the Polish ex-
ample. Although the project for a Polish Charter for Poles abroad was
not adopted, Poland did promulgate a law on Repatriation of Poles
(2000). I shall deal with other aspects of this law in the following sec-
tion but here let me point out that although the Polish law does dwell
on ethnicity, like the Slovak law, it also has a determining territorial
component, like the Hungarian statute. Interestingly, however, the ter-
ritorial scope of the Polish law is defined in a way to exclude any former
Polish territories. It concerns Poles ‘in the Asian part of the former
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ – that is the three Caucasian Re-
publics, the Asian part of the Russian Federation and the Central Asian
Republics (art. 9:1). The Polish Sejm (Lower House of Parliament) spe-
cifically rejected the Senate’s proposed amendment that repatriation
provisions be extended to Poles in all states of the former socialist
bloc.16 The Repatriation Law thus excludes Ukraine, Byelorussia and
Lithuania, all of which were integrated in the pre-1795 Polish Monarch-
ical Republic or Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita) and parts of which
were still included in the Polish ‘Second Republic,’ i.e. the interwar
Polish state. Although there is a considerable number of Poles in these
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countries and, at least in the case of Byelorussia, they may have not
only economic but serious political reasons for seeking repatriation, Po-
land seems to be bending over backwards to avoid suspicion that it is
thinking in terms of its imperial past or historical boundaries. In the
case of Hungary, there is strong suspicion that this is precisely the
thinking behind the Status Law.17
3 Old wrongs and new rights, or how to use citizenship to
correct history
A peculiarity of the new EU states is that citizenship laws and related
provisions are formulated with the intention of redressing past wrongs.
The compensatory or restitutional function – Wiedergutmachung, in the
literal sense of the term – is particularly strong with respect to the re-
cent communist past, though it extends to earlier periods as well.
The Polish Repatriation Act mentioned above is a prime example of
an attempt at such historical redress. The preamble to the Act begins
by ‘recognising that the duty of the Polish state is to allow the repatria-
tion of Poles who had remained in the East […] due to deportations, ex-
ile and other ethnically motivated forms of persecution.’ Repatriates
enjoy significant benefits. They acquire Polish citizenship on the day
they cross the Polish border (art. 4). Their costs of resettlement are un-
derwritten by the Polish state.
Repatriates are of ‘Polish extraction [and] declaring Polish national-
ity.’ Polish extraction is defined as having at least one parent or grand-
parent or two great grandparents who held Polish citizenship or who
cultivated ‘Polish traditions and customs’ (art. 5). Polish nationality is
ascertained by demonstrating ‘links with Polish provenance, in particu-
lar by cultivating Polish language, traditions, and customs.’ Knowledge
of Polish is, obviously, an advantage but it is not a requirement to the
same degree as ‘traditions and customs’ since the latter suffice to con-
firm the Polish nationality of one’s forbearers. These traditions and
customs remain undefined, allowing wide latitude for consular officials
who, according to the law, decide whether an individual meets criteria
for repatriation. One supposes that some of the most evocative tradi-
tions for the vast majority of today’s Polish population would be reli-
gious; for example, celebration of Christmas in the Polish style. This
might encompass non-Catholic Christian Poles and even non believers
but it would exclude members of other faiths, such as observant Jews.
In spite of what one might expect from the preamble and spirit of
the law, proof of deportation, forced exile or persecution are not condi-
tions for obtaining repatriate status. The law also covers, perhaps inad-
vertently, those individuals (and their descendants) who emigrated will-
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ingly to some of the peripheries of the Russian Empire or of the USSR;
for example, as employees in Siberian development projects or in the
military or civil service of the Russian or Soviet state.18 The primary
target of the law, however, are those families who were deported in
1939-1940 from Soviet-occupied Eastern Poland (even though these
areas are no longer part of Poland) as well as earlier exiles and depor-
tees; members of the Polish minority in the USSR transferred in the
Stalinist era to areas far from the Polish border; Polish nationalists and
revolutionaries exiled under the tsar, especially after the 1905 Revolu-
tion in the Russian Empire and the 1863 Insurrection in the Polish
and Lithuanian lands, but perhaps even earlier and under other cir-
cumstances. The number of persons concerned by the Repatriation Act
is insignificant: in the three years preceding the adoption of the Act
fewer than 2000 people were repatriated from the East – this includes
some 200 non-Polish spouses who do not benefit from a repatriation
visa but who are treated like foreign spouses of Polish citizens and
thus granted temporary residence permits. The symbolic significance
of the Act as an affirmation that conferral of citizenship may be used
to right the wrongs of history is enormous.
Although attempts to replace the communist-era Polish citizenship
law (1962) bogged down in legislative paralysis, the bill proposed by
the Sejm to the Senate in 2000 gives further insight into the hypoth-
esis formulated above regarding the objective of righting historical
wrongs through citizenship law.19
According to the proposed bill, the President may confer Polish citi-
zenship, upon his or her own decision, on foreigners who did military
service during the 1939-1945 war in the Polish Army or in Polish mili-
tary formations attached to Allied forces on all fronts or who served in
Polish underground formations and organisations, including those in
partisan units attached to such organisations. These individuals do not
need to have possessed Polish citizenship in the past (arts. 17.1.1;
17.1.2; 17.2). The bill also provides for restitution of citizenship, without
presidential intervention and simply on the basis of a declaration be-
fore a consular official within a specified time period, for some indivi-
duals who left Poland between 1 September 1939 and 4 June 1989 –
the latter date being identified as the beginning of the end of Commu-
nist rule. Those reinstated include individuals who, in order to leave
Poland, were forced to renounce their citizenship under threat of ‘re-
pressions and chicaneries,’ including arrest, loss of work or dwelling,
expulsion from schools including universities (art. 28.1.1.b). The speci-
fic victims of Communist persecution covered in this provision would
seem to be, above all, those students, intellectuals and others purged
as ‘Zionists’ in 1968. Reinstatement is not granted to those who left
Poland voluntarily on the basis of a declaration that they belonged to a
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non-Polish ethnic group and who ‘obtained the citizenship of the na-
tive country of their nationality’ (art. 28.2.4.). This provision is aimed
at preventing ethnic Germans or others from benefiting from the rein-
statement granted to the victims of the 1968 purges. Finally, the bill of-
fers restitution of citizenship to those who had lost it by enlisting in
the Armed Forces of Great Britain, the USA or France after (!) 9 May
1945. In a sense, the bill appears to be saying that Poland – the real Po-
land which is now able to express itself – had not taken a stand against
its wartime allies during the Cold War.
The Czech Republic, also keen to underline and correct the injus-
tices of the communist era, adopted restitution laws. The Law on the
Citizenship of Some Former Czechoslovak Citizens (1999) opens with
the following, somewhat grandiose declaration:
‘Parliament, in order to assuage the legacy of certain wrongs that oc-
curred in the period 1948 to 1989, and realising that Czechs and com-
patriots living abroad contribute to maintaining and cultivating the na-
tional cultural heritage as well as to deepening ties of common belong-
ing with the Czech Republic and realising that Czech emigrants
developed, in exile, notable spiritual, political and cultural activity in fa-
vour of renewal of freedom and democracy in its homeland and that
this activity deserves extraordinary recognition’.
In fact, however, the law benefits all individuals and their descen-
dants who lost their Czechoslovak citizenship during this period for
whatever reason, including by virtue of the prohibition on plural citi-
zenship in Czechoslovakia or by virtue of naturalisation in a state that
prohibited dual citizenship but, presumably, no longer prohibits it.
Restitution of citizenship here may thus be seen as a favour or as a sort
of citizenship-amnesty offered to all Czechs, whatever the circum-
stances of their loss of citizenship. The law did have a cut off period
which expired in 2004 but there is now some question of prolonging
it (Seitlová 2005: 11). With regard to the numerically significant and
politically vocal Czech-American lobby, the bilateral convention dating
back to 1928 between the United States and Czechoslovakia prohibit-
ing dual citizenship had already been invalidated by a Government De-
cree in 1997, without reference to the 1993 Czech Citizenship Law arti-
cle (art. 17) prohibiting dual citizenship in general. In practical terms
the 1999 law on former Czechslovak citizens would therefore be super-
fluous for this important group. This law, as well as other legal disposi-
tions, takes care to include some categories of Slovaks among its bene-
ficiaries and dual Czech and Slovak citizenship is authorised, again as
an exception to a general prohibition. One could argue, however, that
such provisions are no longer prompted by considerations of historical
justice but, rather, amount to housecleaning operations dealing with
some of the messy aspects of the Czech-Slovak divorce.
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In the case of the Baltic States, the very re-emergence of these coun-
tries is itself seen as a redress for historical injustice. Naturally, citizen-
ship laws also serve the purpose here of correcting past iniquities and
they do so largely by legally abolishing the time period during which
injustice was perpetrated. The Estonian Nationality Law (1995) does
not mention dates but this does not mean that it is neutral with regard
to them. At the time of registration for Estonian citizenship in 1989,
only those individuals had an a priori legal claim to citizenship who
were themselves, or one of whose forbears was, an Estonian citizen on
16 June 1940, the date of the Soviet ultimatum leading to occupation.
In accordance with the thesis on state continuity, in 1992 the Estonian
Parliament voted to re-apply the Citizenship Act of 1938, as amended
up to 16 June 1940 (Thiele 2002). The latter qualification deprived a
number of resident non-Estonian nationals of eligibility for facilitated
naturalisation. Like certain other countries, Estonia specifically states
that it will not grant or restore citizenship to those who have acted
against the interests of the state (art. 21.3). Independently of this provi-
sion, the Estonian law also denies citizenship to individuals and
spouses of individuals who entered Estonia ‘in conjunction with the as-
signment of military personnel into active service, the reserve forces or
retirement’ (art. 21.6). An exception is made in the law for individuals
who have retired from the armed forces of a foreign state and have
been married for at least five years (and are still married) to a natural
born Estonian citizen. (One wonders how many such cases there may
be). Apparently, historical injustices may be righted not only by confer-
ring citizenship but also by denying it.
Latvia’s Citizenship Law (1994) also identifies citizens, in the first
instance, as those who were citizens on 17 June 1940 and their descen-
dants, unless they had become citizens of another state after 4 May
1990 (art. 2.1). Naturalisation by Latvians abroad during the period of
occupation is thus distinguished from naturalisation since the re-acqui-
sition of independence. This is in accordance with the idea that since
the occupation was illegal no change of a citizen’s legal status could oc-
cur in that period and thus those who were citizens in 1940 continued
to be citizens in 1990, whatever they had done in the meantime. The
law also considers as citizens women and their descendants who lost
Latvian citizenship by virtue of a law of 1919 concerning women who
married foreigners. This provision too, variants of which may be found
in other citizenship laws, represents the correction of a historical injus-
tice, though one not related to communist rule. Restrictions on who
can obtain Latvian citizenship are more severe in some respects than
those in Estonia. Citizenship will not be granted to those whom courts
have identified as propagating, after 4 May 1990, racist or totalitarian
ideas, the latter comprising communist ideas, as well as those who,
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after 13 January 1991, acted against the Republic of Latvia through par-
ticipation in the Communist Party (CPSU [LCP]) or front organisa-
tions, including the Organisation of War and Labour Veterans. In Lat-
via neither retired Soviet military and police personnel, though only
those who came to Latvia directly after demobilisation, nor former em-
ployees or even informants of the Soviet security services are eligible
for citizenship. Unlike Estonia, military personnel who came to Latvia
on active service, as well as their spouses, do not seem to be ineligible
for naturalisation. Brief mention is made of persons who entered Lat-
via in accordance with the Mutual Assistance Pact between Latvia and
the USSR of 5 October 1939, the follow-up to the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact, but this only seems to exclude the possibility of exceptional rather
than regular naturalisation (art. 13.1.3).
Lithuania adopted the most liberal policies of naturalisation among
the Baltic States. All persons who had been resident for at least ten
years in the Soviet Republic of Lithuania before November 1989 could
opt for citizenship within two years. Nevertheless, even the most recent
Lithuanian Citizenship Law (2002) begins by defining a first category
of citizens resident in Lithuania who held citizenship before 15 June
1940 and their descendants.20 The aim of historical redress comes
through in an article (14.2) granting easier conditions for naturalisation
to deportees or political prisoners who married Lithuanian citizens as
well as to their children born in exile. Individuals married to a
Lithuanian citizen and residing in Lithuania already enjoy facilitated
naturalisation (art. 14.1). In this case, naturalisation is facilitated even
further by shortening the period of residence from five to three years.
Here too legislators cannot resist introducing historical memory into
citizenship law.
4 Conclusions
In concluding an article a few years ago on plural citizenship in post-
communist states, I wrote that citizenship law was in flux (Liebich
2000). In fact, over the last decade it has remained more stable than
one might have thought. In the near future, however, one can perhaps
cautiously predict a peculiar new pattern of interaction between the old
and the new. Citizenship laws, founded on historical concerns about
statehood, ethnicity and past injustices, as well as the societies that
have made these laws their own, will have to confront new realities de-
fined by mobility, immigration and social heterogeneity. One can there-
fore expect the ‘old’ and the ‘new,’ as categories of analysis, to continue
providing a suitable template for understanding citizenship issues in
East Central Europe.
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Annex 1: Continuous statehood among old and new EU Member
States


























Explanatory note: in cases of interrupted or restored statehood, years in
italics indicate the first acquisition of statehood.
Annex 2: Constitutional preambles (extracts)
Czech Republic (1993) We, the citizens of the Czech Republic in Bohe-
mia, Moravia, and Silesia, at the time of the renewal of an independent
Czech state, being loyal to all good traditions of the ancient statehood
of Czech Crown’s Lands and the Czechoslovak State.
Estonia (1992) Unwavering in their faith and with an unswerving will
to safeguard and develop a state which is established on the inextin-
guishable right of the Estonian people to national self-determination
and which was proclaimed on February 24, 1918 […] which shall guar-
antee the preservation of the Estonian nation and its culture through-
out the ages, the Estonian people adopted, on the basis of art. 1 of the
Constitution which entered into force in 1938, by Referendum held on
June 28, 1992 the following Constitution.
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Hungary (2003) In order to facilitate a peaceful political transition to a
constitutional state, establish a multi-party system, parliamentary de-
mocracy and a social market economy, the Parliament of the Republic
of Hungary hereby establishes the following text as the Constitution of
the Republic of Hungary, until the country’s new Constitution is
adopted.
Latvia (1990)* The independent state of Latvia, founded on 18 Novem-
ber 1918, was granted international recognition in 1920 and became a
member of the League of Nations in 1921. The Latvian Nation’s right to
self-determination was implemented in April 1920, when the people of
Latvia gave their mandate to the Constituent Assembly chosen by uni-
versal, equal, direct and proportional elections. In February 1922, the
Assembly adopted the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, which is
still in effect de iure.
*Declaration on the Renewal of Independence.
Lithuania (1992) The Lithuanian Nation having established the State
of Lithuania many centuries ago […] having for centuries defended its
freedom and independence […] having preserved its spirit, native lan-
guage, writing, and customs.
Poland (1997) Recalling the best traditions of the First and the Second
Republic […] Obliged to bequeath to future generations all that is valu-
able from our over one thousand years’ heritage, bound in community
with our compatriots dispersed throughout the world.
Slovakia (1992) mindful of the political and cultural heritage of our
forebears, and of the centuries of experience from the struggle for na-
tional existence and our own statehood, in the sense of the spiritual
heritage of Cyril and Methodius and the historical legacy of the Great
Moravian Empire.
Slovenia (1991) [Proceeding …] from the historical fact that in a centu-
ries-long struggle for national liberation we Slovenes have established
our national identity and asserted our statehood.
Annex 3: Provisions on plural citizenship
Czech Republic (1992)
art. 7.1.b [citizenship by conferment (= naturalisation) for persons who]
can prove that they were released from citizenship of another state, or
INTRODUCTION 33
will by gaining citizenship of the Czech Republic lose their previous
foreign citizenship, unless the persons concerned are stateless.
art. 17 Citizens of the Czech Republic shall lose citizenship of the
Czech Republic instantly upon gaining at own request foreign citizen-
ship, with the exception of cases of gaining foreign citizenship in con-
nection with entering into marriage, or birth.
Estonia (1995)
art. 1.2 An Estonian citizen may not simultaneously be the citizen of
another country.
art. 3 Any person who by birth in addition to Estonian citizenship ac-
quires citizenship of another state must within three years after attain-
ing the age of eighteen years renounce either Estonian citizenship or
citizenship of another state.
art. 5.2 No person may be deprived of Estonian citizenship acquired by
birth.
Hungary (1993)
art. 2.2 The Hungarian citizen who is simultaneously a citizen of an-
other state – if law shall not regulate contrarily – is considered to be a
Hungarian citizen in the application of Hungarian law.
Latvia (1994)
art. 9.1 The granting of Latvian citizenship to a person shall not lead to
dual citizenship.
art. 9.2 If a citizen of Latvia simultaneously can be considered a citizen
(subject) of a foreign country in accordance with the laws of that coun-
try, then the citizen shall be considered solely a citizen of Latvia in his
or her legal relations with the Republic of Latvia.
Lithuania (2002)
art. 12.1.5. [person may be granted citizenship if …] is a stateless person
or is a citizen of a state under the laws of which he loses citizenship of
the said state upon acquiring citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania
and notifies in writing of his decision to renounce citizenship of an-
other state.
art. 18.1.2 Citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania shall be lost upon
acquisition of citizenship of another state.
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Poland (1962)
art. 2 A person who is a Polish citizen under Polish law cannot be re-
cognised at the same time as a citizen of another state.
art. 8.3 Granting Polish citizenship may be dependant on submitting
evidence of loss of or release from foreign citizenship.
Slovakia (1993)
art. 7.2.b The following is in favour of a person requesting the grant of
citizenship of the Slovak Republic [...] [if the person] can prove, that un-
der the law of the state of which this person is a citizen, this person
has lawfully renounced his or her citizenship.
art. 9.1 The citizenship of the Slovak Republic can be lost only at own
request.
Slovenia (1991)
art. 2 The citizen of the Republic of Slovenia, being as well the citizen
of a foreign country, is treated as a citizen of the Republic of Slovenia,
while being in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, unless other-
wise stated by an international agreement.
art. 10.2 [a person can obtain citizenship] when he or she is dismissed
from previous citizenship or is certain to obtain such a dismissal when
obtaining the citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia.
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Annex 4: Federalism and regional autonomies in old and new EU
Member States





































1 My thanks to Andrea Baršová and Piotr Koryś for their help and comments.
2 As Priit Järve put it at the 2005 Vienna workshop Citizenship in the new Member
States and Turkey, Estonian citizenship is practically a genetic determinant, an innate
trait that cannot be removed (see also Järve in this volume). Apparently, Estonia has
not followed the reasoning of the Czech Constitutional Court which distinguished
between ‘deprivation of nationality’ and ‘loss of nationality’ (Baršová in this volume).
36 ANDRE LIEBICH
3 Efforts to adopt a new law have failed in part because of the litigious issues of plural
citizenship. The official Polish position is explained in the following tortured terms:
‘Polish law does not recognize dual citizenship of its citizens. While Polish law does
not forbid Polish citizens from becoming the citizen [sic] of a foreign state, that
citizen will lose their [sic] Polish citizenship once approval has been granted by the
proper Polish authorities’ (Consulate General of the Republic of Poland, Los Angeles.
pan.net/konsulat/law/dualct.htm; also see Górny, Grzymała-Kazłowska, Koryś &
Weinar 2003). With respect to loss of Polish nationality, the 1962 law was amended
in 1998 to remove the provision that ‘the acquisition of a foreign citizenship
automatically results in the loss of Polish citizenship’ (Dziennik Ustaw [Register of
Laws and Statutes] 106, 17 August 1998).
4 The proposition that ethnic Hungarians abroad should also enjoy Hungarian
citizenship, without any reservations about their other citizenship status and without
any residence requirement in Hungary, was only narrowly defeated in a December
2004 referendum. The issue is discussed in Kovács & Tóth (in this volume).
5 Austrian and Hungarian citizenship laws (the legal regimes were entirely separate,
there was no Austro-Hungarian citizenship) did not require candidates for
naturalisation to prove that they had lost their previous nationality but, as of 1870,
they did require such proof for Hungarians seeking to become Austrians and vice
versa (Soubbotitch 1926: 15).
6 Bauböck (2005) has suggested that claims to transnational or plural citizenship are
weaker where a minority enjoys significant political autonomy, such as that obtained
in a federal state.
7 The authorisation of plural citizenship applies only to those (and their descendants)
still resident in Lithuania who held Lithuanian citizenship before 15 June1940 as
well as persons who are of Lithuanian descent and who consider themselves
Lithuanian (Lithuanian Nationality Act, art. 18.1.2). More on this in section 3 below.
8 Extension of authorised cases of plural citizenship is under discussion in the Czech
Republic (Baršová 2003). I imagine that similar discussions are going on in other
countries. I have not researched popular attitudes towards plural citizenship but
these appear to be differentiated. In the, already complex, case of Poland, ‘the
negative attitude towards dual citizenship in Poland does not extend to persons
whose second citizenship is other than German’ (Kamusella 2003: 709).
9 I take the point that the civic-West/ethnic-East stereotype ‘when true is only weakly
true, and according to several measures is false’ (Shulman 2002: 554). With respect
to conceptions of citizenship, however, the civic/ethnic distinction seems to me a
useful heuristic device in tracing a historical evolution.
10 In Poland, 11-13 per cent of the population belonged to the equestrian estate in the
sixteenth century, 9-10 per cent in the eighteenth century. In France under the July
Monarchy (1830-1848), 1.5 per cent of the population was enfranchised. In Britain
the corresponding figure at that time (1828) was 3.2 per cent. Figures cited by
Walicki (1982: 16). In Hungary, the gentry numbered 3-5 per cent of the population
by the fifteenth century (Engel 1990: 43).
11 The Polish Constitution of 1791, celebrated as the first modern European
constitution (it beat the French Constitution by a few months), even while abolishing
its exclusive political privileges still paid homage to the ‘Nobility, or the Equestrian
Order’ stating (art. II): ‘It is in this order that we repose the defence of our liberties
and the present constitution: it is to their virtue, valour, honour, and patriotism, we
recommend its dignity to venerate, and its stability to defend, as the only bulwark of
our liberty and existence.’
12 According to Soubbotitch (1926: 55), many (unnamed) Polish jurists argued that
Poland had never ceased to exist because the partitions were in fact occupations. The
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analogy with present-day Baltic positions is striking (see section 3 below). I have not
found examples of such Polish arguments but their existence is confirmed, a contra-
rio, through a vehement attack on such arguments by Schätzel (1921).
13 A recent reference source refers to indigénat as ‘a second-degree nationality preserved
by nationals of a federal entity’ – which neither Hungary nor Austria ever was – and
describes it as ‘vieilli’ or archaic (Salmon 2001). Even today, however, to ‘be a Swiss
citizen implies a cantonal indigénat and a communal citizenship. The three levels are
inseparable. No one can be a national (ressortissant) of a canton without communal ci-
tizenship or Swiss without a cantonal indigénat’ (etat.geneve.ch). The same document
refers to ‘nationalité (indigénat) genevoise.’ In addition to a droit de cité communal
there is also a concept in some localities of bourgeoisie communale that implies a co-
proprietorship of communal assets.
14 The main remnants of ius soli are to be found in standard international provisions
regarding children born in the territory of the state who would otherwise remain
stateless. Even so, Latvia only adopted such provisions in 1998, restricting them to
children born on Latvian territory after 21 August 1991, the date of the Moscow coup
that might be seen as the last gasp of the USSR. It might be noted that Latvia has
maintained an element of ius soli in qualifying the principle of citizenship by
descent with the provision that if only one parent is a Lativan citizen the child must
be born in Latvia or the responsible parent must be permanently resident in Latvia
for the child to qualify as Latvian.
15 Text available at www.senat.gov.pl.
16 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ‘Polish Repatriation to Focus ‘‘Mainly’’ on
Compatriots from Kazakhstan’, Daily Report, 9 November 2000.
17 Countering the claim that Hungary defines the scope of its Status Law in terms of
its historic boundaries, one might note that the Status Law does not extend to
Austria, though part of historic Hungary today lies within Austria. This exception is
not sufficient to alleviate suspicions. In fact, it nourishes other grounds for
resentment: the Status Law does not cover Austria because one of the tacit intentions
of the Law is to minimise the effects for expatriate Hungarians of Hungary’s entry
into the EU. The resulting inequality of status for citizens of Romania, Ukraine etc.
was one of the principal grounds for international reservations vis-à-vis the law.
18 Some such individuals would be covered by the provision that repatriation cannot be
offered to anyone who ‘during their stay outside the Republic of Poland acted against
the vital interests of the Republic of Poland or participated or participate in human
rights violations’ (arts. 8.3 a and b). The law also excludes those who repatriated from
Poland between 1944 and 1957 to some Soviet Republics. Presumably, however,
descendants of all these individuals are still eligible for repatriation if they meet
other requirements.
19 Ustawa z dnia 29 czerwca 2000 r. o obywatelstwie polskim, Tekst ustawy przekazany
do Senatu zgodnie z art. 48 regulaminu Sejmu (nie zakończony proces legislacyjny)
[Statute of 29 June 2000 regarding Polish citizenship, text of statute transmitteed to
Senate according to article 48 of the Senate Regulation (uncompleted legislative
process)]. ks.sejm.gov.pl.
20 The 2002 law qualifies this category by adding, ‘providing [they] did not repatriate.’
The 1991 law is clearer stating ‘unless [they] repatriated from Lithuania.’ I would
take this to mean that only individuals in this category who continue to reside in
Lithuania are covered. This would be confirmed by the following clause in both laws
that declares as Lithuanians those who ‘permanently resided in the present day
territory of the Republic of Lithuania from 9 January 1919 to 15 June 1940’ as well as
their descendants and those who otherwise would be stateless.
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Part I: Restored states

Chapter 1: Estonian citizenship: Between ethnic
preferences and democratic obligations
Priit Järve
The most important reform in the nationality policy of Estonia after
1945 was the restoration of the pre-1940 nationality in 1992 by reintro-
ducing the 1938 Citizenship Act with slight changes. In 1995, Estonia
adopted a new Citizenship Act which did not change the basic princi-
ples of the acquisition and loss of Estonian nationality but established
more demanding requirements for the acquisition of nationality by nat-
uralisation.
1.1 History of Estonian nationality
1.1.1 Nationality policy since 1945
The Republic of Estonia was established in 1918. In 1940, it was an-
nexed to the Soviet Union as the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic un-
der threat of military force. As a result, the citizens of the Republic of
Estonia were incorporated into the Soviet citizenry. Estonian nationality
was replaced by Soviet nationality. Between 1941 and 1944, Estonia
was occupied by Nazi Germany. In 1944, Estonia was re-conquered by
the Red Army, and Soviet nationality was once again imposed upon
the people on its territory. Estonian nationality ceased to exist de facto.1
Instead, the Soviet passports, which were issued in Estonia after the
Second World War, included a mandatory line with ethnic identifica-
tion of the carrier. ‘Estonian’ became one of such identifications to be
used in Soviet internal passports (Soviet passports for travel abroad did
not mention ethnicity). In Estonia, differently from many internal re-
gions of the USSR, all persons were issued Soviet internal passports
upon reaching the age of sixteen. These passports, not valid for travel
abroad, gave the holders relative freedom of travel within the Soviet
Union. The authorities stamped the carrier’s domicile registration (pro-
piska) and marital status into the passport.
The Soviet Union sought to merge the different ethnic nations and
groups living in the country into a new civic identity – the Soviet peo-
ple. While the Soviet authorities claimed that such an identity was
emerging, and a certain number of citizens reported that they already
regarded themselves as ‘Soviets’, the official registration of different
ethnic identities was not discarded. Thus, Estonians had the inscription
‘Estonian’ in their passports until the dissolution of the Soviet Union2,
though, this inscription could not be automatically converted into Esto-
nian nationality after independence. Since 1992, only pre-1940 na-
tionals and their descendants, regardless of their ethnic identification,
were entitled to acquire Estonian nationality by registration. Those Es-
tonians who settled in Estonia after 1940 and their descendants (with
‘Estonian’ in their Soviet passports) could not acquire Estonian nation-
ality by simple registration but had to take the path of naturalisation.
At the same time, pre-1940 nationals and their descendants of non-Es-
tonian ethnic origin (with ‘Jew’, ‘Russian’, ‘Latvian’, ‘Pole’, etc. in their
Soviet passports) could acquire Estonian nationality by registration. In
new Estonian passports the registration of ethnic identity was dropped.
The debate on nationality between liberal and conservative camps
started in Estonia at the end of the 1980s when the national indepen-
dence movement was gathering momentum. In 1989, the campaign of
registering the citizens of the pre-war Republic of Estonia and their
descendants was carried out by the Estonian Citizens’ Committees, vo-
luntary associations established during the perestroika era to sustain the
idea of the legal continuity of the pre-war Estonian state. On the posi-
tive side, this campaign helped restore the awareness of the link be-
tween the individual and the state. At the same time, being led by na-
tional conservatives, it firmly introduced the exclusive approach to-
wards Estonian nationality. The conservatives pointed at drastic
changes in the ethnic composition of the population of Estonia due to
a considerable influx of Russian-speaking immigrants under the Soviet
regime. These settlers had pushed the share of non-Estonians in the
population up from around 10 per cent in 1940 to unprecedented 38.5
per cent in 1989.
In 1992 the conservatives emerged as winners in the debate on na-
tionality. As a result, the Citizenship Act of 1992 was based on the
principle of the restitution of the pre-1940 nationality. Only those who
were citizens in 1940 and their descendants (regardless of ethnicity)
were granted Estonian nationality by registration, those who settled in
Estonia after 1940 were offered the possibility of becoming Estonian
nationals through naturalisation. As an immediate consequence of this
Act the majority of non-Estonians as well as a small number of Esto-
nians were not granted the right to participate in the national referen-
dum on the country’s new Constitution in 1992 and in the first parlia-
mentary elections after independence later the same year. Estonia’s
new political leadership considered the great number of non-Estonian
settlers as a threat to the nation. Under these conditions nationality be-
came an instrument for the attainment of national homogeneity and
for the political containment of Soviet era settlers. The interests of the
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Estonian ethnic nation, as then understood, were given priority over
full democratic participation.
In Estonia these exclusionary policies enjoyed relatively wide support
as a reaction to the changes in the ethnic composition of population. A
survey of public opinion, carried out in the Baltic States in 1993,
showed that the principle of limiting nationality to descendants of the
pre-1940 citizens was supported by 44 per cent of Estonian, 52 per
cent of Latvian and twelve per cent of Lithuanian respondents (Rose &
Maley 1994: 31-34). These differences among the Baltic respondents
correlated very clearly with the demographics of the respective coun-
tries: the bigger the share of non-titular groups in a given state, the
stronger the reluctance to let them participate in political life.
The restoration of pre-1940 nationality had profound political conse-
quences. The exclusion of the majority of non-Estonians from the for-
mation of state institutions and from the process of adoption of crucial
legal documents, including the Constitution, enabled Estonians to en-
trench themselves firmly in all commanding posts of the state avoiding
power-sharing with minorities. At the referendum on independence in
Estonia in March 1991 there were 1,144,309 persons with the right to
vote. At the referendum on the Estonian Constitution in summer
1992, after the adoption of the first Citizenship Act, the reported num-
ber of eligible voters was 689,319, or only about 60 per cent of the
1991 figure. Consequently, 454,990 adults had been disenfranchised
(Semjonov 2000: 15). It was therefore not surprising that the Parlia-
ment elected in 1992 was 100 per cent Estonian.
The restoration of pre-1940 nationality caused mass statelessness of
non-Estonians, which harmed the relations between different ethnic
communities inside Estonia, caused tension in the relations with Rus-
sia (the absolute majority of non-citizens were Russians), and evoked
criticism, usually disguised as ‘recommendations’, from prominent in-
ternational and regional organisations such as the United Nations, the
OSCE, the Council of Europe and the European Union.
Between 1992 and 2005 the share of stateless residents in the popu-
lation of Estonia declined from 32 to 10.4 per cent (see Figure 1.1).
However, the inability and/or the lack of motivation of older cohorts of
non-citizens to master the Estonian language at the necessary level
raises doubts that the problem of statelessness will be easily overcome
in the near future if the conditions of naturalisation remain the same.
1.1.2 Restoration of Estonian nationality3
On 26 February 1992, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia
put the version of 16 June 1940 of the Citizenship Act of 1938 into
force. The main features of this nationality regulation were the ius san-
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guinis principle and the avoidance of dual nationality. Pursuant to art.
3 of this Law, every person who possessed or whose parents possessed
Estonian nationality before 16 June 1940 – the day of the Soviet ulti-
matum followed by the annexation of Estonia – had a legal claim to Es-
tonian nationality. About 80,000 non-Estonians thereby acquired Esto-
nian nationality.
Russians and others who came to Estonia after 16 June 1940, all in
all almost one third of the entire population in 1992, were automati-
cally excluded from Estonian nationality. In essence they were mostly
immigrant workers but perceived by many as colonial settlers with no
right to automatic acquisition of Estonian nationality. Their only way to
acquire Estonian nationality was through naturalisation. As a precondi-
tion for naturalisation the applicant had to have his or her permanent
place of residence in the Estonian territory (as proved by propiska) for
at least two years before and one year after the day of application (resi-
dence census ‘two plus one’) and had to prove their knowledge of the
Estonian language. The earliest date for establishing the permanent
place of residence was set at 30 March 1990. The required time period
was counted only from that day onwards, so that 30 March 1993 was
the earliest date when one could acquire Estonian nationality by natur-
alisation. Thus a large part of the population, especially Russians, did
not have the right to vote or the right to be elected in the parliamentary
election of 20 September 1992 and were therefore excluded from poli-
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Figure 1.1: Estonian citizens and stateless persons in Estonia, 1992-1.5.2005, per cent of
the whole population
Source: Estonian Ministry of the Interior and Statistical Office of Estonia
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already strained. These tensions were somewhat eased by the right of
non-citizens to vote at the local elections after 1996.
After some changes in the 1992 Citizenship Act a new Citizenship
Act was passed on 19 January 1995 and entered into force on 1 April
1995.4 The new Act integrated all regulations on nationality and intro-
duced some new conditions for naturalisation (residence in Estonia on
the basis of a permanent residence permit issued at least five years
prior to the date of written application for Estonian nationality and at
least one year after the registration of the written application; and a test
on the knowledge of the Estonian Constitution and the Citizenship
Act).
According to the initial version of the 1995 Citizenship Act, children
of stateless parents born in Estonia could not acquire Estonian nation-
ality after birth. This was in violation of the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights (art. 24(3)) and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (art. 7(1)), both of which Estonia had ratified. These provi-
sions proclaim the right of the child to acquire a nationality. This con-
troversy triggered a heated discussion. Some politicians and lawmakers
saw a danger of compromising the governing principle of nationality
acquisition (ius sanguinis) by adding the ius soli principle to it.
After political and academic debates, in which the role of recommen-
dations issued by international actors should not be underestimated,
an amendment to the Citizenship Act was finally adopted in December
1998, which entered into force on 12 July 1999. Pursuant to this
amendment, children under the age of fifteen born on Estonian terri-
tory after 26 February 1992 can acquire the Estonian nationality on the
basis of a declaration if their parents are stateless and have been legal
residents of Estonia during the previous five years. This new regulation
did not include children between the ages of fifteen and eighteen who
are under the protection of art. 1 of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and children born before 26 February 1992. Thiele (1999) ar-
gues that this domestic regulation was not fully in line with Estonia’s
international obligations.
Some changes in the legislation on nationality have made the natur-
alisation process easier for certain groups of applicants. For example,
in June 2002, the Estonian Parliament adopted amendments to the Ci-
tizenship Act, which created special conditions for acquisition of Esto-
nian nationality through naturalisation by persons with severe or mod-
erate disabilities (such as a visual, hearing or speech impairment). Dis-
abled persons who have appropriate medical certificates are not obliged
to pass exams on knowledge of the language or of the Estonian Consti-
tution and the Citizenship Act. There are also other measures being ta-
ken to facilitate naturalisation such as a more generous reimbursement
of the costs of language studies, or recognition of Estonian language
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and Civics exams taken by students of Russian-language schools, as va-
lid for naturalisation.
1.2 Basic principles of the most important current modes of
acquisition and loss of nationality
The basic principles of Estonian nationality are stipulated in art. 8 of
the Constitution as follows: every child with at least one parent who is
an Estonian national shall have the right, by birth, to Estonian nation-
ality; any person who as a minor lost his or her Estonian nationality
shall have the right to have his or her nationality restored; no person
may be deprived of Estonian nationality acquired by birth; no person
may be deprived of Estonian nationality because of his or her beliefs.
As further specified by art. 8, the conditions and procedures for the ac-
quisition, loss and restoration of Estonian nationality shall be estab-
lished by the Citizenship Act. The basic constitutional principles of na-
tionality are reiterated in arts. 5(1), 16(1), 28(3) and 28(2) of the 1995
Citizenship Act respectively.
1.2.1 Acquisition of nationality
Acquisition of Estonian nationality is stipulated by Chapters 2 and 3
(arts. 5 through 15) of the 1995 Citizenship Act. This includes acquisi-
tion of nationality by birth, by naturalisation and for achievements of
special merit. Nationality by naturalisation and for achievements of
special merit shall be granted by a decision of the Estonian Govern-
ment.
According to art. 5, nationality is acquired by birth if at least one of
the child’s parents holds Estonian nationality at the time of the child’s
birth. Nationality is also acquired by birth if the child is born after the
death of his or her father and if the father held Estonian nationality at
the time of his death. If a child of unknown parents is found in Esto-
nia, a court can declare that the child has acquired Estonian nationality
by birth upon application by the guardian of the child or a guardian-
ship authority, unless the child is proved to be a citizen of another
state. According to art. 5, nobody shall be deprived of Estonian nation-
ality acquired by birth.
Arts. 6 through 15 establish conditions for acquisition of Estonian
nationality by naturalisation and for achievements of special merit. The
conditions for acquisition of nationality by naturalisation differ depend-
ing on whether a person is at least fifteen years of age, or under that
age.
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An alien5 who is at least fifteen years of age and wishes to acquire
Estonian nationality by naturalisation shall have stayed in Estonia on
the basis of a permanent residence permit for at least five years prior
to the date on which he or she submits an application for Estonian na-
tionality and for one year from the day following the date of registra-
tion of the application. Additionally, he or she must have knowledge of
the Estonian language and of the Constitution of the Republic of Esto-
nia and the Citizenship Act. In accordance with the requirements pro-
vided for in this Act he or she must also have a permanent legal in-
come which ensures his or her own subsistence and that of his or her
dependants, be loyal to the Estonian state, and take the following oath:
‘In applying for Estonian citizenship, I swear to be loyal to the consti-
tutional order of Estonia’.
For a minor to acquire Estonian nationality by naturalisation, an ap-
plication by his or her parents, or by a single or adoptive parent of Es-
tonian nationality, accompanied by specific documents, is required.
After the amendments to the Citizenship Act, which entered into force
on 12 July 1999, a minor’s stateless parents and stateless single or
adoptive parent(s) also have the right to apply for nationality by natura-
lisation for a minor.
Estonian nationality can be acquired for achievements of special
merit to the Estonian state, which are defined as ‘achievements which
contribute to the international reputation of Estonia in the areas of cul-
ture or sports or in other areas’ (art. 10). Proposals for the granting of
nationality for achievements of special merit may be submitted by
members of the Estonian Government. The Government is required to
approve the granting of citizenship for achievements of special merit.
According to the amendment which entered into force in November
1995 (seven months after the Citizenship Act entered into force), Esto-
nian nationality for achievements of special merit may be granted to
not more than ten persons per year.
However, in some cases, naturalisation is ruled out. According to art.
21 of the 1995 Citizenship Act, Estonian nationality shall not be
granted to or resumed by a person who:
1. submits false information upon application for Estonian nationality;
2. does not observe the constitutional order and laws of Estonia;
3. has acted against the Estonian state and its security;
4. has committed a criminal offence for which a punishment of impri-
sonment of more than one year was imposed and whose criminal
record has not expired or who has been repeatedly punished under
criminal procedure for intentionally committed criminal offences;
5. has been employed or is currently employed by foreign intelligence
or security services;
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6. has served as a professional member of the armed forces of a for-
eign state or who has been assigned to the reserve forces thereof or
has retired there from, nor shall Estonian nationality be granted to
or resumed by the spouse of such a person.
Thus, art. 21(6) clearly targets those non-Estonians (together with their
spouses) who are not Estonian nationals by birth and who remained in
Estonia after they retired from the Soviet Army.6 However, the same
art. 21 also offers them one possibility to acquire Estonian nationality.
It stipulates that Estonian nationality may be resumed by, or granted
to, a person who has retired from the armed forces of a foreign state if
the person has been married for at least five years to a person who ac-
quired Estonian nationality by birth and if the marriage has not been
terminated by divorce.
1.2.2 Loss of nationality
Loss of Estonian nationality is foreseen for persons who have acquired
the citizenship of another state, or who have provided false information
in the naturalisation process. Conditions and procedures for loss of Es-
tonian nationality are stipulated in Chapter 6 of the 1995 Citizenship
Act (arts. 22 through 30). According to these stipulations, a person
shall cease to be an Estonian national 1) through release from Estonian
nationality; 2) through deprivation of Estonian nationality, and 3) upon
acceptance of the citizenship of another state.
A person who wishes to be released from Estonian nationality shall
submit an application, identification documents, a certificate which
proves that he or she has acquired the citizenship of another state or
will acquire the citizenship of another state in connection with his or
her release from Estonian nationality, and pay the state fee.7 According
to art. 26, release from Estonian nationality may be refused to a person
if: 1) the person would become stateless as a result; 2) he or she has
unfulfilled obligations towards the Estonian state; 3) he or she is in ac-
tive service in the Estonian Defence Forces. Decisions on release from
Estonian nationality shall be taken by the Government.
According to art. 28, a person shall be deprived of Estonian national-
ity by an order of the Estonian Government if he or she 1) as an Esto-
nian national, enters state public service or military service of a foreign
state without permission from the Estonian Government; 2) joins the
intelligence or security service of a foreign state or foreign organisation
which is armed or militarily organised or which engages in military ex-
ercises; 3) forcibly attempts to change the constitutional order of Esto-
nia; 4) upon acquisition of Estonian nationality by naturalisation or
upon resumption of Estonian nationality submits false information
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and thereby conceals facts which would have precluded the granting of
Estonian nationality to him or her or which would have precluded him
or her from resuming Estonian nationality; 5) is a citizen of another
state but has not been released from Estonian nationality. This latter
provision makes it possible to deprive naturalised dual citizens of their
Estonian nationality if they have acquired another nationality. Since Es-
tonian law is in principle opposed to dual nationality, such persons are
obliged to apply for release from their Estonian nationality.
Art. 28(3) establishes an important difference between nationals by
birth and by naturalisation. It stipulates that the reasons for depriva-
tion of nationality listed in art. 28 do not apply to persons who acquire
Estonian nationality by birth. It means that those who have acquired
nationality by naturalisation are vulnerable – they can be deprived of
their newly obtained nationality.
Art. 29 addresses the loss of Estonian nationality upon acceptance of
citizenship of another state or renunciation of Estonian nationality. It
stipulates that a person is deemed by the government agency
authorised by the Estonian Government to have ceased being an Esto-
nian citizen upon acceptance of the citizenship of another state or
upon renunciation of Estonian nationality in favour of the citizenship
of another state. Nevertheless, in the light of these stipulations it re-
mains unclear what happens if an Estonian national by birth does not
declare his or her wish to be released from Estonian nationality after
he or she has acquired, or is going to acquire another nationality.
While the 1995 Citizenship Act rules out multiple nationality (arts.2
and 3) the state has been quite tolerant in cases of the resumption of
Estonian nationality by emigrants under art. 16(1) which grants every-
one who loses Estonian nationality as a minor the right to resume Es-
tonian nationality. Several such Estonians holding multiple national-
ities have been members of the Estonian Government and elected to
the Parliament.
1.3 Current debates on nationality
1.3.1 The focus of the debate
From the very outset of Estonian nationality policy in 1992, the ap-
proaches of Estonians and Russian-speakers to the issue of nationality
have been almost diametrically opposed to each other. The approach
characteristic of the Estonians draws heavily on history and underlines
that the changes in the ethnic composition during the Soviet years,
when the share of Estonians fell from 90 per cent to almost 60 per
cent between 1940 and 1989, were dangerous for the survival of the
Estonian nation. Therefore, refusal to grant nationality to Soviet era
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settlers by registration was regarded by many Estonians as an adequate
reaction to these changes in the population. The Estonian side also ar-
gues that in comparison with citizenship laws of other countries the
Estonian requirements for nationality are quite liberal by current inter-
national standards.
The opposite approach, taken by the Russian-speaking minorities
and by several international actors, maintains that history and nation
do not matter as much as the Estonians think they do. Rather, one
should start with the present multi-ethnic situation and think about in-
dividuals. As a characteristic example of this view, Helsinki Watch
pointed out that it ‘rejects the argument that all those who came to Es-
tonia after 1940 did so illegally and therefore were never citizens. Their
residency was legally established under the applicable law at the time
they entered the territory of Estonia. Those who settled in Estonia after
1940 must be treated as individuals, not as instruments of state policy,
however reprehensive that policy may have been’ (Helsinki Watch
1993: 14).
According to the proponents of this view, stateless people are a secur-
ity risk, since the interests of these individuals are not properly repre-
sented at the state level, and their behaviour can be unpredictable. The
underlying implication of this argument is usually that Estonia should
grant nationality more generously by further simplifying its conditions
for naturalisation, especially the language requirements. Most of the
ensuing debate has been about the political acceptability of such sim-
plifications, and in most cases the Estonian legislators have rejected
the proposals to that end. After more than a decade of debates, the op-
position between the two approaches has somewhat softened but is still
far from having disappeared. As long as there remain many tens of
thousands of stateless persons, the debate will probably continue.
1.3.2 International debate
Estonia was regularly encouraged by international actors to speed up
naturalisation to reduce the proportion of non-citizens in the popula-
tion, especially during the country’s accession to the European Union.
Estonia had to discuss its nationality issues with international partners
and to even make changes in its Citizenship Act to bring it into align-
ment with the country’s international obligations and to promote nat-
uralisation. Several international and regional organisations, foreign
embassies in Estonia, and international NGOs not only participated in
the debate but also provided necessary know-how and financial assis-
tance to their Estonian interlocutors. However, under the conditions
set by the 1995 Citizenship Act naturalisation slowed down for several
years. In 1997 international partners persuaded the Estonian authori-
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ties to launch a policy of integration for non-Estonians. A special gov-
ernment agency (Bureau of the Minister of Population Affairs8) and a
specialised foundation for the integration of non-Estonians9 were es-
tablished, which started to work out and to implement integration pro-
grammes and action plans to resolve the problem of statelessness.10
After several years of modest yields, the numbers of naturalised citi-
zens started to grow after Estonia joined the EU in 2004. Estonia inter-
preted the admission to the EU as the ultimate international approval
of its nationality policies. The EU and other international actors have
stopped issuing recommendations on how Estonia should develop its
nationality policy. Only Russia has not dropped the problem of state-
lessness in Estonia from its political agenda. It remains to be seen to
what degree Russia can internationalise this issue in its contacts with
the EU, in the framework of the OSCE and in the Council of Europe.
In the wake of Estonia’s admission to the EU, inputs from interna-
tional actors have ceased to inform the domestic debate on nationality
issues. Since then, this debate has been shaped more than ever before
by internal incentives.
1.3.3 Domestic debate
Estonian policy on nationality has remained conservative ever since in-
dependence, without major ‘home-made’ debates after the Citizenship
Act of 1992 was adopted. Instead, the mainstream political parties have
regularly declared prior to national elections that, regardless of the elec-
tion results, the Citizenship Act and the corresponding policies will not
be changed.
The Estonian political elite deemed that the initial non-inclusion of
Soviet era settlers into the citizenry served the interests of the survival
of the Estonian ethnic nation and its culture. According to a statement
by a former Estonian minister, the ultimate hope for the future of the
non-Estonians was ‘that a third or so will become Estonian citizens, a
third may remain here with Russian citizenship, and at least a third
will leave’ (Lieven 1993: 377). By 2000, these hopes had only partially
materialised, mainly because the formation of a persistent contingent
of stateless residents had not been anticipated. The results of the popu-
lation censuses of 1989 and 2000 showed that 29 per cent of non-Es-
tonians from 1989 had become Estonian citizens by 2000 and 14 per
cent had obtained Russian citizenship, while the total number of non-
Estonians had decreased from 602,381 to 439,833, or by 27 per cent be-
tween the two censuses.11 In 2000, 173,539 non-Estonians, or 39 per
cent of their number in 2000, were Estonian citizens, 86,067 non-Es-
tonians, or 20 per cent, were Russian citizens and 170,349 non-Esto-
nians, or 39 per cent, were stateless residents (Statistical Office of Esto-
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nia 2001: 13-14). By the end of 2005, the number of stateless residents
had fallen to 136,533, which was 23 per cent of the number of non-Esto-
nians in 1989 and 31 per cent of their number in 2000.12
In 1995 minority members won six seats of the 101 in the Estonian
Parliament, for the first time since independence, as representatives of
the so-called Russian parties (minority parties). They organised a sepa-
rate faction which tried to initiate changes in the Citizenship Act in or-
der to make the acquisition of nationality easier for stateless Russian-
speakers. However, all those attempts were systematically aborted by
firm resistance from the Estonian majority in the Parliament. As a re-
sult the minority parties were compromised in the eyes of Russian-
speaking voters and during the 2002 national elections these parties
were unable to surpass the 5 per cent threshold to get into the Parlia-
ment. In 2002 nine candidates of minority origin were elected to the
Estonian Parliament on the lists of the so-called Estonian parties,
which have started to compete among themselves for the votes of nat-
uralised non-Estonians. As members of mainstream parties, minority
MPs hope to be more successful than before in defending the interests
of non-Estonians, by promoting naturalisation, minority education and
the public use of minority languages.
1.3.4 Changes in public opinion
Influenced by history many Estonians came to perceive Russia and
Russians as threats. Surveys of public opinion and sociological research
of the early 1990s showed that Estonians tended to support the official
nationality policies which sought to control the participation of Rus-
sians in Estonian politics with the help of the Citizenship Act. Approxi-
mately one fifth of Estonians thought that the official policies, includ-
ing the language requirements for obtaining nationality were not harsh
enough. In 2000, 46 per cent of Estonians had the opinion that Esto-
nia would benefit if non-Estonians leave the country (Kruusvall 2001).
The majority of Russian-speakers in Estonia have considered the of-
ficial policies on nationality, let alone the more radical views reflected
in various media outlets, internet chat-rooms and elsewhere, as unfair
and discriminatory. Nevertheless, the data from integration monitoring
in 2000 showed that non-Estonians were predominantly oriented to-
wards acquiring Estonian nationality: it was desired by 80 per cent of
the family members of Estonian citizens who were without nationality,
by 62 per cent of the family members of non-citizens, and by 61 per
cent of the family members of Russian citizens. Estonian nationality
was desired in the first place for children, but also for spouses and par-
ents. At the same time, 12 per cent of the family members of non-citi-
zens did not want citizenship, and 16 per cent had not made up their
54 PRIIT JÄRVE
minds. It might well be that a certain number of non-citizens had re-
signed themselves to their status and did not see any particular reason
(or possibility) to change it (Hallik 2001).
While the official Estonian view on nationality has remained basi-
cally the same since 1992, the public opinion of Estonians has changed
due to an increase in overall tolerance and the proliferation of related
values. Most remarkably, the integration monitoring of 2005 showed
that already as much as 54 per cent of Estonians agree to grant nation-
ality to Russians born in Estonia on simplified terms. Only about one
third of Estonians held this view in 2000 (37 per cent in 2002).13 This
means that the majority of Estonians no longer perceive Russians as a
grave threat. It also means that tolerance of ordinary Estonians in na-
tionality issues has overtaken official policies. These changes in public
opinion may facilitate new policy initiatives to overcome the problem
of statelessness.
1.4 Statistics on acquisition of nationality since 1992
Estonian statistics on acquisition of nationality date from after the
1992 Citizenship Act was adopted. The introduction of this Act granted
Estonian nationality by registration to 68 per cent of the population
who, or whose predecessors, were Estonian nationals before 17 June
1940. The rest of the population (32 per cent) who, or whose predeces-
sors, were not Estonian nationals before that date, were bestowed the
status of aliens. Over 95 per cent of those aliens were not of Estonian
descent.
In 1993, after several reorganisations at governmental level, the Esto-
nian Citizenship and Migration Board (CMB) was established.14 The
CMB is a government agency acting within the administrative area of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its main tasks include: determin-
ing the status of persons living in Estonia either as Estonian citizens or
as aliens and issuing identity documents to the residents of Estonia, as
well as receiving and processing applications for acquiring and restor-
ing Estonian nationality, as well as for exemptions from Estonian na-
tionality, and preparing the respective material for the Government of
the Republic to decide on these applications (CMB 2003: 4).
Currently, the CMB provides the most reliable statistics on national-
ity and naturalisation in Estonia. According to these data, between
1992 and 30 April 2005 as many as 133,555 persons have acquired Esto-
nian nationality by naturalisation. Two special categories of applicants
account for more than one third of that number. Between 1992 and
1995, a simplified fast track procedure for naturalisation without a lan-
guage exam was available for those aliens (Soviet era settlers) who had
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participated in the elections of the Estonian Citizens’ Congress in 1990
and registered themselves as applicants for nationality already prior to
March 1990 (of those persons 24,102 were naturalised), as well as for
Estonians living outside Estonia, of whom 25,966 used this simplified
procedure (CMB 2003: 13).
Besides those two special categories, the CMB has provided statistics
on the following categories of naturalised persons:
1. those who acquired Estonian nationality on general conditions, i.e.
who passed all exams, (49,104 persons between 1992 and Novem-
ber 2003);
2. minors under fifteen years of age (23,902 persons between 1992
and November 2003);
3. persons without active legal capacity and disabled persons (319 indi-
viduals between 2001 and November 2003);
4. persons granted nationality for achievements of special merit (702
persons between 1992 and November 2003);
5. minors under fifteen years of age whose parents are resident non-
citizens (art. 13(1) of the Citizenship Act) (5,949 persons between
1999 and May 2005).
Between 1992 and December 2005, 2,728 persons have been released
from Estonian nationality. Between 1992 and November 2003, the
Government has refused to grant nationality to 583 applicants.15
The process of naturalisation has not been a homogeneous flow of
applications and their approval. After the Citizenship Act of 1992, the
tempo of naturalisation was much higher than in the wake of the 1995
Citizenship Act which changed the conditions of naturalisation by
making the language exam more rigorous and by adding an exam on
the Constitution and the Citizenship Act which also had to be taken in
the Estonian language. Thus, between 1992 and 1996 as many as
87,712 persons naturalised under the conditions set by the first Citizen-
ship Act, or 63 per cent of all persons who have naturalised between
1992 and 2005 (see Figure 1.2). In 1996, 16,740 persons passed the ci-
tizenship language exam, which followed the old rules and require-
ments. In 1997, only 2,099 persons passed an upgraded language
exam (UNDP 1999: 42).
However, in spite of the complications related to naturalisation, such
as language exams which are considered difficult by the applicants,
and the growing share of non-Estonians among citizens, who are eyed
with suspicion by ethnic conservatives, no political force in Estonia has
proposed to stop the process. As a result, in November 2005 the overall
number of naturalised persons (137,199) finally surpassed the number
of stateless persons (136,533).16
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1.5 Conclusions
The current naturalisation process in Estonia is a politically sensitive
and cautious inclusion of non-citizens in which international ‘suppor-
tive pressure’ has played an important role. Naturalisation has brought
new members to Estonian citizenry, made it ethnically more diverse
and moved the country closer to full democratic participation. It is esti-
mated that about 20 per cent of all Estonian nationals are non-Esto-
nians. More than half of them have acquired nationality after 1992
through naturalisation. However, 136 thousand permanent residents of
Estonia were still without a nationality at the end of 2005. This means
that sustained practical efforts to promote integration and naturalisa-
tion are needed in Estonian society for years to come. Both non-Esto-
nians and Estonians should be targeted in order to promote better mu-
tual understanding and cultural accommodation.
Steps should also be taken in developing legal instruments and stan-
dards concerning nationality and statelessness. While Estonia has
signed and ratified the majority of international instruments aimed at
combating racial and ethnic discrimination,17 it has so far failed to sign
and ratify a number of international treaties dealing with issues of na-
tionality and statelessness such as the UN Convention of the Status of
Stateless Persons (1954); the UN Convention on the Nationality of Mar-
ried Women (1957); the UN Convention on the Reduction of Stateless-
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Figure 1.2: Naturalisation in Estonia, 1992-2005, persons naturalised per year in thousands
Source: Estonian Citizenship and Migration Board
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Status to Reduce the Number of Cases of Statelessness (1973); and the
European Convention on Nationality (1997).
One is inclined to hope that membership in the EU and the prolif-
eration of democratic values will motivate Estonia to sign and ratify
more international treaties in the near future to help overcome state-
lessness and promote the political participation of minorities through
citizenship.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Estonia
Date Document Content Source
1992 Constitution of Estonia www.legislationline.org
1993 Aliens Act (consolidated in
2003)
Regulates the entry of
aliens into Estonia, their
stay, residence and
employment in Estonia and
the bases for legal liability
of aliens.
www.legislationline.org
1995 Citizenship Act (adopted
19 January 1995, entered
info force 1 April 1995)
Replaced the Citizenship
Act of 1992, did not change
the basic principles of








Amendment Act of 18
October 1995 (entered into
force 20 November 1995)
Established that citizenship
for achievements of special
merit may be granted to no
more than ten persons per
year.
www.legislationline.org
1995 Language Act Established the Estonian
language as the only official
language of Estonia,
regulates the requirements
for proficiency in the
Estonian language and the
use of Estonian and foreign
languages in Estonia.
www.coe.int







Amendment Act of 8
December 1998 (entered
into force 12 July 1999)
Provided for acquisition of
citizenship for children of
stateless single or adoptive
parents; introduced
deprivation of citizenship
in case of submission of
www.legislationline.org
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Date Document Content Source
false information in the
process of application and




1999 Identity Documents Act Established an identity
document requirement and
regulates the issue of
identity documents to
Estonian citizens and




Amendment Act of 14 June
2000 (entered into force 10
July 2000)
Amended the requirements
for naturalisation for a




2001 Penal Code Article 174 Established penalties for
the alteration of a child's
descent by substituting a
child with a child of another
person for personal gain,




Amendment Act of 14
November 2001 (entered
into force 1 February 2002)
Revised the wording of
some articles as a result of
changes in other civil laws.
www.legislationline.org
2002 Citizenship Act
Amendment Act of 5 June
2002 (entered into force 1
July 2002)
Specified rules for the
naturalisation of children
whose parents are dead,
missing or have restricted
active legal capacity or
whose parents are deprived
of their parental rights.
www.legislationline.org
2002 Citizenship Act
Amendment Act of 19 June
2002 (entered into force 1
August 2002)
Ruled that the Government
of the Republic shall
substantiate the granting of
citizenship for
achievements of special
merit (but not the refusal to
grant citizenship on these
grounds); regulated the
fees for the acquisition of
citizenship by
naturalisation, for
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Date Document Content Source
October 2002 (entered into
force 10 November 2002)
with a severe, profound or
moderate disability.
2003 Citizenship Act
Amendment Act of 29
January 2003 (entered into







Amendment Act of 10
December 2003 (entered








Amendment Act of 11
February 2004 (entered into
force 20 March 2004)
Specified residence periods
required for naturalisation
(five years on the basis of a
permanent residence
permit prior to application
and six months from the
day following the date of
registration of the
application);established
time limits and obligations




Legal texts can also be found under: www.legaltext.ee
For selected pieces of secondary documentation see: www.legislation-
line.org
Notes
1 Although the 1977 Constitution of the Estonian SSR used the term ‘citizens of the
Estonian SSR’, it was merely a synonym of the mandatory Soviet registration of
domicile (in Russian: propiska).
2 In this chapter the terms ‘Estonian’, ‘Russian’, etc. designate ethnicity. The term
‘non-Estonians’ refers to all individuals whose ethnic origin is different from that of
Estonians. The term ‘Russian-speakers’ stands for those non-Estonians whose
mother tongue, or predominantly used language, is Russian.
3 This subsection draws on Thiele (1999: 14-16).
4 An English translation is available at: www.legislationline.org.
5 Estonian law uses the term ‘alien’ rather than ‘foreign national’ to categorise a person
who is not an Estonian citizen (Aliens Act of 1993, art. 8). The category of ‘aliens’
also applies to stateless persons who form a large group among Estonia’s non-
citizens. The Estonian identification document issued to a stateless person is called
an ‘Alien’s passport’ which many stateless persons who were born in the country
consider as inappropriate, if not insulting. In Estonian political discourse the
stateless persons are characterised differently from the legal jargon as individuals
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‘who have undetermined citizenship’ which gives to the whole issue a slightly more
optimistic twist.
6 According to estimates, this group, which the authorities consider as a threat to the
state security, includes approximately 30,000 persons (together with their family
members). Their pensions and health insurance are paid by the Russian Federation.
Many of them are also citizens of the Russian Federation. So far, Estonia has
provided the Soviet Army retirees only with temporary residence permits to make
their expulsion for security reasons possible and their application for nationality
impossible. However, under the new EU regulations, which entered into force in
January 2006, these persons shall enjoy the right to permanent residence permits as
nationals of third states who have legally resided in an EU Member State for five
years or more. Thus, they will have the right to apply for nationality as permanent
residence permit holders under one article of the Citizenship Act while having no
right to do so under another article of the same Act. This controversy seems to call
for new regulations, or amendments to this Act.
7 At the end of 2005, the state fee for naturalisation as well as for release from
Estonian nationality was 250 Estonian kroons (16 euros) while the minimum
monthly salary was 3,000 Estonian kroons. The applicants do not usually consider
this fee as a significant obstacle.
8 See www.rahvastikuminister.ee.
9 See www.meis.ee (Non-Estonians’s Integration Foundation).
10 The state programme ‘Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007’ can be accessed at
www.riik.ee/saks/ikomisjon/programme.htm.
11 After 1991, depopulation became a firm trend in Estonia. The censuses of 1989 and
2000 show that while all minority groups diminished in size, only Ukrainians,
Byelorussians, Tatars, Jews and Germans lost more than one third of their members.
At the same time, the most numerous group – the Russians in Estonia – had
decreased from 475 to 351 thousand, or only by one fourth. All in all, the absolute
number of non-Estonians went down 27 per cent between the two censuses while
the absolute number of Estonians diminished by only 12 per cent. As a result the
share of Estonians in the whole population went up 6.4 percentage points from 61.5
to 67.9. According to the census of 2000 the total population of Estonia was
1,370,052 (in 1989: 1,565,622) (Statistical Office of Estonia 2001: 14).
12 Broadcast on Estonian TV on 28 December 2005 available at: www.itv.ee.
13 See the results of Integration Monitoring 2000, 2002, and 2005 at www.meis.ee.
14 Estonians, worried by growing immigration, already started inventing measures
during the pre-Gorbachev era to bring this process under their control. Thus, in the
early 1980s, the municipality of Tallinn, the capital city of Estonia, started to limit
the number of workers that industrial and other enterprises were allowed to bring to
Estonia, charging them considerable fees for every worker who eventually settled in
Tallinn. It is interesting that the legality of these improvised methods was not
challenged by Moscow, possibly because the growing interethnic tensions had
already sparked public unrest among the youth in Tallinn in the autumn of 1980.
However, a more systemic foundation for the immigration policy was laid in 1990,
when the Supreme Council of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (Estonian SSR)
established the National Migration Board of the Estonian SSR, the predecessor of the
CMB. This agency’s task was to carry out state control of migration and issue
residence and work permits. For that purpose the Supreme Council adopted the
‘Immigration Law of the Estonian SSR’, which entered into force on 1 July 1990.
This law established the requirement that any alien who wanted to settle in Estonia
must apply for a residence permit. The first permits were issued in January 1991.
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15 These numbers are based on data published by the CMB in 2003 and more recent
data provided by the Bureau of the Minister of Population Affairs in an e-mail on 25
May 2005 and available at: www.rahvastikuminister.ee.
16 Source: www.rahvastikuminister.ee.
17 These documents include the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (entry into force in Estonia 19 January 1992), the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (20 November
1991), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (21
January 1992), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (21 January
1992), the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (21
January 1992), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (20 November 1991), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (20
November 1991), the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities (1 February 1998).
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Chapter 2: Checks and balances in Latvian
nationality policies: National agendas and
international frameworks1
Kristı̄ne Krūma
Upon restoration of independence Latvia strictly followed the principle
of state continuity. This has also been reflected in nationality policies
which followed the ex iniuria ius non oritur principle. However, Latvia
had to take the framework of international law that existed when inde-
pendence was restored into account and to deal with a large number of
Soviet-era settlers. This led to the creation of a specific category of per-
sons in international law, namely so-called non-citizens, which has be-
come the main issue of international debates on Latvian nationality po-
licies.
2.1 History of nationality policy
2.1.1 Nationality policy prior to regaining independence
An important step in the process of consolidating the new statehood
proclaimed on 18 November 1918 was the adoption of the Law on Citi-
zenship in 1919. This Law was not repealed after the occupation of Lat-
via by the Soviet Union in 1940. At the same time, Latvian nationals
became nationals of the USSR by way of automatic imposition of the
latter’s nationality.
There were different views regarding the status of Baltic nationals
after the Second World War. In some of the lawsuits initiated by Baltic
nationals concerning their nationality they were still considered Baltic
nationals by courts of other states. The varying treatment of Baltic na-
tionals by other states prevailed until 1991 when the Baltic States re-
gained independence.
Upon the restoration of independence in 1990 the decision-makers
were faced with the dilemma of the two main options available regard-
ing nationality. Under the first option it was argued that the original
state had disintegrated or disappeared and that a new state had been
founded. The newly-founded state could therefore determine its na-
tionals on the basis of its territory – a ‘zero option’. As far as this op-
tion is concerned, one may add, however, that the codification efforts
of the International Law Commission at the United Nations concern-
ing the nationality of persons in situations of state succession showed
that awarding nationality to all residents by successor states that
emerged from the dissolution of a predecessor state is by no means an
automatic or established rule of international law.2 It is a preferred so-
lution, especially in view of the existing obligation not to create state-
lessness, but state practices continue to vary.
The second option emanated from the concept of state continuity,
which implies the continuity of the nationality of the state in question
(Thiele 1999: 12).3 When adopting nationality legislation Latvia was
guided by the principle of continuity of the state and the humanitarian
principles prohibiting the imposition of the nationality of the occupy-
ing country upon nationals of the occupied country. It was argued that
automatic conferral of USSR nationality on the population of the Baltic
States as a consequence of their occupation in 1940 was unlawful un-
der international law as long as the Baltic States were presumed to ex-
ist (Kalvaitis 1998: 231; Ziemele 2001: 233).4 Therefore, Latvian na-
tionals recovered de facto rights and obligations deriving from their Lat-
vian nationality but those USSR nationals who arrived in Latvia as a
result of its foreign occupation were made subject to the naturalisation
procedure according to relevant legal provisions.
2.1.2 Restoration of nationality
During this period, the political institutions of the Soviet era were still
in place. However, their freedom to act was significantly restricted.
Since Latvia was guided by the principle of state continuity it had to re-
store not only nationality but also its pre-1940 institutions, including
its parliament. The post-Soviet institutions acting in this period had
limited capacity. Their authority was only to preserve continuity until
the fifth legitimately elected Parliament would start functioning.
According to the state continuity thesis the aggregate body of Latvian
nationals was re-established in accordance with the 1919 Law on Citi-
zenship, as amended in 1927. It was considered again applicable with
the adoption of the 15 October 1991 Resolution on the Renewal of the
Republic of Latvia’s Citizens’ Rights and Fundamental Principles of
Naturalisation by the Supreme Council. The presumption was that Lat-
vian nationality had continued to exist, irrespective of the loss of inde-
pendence in 1940. The Decree on the Order in which the Citizens of
the Soviet Socialist Republics Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are Granted
USSR Citizenship (1940) on the basis of which Soviet nationality was
imposed on Latvian nationals was declared null and void ab initio.
According to the Resolution the following groups of individuals were
recognised as nationals: (1) those who were Latvian nationals on 17 June
1940 and their descendants, if they had lived in the country and had re-
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gistered by 1 July 1992; (2) persons who were Latvian nationals on 17
June 1940 and their descendants if they did not reside in Latvia or were
nationals of another state and had submitted an expatriation permit; (3)
persons born and residing in Latvia if their parents were unknown.
The process of naturalisation was also made easy for persons who
were living in Latvia on 17 June 1940 without the Latvian nationality.
This approach was based on the premise that if Latvia had not been oc-
cupied, these persons could have acquired nationality (Ziemele 1998:
208).
It was considered that only the nationals proper, as defined by the
1919 Law, could legitimately restore the political system of Latvia and
thus take part in the elections for the Fifth Parliament in 1993. Others
who did not qualify for nationality could apply for naturalisation under
the 1919 Law and the Resolution. Since the requirements for naturali-
sation were high, including inter alia sixteen years of residence, natura-
lisation based on the Resolution never occurred (Ziemele 1998: 208;
Kalvaitis 1998: 255).
2.1.3 Basis for current nationality policy
During the parliamentary election campaign in 1993 nationality was
the most important issue. Proposals ranged from repatriation of all
Soviet time settlers to a zero option. The elected Parliament in a way
represented the opinion of Latvian nationals as to how the state should
proceed in this matter. Initial proposals were very strict. According to
the first model adopted by the Parliament, the first applications for
naturalisation would have been accepted in 2000 and then only at a
rate of 0.1 per cent of the previous year’s total number of nationals.
This would have resulted in approximately a thousand new nationals
annually. This draft was heavily criticised by the Western democracies
and by international organisations. As a result the President of Latvia
refused to sign the adopted law. Complex nationality issues were even
the reason for postponing Latvian membership of the Council of
Europe.
The new Law on Citizenship was adopted only on 22 July 1994. Ac-
cording to art. 2, as amended in 19955, nationals of Latvia are: (1) per-
sons who were nationals on the date of occupation and their descen-
dants, unless they had acquired the nationality of another state after
Latvia proclaimed its independence on 4 May 1990; (2) Latvians and
Livs6 who permanently reside in Latvia, do not hold the nationality of
another state or have received an expatriation permit; (3) women who
permanently reside in Latvia and had lost their nationality according to
the Law on Citizenship of 1919 as well as their descendants unless they
had acquired the nationality of another state after 4 May 1990; (4) nat-
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uralised persons; (5) children who are found in the territory of Latvia
whose parents are unknown; (6) orphans living in an orphanage or a
boarding school in Latvia; (7) children born of parents both of whom
were nationals of Latvia at the time of such birth, irrespective of the
place of birth of such children; (8) persons who permanently reside in
Latvia and are duly registered and who have completed a full educa-
tional course in general education schools in which Latvian was the
language of instruction, or in mixed language schools, if they are not
nationals of another state or have received an expatriation permit. As
argued by Ineta Ziemele, the latter category broadens the scope of Lat-
vian nationals in that it includes those former USSR nationals who
may have integrated into Latvian society, irrespective of their place of
birth (Ziemele 2001: 235). The right of a child to acquire Latvian na-
tionality was ensured by providing that if at least one parent is a Lat-
vian citizen the child will acquire Latvian nationality, subject to mutual
agreement by the parents.
Those who did not belong to the above mentioned groups had to nat-
uralise according to the procedures set out by law and the regulations
of the Cabinet of Ministers.7 Although naturalisation requirements
were made easier, they were still exclusionary. The law provided for
gradual naturalisation, the so-called ‘window-system’, thus limiting the
rights of individuals to freely choose the timing for naturalisation. It
was provided that persons will be naturalised in stages starting in
1996 and ending in 2003 (Kalvaitis 1998: 231). After 2003 all persons
would have the right to apply.8 This approach was adopted because it
was expected that considerable numbers of non-citizens would apply
for Latvian nationality and civil servants would therefore be unable to
ensure proper application of the law. However the number of applica-
tions turned out to be much lower than expected. The reasons for the
low interest were only analysed after the law was adopted. The main
reasons identified were (1) lack of knowledge of the Latvian language;
(2) unwillingness to enter into obligatory military service; (3) the easier
requirements for obtaining a Russian visa for non-citizens; (4) the
number of rights already granted; (5) political mistrust and disappoint-
ment at not having been granted nationality automatically and (6) an
identity crisis after the collapse of the USSR.
2.1.4 Recent developments of nationality policy
There were many assessments on the compliance of Latvia’s laws with
applicable international standards in the area of nationality. These were
accompanied by numerous recommendations, in particular concerning
facilitation of access to nationality for Soviet-era settlers. In view of the
constant pressure of the UN Commission on Human Rights, the
66 KRISTĪNE KRŪMA
Council of Europe, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minori-
ties and most notably the European Union,9 Latvia amended its Citi-
zenship Law in 1998 (Tomaševski 2000: 340). The amendments were
confirmed in a referendum and became effective in November 1998.10
These amendments abolished the ‘window-system’ and provided na-
tionality for children born in Latvia after 21 August 1991 to stateless
persons or non-citizens. In accordance with art. 3 of the Citizenship
Law the parents of the child were required to submit an application for
the acquisition of nationality before the child reached the age of fif-
teen.11 In addition to these amendments, the naturalisation procedure
was simplified, i.e., several groups of individuals were identified for ex-
emption from the naturalisation process or who did not have to pass
the naturalisation exams. Thus, for instance, applicants over the age of
65 were exempted from the history test.12
Western countries and international organisations provided consider-
able assistance to Latvia with the objective of overcoming the main bar-
riers which kept the numbers of applications for nationality low. Spe-
cial attention was paid to language training. About 50 different sets of
learning and informational material were published and 45 projects to
facilitate naturalisation were initiated, an information centre was estab-
lished and a number of campaigns were organised.
Notwithstanding the latest amendments and campaigning, the num-
bers of non-citizens are still quite high. By June 2005 there were about
432,000 non-citizens in Latvia (in 1995 the number was 735,000).
However, by the end of 2005, nationality through naturalisation had
only been granted to 105,088 persons (the rest has either been repa-
triated or acquired Russian nationality while remaining residents of
Latvia). Various attempts to speed up the naturalisation of non-citizens
have had limited success. Within the last ten years the number of non-
citizens has not decreased very much (Berg & van Meurs 2001: 145).13
The reasons for the lack of interest are changing however. For instance
knowledge of the language and military service are no longer men-
tioned in public opinion polls as important barriers to naturalisation.
Moreover, there are reasons why interest is growing these days, the
main reason being the enlargement of the European Union. The Nat-
uralisation Board now foresees that naturalisation could be completed
in seven years but there will remain about 130,000 persons who will
choose to remain non-citizens for the rest of their lives.
2.1.5 The status of non-citizens
When Latvia regained independence in 1991 it inherited large Russian-
speaking communities that had arrived there from the ex-USSR. The
Soviet central authorities had encouraged large-scale immigration of
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the labour force, to meet the local demands of Soviet industrialisation
and ethnic politics. Consequently, the collapse of the Soviet Union af-
fected mostly the Russian people and other Eastern Slav groups such
as Byelorussians and Ukrainians (Berg & van Meurs 2001: 139). The
historical minorities of Slav origin living in the Baltic States before the
Soviet invasion were treated differently.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing independence of
Latvia created problems for persons who were living in Latvia but who
suddenly realised that they were nationals of a state which no longer
existed. Various international organisations were criticising Latvia for
having too many inhabitants without nationality. This was due to the
fact that former USSR nationals were not automatically granted Latvian
nationality, nor did they apply for Russian nationality or the nationality
of another state. Western European countries and international organi-
sations considered that a large number of persons without any factual
nationality could constitute a risk for internal stability and could pro-
voke ethnic conflicts. They could not be extradited as settlers from an
occupying state because this would be contrary to human rights law
which prohibits the expulsion of aliens en masse. Nor could these per-
sons be classified as stateless because that would be against the princi-
ple on the reduction of statelessness.
Under the circumstances a special status of non-citizen was intro-
duced. Non-citizens are persons who were USSR nationals but who,
after 1991, did not qualify for Latvian nationality and did not acquire
Russian or any other nationality. The Former USSR Citizens Act in art.
1 states:
‘The persons governed by this Act – ‘‘non-citizens’’ – shall be
those nationals of the former USSR, and their children, who are
resident in Latvia […] and who satisfy all the following criteria:
1. on 1 July 1992 they were registered as being resident within the ter-
ritory of Latvia, regardless of the status of their residence; or their
last registered place of residence by 1 July 1992 was in the Republic
of Latvia; or a court has established that before the above mentioned
date they had been resident within the territory of Latvia for not less
than ten years;
2. they do not hold Latvian nationality;
3. they are not and have not been nationals of any other state’
This provision recognises non-citizens as a special category whose legal
status in some areas provides them with more rights and guarantees
than, for example, proper permanent residents, however non-citizens
are not yet nationals of Latvia.
Special rights given to non-citizens of Latvia can be summarised as
follows. Non-citizens are given a special passport. The passport not
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only grants a special status of belonging to the state and thus allowing
the constitutional right of return but has even been recognised by
some countries as sufficient for a visa-free entry into their country (for
instance Denmark). In accordance with art. 2 of the Former USSR Citi-
zens Act, non-citizens of Latvia cannot be deported, which is not the
case with third-country nationals. When ratifying international conven-
tions Latvia as a rule submits a declaration requesting the equal treat-
ment of citizens and non-citizens. For instance, upon ratification of the
European Convention on Extradition and its Protocols in 1997 Latvia
stated that it shall apply to both citizens and non-citizens. Non-citizens
enjoy human rights granted to nationals and this has been submitted
by Latvia and accepted by a number of international treaty monitoring
bodies. Moreover, in accordance with art. 2 of the Law on Diplomatic
and Consular Service, they enjoy diplomatic protection of Latvia.
Latvia does not allow non-citizens the right to be elected at national
and municipal levels or to hold public office. Moreover, non-citizens in
Latvia are restricted from practising certain professions like those of:
judge, court bailiff, notary, prosecutor, policeman, state security officer,
land surveyor, fireman, national guard, captain of a crew, private detec-
tive, attorney, or employee in diplomatic and consular service. There
are also restrictions on possessing land, social rights and repatriation.
Although, unlike immigrants in the EU, non-citizens are not nationals
of any other state, they are treated as long-term resident third-country
nationals in the EU framework in accordance with the provisions of Di-
rective 2003/109/EC and are granted visa-free travel in accordance
with Regulation 539/2001.14 This approach has been criticised by ex-
perts15 and raises questions about the extent that Latvia can live up to
its international human rights obligations, i.e., especially those that fall
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Up to now there have been several attempts to classify non-citizens
under a heading recognised by international law.16 Moreover, Latvia is
still under international pressure to end discrimination in its national-
ity policies.17 Latvian courts have recently given an authoritative inter-
pretation of the status of non-citizens, the most important of which is
the recent ruling of the Constitutional Court.18
The Constitutional Court had to review the amendments made to
the Former USSR Citizens Act which provided for the revocation of
the status of non-citizen for persons who acquired the status of perma-
nent residence in another country after 1 June 2004. Until these
amendments the status could only be renounced on condition that a
nationality had been acquired. The Court regarded the amendments as
unconstitutional. It started analysing the adoption of the Former USSR
Citizens Act in historical and political context and concluded that the
opinion that Latvia had a duty to grant nationality automatically to
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those individuals and their descendants who have never been Latvian
nationals and arrived during occupation is unfounded (para. 13). The
Court acknowledged that the introduction of the status of non-citizen
was a complicated political compromise as a result of which a category
unknown in international law has been created. The Court has noted
that Latvia has consistently defended its position that non-citizens can-
not be qualified as stateless persons and this view has been accepted
by the international monitoring bodies (Ziemele & Kruma 2003).19 In
its judgment (para. 17) the Court defined the status of non-citizen in
the following way:
‘The status of non-citizens is not and cannot be considered as a
mode of Latvian nationality. However, the rights given to non-citizens
and the international obligations which Latvia has undertaken in rela-
tion to these persons, signify that the legal link of non-citizens to Latvia
is recognised to a certain extent and based on it mutual obligations
and rights have emerged. This is derived from art. 98 of the Constitu-
tion which inter alia states that anyone who possesses a Latvian pass-
port has a right to protection by the state and the right to freely return
to Latvia.’
The court therefore confirmed that non-citizens have a special link
with Latvia which entails mutual rights and obligations. Those are,
however, different from the ones of nationals. It can be argued that
non-citizens possess ‘functional Latvian nationality’, i.e., they have
many of the rights of nationals except for political rights and the right
to hold certain positions but they cannot be defined as nationals.
Latvia has adopted a so called ‘carrot-stick’ policy towards non-citi-
zens, i.e., if they want to enjoy the rights of EU nationals, then they
have to become nationals of a Member State. The current problem lies
in the fact that the number of non-citizens is considerable and it is not
decreasing fast enough.
2.2 Basic principles for the acquisition and loss of nationality
2.2.1 Acquisition of nationality
General principles
According to the Citizenship Law of 1994 Latvian nationality is ac-
quired on the basis of the ius sanguinis principle. Moreover, Latvian
nationality legislation maintains the continuity of Latvian nationality,
as identified in 1919. This is evident in the 1991 Resolution which re-
fers to the restoration of the rights of Latvian nationals and not to a re-
storation of the institution of ‘nationality’, which is presumed to exist.
In addition to the ius sanguinis principle, there are groups of indivi-
duals which are granted nationality almost automatically.20 Firstly, cer-
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tain ethnic groups: Latvians and Livs are nationals if they live perma-
nently in Latvia and hold no other nationality. However, if they immi-
grate from other countries they will be subject to a simplified naturali-
sation procedure. Secondly, persons who completed education in
schools with Latvian as a language of instruction. Thirdly, women who
lost their nationality in accordance with the archaic rule on revocation
of nationality upon marriage with a person of another nationality.
Fourthly, children, whose parents are unknown, and orphans.
Lastly, children born after 21 August 1991 to persons who are state-
less or non-citizens. In order to apply for nationality in the case of sta-
telessness a child should be (1) a permanent resident; (2) stateless or a
non-citizen ‘for the entire time’ of its life prior to application; (3) fluent
in Latvian which is verified by a document from an educational estab-
lishment or by the Commission of the Naturalisation Board; (4) over
the age of fifteen. The applicant also should not have a criminal record
of more than five years of imprisonment. Until the child reaches the
age of fifteen the application can be submitted by both parents jointly
or separately, or by the adoptive parents of a child, if they are stateless
persons or non-citizens and have resided in Latvia for at least five
years. It shall be noted that a certificate of language proficiency shall
be submitted only by those minors who have not been registered by
their parents until the age of fifteen. Moreover, after they have reached
the age of eighteen general naturalisation requirements apply.
Art. 13 provides for the admission to nationality for special meritor-
ious service beneficial to Latvia. A decision must be passed by Parlia-
ment on each individual case. A person cannot acquire dual nationality
by the application of art. 13, and the restrictions of art. 11 are applicable
(see below).
Dual nationality
Dual nationality is, in principle, not permitted in Latvia. The 1994 Citi-
zenship Law does not, however, exclude this possibility if the person
has registered his or her Latvian nationality. This means that Latvia will
not create dual nationality, while acknowledging that other states may
do so.
The Citizenship Law is indeed ambiguous in relation to dual nation-
ality. Art. 9 provides that a person who acquires Latvian nationality
cannot be a dual national. Para. 2 of the same article states that in case
a person is considered to be a national of another state, in his or her
relations with Latvia the person is considered only to be a citizen of
Latvia. Art. 24 provides the possibility to revoke nationality by court de-
cision if a person has acquired the nationality of another state without
renunciation of his or her Latvian nationality. The possibility to hold
dual Latvian nationality and that of another state is set out in the Tran-
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sition Regulations of the Citizenship Law. They provided that those Lat-
vian nationals who, during the period from 17 June 1940 until 4 May
1990, left Latvia as refugees or were deported and their descendants
could register as Latvian nationals until 1 July 1995. This provision is
gender neutral meaning that descendants of either parent could regis-
ter. However, it does not mention that they have to renounce their cur-
rent nationality.
Currently there are 30,793 dual nationals most of whom (12,473) are
also nationals of the USA.
Naturalisation
Individuals who have registered with the Residents’ Register are con-
sidered to reside lawfully in Latvia and are entitled to acquire national-
ity through naturalisation if they have received a permanent residence
permit. The naturalisation requirements are the following: (1) perma-
nent residence in Latvia for five years counting from 4 May 199021; (2)
knowledge of the Latvian language, the Constitution22, the anthem and
the history of Latvia; (3) a loyalty oath to the Republic of Latvia; and (4)
legal source of income (art. 12).
The Law provides for a special procedure of naturalisation in cases
where applicants have been nationals of Lithuania, Estonia or Poland
before the USSR intervention and have lived in Latvia for at least five
years. These rules also include their descendants (art. 14).23 The special
procedure also applies to persons married to Latvian citizens for not
less than ten years, who have been residing in Latvia for at least five
years, even if the spouse has passed away (art. 14). A special procedure
provides that these applications are considered expediently.
Upon application, a person shall declare that he or she does not hold
any other nationality and that none of the restrictions apply as speci-
fied in art. 11 of the Citizenship Law.
Article 11 establishes restrictions for naturalisation, if a person:
– has acted against the independence of Latvia and its powers which
has been established by the courts;
– propagated totalitarian ideals or ethnic or racial hatred which has
been established by the courts;
– served in the institutions of another state, including the armed
forces;
– served in the USSR army and was called-up from outside Latvia;
– has been employed by the KGB, the security or intelligence or a si-
milar service of another state;
– has been sentenced in Latvia or another state for a crime, which is
a crime in Latvia;
– has, after 13 January 1991, worked against Latvia in several organi-
sations.24
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This Article seems to follow a rather exclusionary approach. For in-
stance, if a person has been convicted for any crime (even if imprison-
ment was only for a year) he or she can never apply for Latvian nation-
ality. Also the restrictions in relation to the affiliation with the KGB
could be challenged as to their legitimacy and proportionality since
there are nationals who had the affiliation but who were nationals or
acquired nationality by registration.25
Children up to the age of sixteen acquire nationality together with
the naturalised parent without undergoing the naturalisation process
as set out in art. 12. This is also the case if the parents have not
reached an agreement but the child permanently resides in Latvia or in
cases of adoption. Nationality is granted to a minor from fourteen to
eighteen years of age only with his or her written consent (art. 16). If a
minor’s nationality has changed and his or her consent has not been
obtained, he or she can, within a year of coming of age, renew Latvian
nationality irrespective of the period of residence in Latvia (art. 16,
para. 2). If the nationality of a child has changed as a result of the mar-
riage of (one of) its parents, the naturalisation procedure will not be
applicable if the child wishes to renew his or her Latvian nationality.
In accordance with art. 4 of the Citizenship Law all Latvian nationals
are equal irrespective of the way nationality has been acquired. This is
a constitutional principle confirmed by the Constitution in art. 91 stat-
ing that all are equal before the law and human rights shall be re-
spected without any discrimination.
The Naturalisation Board working under the auspices of the Ministry
of Justice is responsible for the examination of applications for natura-
lisation. During the naturalisation procedure the Board co-operates
with other institutions with the aim to verify the information sub-
mitted by the applicants. Its decisions are subject to appeal in court.26
During court proceedings the naturalisation process is suspended until
the decision of a final instance or until the case is dropped. The proce-
dure of naturalisation is set out in detail in a number of regulations of
the Cabinet of Ministers. The Regulations on the Procedure of Accep-
tance and Review of Naturalisation Applications include application
forms and specify the procedure for submission of applications and
the documents to be submitted.27 Naturalisation takes place in regional
units of the Naturalisation Board. In 2004, the procedure for submit-
ting documents was liberalised and the requirement that documents
must be submitted in the regional unit of the registered place of resi-
dence of the applicant was lifted. The naturalisation procedure is rela-
tively easy and takes no more than up to six months from the date of
application. Also the fee for naturalisation has been lowered several
times. Since 2003 it has been set at 20 Lats (approx. 30 euros) and at 3
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Lats (4 euros) for certain groups of applicants.28 Persons may withdraw
their applications at any stage of the naturalisation procedure.
The requirements for the examinations are set out in the Regula-
tions on the Examination of Proficiency in the Latvian Language and
the Examination of Knowledge of the Basic Principles of the Constitu-
tion, the Text of the National Anthem and the History of Latvia for Per-
sons Who Wish to Acquire the Citizenship of Latvia through Naturali-
sation. The regulations provide that knowledge of the language, of the
Constitution, the anthem and history shall be tested by an examination
commission established by the Naturalisation Board.29 Persons exempt
from the tests are those who: (1) have acquired primary, secondary or
higher education in educational institutions with Latvian as the lan-
guage of instruction, (2) have disabilities. Persons over the age of 65
shall be subject to the Latvian language test only.30
According to sect. 4, the employees of the Naturalisation Board, the
members of the Standing Committee on the Implementation of the Ci-
tizenship Law, of the Parliament as well as representatives from other
organisations and institutions, shall be allowed to be present in the ex-
aminations as observers if they have received permission from the
head of the Naturalisation Board. The examination of language profi-
ciency takes place within two months from the day when all the neces-
sary documents have been submitted, and the examination of the other
topics two months after passing of the language exam (sect. 6). If the
applicant does not attend or fails the exam he or she can retake the
exam after three months in the case of the language exam and after
one month in the case of the so-called knowledge exam (sect. 9).
The language proficiency exam has a written and an oral part (sect.
11). According to sect. 22, the examination commission shall assess the
applicant’s ability to read, write, listen and understand talks on topics
of everyday life. Applicants above the age of 65 only take the oral lan-
guage test (sect. 21).
Language proficiency has often been mentioned as the main obstacle
for naturalisation. Therefore, in 1996, the State Programme for Latvian
Language Learning was initiated. In the framework of the programme
a number of language courses and information campaigns on naturali-
sation were conducted by the Naturalisation Board with financial assis-
tance from various international organisations and Western countries.
The success rate was high: in 1998 only 2 per cent of the applicants
did not pass the exam the first time, while in 2002, when the number
of applicants increased significantly, 15 per cent had to repeat their
exam (Brands-Kehre & Puce 2005: 23).
The knowledge exam may be taken orally or in writing, based on the
applicant’s choice (sect. 23). The success-rate is high, too. In 1998 only
0.4 per cent failed the test at the first attempt. In 2003 and 2004 the
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figure rose to 3 and 4 per cent respectively. The relative increase of
failed first attempts can be explained by the overall rise of applications
from 5,608 in 1998 to 21,297 in 2004.
2.2.2 Loss of nationality
Latvian nationality is lost in cases of renunciation or revocation. Ac-
cording to art. 23, renunciation can take place if a person has been
guaranteed the nationality of another state except if he or she has un-
fulfilled obligations towards the state or has not fulfilled mandatory
military service. The clause on the fulfilment of obligations towards
the state is unclear, i.e., whether it involves fiscal or other obligations.
Such a broad formulation may make it possible to arbitrarily deny the
right to change nationality (Ziemele 1998: 248). Moreover, since 2004
Latvia has a professional army and mandatory military service has been
abolished.
Art. 24 provides for three cases when nationality can be revoked by a
decision of a regional court, namely, if a person (1) has acquired the na-
tionality of another state without renouncing Latvian nationality; (2)
continues to serve in foreign armed forces or similar institutions with-
out permission from the Cabinet of Ministers; or (3) has acquired na-
tionality by fraud. The provision applies equally to all nationals, except
for those who hold dual nationality and are thus exempted from the ap-
plication of art. 24 (Ziemele 1998: 247). Family members are also not
affected by such proceedings. These grounds comply with those identi-
fied in the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. If a person
continues to reside permanently in Latvia for five years then this revo-
cation does not affect future naturalisation (art. 25, para. 2).
2.3 Current political debates
The nationality issue still appears in public debate and is mainly re-
ferred to by left wing parties who traditionally represent the Russian-
speaking electorate. Most noticeably it is raised in context with other
ethnically sensitive laws, for instance, the Education Law or the ratifica-
tion of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protec-
tion of National Minorities.
Right wing parties have recently reopened the nationality debate. It
was planned that during the autumn session of 2005 the Parliament
would consider amendments in the Citizenship Law. The aim of the
amendments was to re-formulate with greater precision the cases
where nationality cannot be granted to persons who acted against the
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state as well as to ease the process of granting nationality to several
groups of children.
According to the head of the Naturalisation Board, Eizenija Alder-
mane, the Citizenship Law, last amended in 1998, currently needs cer-
tain amendments of a technical nature. She mentioned as an example
the case where it is unclear what nationality shall be given to a child if
one of the parents is a non-citizen and the other is a foreigner. The
same applies in relation to the so called ‘forgotten’ children, i.e. chil-
dren whose parents naturalise but forget to apply for the naturalisation
of their children.
The most important amendments are expected in relation to art. 11
which provides for restrictions in granting nationality. According to Al-
dermane ‘the situation has changed; the world faces international ter-
rorism and other security concerns which shall be reflected in the Law.
Moreover, current reading of the Law provides that nationality is not
granted to a person who was an employee of the KGB or other foreign
security service. This formulation does not cover persons who are still
employed by these institutions’.31
In 2005 the Minister for Integration, Ainars Latkovskis, considered
that a more general formulation should be included allowing national-
ity to be withheld from persons acting against the state and state secur-
ity. He mentioned as examples the nationality laws of Estonia, Russia
and other states. In this context the case of Mr. Petropavlovskis shall be
mentioned. Mr. Petropavlovskis is a non-citizen and a member of a ra-
dical group called ‘Headquarters for the Protection of Russian Schools’
which amongst other things organises various kinds of protests against
an education reform that provides that in secondary schools, which are
financed by the state, 60 per cent of the subjects shall be taught in Lat-
vian. He joined one of the radical left parties and was willing to be a
candidate for local government elections after naturalisation. In the
meantime, he publicly campaigned for violence, bloodshed, terrorism
and threatened to act after naturalisation. However, the Cabinet of Min-
isters refused his application for nationality on 16 November 2004
based on the argument that he is not loyal to the state, a decision
which was challenged by Mr. Petropavlovskis.32 This is the first case of
the Cabinet of Ministers refusing to grant nationality to a person who
has complied with all other requirements of the Citizenship Law. Ac-
cording to art. 17, the Cabinet of Ministers decides on whether nation-
ality is granted or not. Para. 3 of the same article states that a negative
decision by the Naturalisation Board is subject to appeal in court.33 The
Administrative Court of the first instance has agreed with the position
of the Government because the law does not explicitly state that deci-
sions of the Government can be appealed.34 Moreover, in the view of
the court, compliance with the requirements of the Citizenship Law
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does not establish a subjective right to Latvian nationality. The court
agreed with the Government that this reading of the Law does not con-
tradict the obligations of Latvia as a signatory state of the European
Convention of Nationality. The main reason for this is that the current
procedure of naturalisation was established in 1997 while Latvia signed
the Convention only in 2001. The case was appealed unsuccessfully.
Public statements by Mr. Petropavlovskis imply that he intends to ap-
peal to international instances.
The discussions on amendments to the Citizenship Law have been
stopped. The Cabinet of Ministers agreed that the pre-election cam-
paign for the next parliamentary elections, which will take place in au-
tumn 2006, is not the right time for discussing amendments of politi-
cally sensitive laws.
2.4 Statistics
2.4.1 Status and ethnic composition of Latvian inhabitants
The following tables on status and ethnic composition of Latvian inha-
bitants illustrates both Latvian national sentiments from the 1930s
when they were a considerable majority and the current situation
where Latvia is still hosting large numbers of non-citizens.
As evident from Table 2.1, the ethnic composition of Latvia’s resi-
dents changed considerably during the occupation.
Table 2.2 shows that notwithstanding various efforts to liberalise nat-
uralisation requirements, the numbers of non-citizens have not de-
creased significantly since the beginning of the 1990s.
Table 2.1: Changes in ethnic composition of Latvia’s population
1935 1995 2005
Latvians 75.5% 55.1% 58.9%
Non-Latvians 24.5% 44.8% 41.1%
Source: Ziemele 2001: 236, and Naturalisation Board, www.np.gov.lv
Table 2.2: Citizens and non-citizens of Latvia
1993 2005
Nationals 1,715,930 (71.8%) 1,826,804 (79.6%)
Non-citizens and foreign nationals ,673,398 (28.2%) ,469,458 (20.4%)
Total 2,389,328 2,296,062
Source: Ziemele 2005: 156, 365, Naturalisation Board, www.np.gov.lv, and Register of
Residents of the Department of Citizenship and Migration, www.pmlp.gov.lv
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Table 2.3 illustrates that it was mainly residents of Russian or East-
ern Slav origin who became stateless or non-citizens after the restora-
tion of independence in 1990. The situation has not changed since
then and the naturalisation process is generally slow.
2.4.2 Acquisition of nationality by children
The discussions before the 1998 referendum on the possibility of
granting nationality to children of non-citizens and stateless persons
were heated and there were arguments that large numbers of children
would acquire nationality without being sufficiently integrated. Cur-
rently available statistics tell the opposite.
Table 2.4: Children of non-citizens and stateless persons born after 21 August 1991 who










Source: Naturalisation Board, www.np.gov.lv
Altogether 3,706 children have benefited from the amendments to the
Citizenship Law in 1998 of which 2,917 are of Russian origin. This fig-
ure is unsatisfactory considering that there are altogether about
20,000 children who have the right to acquire nationality according to
Table 2.3: Residents of Latvia on 1 July 2005 (by ethnic origin)1
Nationals Non-citizens Aliens, stateless Total %
Latvians 1,349,539 2,120 1,033 1,352,692 58.9%
Lithuanians 17,655 12,263 1,571 31,489 1.4%
Estonians 1,522 658 349 2,529 0.1%
Byelorussians 28,551 56,829 2,024 87,404 3.8%
Russians 346,746 288,207 21,084 656,037 28.6%
Ukrainians 13,812 40,952 3,813 58,577 2.6%
Poles 40,642 14,885 556 56,083 2.4%
Others 28,337 16,955 5,959 51,251 2.2%
Total 1,826,804 432,869 36,389 2,296,062 100%
Source: Naturalisation Board, www.np.gov.lv, and Register of Residents of the the
Department of Citizenship and Migration, www.pmlp.gov.lv
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the provisions of the Citizenship Law. In 2004, the Minister for Inte-
gration, together with the Minister for Children and Family Affairs,
conducted an information campaign sending information to the par-
ents of these children. As a result there was an increase in the number
of applications (Brands-Kehre & Puce 2005: 24).35 Experts have sug-
gested replacing the current system with the automatic registration of
children born to parents who are stateless or non-citizens as nationals.
2.4.3 Naturalisation
Naturalised persons per year
As argued above, naturalisation rates remain low but with positive ten-
dencies. The respective statistics allow some general conclusions to be
drawn on the motivation of the potential applicants for nationality to
start on the naturalisation process.
















Total 111 142 105 088
Source: Naturalisation Board, www.np.gov.lv
The biggest wave of naturalisation started after the window-system was
abolished. In 1998, only 4,439 persons were naturalised; the number
rose to 12,427 persons in 1999. This increase might also be due to a
number of campaigns for naturalisation taking place at the time.
The second wave of naturalisations started after it became clear that
Latvia would become a member of the European Union. From 2003 to
2004 the number of naturalisations rose from 10,049 to 16,064. In
2005, 19,736 persons were naturalised and the high rate of naturalisa-
tion remains steady.
Notwithstanding the growing figures, the data are still not satisfying
when the overall number of non-citizens is taken into account. The
main reason for the high number of non-citizens mentioned by the
CHECKS AND BALANCES IN LATVIAN NATIONALITY POLICIES 79
authors of the report ‘Democracy Audit’ is the lack of motivation of
non-citizens to naturalise. Firstly, non-citizens consider that they auto-
matically deserve nationality. Secondly, there are certain benefits in re-
taining the status of non-citizen, mainly easier travel requirements to
the CIS countries. Thirdly, there is fear of the naturalisation exams.
The last reason to be mentioned is the fee to be paid which, although
lowered, is still relatively high for many people living in Latvia.
Ethnic origin of applicants for naturalisation
The ethnic origin of applicants for naturalisation is indicative of the
fact that Latvia is still dealing with its post-occupation legacies. The mi-
gration rates are insignificant and applicants for naturalisation are So-
viet-era settlers.









Source: Naturalisation Board, www.np.gov.lv
During the Soviet-era large numbers of ‘blue-collar socio-economic’
profile immigrants were sent to Latvia. At that time the Soviet central
government put emphasis on the promotion of economic industrialisa-
tion. Latvia has suffered under this policy because (1) Latvia hosted the
headquarters of the Soviet army for the Baltic region and (2) the Lat-
vian political elite was most sympathetic compared to other Baltic
states.
Age of applicants for naturalisation
Most applicants are to be found in the age groups of eighteen to 30
and 31-40. These statistics exemplify that if the ‘window system’ had
been maintained the numbers would be different because the age
groups starting at 41 represent a considerable proportion of those who
applied for naturalisation.
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Table 2.7: Age of applicants for naturalisation in Latvia (1 February 1995 – 31 December
2005)






61 and older 7,564 7.1
Source: Naturalisation Board, www.np.gov.lv
Nationality granted for special meritorious service for the benefit of Latvia
With regard to granting of nationality for special meritorious service
two periods can be distinguished. From 1995 to 1998 there were 199
cases of naturalisation due to special services, whereas the number
dropped to only twelve since 1999.
This decline is explained by changes in the Citizenship Law in 1998
when the so-called ‘window-system’ was dropped. Therefore those who
want to become nationals can apply for naturalisation and they do not
have to rely on the special procedure for the extension of nationality by
Parliament. This procedure most often is used for sportsmen.
2.5 Conclusions
Latvian nationality policy is based on the concept of state continuity.
The rights attached to nationality were therefore restored to those who
were nationals at the time of the occupation of Latvia in 1940 and their
descendants. This policy led to the situation that a large group of peo-
ple who settled in Latvia during occupation remained stateless. Being
under international pressure to comply with the international legal fra-
mework, especially regarding the reduction of statelessness, Latvia in-
troduced the status of non-citizen. A so called carrot-and-stick policy
has been adopted with regards to this group. Non-citizens are denied
political rights and the right to hold certain posts or to be employed in
certain professions. In order to enjoy these rights they have to natura-
lise.
Taking into account that nationality is a politically sensitive topic in
Latvia it is doubtful that radical changes will occur in the near future.
The difficult compromise made in 1998 is satisfactory for the ruling
centre-right wing parties. However, the question of the fate of non-citi-
zens in the framework of EU law remains unsettled.
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Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Latvia
Date Document Content Source




and loss of nationality
during the interwar period.
1922 Constitution of the
Republic of Latvia (adopted
15 February 1922 with
latest amendments on 15
December 2005)
The Constitution was
restored after restoration of
independence.
www.ttc.lv
1940 Decree on the Order in
which the Citizens of the
Soviet Socialist Republics
Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia are Granted USSR
Citizenship
Imposed Soviet nationality
on the nationals of three
Baltic States automatically.
1990 Declaration on the Renewal
of Independence of the
Republic of Latvia (4 May
1990)
Restored the authority of
the 1922 Constitution and
suspended it immediately
except for a few provisions




1991 Resolution on the Renewal




Aimed at reconstituting the
body of nationals who
could elect a legitimate
Parliament and was based
on the 1919 Law.
1994 Law on Citizenship The first version provided a
'window system' limiting
the right to naturalise on






Provided for right to
citizenship for Latvians and
Livs who have registered
domicile in Latvia, persons
who have acquired
education in Latvian as well
as women who lost their
citizenship by marriage in
accordance with the 1919
Law.
1995 Law on the Status of
Former USSR Citizens Who
Are Not Citizens of Latvia
or Any Other State
(amended in 1997, 1998,
and 2000)












repealed and access to
Latvian nationality for
children of non-citizens
and the stateless was
liberalised.
1999 Regulations No. 32 on the
Procedure for the
Acceptance and Review of
the Application on the
Recognition of a Child as a
Citizen of Latvia
Specified the procedure
and documents to be
submitted to the
Naturalisation Board with
an application for the
recognition of a child as a
citizen.
www.legislationline.org
1999 Regulations No. 33 on the
Examination of Proficiency
in the Latvian Language
and the Examination of
Knowledge of the Basic
Principles of the
Constitution, the Text of the
National Anthem and the
History of Latvia for
Persons Who Wish to





Provided for the procedure
to be followed during
examinations, identified
the persons to be
exempted from tests, and
specified the competencies
and obligations of the
examination commissions.
www.np.gov.lv
1999 Regulations No. 34 on the
Procedure for the
Acceptance and Review of
Naturalisation Applications
(with amendments 2000,
2001, 2003, 2004, 2005,
2006)
Established the procedure




followed were necessary in
order to bring the
Regulations in line with
other laws adopted in the
meantime, such as the
Immigration Law, the Law
on the Declaration of






1999 Law on the Status of
Stateless Persons in the
Republic of Latvia
Non-citizens are not
subject to this law.
www.ttc.lv
2000 Regulations No. 410 on the
State Duty Payable for
Documenting Renunciation
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Date Document Content Source
of the Citizenship of Latvia
and Restoration of the
Citizenship of Latvia
2001 Regulations No. 234 on the





Provided for three different
categories of applicants
and the amount of state
duty to be paid by each of
those groups (20 Lats, 3
Lats, exempt from paying).
www.legislationline.org




Citizenship of Latvia (with
amendments 2004)
Set guidelines for the
procedure on loss and
restoration of citizenship.
Specified the documents to
be submitted by the
applicant and the
respective decisions to be
taken by the Naturalisation
Board. The amendments
brought the Regulations in
line with the new Law on
Administrative Procedure.
www.legislationline.org
2004 Regulations No. 378
Regarding Passports for
Latvian Citizens and Aliens
as well as Travel
Documents for Stateless
Persons
Set out the application
procedures for passports
and the contents of each
document.
www.ttc.lv
2004 Regulations No. 1011 on
the Procedure to
Determine the Status of
Latvian Non-citizens
Provided for procedure to
be followed by applicants
and the Office of
Citizenship and Migration
Affairs regarding decisions
as to whether a person
satisfies all the conditions
to qualify for the status.
www.pmlp.gov.lv
Notes
1 I would like to thank Prof. Ineta Ziemele for her comments on the draft of this
article. The usual disclaimer applies.
2 UN Doc A/RES/55/153 (Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the Succession
of States), 30 January 2001.
3 For a detailed treatment of this principle, see Ziemele 2005.
4 Latvia like the other Baltic States was guided by the principle ex iniuria ius non oritur
which has been seen as a rather inflexible approach.
5 In 1995 grounds (2), (3) and (8) were included.
6 Livs are a historic indigenous group of Finno-Ugric descent living near the Baltic sea.
7 See the part on naturalisation in section 2 below.
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8 For instance a person who was 45 years of age and born in Latvia could apply for
naturalisation in 2000, while a person who was twenty could apply in 1996.
9 The European Union ‘expressed grave concern at certain aspects of the […] law on
citizenship adopted in Latvia’ (European Commission, General Report on the Activities
of the European Union 1994 Brussels/Luxembourg 1995, para. 759). See also the Opi-
nion No. 183 (1995) on Latvia’s application for membership in the Council of Europe;
stars.coe.fr.
10 The amendments were adopted on 22 June 1998. The referendum was held on 3
October 1998 and about 53 per cent of the electorate voted for the adoption of the
amendments.
11 Only in exceptional cases can such an application be submitted by a single parent,
i.e., by a mother if there is no entry regarding the father in the birth record or by the
remaining parent if one parent is deceased.
12 Apart from that the requirements of exams and the fee to be paid for naturalisation
have been lowered a number of times.
13 See the section on statistics at the end of this chapter.
14 The EU accession negotiations avoided the issues related to the status and rights of
non-citizens. The Commission of the European Union, when interpreting the scope
of the application of the so called Third-country Nationals’ Directive (Council
Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 Concerning the Status of Third-
country Nationals who are Long-term Residents, Official Journal, L 016, 23 January
2004, pp. 0044-0053) stated that ‘the expression ‘‘third-country national’’’ covers ’all
persons who are not citizens of the Union in the sense of Article 17 paragraph 1 of
the EC Treaty, that is to say those who do not have the nationality of an EU Member
State’. This indicates that persons with undetermined citizenship fall within the
scope of the directive. Letter from the Directorate-General Justice and Home Affairs,
European Commission to the Permanent Delegation of Latvia in the EU institutions,
23 June 2003.This places non-citizens in a disadvantageous situation compared to
the status they have enjoyed so far.
15 See the conclusions by an EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental
Rights, Synthesis report for 2003, p. 88. The experts regret that the situation of non-
citizens has not been resolved during the entry negotiations between Latvia and the
EU.
16 For instance, Kees Groenendijk suggested to call them ‘denizens’, a term describing
residents enjoying a status between alien and citizen (Groenendijk 1993: 15).
17 See the concluding observations of the Committee for the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination on Latvia, 12 April 2001. CERD/C/304/Add.79, available under www.
unhchr.ch, and the report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human
Rights, on his visit to Latvia, 5–8 October 2003, available under www.coe.int.
18 See Constitutional Court Case 2004-15-0106, Official Gazette No. 40, 9 March 2005.
Most other rulings have been passed by administrative courts. Thus, for instance, the
department of administrative cases of the Supreme Court Senate gave the following
definition: ‘The link of a non-citizen to the Republic of Latvia is closer than it is in
the case of a stateless person or an alien. Therefore, the revocation of the status of
non-citizen means a significant limitation of the rights of the respective person’ (case
of Oganess Saakjan, Decision of 2004, No. SKA-89, C27261801). The regional court,
on the other hand, was faced with a case of a non-citizen and a Russian parent who
wanted to register their child as a non-citizen. The court concluded that ‘the Republic
of Latvia has acknowledged its jurisdiction also over non-citizens and a Latvian non-
citizen in his rights is closer to the status of citizenship. It shall also be acknowl-
edged that the link of a non-citizen to the Republic of Latvia is stronger than that of
a stateless person or an alien. Taking into account that the parents of the child have
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chosen Latvia as place of residence, it can be concluded, that the human rights of the
child are not limited in Latvia if she is granted the status of a non-citizen’ (case of
Sergej Zaharov, Decision of 2004, No. AA 1218-04/4, A42173104).
19 See, for instance, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Latvia,
3 October 1995. CCPR/C/79/Add.53; A/50/40, paras. 334–361. www.unhchr.ch.
Concluding observations of the Committee of the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination: Latvia, 12 April 2001. CERD/C/304/Add.79. www.unhchr.ch.
20 Almost automatic acquisition means that a person shall approach the regional office
of the Naturalisation Board and submit documents testifying that the person
permanently resides in Latvia as well as supporting documents confirming that the
person belongs to one of the groups of persons qualifying for almost automatic
citizenship (for instance, diploma of secondary education in Latvian).
21 According to para. 4 of art. 24 of the Immigration Law permanent residence can be
acquired after five years of residence in Latvia with a temporary residence permit.
This means that a person shall reside five years in Latvia in order to obtain
permanent residence and a further five years with permanent residence to acquire
the right to apply for citizenship. Exceptional cases provide for a shorter residence
requirement as permanent residence permits can be issued in certain cases
immediately after arrival (for instance, family reunification, former citizens and non-
citizens and alike).
22 The Law states that a person shall know the basic principles of the Constitution of
the Republic of Latvia and the Constitutional Law Rights and Obligations of a
Citizen and a Person. However, this law lost its force on 6 November 1998 when the
Constitution was supplemented with a chapter on human rights.
23 In the case of Estonia and Lithuania they had to be citizens of the respective
countries on 17 June 1940, but in the Polish case on 1 September 1939.
24 These include the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Latvian Communist
Party, the Working People’s International Front of the Latvian SSR, the United
Council of Labour Collectives, the Organisation of War and Labour Veterans, the All-
Latvia Salvation of Society Committee or their regional Committees or the Union of
Communists of Latvia.
25 According to the Naturalisation Board there were approximately twenty court cases
related to the application of art. 11. Most of them concerned persons with alleged
affiliation to the KGB. Since 2002 the Naturalisation Board has lost in only one
court case on the application of art. 11. The case involved a person who challenged
the decision to refuse the application for citizenship on the basis that he served in
the USSR army.
26 The Naturalisation Board is considered as one of the best performing institutions in
Latvia. In relation to court cases the statistics show that out of 338 court cases the
Naturalisation Board has lost only five.
27 A special procedure is provided by the Regulations on the Procedure for the
Acceptance and the Review of the Application on the Recognition of a Child to be a
Citizen of Latvia. The documents submitted are subject to verification by the Office
of Citizenship and Migration Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior if a child has
reached the age of fourteen (minimum age for criminal liability). Any other state and
self government institution can be approached by the Board (sect. 19).
28 Regulations on the State Duty Payable for Submission of a Naturalisation
Application, Regulations No. 234 (Record No. 26, para. 43), Riga, 5 June 2001. The
rate is lowered to 3 Lats for: (1) members of poor families or poor persons; (2)
unemployed; (3) members of families with more than three under age children; (4)
persons receiving old-age pension; (4) disabled persons with a certain degree of
disability; (5) pupils and students; (6) full time students of tertiary education
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establishments. Persons exempted are: (1) politically repressed; (2) severely disabled
persons; (3) orphans and children who are not under their parents’ charge; (4)
persons sheltered by social care institutions of the state or self-government. The fees
were changed in 1997, 2001 and 2002.
29 It was common practice that language proficiency had to be verified even after a
person had passed the exam in case he or she wanted to hold a public position. This
practice was changed after the decision of the Human Rights Committee in the
Ignatane case (Communication No. 884/1999, 31 July 2001). Antonina Ignatane was
deleted from the list of candidates for local government elections after language
inspectors conducted an unexpected language examination at her place of work
concluding that her level of language proficiency did not correspond to the highest
degree necessary to be elected for local government.
30 These exceptions were introduced in 1998.
31 LETA [National News Agency], 1 February 2005. ‘Gatavos grozı̄jumus pilsonı̄bas
likumā’ [Amendments to Citizenship Law in preparation], Diena [daily newspaper],
12 April 2005.
32 LETA, 8 December 2005.
33 This procedure was introduced with amendments of 1997. Prior to the 1997 reform,
decisions on naturalisation were taken by the Ministry of the Interior and they were
subject to judicial review.
34 Case No. A42248104, A1486-05/3, decision by the Administrative Court on 16
December 2005.
35 The Table is based on data on ethnic origin as indicated by residents. At the
beginning of the 1990s all residents were required to declare their ethnic origin
which was mentioned both in their passports and in the Register of Residents.
Current practice is that those applying for naturalisation are required to declare their
ethnic origin on an application form that they submit to the Naturalisation Board.
This requirement is optional as is the reference to ethnic origin in the passport.
36 The number of applications received during 2004 was equal to the numbers received
from 1998-2004.
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Chapter 3: Lithuanian nationality: Trump card to
independence and its current challenges1
Kristı̄ne Krūma
There are slight differences between the Latvian and Lithuanian ap-
proaches as far as the transition from the Soviet to democratic institu-
tions is concerned. Lithuania could be said to have used the Soviet le-
gal and institutional basis for the adoption of the decisions necessary
at the time more than Latvia did. However, it will be argued that these
differences do not challenge the underlying principle of ex iniuria ius
non oritur followed also by Latvia and Estonia.
In comparison to other Baltic States Lithuania escaped close interna-
tional scrutiny of its nationality policies. Therefore nationality has, un-
til recently, not created any controversies. Only after Lithuania encoun-
tered hurdles related to the presidential discretion for granting nation-
ality has the issue attracted attention, especially on the national
political agenda.
3.1 History of nationality policy
3.1.1 General overview of nationality policy
The same scenario of imposing the Soviet nationality upon their na-
tionals was applied in all three Baltic States, including Lithuania. How-
ever, Soviet Citizenship Law did allow the Soviet republics some
authority regarding nationality matters (Kalvaitis 1998: 240). This was
seized by Lithuania in 1989 when it enacted its first Citizenship Law.
Those who opted for Lithuanian nationality did not, however, lose their
status as nationals of the Soviet Union.
Guided by the principle of ex iniuria ius non oritur, Lithuania, having
declared independence on 11 March 1990, first reinstated the 1938
Constitution and simultaneously suspended some of its articles as they
were incompatible with democratic principles. Following the full sus-
pension of the 1938 Constitution, the Provisional Basic Law was en-
acted, accounting for present-day realities (Kalvaitis 1998: 243). The
1992 Constitution was carefully drafted with reference to laws in force
before 1940 and with an emphasis on constitutional continuity (Zie-
mele 2005: 40). However, the enactment of the 1989 Citizenship Law
before adoption of the Constitution is the main difference to the ap-
proaches adopted in the two other Baltic States because Lithuania was
guided by the conflicting principle ex factis ius oritur, at least to a cer-
tain extent. This means that the new Constitution was adopted by an
extended body of nationals in comparison to the citizenship laws prior
to 1940.
The development of Lithuanian nationality legislation can be divided
into three main phases. The first phase started with the Law adopted
in 1989 providing for liberal conditions upon which Lithuanian nation-
ality could be acquired. This phase ended with the Law of 1991 when
Lithuania had already restored its independence and stricter criteria for
the acquisition of nationality were introduced. This second phase is
problematic and confusing because there were various attempts to find
a balance between compliance with the principle of continuity of na-
tionality and the avoidance of double nationality. The third phase was
initiated by the new 2003 Law on Citizenship. It attempts to stream-
line provisions of the 1991 Law and its numerous amendments and to
bring certain provisions in line with the requirements for human
rights.
3.1.2 The 1989 Citizenship Law
The first Lithuanian nationality law was adopted on 3 November 1989.
The Law identified four categories of persons who were or could be-
come nationals of Lithuania:
– Persons, who were nationals or permanent residents prior to 15 July
1940, their children and grandchildren who are or have been per-
manent residents of Lithuania.
– Persons who had a permanent place of residence in Lithuania if
they were born in Lithuania or they were Lithuanian descendants
and provided they were not nationals of another state.
– Other persons who at the time of the adoption of the Law were per-
manent residents for at least two years and had employment or
other legal source of support in Lithuania. Thus, the law allowed
persons who arrived in Lithuania during the Soviet period to ac-
quire Lithuanian nationality. They had to declare their intention to
become nationals within two years following the entry into force of
the law2, i.e., until November 1991. Upon registration they had to
swear an oath of allegiance to the Lithuanian Constitution and laws
(Kalvaitis 1998: 244, 261). This principle applied irrespective of
their nationality or language abilities.
– Persons who had acquired the Lithuanian nationality in accordance
with the law.
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According to the Constitutional Court of Lithuania in Case 7/94, the
Law differentiated between existing and potential holders of Lithuanian
nationality.3 Persons who were nationals prior to occupation, their des-
cendants and permanent residents on 15 June 1940 who continued to
reside in the country when the Law entered into force, were considered
nationals ipso facto. The same applied to persons born in the territory
of Lithuania and still residing there, and persons whose parents were
born or resided in that territory. These persons were considered as hav-
ing a permanent legal relationship with Lithuania; a principle which
was considered particularly important in Lithuania for its nationality
policies (Ziemele 1998: 223).
Soviet time immigrants were considered only as potential nationals
as they were guaranteed the right to freely decide on their nationality.
After they accepted nationality they all had to take a pledge of loyalty to
Lithuania (Kalvaitis 1998: 261). In case 7/94, the Constitutional Court
emphasised that there were differences between this category of per-
sons and the other nationals. The latter never had firm permanent le-
gal relations with Lithuania and they were immigrants holding Soviet
nationality. After the restoration of an independent Lithuania they be-
came foreigners if they did not use the option provided for by the 1989
Law. It has to be recalled that this choice was not obvious or easy at the
time. In 1989 or even 1990, it was still difficult to foresee the collapse
of the Soviet Union. Taking an oath of allegiance to Lithuania required
certain convictions. 90 per cent (87 per cent according to other
sources) of non-Lithuanian permanent residents registered as nationals
under these provisions. Only 1 per cent of the pre-independence electo-
rate chose not to become nationals of the Republic of Lithuania (Kalvai-
tis 1998: 261).
The law did not provide for the possibility of dual nationality. This
was confirmed in the Provisional Basic Law in art. 13 which stated that
as a rule, a citizen of Lithuania may not at the same time be a citizen
of another state. The subsequent amendments on 16 April 1991 con-
firmed that Lithuanian nationality is lost upon the acquisition of the
nationality of another state. However a number of exceptions existed at
that time as well. These concerned persons who were nationals of
Lithuania prior to 15 June 1940 and their descendants.
3.1.3 The 1991 Citizenship Law
The second Citizenship Law in Lithuania was adopted on 10 December
1991.4 It established who are to be considered Lithuanian nationals.
The new law ended the liberal period when any resident could apply
for nationality after two years of residence and introduced stricter re-
quirements. It was subsequently amended several times: 19 November
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1992, 16 July 1993, 3 October 1995 and 6 February 1996. The follow-
ing comments on the 1991 Law take these amendments into account.
The law identified groups of individuals eligible for Lithuanian na-
tionality. Initially those included:
– nationals of Lithuania prior to 15 June 1940 including their children
and grandchildren if they had not acquired nationality of another
state;
– permanent residents of Lithuania between 9 January 1919 and 15
June 1940 within the territory of the present Lithuania, their chil-
dren or grandchildren, if they continue to reside in Lithuania and
are not nationals of another country;
– persons of Lithuanian origin who left Lithuania prior to 16 Febru-
ary 1918, if they have not acquired nationality of another state;5
– persons who acquired nationality in accordance with the Law on Ci-
tizenship effective prior to 1991;
– other persons who acquired nationality under the Law (naturalised).
The Supreme Council in the Resolution on the Procedure for Imple-
menting the Republic of Lithuania Law on Citizenship of 10 December
1991, clarified in sect. 5 that persons serving in the armed forces, inter-
nal troops and state security structures, as well as other law enforce-
ment and repressive structures of the Soviet Union must not be con-
sidered as permanently residing or employed in Lithuania. This was in
line with the Supreme Council Resolution on 1939 Treaties between
Germany and the USSR and Elimination of their Consequences for
Lithuania (7 February 1990) and the Supreme Council Declaration on
the Status of Soviet Armed Forces in Lithuania (19 March 1990). They
stated that servicemen of the occupation army were not entitled to the
right to participate in elections organised in Lithuania, with the excep-
tion of those persons who under the 1989 Law on Citizenship could be
recognised as nationals of Lithuania. A descendant of a Lithuanian citi-
zen, as identified prior to 15 June 1940, who had served in the Soviet
army, was not excluded from Lithuanian nationality. The USSR nation-
ality was declared null and void with respect to such individuals as for
all other Lithuanian nationals. The Constitutional Court said that:
‘Such a decision meant that the consequences of occupation and an-
nexation with regard to citizens of Lithuania on whom citizenship of
the Soviet Union had been forced against their will, were being un-
done. It goes without saying, that such decision on the part of the state
could only be adopted regarding its citizens, and the state could by no
means resolve issues concerning the citizenship of another state’.
According to art. 12 of the 1991 Lithuanian Constitution, with the ex-
ception of cases established by law, no person may be a citizen of the
Republic of Lithuania and another state at the same time. The Citizen-
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ship Law deals with the issue of double nationality in a confusing way
which is closely connected with a certain conflict between the princi-
ples of continuity of nationality and the principle of effective link that
the Law tries to accommodate. Relevant provisions of the Law have
been amended several times to clarify who can and who cannot acquire
double nationality. Concerns were expressed by the Lithuanian na-
tionals who could not obtain Lithuanian passports because they had in
the meantime acquired another nationality. They were therefore denied
the possibility to restore their nationality because dual nationality was
prohibited. The Council of Europe characterised this situation as unsa-
tisfactory (Ziemele 1998: 220).
Explanations were given by the Constitutional Court in Case 7/94
when it dealt with questions pertaining to the right of members of the
Soviet armed forces to acquire Lithuanian nationality. The Constitu-
tional Court was approached by a group of MPs who challenged the va-
lidity of the Resolution of the Parliament which provided that members
of the USSR army, who had terminated their service before 1 March
1992 and 4 November 1994, and had been issued a Citizen Certifica-
tion Card, could acquire citizenship. The Court declared the provisions
of the Resolution unconstitutional. It clarified that the 1989 Citizen-
ship Law ‘did not provide for a possibility for a citizen of Lithuania to
be at the same time a citizen of another state’. This was supported by
another general principle of the 1989 Law, providing that Lithuanian
nationality is lost with the acquisition of another nationality (Ziemele
1998: 220). The Court noted that there is only one exception to this
general rule, i.e., persons who were nationals of the Republic of Lithua-
nia prior to 15 June 1940 and their descendants. The latter explanation
relates to the application of the principle of continuity of nationality
while the prohibition of dual nationality is linked in principle to the
understanding of effective link by Lithuania as concerns its decisions
on nationality issues.
According to this ruling of the Constitutional Court, the Law was
amended in 1995. Art. 1 provided that nationals of Lithuania prior to 15
June 1940, and their children, are nationals of Lithuania if they have
not renounced Lithuanian nationality. The requirement that they
should not be nationals of another state was lifted. However, this con-
dition was still applicable to their grandchildren.
This amendment also affected arts. 17 and 18 of the 1991 Law. Art.
17 stated that the right to nationality of Lithuania shall be retained for
an indefinite period for (1) persons who were nationals prior to 15 June
1940 and their children provided that they have not renounced Lithua-
nian nationality and (2) persons of Lithuanian origin residing in other
states.6 According to the 1995 amendments a person of whom one par-
ent or grandparent is Lithuanian and who is Lithuanian him or herself
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shall be considered a person of Lithuanian origin. The same amend-
ments provided for differentiation between the above mentioned cate-
gories (1) and (2). While the first group could retain another national-
ity, the second had to renounce the nationality of another state and re-
turn to Lithuania for permanent residence in order to be granted
Lithuanian nationality.
Art. 18 stated that all persons mentioned in art. 17 should renounce
the nationality of another state. Moreover, persons of Lithuanian origin
residing in other states shall become permanent residents as well as
take the oath to Lithuania in order to acquire nationality.7 Such a com-
plicated scheme reflects the problems caused by the prohibition of dual
nationality when the independence of a state, which was suppressed
for a considerable time, is restored. It was only when amendments
were made in 1993 that persons who were deported or left Lithuania
during occupation and their children who had not acquired nationality
of another state by birth and lived in other states could recover Lithua-
nian nationality by presenting a written notice to the authorities. Be-
fore these amendments neither provisions of art. 17 or art. 18 provided
possibilities to acquire dual nationality.
Therefore, on the one hand, the Law identifies nationals with respect
to whom the prohibition of dual nationality does not apply, i.e., groups
of individuals whose right to nationality is retained for an indefinite
period without renouncing their present nationality. On the other
hand, there are groups of persons who have the right to nationality but
the right can only be exercised when they renounce their present na-
tionality (Ziemele 2001: 235-236).
Distinctions apply also to different categories of children, i.e., those
who are considered nationals by birth and those who have to acquire
nationality although they are born in Lithuania. A child born to parents
one of whom is a Lithuanian citizen shall be a citizen irrespective of his
or her place of birth if at least one parent has permanent residence in
Lithuania (art. 9). If, however, both parents reside outside Lithuania
they shall reach an agreement on the child’s nationality until he or she
is eighteen years of age. Foundlings shall be considered nationals while
children born to stateless persons who are permanent residents in
Lithuania shall acquire Lithuanian nationality (arts. 10 and 11). The arti-
cles do not specify whether these children have to be born in Lithuania,
which may imply that the Law means children who have arrived in the
country with their parents. Both articles draw a distinction between
children who shall be nationals by birth and those who have to acquire
nationality (Ziemele 1998: 237).
In relation to spouses of Lithuanian nationals art. 14 provided a sim-
plified procedure for the acquisition of nationality, i.e., three years of
residence in Lithuania while married, the passing of exams on lan-
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guage and the Constitution as well as the renunciation of their pre-
vious nationality. The amendments of 1992 added another category of
persons subject to a simplified procedure. It stated that those who are
married to Lithuanian nationals who were deportees or political prison-
ers and their children born in exile shall be granted Lithuanian nation-
ality if they are married for at least three years and have moved for per-
manent residence to Lithuania together with their spouse. These per-
sons would only have to renounce their previous nationality and to
pass an examination on the Constitution of Lithuania.
Lithuania’s general approach to the regulation of nationality, espe-
cially in the early 1990s, can be considered as more liberal in compari-
son to the other Baltic States. First, most of the Soviet-era settlers ac-
quired nationality on the basis of the 1989 Law while Latvia and Esto-
nia re-established the body of nationals on the basis of the legislation
of the pre-occupation period. Second, Lithuania did not introduce any
quota system while Latvia abolished its quota system only in 1998.8
Third, Lithuania included residence during Soviet period as valid for
nationality purposes. Latvia and Estonia took into account only the resi-
dence after restoration of independence. Therefore, Lithuania managed
to avoid criticism which is still addressed to Latvia and Estonia. This
has often been explained by the different proportion of non-indigenous
population residing in Lithuania when independence was restored.
The Lithuanian approach cannot be qualified as a ‘pure zero-option’
because there were distinctions made between different groups of per-
sons. The principle of continuity of nationality remained the main
point of departure for deciding how to identify nationals. That is the
reason why some of the groups were not considered as nationals ipso
facto and were subject to naturalisation according to the 1989 Law.
However the procedure was very simple and a majority of the groups
affected by this clause, mainly former USSR nationals, naturalised. As
a consequence the 1991 Law did not really have to address the issues
concerning the former USSR nationals, except when they had not used
the 1989 Law option (Ziemele 1998: 225). As concerns nationals how-
ever, a distinction was made between the execution of the right to na-
tionality and the restoration of nationality. Restoration concerns situa-
tions where the original nationality was not retained throughout the oc-
cupation or when some actions are needed to re-instate it (Ziemele
1998: 224).
3.1.4 The 2003 Citizenship Law
The third Law on Citizenship was adopted on 17 September 2002 and
entered into force on 1 January 2003. It repealed the 1991 Law and in-
corporated certain related laws (such as the Law on the Validity of Citi-
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zenship Documents). The Law was subsequently amended in 2003
and 2004.9 One of the main issues which was publicly debated was
the question of Lithuanian émigrés holding dual nationality.10 Emi-
grants voiced their discontent with the fact that they are stripped off
Lithuanian nationality when acquiring the nationality of another state.
The new Law accommodated their requests and in addition provided
for possibilities to have their nationality status re-instated. However,
some national minorities protested against the Law. They argued that
permitting dual nationality only to ethnic Lithuanians contravenes the
Constitution and international norms.
The new Law on the Implementation of the Republic of Lithuania
Law on Citizenship was adopted in 2003 (amended in 2004). One of
the main provisions stated that those who applied for nationality under
the 1989 Law but did not receive a document confirming their status
and were residing abroad, lost their nationality on 31 December 2003.
This decision was taken by the Minister of the Interior.
The new Citizenship Law slightly amended art. 1 defining the cate-
gories of nationals. It now includes references not only to children and
grandchildren of persons who were nationals prior to 15 June 1940 or
permanent residents from 9 January 1919 to 15 June 1940 but also to
their great-grandchildren. Moreover, those who were nationals prior to
15 June 1940 and their descendants (including great-grandchildren) do
not have an obligation to renounce a nationality held from another
state. Reference to 16 February 1918 has been lifted and, thus, any per-
son of Lithuanian descent is a Lithuanian citizen if he or she does not
have any other nationality. Hence, the Law expands the category of per-
sons who have an inherent right to nationality of Lithuania up to the
fourth generation, and introduces conditions for simplified restoration
of nationality for those who lost their Lithuanian nationality but have
an inherent right to it. The former art. 17 has been simplified and art.
18 has been deleted altogether.
The conditions upon which a child is considered a citizen if only
one parent is a Lithuanian citizen have also been slightly changed. Ac-
cording to the new art. 9, a child shall be a citizen if born in the terri-
tory of Lithuania and one of the parents is a national. In case the child
is born outside Lithuania, his or her nationality is to be determined by
an agreement between the parents (of whom one must be a Lithuanian
national) until he or she reaches eighteen years of age. This shall be
done irrespectively of their place of permanent residence. Art. 10 pro-
vides ius soli acquisition of nationality for children whose parents are
stateless persons permanently residing in Lithuania.
The conditions for acquiring Lithuanian nationality were made stric-
ter for spouses (art. 14). Firstly, the 2003 Law provided that only those
spouses who had been married for at least five years and had been resi-
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dent in Lithuania for that period were to be granted nationality. They
had to pass exams on language and the Constitution and were not al-
lowed to hold another nationality. Thus, stricter requirements were in-
troduced as previously only three years of residence were required.
With the amendments effective from January 2005, the residence re-
quirement for spouses of Lithuanian nationals has been raised even
further to seven years.11 Secondly, persons married to Lithuanian na-
tionals who were deportees or political prisoners and their children
born in exile are no longer exempt from the Lithuanian language
exam. They also have to reside in Lithuania for five, not three years as
before. Thirdly, the Law has introduced conditions upon which a per-
son can acquire nationality in the case of his or her spouse being de-
ceased, if they were married for more than a year with residence in
Lithuania. In these cases a person could acquire Lithuanian nationality
after three years of residence provided that he or she passes the exams
on language and the Constitution and renounces his or her previous
nationality. However, after the amendments effective from January
2005 the residence requirement was raised to five years.
It shall be noted that at least some amendments were introduced be-
cause of a ruling of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania in case No.
40/03 of 30 December 2003 regarding the granting of nationality by
way of exception.12 The petitioners – several MPs – asked the Court’s
ruling on the possible violation of the constitutional principle of equal-
ity by the President when he granted nationality by exception to one of
his advisors, Jurij Borisov. These events were heatedly debated and sub-
sequently led to an impeachment procedure against the President. In
summary, the Constitutional Court ruled that in cases when the Presi-
dent grants nationality by way of exception he or she shall verify the
service which was given to Lithuania as a state, establish whether the
person has permanent factual links with Lithuania, whether the appli-
cant is not subject to any exceptions mentioned in the Law as well as
his or her possibilities to recover nationality on his or her own initia-
tive in accordance with the Law.
Generally the Law streamlines the conditions for the acquisition and
retention of nationality of the previous Law which due to its numerous
amendments became too cumbersome. A number of provisions are ex-
cluded because they do not relate to the acquisition or retention of na-
tionality but rather dealt with the conditions for entry and residence in
the territory of Lithuania. The Law is clearer regarding the continuity
and restoration of nationality as well as dual nationality. Moreover, it
brings the conditions in line with the requirements of human rights
law (groups excluded from acquiring nationality, loss of nationality due
to invalid passport etc.) and provides for stricter requirements in cer-
tain cases (spouses). Finally, the Law grants more authority to the Min-
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ister of the Interior and clarifies a number of provisions in relation to
the naturalisation procedure. These latest provisions came into force
on 1 April 2006.13
3.2 Basic principles of the most important current modes of
acquisition and loss of nationality
3.2.1 General principles of the acquisition of nationality
Art. 12 of the Constitution proclaims that ‘citizenship of the Republic
of Lithuania shall be acquired by birth or on other grounds established
by law’. However, the Citizenship Law does not mention the principle
of reducing statelessness as a possible guideline for the nationality pol-
icy of the state (Ziemele 1998: 248). There is no support for the argu-
ment that Lithuania has adopted the ius soli principle in addition to
the ius sanguinis principle as basis for the acquisition of nationality in
the Law.
Art. 7 enumerates the grounds on which the nationality of Lithuania
can be acquired by: (1) birth; (2) exercising the right to nationality; (3)
naturalisation; (4) international treaties; (5) reference to other grounds
provided in legislation. Reference to international treaties is unclear. It
can be argued that in cases where the Citizenship Law contravenes
Lithuania’s international obligations the norms of the treaties would
then be directly applicable.
3.2.2 Right to nationality
The Lithuanian Citizenship Law identifies a number of groups who
are considered Lithuanian nationals by birth and by exercising the
right to nationality. Nationals are, firstly, those individuals who were
nationals by right, i.e., they were nationals before 15 June 1940 or are
of Lithuanian descent. However, a distinction is made within this cate-
gory of people between nationals ipso facto who do not have to re-
nounce the nationality of another state and those who have to do so in
order to become nationals of Lithuania. In both cases their right is pre-
served indefinitely. Secondly, nationals are people who were born in
the territory and have subsequently resided there (Ziemele 2001: 237).
They are given the right to acquire nationality on the basis of applica-
tion because their links with Lithuania are not considered as obvious
(Ziemele 2001: 237). Otherwise they are regarded as foreigners, albeit
with the right to permanent residence. In comparison with the first
group their right to opt for nationality is not preserved indefinitely
(Ziemele 1998: 222). Thirdly, children born to Lithuanian parents and
foundlings shall be Lithuanian nationals while children born to state-
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less persons have the right to acquire nationality. The provision is neu-
tral regarding the gender of the parents.
Nationals residing outside Lithuania can submit their applications to
diplomatic and consular missions. The Minister of the Interior has the
authority to submit a recommendation to recognise a person as having
lost nationality, and to receive applications for retention of nationality
by persons who were nationals prior to 15 May 1940 and those of
Lithuanian descent. According to art. 29 if a person fails to obtain the
necessary documents attesting Lithuanian nationality held prior to 15
June 1940 or his or her Lithuanian descent, the Minister of the Inter-
ior or Minister of Foreign Affairs and institutions authorised by them
may apply to the Presidential Citizenship Commission for a verifica-
tion of facts. The Commission presents its recommendatory findings
to the Minister of the Interior or the institution authorised by him. Ac-
cording to art. 31, repeated applications shall be accepted no earlier
than one year after the adoption of the previous decision.
3.2.3 Naturalisation
Art. 12 lays down several requirements to be met in order to acquire
Lithuanian nationality.
The requirements are the following:
– passing the Lithuanian language exam (speaking and reading);14
– ten years of permanent residence in Lithuania;
– permanent employment contract or a constant legal source of sup-
port;
– knowledge of the Constitution;
– lack of any other nationality; and
– agreement to take the oath to Lithuania.
Amendments in 1995 lifted the requirements of the language exam
and the knowledge of the Constitution exam for persons over 65 years
of age, disabled persons of group I and II15 and the sick with grave
chronic mental diseases. These exceptions were upheld in the Law of
2003. In addition, this Law has lifted the requirement that refugees
have to be stateless or renounce their nationality prior to applying for
Lithuanian nationality.
Art. 12 provides that interests of the state have to be taken into con-
sideration when nationality is granted. The application of this provision
is unclear and open to discretion.
The terms ‘permanent residence in the territory of Lithuania’ and
‘constant legal source of support’ were clarified in sect. 3 of the Su-
preme Council Resolution on the Procedure for Implementing the Re-
public of Lithuania Law on Citizenship (adopted on 10 December
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1991). A person shall be considered as permanently residing in Lithua-
nia if he or she has been registered in the register of permanent resi-
dents, has accommodation, and is employed in Lithuania under an em-
ployment contract or has another paid occupation in Lithuania and
pays taxes there. A person will also be considered as permanently resid-
ing if he or she is somebody’s dependent or is paid a pension legally
due to him or her in Lithuania. Residency is counted including the per-
iod 1940-1991 (Kalvaitis 1998:264).
Lithuanian practice as confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Case
7/94 has established that neither an occupying army nor repressive
structures of a foreign state which resided in Lithuania without con-
sent of Lithuania’s authorities could be considered as lawfully residing
for the purpose of the permanent residence requirement of the Citizen-
ship Law (Ziemele 2001: 236). Likewise, service in such foreign forces
cannot be considered as legal employment. Moreover, this interpreta-
tion is valid also in the context of the 1989 Law.
According to art. 16, the President has the right to grant nationality
by exception. The requirements for this option are, first, significant
contribution to strengthening of Lithuanian statehood by the person in
question. Second, the person has to contribute to an increase in Lithua-
nia’s power and its authority in the international community. Third,
the person should be integrated in the Lithuanian society, i.e., he or
she must have permanent factual links with Lithuania. Fourth, accord-
ing to the ruling of the Constitutional Court in Case 40/03, art. 13 is
applicable in these cases.
Art. 13 identifies the groups of persons precluded from acquiring na-
tionality. Those include persons who (1) have committed crimes against
humanity or acts of genocide; (2) have taken part in criminal activities
against Lithuania; (3) before coming to Lithuania have been tried for a
deliberate crime for which the criminal liability is imposed in Lithua-
nia or have been sentenced in Lithuania; (4) are chronic alcoholics or
drug addicts and (5) have especially dangerous infectious diseases.
Exclusion of alcoholics, drug addicts and criminals applied until the
adoption of the Law of 2003. Criminals who have been convicted be-
fore the adoption of the Law were subject to an ex post facto penalty to
their punishment. Exclusion from naturalisation of alcoholics and drug
addicts was particularly pernicious because it was likely to discourage
them from seeking needed treatment.16
Since 1 January 2005 groups (1) and (2) have been widened and in-
clude not only those persons who committed aforementioned crimes
but also those who were preparing or attempting to commit those
crimes and acts. Moreover, the amendments added that persons who
do not have the right to reside in Lithuania cannot be granted national-
ity.
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Since then, art. 13 on conditions for withholding nationality has been
changed to bring it in line with human rights requirements. Firstly, it
no longer states that chronic alcoholics, drug addicts or those ill with
especially dangerous infectious diseases cannot become nationals. Sec-
ondly, the scope of persons who have had criminal charges against
them has been minimised. The Law no longer refers to persons who
before coming to Lithuania have been tried for a deliberate crime but
only to persons who before coming to Lithuania have had a custodial
sentence imposed on them for a premeditated crime. Also in relation
to those convicted in Lithuania a reference is made to premeditated
crime, not to a deliberate one.
The procedures for resolving issues related to nationality are set out
in chapter V of the Law. The chapter includes detailed information as
to what documents shall be submitted in each case when a person ap-
plies for nationality. According to para. 10 of art. 28 all applications for
the acquisition, renunciation and restoration of nationality shall be
submitted to the President through the executive institution of the mu-
nicipality. Applications for nationality are reviewed by the Citizenship
Commission which is established by the President. It submits propo-
sals for decision to the President. Decrees by the President should be
co-signed by the Minister of the Interior. According to the Constitu-
tional Court the responsibility for these decrees lies with the Ministers.
The reason for this is that the President can be removed from office
only for grave violations of the Constitution. In case of denial an appli-
cant is provided with a reasoned decision in writing. According to art.
30 decrees by the President concerning the granting, retention, restora-
tion or loss of nationality as well as declaring an act on the granting of
nationality invalid are published in the Official Gazette.
3.2.4 Loss of nationality
The grounds for loss of Lithuanian nationality are outlined in art. 18. It
provides that nationality is lost (1) upon renunciation; (2) upon acquisi-
tion of nationality of another state; (3) on grounds provided for by inter-
national agreements to which Lithuania is a party.17 According to the
latest amendments in 2004 (effective of 1 April 2006) a person would
lose nationality if, while working in another state, he or she were to in-
jure the interests of Lithuania. The formulation is wide and it is un-
clear what is meant by damaging Lithuanian interests. Acquisition of
nationality of another state does not result in loss of nationality for two
groups of persons, i.e., persons who were nationals prior to 15 June
1940 and their descendants as well as persons of Lithuanian descent.18
A person may be recognised as having lost nationality if he or she is in
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the military service of another state or is employed in the public service
of another state without permission of the Lithuanian authorities.
Moreover, there are a number of grounds on which naturalisation
can be invalidated. Art. 21 provides that, firstly, naturalisation will be
deemed invalid if nationality has been acquired by fraud or if a person
has committed international crimes provided for by the international
treaties or customary law (aggression, genocide, crimes against human-
ity, war crimes or crimes against Lithuania). Secondly, the act of natur-
alisation will be declared invalid if the court establishes that after 15
June 1940 a person has ‘organised or carried out deportation or exter-
mination of the residents, suppressed the resistance movement in
Lithuania’ (official translation). The same result would be reached if a
court establishes that a person took part in the actions against indepen-
dence and territorial integrity of Lithuania after 11 March 1990.
The act of invalidation applies to naturalised nationals and Lithua-
nian descendants, if they have opted for Lithuanian nationality (Zie-
mele 1998: 221). A declaration of invalidity may be used as an addi-
tional penalty in relation to other criminal charges, e.g. if a person has
committed crimes against humanity, acts of genocide or crimes against
the Republic of Lithuania, prior to or after acquisition of nationality, as
determined by the court decree. Original nationals cannot be subjected
to such an additional penalty in similar circumstances (Ziemele 1998:
250). The article does not set any precise time limit within which
charges brought against a person for crimes against Lithuania could af-
fect naturalisation. This again opens the possibility of arbitrary deci-
sions which could result in statelessness and would run against the
rule prohibiting arbitrary deprivation of nationality (Ziemele 1998:
250).
Art. 30 provides that invalidation of nationality is enacted by the Pre-
sident of Lithuania who issues a decree to that effect. The decree is not
subject to judicial scrutiny. As the Lithuanian Citizenship Law is both
complex and cumbersome on a number of issues the right to appeal
decisions would be more than desirable (Ziemele 1998: 222).
According to art. 18 everyone has a right to renounce their national-
ity. However, the same article provides for exceptions. Thus application
for renunciation may not be considered if the person has been charged
with a criminal act or if a court judgement passed on the person has
become effective and enforceable. Setting the absence of criminal
charges as a condition for the renunciation of nationality may also raise
human rights considerations. The person may still be entitled to re-
nounce nationality, which would not affect procedures employed by the
state as long as the person remains within its jurisdiction (Ziemele
1998: 249).
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The Law on Citizenship places additional safeguards in order not to
allow the cases of statelessness to arise. Art. 20 provides that a person
who has lost nationality as a result of renunciation or on grounds pro-
vided in an international treaty may be reinstated with Lithuanian na-
tionality if he or she submits an application while having permanently
resided in Lithuania for at least ten years, has a legal source of support
and is stateless. Special conditions are provided for persons who were
nationals or permanent residents before 15 June 1940 and their descen-
dants as well as persons of Lithuanian descent. If they have lost nation-
ality as a result of renunciation or on the basis of an international
treaty, Lithuanian nationality is restored automatically on the basis of
application.
3.3 Current political debates
The most recent proposals in the field of nationality policies aim at es-
tablishing a procedure for restoration of Lithuanian nationality for
those who lost it upon acquisition of another nationality prior to 1 Jan-
uary 2003. This is a continuation of the policy established in the last
Citizenship Law. In order to draft a legislative proposal a working
group of experts from different state institutions has been estab-
lished.19
Another debate regards the nationality of Jewish emigrants (Litvaks)
from Lithuania. During his visit to Israel on 15-16 March 2005, Presi-
dent Valdas Adamkus said that he sides with the motion to give them
Lithuanian nationality.20 The speaker of the Lithuanian Parliament Ar-
turas Paulauskas predicted that Adamkus had provoked spearhead de-
bates over the issue and possible amendments to the Citizenship Law.
These debates, however, as noted by Paulauskas will have to take into
account the history of all minorities in Lithuania, such as the Polish
and German, as well. The speaker of the Seimas said that the Parlia-
ment debated the issue of nationality for Litvaks a couple of years ago
but stopped short of endorsing it in a new nationality law. Rzeczpospoli-
ta, a Polish daily, wrote that Lithuania should not limit the right to na-
tionality to one group but should also grant nationality to the Polish
people coming from what is now Lithuania. Dual nationality may cur-
rently only be granted automatically to foreigners of Lithuanian origin.
It may therefore be concluded that no major changes are envisaged
in Lithuanian nationality policy. Recent political debates confirm that
general tendencies are towards the liberalisation of the acquisition of
nationality in relation to certain groups, including dual nationality for
those who are of Lithuanian origin.
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3.4 Statistics
Taking into account that nationality and statelessness issues were not
high on the political agenda due to the liberal approach adopted in the
1989 Law, no exact statistics were maintained. Lithuanian statistical in-
formation is therefore rather poor.
Table 3.1 shows the significant changes to the ethnic composition of
Lithuania between 1923 and 1992.




Source: Department of Migration, Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania, www.
migracija.lt
Data for the period from 1992 onwards are not available because no ex-
act statistics were maintained during that period. Data on naturalisa-
tion only have been available since 2002. As Table 3.2 shows, between
2,400 and 3,400 persons have been naturalised each year.
Table 3.2: Acquisitions of Lithuanian nationality, 2002-2004
YEAR 2002 2003 2004
NUMBER 3299 2451 3403
Source: Department of Migration, Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania, www.
migracija.lt
The number of deprivations of nationality are rather high, but have de-
clined since 2002 from 1,026 to 701 per year (see Table 3.3).
Table 3.3: Deprivation of Lithuanian nationality, 2002-2004
YEAR 2002 2003 2004
NUMBER 1026 611 701
Source: Department of Migration, Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania, www.
migracija.lt
Restoration of nationality did not play a significant role in the last
years, the number of cases has been below a hundred each year.
Table 3.4: Restoration of Lithuanian nationality, 2003-2004
YEAR 2003 2004
NUMBER 82 68




The Lithuanian approach to nationality issues has been considered as
more liberal than the regulations in other Baltic States because it did
not apply pre-1940 citizenship laws in order to reconstitute its body of
nationals. The Citizenship Law of 1989 provided easy criteria for acqui-
sition of nationality. As the result of liberal laws most of its residents
acquired Lithuanian nationality. However, the Citizenship Law of 1991,
enacted immediately after restoration of independence, introduced
much stricter requirements for the acquisition of Lithuanian national-
ity. These are still in existence and in certain cases are more stringent
than the regulations in other Baltic States, such as the conditions on
residence before applying for citizenship.
One of the major areas of confusion relates to the regulation of dual
nationality in Lithuania. Dual nationality has become more restricted
since the adoption of the 1991 Citizenship Law. It has provoked public
debates due to its exclusionary nature and unclear application. The si-
tuation has been addressed in subsequent amendments and most nota-
bly in the Law of 2003. From the overall developments it seems that
Lithuania is becoming more liberal concerning dual nationality.
The main remaining problem of Lithuanian nationality policy is the
wide discretion given to the President concerning the granting of na-
tionality. Notwithstanding the amendments introduced after the deci-
sion of the Constitutional Court in the Paksas case, the judicial review
of all decisions related to nationality would be a welcome development.
This would also facilitate Lithuania’s ratification of the European Con-
vention on Nationality which has not yet been signed.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Lithuania
Date Document Content Source
1989 Supreme Soviet of the
Lithuanian Soviet Socialist
Republic Law on Citizenship
(3 November 1989 No. XI-
3329)
Reconstituted the body of
nationals by restoring
nationality to those who
were nationals before the





1991 Republic of Lithuania Law
on Citizenship (5 December
1991
No. I-2072 as amended by
2 July 1997, No. VIII-391)
Introduced stricter
naturalisation requirements
and a complicated system in
relation to dual nationality.
www.uta.edu
1991 Supreme Council of the
Republic of Lithuania
Clarified the application of
the Citizenship Law in
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Date Document Content Source
Resolution on the Procedure
for Implementing the
Republic of Lithuania Law
on Citizenship (11
December 1991, No. I-2080)
relation to inter alia persons
who served in armed troops
and other state security
structures of the Soviet
Union.
www.litlex.lt
1991 Law on the Validity of
Citizenship Documents
issued by the Republic of
Lithuania and on the
Supplement to the Law on






Citizenship shall be valid
until the person is issued
with new citizens' passport
but no longer than 1 July
1993. Supplemented
Citizenship Law of 1991 and
provided that new
Citizenship Law shall




1992 Constitution of the Republic
of Lithuania
Confirmed the basic
principles of acquisition of
Lithuanian nationality (ius
sanguinis) and a negative
position in relation to dual
nationality.
www.litlex.lt
2002 Law on Citizenship (as last
amended by the Law of 3
April 2003 N° IX-1456)
Repealed the 1991 Law,
extended the category of
persons who have inherent
right to nationality and
simplified the restoration of
nationality; clarified
Lithuania's position on dual
nationality; introduced ius
soli for children whose
parents are stateless and
reside in Lithuania;
introduced higher





2002 Law on Implementation of
the Law on Citizenship (as
last amended by the Law of
21 January 2003 N° IX-1298)
Clarified the procedural





2003 Decision of the
Constitutional Court of
Lithuania on the
Compliance of the President
States that citizenship of the
Republic of Lithuania is
granted to Jurij Borisov by
way of exception in
www.lrkt.lt
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Date Document Content Source
of the Republic of Lithuania
with Decree No. 40 on
Granting Citizenship of the
Republic of Lithuania by way
of Exception of 11 April
2003
compliance with the
Constitution of the Republic
of Lithuania and para. 1 of




2004 Amendments to the Law on
Citizenship (12 September
2004, N° IX-1078)
Brought the law in line with
human rights (regarding
refugees, alcoholics, drug
addicts); took into account
the ruling of the
Constitutional Court in the




2004 Amendments to the Law on
the Implementation of the
Law on Citizenship (11
November 2004, N° IX-
1079)
Streamlined the procedures
for the acquisition of
nationality attempting to
address problems as




1 I would like to thank Prof. Ineta Ziemele for her comments on the draft of this
article. The usual disclaimer applies.
2 Permanent residence was determined by so called propiska which is something simi-
lar to a residence permit nowadays. It had to be obtained before individuals could
move to another place. This was applicable not only in between republics but also
within republics. Report on Lithuania, European Commission against Racism and
Intolerance. Strasbourg, September 1997, ECRI (97) 56 para. 6.
3 Case No. 7/94 of 13 April 1994 (1994) 1 E.E.C.R.C.L.255. Available at www.lrkt.lt.
4 The texts used here are available under www.litlex.lt and www.minelres.lv.
5 This option was inserted with amendments of 3 October 1995.
6 This article was slightly changed by amendments on 6 February 1996. Before these
amendments the law provided that citizenship shall be retained by children who had
Lithuanian citizenship until 15 June 1940 and who were born in Lithuania or in
refugee camps but are at present time residing in other states.
7 Before amendments of 7 December 1993 this condition was also applicable to
children of persons who held Lithuanian citizenship until 15 June 1940.
8 See chapter 2 on Latvia in this volume.
9 Certain provisions of amendments are effective since 1 April 2006, but some since 1
January 2005.
10 For details on these debates see the articles ‘Lithuanian émigrés unhappy with
citizenship loss’, ELTA [National News Agency], 6 June 2001, ‘New Law will entitle
Lithuanian emigrants to keep citizenship’, ELTA, 17 September 2002, and ‘Adamkus
signed controversial citizenship law’, ELTA 30 September 2002.
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11 The proposed amendments were even stricter and debate was reopened after the
President of Lithuania intervened with proposals to liberalise the procedure for
naturalisation in Lithuania for spouses. The compromise reached was that the
required term of residency would be increased from five to seven years, but not to
ten years as foreseen in the draft law (86 in favour, five against, seven abstentions).
The President also opposed the additional requirement that the couple should have
minor children who are Lithuanian citizens. In his view this would contradict the
principle of equality contained in the Constitution. The proposals made by the
President were harshly criticised by Conservative Members of Parliament. They saw
the proposals as threat to the survival of the Lithuanian nation and national identity.
Moreover, they were afraid that liberal citizenship procedures might stimulate
marriages of convenience, often referring to Denmark to illustrate this point. See
‘Seimas approves more liberal procedures for admission to citizenship via marriage’,
ELTA, 9 December 2004.
12 On this case, see also ‘Lithuanian Practice in International Law 2004’, as reported in
the Baltic Yearbook of International Law 5, 2005: 329-332.
13 In addition, on 1 April 2006 the authority on questions of citizenship, formerly
attributed to municipal institutions, was transferred to the Department of Migration
of the Ministry of the Interior.
14 On 11 February 2004 the Ministers of Education and Science and Justice confirmed
the programme of exams on the basics of the Lithuanian Constitution and language.
The procedure for the organisation and implementation of the exams was confirmed
by both Ministers on 1 March 2004.
15 There are three groups of disability of which group I is the heaviest. The group is
assigned by a special commission on the basis of a diagnosis. Assignments can be
for a defined period or for life. Group I is as a rule assigned for life.
16 Provisions at issue were closely monitored, at least, by the Human Rights Watch,
which on a number of occasions condemned their application and advocated to
abolish them. See the reports on human rights developments in Latvia, Lithuania
and Estonia available at www.hrw.org.
17 Before the Law of 2003 was adopted it was possible to lose citizenship on the basis
of severance of actual links with Lithuania. A person who has lived abroad with an
invalid passport for more than three years or who has entered foreign military or
public service without the permission of the competent authorities was considered to
have severed links with Lithuania.
18 However, it is not entirely clear because according to art. 1, para. 3, persons of
Lithuanian descent can acquire Lithuanian citizenship if they are not citizens of any
other state. The only plausible explanation can be that according to art. 18 they do
not lose their right to acquire Lithuanian citizenship because they possess the
citizenship of another state.
19 Information provided by the Head of the Division on Citizenship Matters of the
Ministry of the Interior, Mrs. Daiva Vezikauskaite.
20 For more information on the debate see ELTA, 15 March 2005, and ELTA, 16 March
2005.
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Part II: States with histories of shifting borders

Chapter 4: Same letter, new spirit: Nationality
regulations and their implementation in Poland
Agata Górny
During the last century, the rewriting and reconstructing of the perti-
nent laws relating to Polish nationality were shaped, first of all, by
transformations in the Polish state’s political construction. Namely, the
Second Republic of Poland (1918-1939), the Polish People’s Republic
(1945-1989) and the Third Republic of Poland (from 1989 onward)
have represented different political systems and approaches towards
the concept of Polish citizenship.
Arguably, the development of the legal notion of Polish citizenship
has always been strongly embedded in the historical context of the
country, as belonging to the Polish nation has not always been synon-
ymous with membership within the Polish state. This situation has
been caused by radical reconfigurations of Poland’s borders in the last
century and substantial political (also economic) emigration from Po-
land. Moreover, the communist Polish People’s Republic promoted the
idea of a single socialist nation comprised of members/inhabitants of
Soviet Bloc countries. Thus, geo-politics defined a concept of the nation
that was far removed from the way in which many Polish people con-
strued their own identity.
I differentiate, therefore, between the distinct concepts of ethnicity
and nationality/citizenship. The latter dual concepts refer to affiliation
to the state and are certified by a legal bond between a citizen and the
state. Ethnicity constitutes more of a subjective feeling of belonging to
an ethnic group or to a given nation, along with concurrent, objective
criteria relating to a person’s ancestry. Such a differentiation is neces-
sary in a presentation of the regulations and practice regarding Polish
nationality since, in my opinion, ethnicity was very important in the
law on nationality in the Polish People’s Republic and still plays a role
in current Polish legislation.
The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate evolutions in the field of
Polish nationality, focussing on its acquisition and loss. I present
changes not only in written law but also in practice regarding Polish
nationality. This is necessary due to a high level of discretion in the
Polish legislation in this field. Analyses of regulations are further en-
riched with selected statistics on the acquisition of the Polish national-
ity to better capture the nature of the phenomenon in Poland.
Aside from analysing legal acts and statistics, the chapter will indi-
cate the direction in which the approach towards Polish nationality has
been going since the 1990s. I argue that contemporary Polish national-
ity policy (if we can talk about one) still puts the emphasis on emi-
grants and the diaspora rather than on immigrants. My argument is
supported by the debate and work on new legislation relating to mat-
ters of Polish nationality in the Polish Parliament in 1999-2001. The
focus on the diaspora can be found in bills on Polish nationality and
related bills, of which only the Repatriation Bill was enacted (in
2000).1 Thus, I devote some space to the most recent bill on Polish na-
tionality, debated in the Parliament in 2001, which combined elements
from earlier bills.
The chapter opens up with a historical overview of developments in
nationality legislation from the post-war era to the present. Then, it dis-
cusses basic rules governing acquisition and loss of Polish nationality
in contemporary Poland. Subsequently, discussions regarding new reg-
ulations and their underlying orientations and trends in policy on Pol-
ish nationality are presented. Finally, selected statistics on the acquisi-
tion of Polish nationality are provided and discussed.
4.1 Polish nationality in historical perspective
4.1.1 Introductory remarks
There have been three acts on Polish nationality enacted – in 19202,
19513 and 19624 – that share important elements. First of all, the acqui-
sition of Polish nationality by birth has always been driven by the blood
principle (ius sanguinis), with the territory principle (ius soli) merely
playing a secondary role. Secondly, due to radical changes in Poland’s
international borders and long-standing emigration from Poland, is-
sues concerning the recognition of Polish nationality have always been
crucial to Polish legislation on nationality. Finally, rules concerning for-
eigners’ naturalisation in Poland have been of secondary importance in
the debate and legislation on Polish nationality, despite considerable
growth in immigration to Poland since the early 1990s.
4.1.2 Post-Second World War (1945-1962)
The end of the Second World War and agreements signed between Sta-
lin and other allied leaders radically altered Polish territory. This in-
volved two major changes – loss of (formerly) eastern Polish lands in-
habited by Polish citizens and the acquisition of eastern German lands
populated largely by German citizens (the ‘Regained Territories’). The
loss of the eastern Polish territories brought the problem of repatriat-
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ing Polish citizens from the newly-Soviet territory. This act was based
on several Polish-Soviet mutual repatriation agreements signed in the
1940s and in 1957. On the basis of these agreements, all people of Pol-
ish and Jewish ethnicity, who had been Polish citizens as of 17 Septem-
ber 1939, were entitled to move and resettle within Poland’s new bor-
ders (Łodziński 1998). All repatriates were treated as Polish citizens,
and automatically lost their foreign nationality upon repatriation to Po-
land. The repatriation agreements signed with the Soviet Union con-
cerned also the resettlement of Polish citizens of non-Polish (Ukrai-
nian, Belarusian, Russian etc.) ethnicity to the USSR. Here, the princi-
ple of expatriation from Poland was not based on nationality but
ethnicity.
Nevertheless, the biggest national group expatriated from Poland in
the post-war period, on the basis of the Potsdam agreements, was Ger-
mans. They were officially excluded from Polish society by the Act on
the Exclusion of Persons of German Ethnicity from Polish Society
(1946).5 This applied to people not verified as Polish nationals or those
manifesting their German origins.6 Ethnic Poles, even the ones having
been German citizens before the Second World War, were entitled to
stay in Poland. Special official bodies were established and appropriate
legal rules introduced to verify the Polish ethnicity of those who wished
to stay in Poland.7 Two pivotal legal acts announced at that time were
the Act on Polish Nationality of Persons of Polish Ethnicity Inhabiting
the Regained Territories (1946)8 and a like decree for inhabitants of
the former Free City of Gdańsk (Danzig) (1947).9 These acts directly
linked a person’s nationality to his or her ethnicity.
Ethnicity verification and objective ethnicity criteria were also in-
cluded in the 1951 Act on Polish Nationality. Namely, the Act obliged
the inhabitants of the Regained Territories and the former Free City of
Gdańsk to obtain adequate documents certifying their Polish ethnicity.
It also gave the right to Polish nationality to all Polish repatriates.
Again, Polish nationality was linked to ethnicity on a legal basis. This
link was also reflected in two subsequent legal acts concerning the per-
mission for the renunciation of the Polish nationality for people of Ger-
man (1956)10 and Jewish (1958)11 ethnicity who left for their ethnic
homelands (Albiniak & Czajkowska 1996: 324-325). Such acts were de-
signed to simplify the renunciation of Polish nationality. Behind these
acts lay, however, the idea of expelling those expressing non-Polish eth-
nicity from the country. The fact that this pressure was directed to-
wards selected ethnic groups is symptomatic.
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4.1.3 Stabilisation (1962-1989)
Another Act on Polish Nationality was introduced in 1962. This Act,
without major amendments, remained effective until the end of the
communist regime in Poland. It did not challenge the rules for the re-
cognition of Polish nationality included in the 1951 Act by assuming a
continuity of the law on Polish nationality. Nor did it directly address
the issue of Polish ethnicity, although it still accorded special rights to
repatriates returning to Poland.12 The link between ethnicity of a per-
son and his or her right to Polish nationality was made an issue in the
late 1960s. Polish authorities officially challenged the loyalty of Polish
citizens of Jewish origin to the Polish state. People with ‘dual loyalties’,
usually active in some way in political life were made to leave Poland
after signing a document expressing their intention to renounce their
Polish nationality upon acquisition of the Israeli nationality (Stola
2000). This ‘action of mass renunciation of Polish nationality’ was
based on the above-mentioned Decree of 1958. It is not within the
scope of this analysis to present the comprehensive political back-
ground behind asking Jews to repudiate their Polish nationality.13 It de-
monstrates, however, how the concept of Polish ethnicity and accordant
right to Polish nationality was exploited in Poland during the commu-
nist era.
Furthermore, many Polish people who emigrated from Poland dur-
ing the communist era were ‘asked’ to relinquish their Polish national-
ity while visiting Poland. If they didn’t relinquish it, they risked being
imprisoned in Poland for illegally overstaying abroad. Here, ‘a need to
renounce’ Polish nationality was justified not by the ethnicity criterion,
but by a lack of loyalty towards the Polish People’s Republic and its
ideology. Those procedures did not violate the Polish legislation on na-
tionality. However, they have been recently challenged as violating the
Polish Constitution by making renunciation of the Polish nationality
effectively compulsory for some people (Jagielski 2001).
In general, an analysis of legal acts on Polish nationality alone does
not allow for an understanding of the issues of nationality and nation
in communist Poland. This is due to the officials’ high level of discre-
tionary powers regarding Polish nationality at that time, which was par-
ticularly evident in how the relationship between ethnicity and nation-
ality was treated. Although absent from the 1962 Act on Polish Nation-
ality, ethnicity was a factor in decisions regarding Polish nationality
and played a particular role in relation to German and Jewish minori-
ties. Special decrees designed for these two groups in 1956 and 1958
were not voided until 1984 (Albiniak & Czajkowska 1996: 326).
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4.1.4 Political and economic transition (the post-1989 era)
The end of the Polish People’s Republic and the establishment of the
Third Republic of Poland necessitated deep economic and political re-
forms in the country. Likewise, changes in the nationality law were
considered to be necessary even as early as the negotiations that led to
fully democratic elections. However, a new Act on Polish Nationality
has not been enacted yet and the 1962 Act on Polish Nationality, with
some amendments from the late 1990s, is still in force.14 Even so,
some policy changes regarding Polish nationality have been intro-
duced. These changes in policy take advantage of imprecise formula-
tions in the 1962 Act on Polish Nationality. In this way, a strongly sub-
jective approach in conferring Polish nationality has been continued in
the Third Republic of Poland.
The most significant amendments to the 1962 Act were introduced
in 1999. The issue of repatriation was removed from the Act on Polish
Nationality and a separate legal act – the Repatriation Act – dealing
with this phenomenon was implemented in 2000. Rules regarding
loss of Polish nationality were changed since one of the clauses of the
Act, namely that ‘acquisition of a foreign nationality results in the loss
of Polish nationality,’ violated the 1997 Polish Constitution15 (Jagielski
2000). An amendment was passed to make it impossible to deprive
anybody of Polish nationality unless he or she expressed the desire to
give it up.
Amendments from 1999 also encompassed a few more precise,
hence less discretionary, criteria for granting Polish nationality. A defi-
nition of the type of stay (on the basis of a permanent residence per-
mit) was added to the requirement regarding the duration of stay in
Poland – five years. In practice, it amounts to around ten years of legal
residence in Poland although it varies for different groups of foreign-
ers.16 Major changes were introduced to the procedure designed for for-
eign spouses of Polish citizens (art. 10). The simplified procedure of
acquiring Polish nationality started to apply not only to foreign women
married to Poles, as it used to be, but also to foreign men. Under the
amendments, they were entitled to Polish nationality either three years
and six months after their marriages to Poles or after six months of liv-
ing on the basis of a permanent residence permit in Poland. In the
past, the corresponding requirement was totally different – application
for Polish nationality had to be made within three months of marriage.
A presidential Ordinance put into force in 200017 was another step
towards reduced discretion in decisions regarding the acquisition and
loss of Polish nationality, although it did not change the procedures
themselves that much. As a consequence of this ordinance, a list of
documents and forms required by the Presidential Chancellery to pro-
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cess appropriate applications became written law instead of less formal
rules, as had been the case before. The President initiated another
greatly significant change to Polish nationality policy. In 1999, the Pre-
sident expressed his will (in a form of a legal act) to terminate all re-
maining conventions concerning avoidance of dual nationality with
post-communist countries – a legacy of the communist era.18 These
conventions had been affecting foreigners’ naturalisation process by
creating inequality among applicants for Polish nationality. Most citi-
zens of the Soviet Bloc were not allowed to retain their previous nation-
ality upon naturalisation in Poland, whereas for other foreigners it was
subject to a discretionary decision of the Polish President. By 2002, as
a consequence of the President’s initiative, Poland ceased to be a party
of those conventions.19
4.2 Basic principles of current regulations on Polish nationality
4.2.1 Acquisition of Polish nationality
The 1962 Act on Polish Nationality deals with the acquisition of Polish
nationality by birth and with most modes of after-birth acquisitions.
The latter are regulated by three articles (arts. 8, 9 and 10). They corre-
spond with three procedures: conferment, acknowledgement and a simpli-
fied marriage procedure. One mode of acquisition – repatriation – is
covered by a separate legal act – the 2000 Repatriation Act.
Acquisition by birth is driven chiefly by the ius sanguinis principle: a
child becomes a Polish citizen when he or she has at least one Polish
parent (arts. 4 and 6). The ius soli principle applies only when both
parents are unknown (art. 5).
Conferment (art. 8) is the most discretionary procedure and can be
considered as a ‘fast track’ for granting Polish nationality. Within this
procedure, the President has virtually unrestricted power to grant or re-
fuse Polish nationality without any justification. Officially, using this
procedure, a foreigner can be granted Polish nationality when he or she
has lived in Poland, on the basis of a permanent residence permit, for
at least five years. However, the President can also use this procedure
for achievement-based conferment of Polish nationality, such as for
athletes, artists, scientists and others who rendered or are expected to
render some valuable service to the Polish State. The President can
also make acquisition of the Polish nationality conditional on renuncia-
tion of an applicant’s former nationality.
Acknowledgement (art. 9) can be considered as an entitlement-based
procedure of acquisition, as it gives relatively little space for discretion.
Within this procedure, a stateless person or a person whose nationality
is unknown can be granted Polish nationality, after he or she has lived
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in Poland, on the basis of a permanent residence permit, for at least
five years. Applications within this procedure are collected at the local
level (in starostwo) and decisions are made by voivods (the elected gov-
ernor of a voivodeship – province), who have to justify their positive
and negative decisions.
Marriage procedure (art. 10) defines acquisition by declaration. Within
this procedure, a person married to a Polish citizen acquires, upon appli-
cation, Polish nationality when he or she has lived in Poland, on the ba-
sis of a permanent residence permit, for at least six months or has
been married for at least three and a half years. The practice shows
that this procedure is the least discretionary among the three described
paths.
The conferment of Polish nationality can be extended to children of
the applicant. It can be extended also to adopted children but only after
the written agreement of the legal guardian (art. 8). In general, the na-
tionality of children over sixteen cannot be changed without their ex-
pressed agreement (arts. 7 and 8). Polish nationality is automatically
extended to all children of the applicant living in Poland at the time
only in the acknowledgement procedure (art. 9).
As demonstrated above, the main requirement for being successfully
naturalised in Poland concerns the duration of residence in Poland.
The Act on Polish Nationality does not demand any proof of attach-
ment to the Polish nation and culture or fluency in Polish. It has been,
however, observed that Polish nationality has sometimes been refused,
especially within the conferment procedure, due to the unsatisfactory
level of an applicant’s integration in Polish society in cultural, social or
economic terms (Jagielski 2001). A study of positive and negative deci-
sions on applications for Polish nationality in the Warsaw voivodeship
in 1989-1998 revealed also that an applicant’s Polish origins could be
to his or her advantage (Górny 2001).
Repatriation to Poland is inseparable from the acquisition of Polish
nationality. Repatriates become Polish citizens upon crossing the Pol-
ish border with a repatriation visa in their hands; Polish ethnicity is
the exclusive criterion for being entitled to the repatriation visa.20 Des-
ignates of Polish ethnicity, that have to be observed jointly, encompass:
declaration of Polish ethnicity, attachment to Polish culture (cultivation
of Polish language and tradition) and having at least one parent or
grandparent or two great grandparents of either Polish ethnicity or Pol-
ish nationality in the past. Thus, for repatriates, the right to Polish na-
tionality is exclusively based on an ethnicity criterion, which forms an
exception to the Polish nationality law.
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4.2.2 Loss and reacquisition of Polish nationality
Polish nationality cannot be taken away from anybody without his or
her will. ‘A Polish citizen loses his or her Polish nationality, upon his
or her application, after the President consents to it.’ Resignation from
Polish nationality extends to children only if the second parent agrees
to it or is deprived of his or her parental rights. Children over sixteen
have to agree to renunciation. Apart from self-renunciation, Polish na-
tionality can be taken away by option when parents, among whom one
is a foreigner, declare the choice of a foreign nationality for a child
within three months of the child’s birth.
As far as reacquisition of Polish nationality is concerned, the 1962
Act limits such possibility only to persons who lost their Polish nation-
ality due to marriage with a foreigner (art. 11). In such cases Polish na-
tionality can be returned, upon application, after termination of the
marriage. However, the President can also restore Polish nationality in
other cases using the conferment procedure. In 1998, President Kwaś-
niewski even declared that he would be returning Polish nationality to
German and Israeli citizens who had lost it in the past and that he
would not require renunciation of their foreign nationality. Conse-
quently, restoration of Polish nationality is another element of the Pol-
ish law on nationality where the level of discretion is relatively high.
4.2.3 Dual nationality
Dual nationality is tolerated in Poland although there is very little space
devoted to this issue in the 1962 Act on Polish Nationality. A short art.
2 says that ‘a Polish citizen, according to the Polish law, cannot be re-
cognised as a citizen of another country at the same time’. The inter-
pretation of this article varied and created some controversies in var-
ious periods. Its present interpretation is that a Polish citizen cannot
use his or her rights as a foreign citizen in contacts with Polish autho-
rities (Zdanowicz 2001). Such a relatively liberal approach is an effect
of the liberalisation of policy on dual nationality, which started in the
mid-1980s (Zdanowicz 2001). The liberalisation was further facilitated
by the termination of conventions on the avoidance of dual nationality
in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
It should be noted, however, that an official policy on dual national-
ity has never been articulated in Poland. Furthermore, the President,
who can ask for the relinquishment of foreign nationality upon natura-
lisation in Poland (art. 8), has not defined his position on this issue.
Consequently, as in other fields of nationality policy, the role of the
President is pivotal and the approach towards dual nationality in Po-
land is highly discretionary. Such ‘unofficial’ practices regarding dual
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nationality create many misunderstandings in this area, such as the
common opinion of the Polish diaspora that dual nationality is not ac-
cepted by Poland.
4.3 The unresolved debate (1999-2001)
Changes in the Polish nationality law have been planned since 1989,
but only selected goals have been achieved to date. The most important
act – the Act on Polish Nationality – remains unchanged although
there have been already several bills on Polish nationality proposed and
discussed in the Polish Parliament. Work on nationality legislation was
particularly intensive during the third parliamentary term (1997-2001),
when post-Solidarity parties held a majority in the Polish Parliament.
In the fourth parliamentary term, when post-communist parties held
the majority, work on nationality legislation was put off.21
The necessity to enact a new Act on Polish Nationality, frequently de-
clared by politicians (mostly post-Solidarity ones), stems from the fact
that the ideology regarding entitlement to Polish nationality changed
radically after 1989 in Poland. Also, new social currents, with the de-
mocratisation in CEE countries, required new solutions in the law on
Polish nationality. Reinstatement of Polish nationality to people who
were deprived of it needs to be clearly defined. Moreover, issues relat-
ing to the repatriation of people of Polish descent from the territory of
the ex-USSR again became prominent in the 1990s. Last but not least,
increasing immigration to Poland requires that the rules on naturalisa-
tion need to be re-evaluated and made less discretional.
Whereas the repatriation problem has been solved legislatively with
the introduction of the Repatriation Act in 2000, no special legislation
dealing with the two remaining issues has been enacted. Preparation
of an Act on Polish Nationality started in the late 1990s and three bills
on Polish nationality have been proposed. The most recent was the de-
puties’ proposal submitted in 2000, which combined the two earlier
proposals. Certain issues included in the latest Bill to demonstrate the
political background and aims behind the formulation of a new Act on
Polish Nationality are worth noting.
In the Bill, as in all acts on Polish Nationality, the basic rule for
being recognised as a Polish citizen was the ius sanguinis principle.
This newest Bill foresaw special procedures for people intending to re-
acquire their Polish nationality lost in the past. In fact, as stated in the
introduction to the Bill, the problem of ‘reinstating Polish nationality
to all those who have the right to it’ was considered very important by
the Bill’s authors. The proposed reinstatement procedure would have
applied to those who had lost Polish nationality on the basis of pre-
POLISH NATIONALITY: SAME LETTER, NEW SPIRIT 121
vious Acts on Polish Nationality (1920, 1951, 1962) and whose relin-
quishing of Polish nationality had not been ‘fully voluntary’.22 Appli-
cants’ entitlement to this procedure would not have been contingent
on living permanently in Poland. The Bill also proposed a procedure
for granting nationality to a particular group of people of Polish origin
– Polish veterans of the Second World War. As far as a naturalisation
procedure is concerned, the Bill on Polish Nationality added to a list of
requirements proposed in the 1962 Act by introducing criteria desig-
nating applicants’ level of social, economic and cultural integration into
the Polish society. They included: adequate knowledge of the Polish
language, evidence of applicants’ ability to maintain themselves in Po-
land, absence of criminal record and behaviour not violating loyalty to-
wards the Polish state. These criteria were intended to set more precise
and thereby less discretional criteria for naturalisation in Poland.
The parliamentary debates on the above proposals were fairly uncon-
troversial (Górny, Grzymała-Kazłowska, Koryś & Weinar 2003) and so
can be considered as indicative of the approach to nationality matters
observed in the contemporary Polish political scene. The reasons there
was eventually no consensus on the Bill, leading to its withdrawal from
the parliamentary agenda are not clear. It seems, however, that the is-
sue dividing the Polish Parliament was the problem of acceptance of
dual nationality (Górny, Grzymała-Kazłowska, Koryś & Weinar 2007).
Right-wing, post-Solidarity policy-makers supporting the Polish dia-
spora insisted on the need for more open acceptance of dual nationality
whereas less radical left-wingers in the Parliament promoted the pre-
sent status quo – quiet/unofficial tolerance of it.
In general, the Bill on Polish Nationality focused on securing the
right of people of Polish origin to Polish nationality. Similar aims were
to be achieved by enactment of the Repatriation Act in 2000. As far as
safeguarding the interests of the Polish diaspora is concerned another
Bill was discussed in the Polish Parliament in 1999-2001 – the Bill on
the Polish Charter. The draft anticipated ways to determine national af-
filiation of persons of Polish origin or of Polish nationality. It was to be
issued not only to former Polish citizens, but also to their descendants.
The Charter was to offer to its beneficiaries the freedom of entry and
extended social entitlements in Poland. At the same time, the Charter
did not impose any obligations on its beneficiaries and the application
procedure was to be free of charge. Similar projects of a Special Status
Law have been introduced in three other Central European countries –
Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia (see Kovács and Tóth, Kusá and
Medved in this volume). In Poland, the project was not accepted due to
the financial burden that it would have put on the Polish State in its
proposed form and due to conflict with the acquis communautaire.23
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The focus of both discussions and political and legislative action re-
garding Polish nationality and related matters is undoubtedly on the
Polish diaspora and Polish emigrants, with immigration and naturali-
sation being of secondary importance. However, only the issue of repa-
triation has been resolved legislatively. Work on an Act on Polish Na-
tionality and on the Polish Charter – the Procedure for the Recognition
of Membership to the Polish Nation or of Polish Origin – have been
postponed. In fact the projects have been abandoned in parliaments
with a post-communist majority. Polish NGOs (primarily Wspólnota
Polska) helping Poles in the East had unsuccessfully lobbied for the en-
actment of that Procedure before 2003, when visa requirements were
imposed on citizens of countries neighbouring Poland to the East.
Since the elections in 2005, when the post-Solidarity parties won the
majority in parliament, repatriation, citizenship legislation and the
Polish Charter have been put on the political agenda again.
4.4 Acquisitions of Polish nationality in numbers
4.4.1 Comment on data
Data on acquisitions of Polish nationality have just recently been inte-
grated into the main statistical system and database of foreigners. I will
therefore only focus on acquisitions through one procedure, namely
the conferment of Polish nationality, for which nation-wide data are
available over a reasonable period of time. At the same time, the char-
acteristics of applicants using this procedure accurately reflect the nat-
ure of the phenomenon and the most important groups being natura-
lised in Poland. To make my description more exact and informative, I
enrich it with fragmented data on other procedures and repatriation.
These data include information on foreigners who were naturalised by
acknowledgement and marriage procedures in 1997 and in recent
years (2002-2004).24 I will also show results of research carried out in
the Warsaw voivodeship in 1999, when I collected data on applicants
for Polish nationality in 1989-1998 based on the three most important
procedures: conferment, acknowledgement and marriage.25
4.4.2 Naturalisations – conferment and two other procedures
In 1992-2004, two consecutive Polish Presidents, using the confer-
ment procedure, granted Polish nationality to 13,227 people. The big-
gest national group of newly admitted Polish citizens were Germans
(12 per cent). Other important groups constituted: Israelis (8 per cent),
Canadians (6 per cent), Bulgarians (4 per cent) and Americans (3 per
cent), (see Table 4.1). However, as much as 30 per cent of applicants
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originated from the former Soviet Union, with Ukrainians being the
leading group (10 per cent).
Most applicants for Polish nationality originated from countries con-
stituting traditional areas of destination for Polish emigrants: Germany,
US, Canada and various countries in Western Europe (e.g. France).
The intensive Polish-Bulgarian student exchanges during the commu-
nist era resulted in many Polish-Bulgarian marriages and complicated
nationality matters for their families. It is evident that the conferment
procedure has been used by the Presidents to return Polish nationality
to Polish emigrants who had lost it. This also explains the high num-
ber of Israelis ‘naturalising’ in Poland.
The group of ex-USSR citizens naturalising via the conferment pro-
cedure in Poland in the 1990s and 2000s is quite high. It does not
fully reflect, however, the predominance of ex-Soviet citizens in con-
temporary migration to Poland, since they were particularly likely to
use the acknowledgement procedure in the 1990s. This was due to the
requirement to relinquish their original nationality in accordance with
bilateral conventions on avoiding dual nationality, still effective be-
tween Poland and countries of the former Soviet Bloc in the 1990s.
The acknowledgement procedure is less discretional than the confer-
ment and therefore already stateless people tend to choose the ac-
knowledgement instead of the conferment procedure. In 1989-1998,
in the Warsaw voivodeship, 76 per cent of ex-USSR citizens (stateless
persons at the moment of applying) used the acknowledgement proce-
dure and citizens of this region constituted a full 94 per cent of all
those applying for naturalisation under this procedure.
The chart showing the number of naturalisations granted by the Pre-
sidential Chancellery in the period analysed is reminiscent of a U-
Table 4.1: Foreigners granted Polish nationality by means of the ‘conferment procedure’ in
1992-2004 by (former) nationality











a I include the general category ex-USSR, since for as many as 804 persons the statistics do
not indicate from which former Soviet Union republic they originate.
Source: Author's own compilation based on data provided by the Polish President's Chan-
cellery
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shape (see Figure 4.1). The highest annual numbers registered were
1,522 (in 1992) and 1,791 (2004), whereas the fewest 679 and 555 oc-
curred in the mid-1990s-1996 and 1997, respectively. The ‘boom’ of
naturalisations registered at the beginning of the 1990s was caused
mainly by ‘early re-conferments’ of Polish nationality. For example, in
1992-1995, over one quarter of the people granted Polish nationality
were German citizens, probably many or most of whom had lost their
Polish nationality in the past.
The quite evident, i.e. 56 per cent, growth in the number of acquisi-
tions in 1998 can be partly explained by factors described above.
Among them, the increase in the number of applications by Israelis
(and other Polish emigrants) seems to be important. The number of
‘naturalising’ Israelis rose in 1998 after President Kwaśniewski’s afore-
mentioned promise of a ‘broad and uncomplicated restoration’. In
1997, the President granted (restored) Polish nationality to only nine-
teen Israelis, whereas in 1998 the respective number was six times
higher – 114 persons.
A gradual increase in volume of ex-USSR citizens using the confer-
ment procedure also contributed to the increase in acquisitions. Immi-
grants from the former Soviet Union have constituted the main seg-
ment of ‘new wave’ immigration to Poland, which began in the late
1980s, and these migrants started to qualify for naturalisation in the
latter half of the 1990s. The subsequent termination of bilateral con-
ventions on the avoidance of dual nationality with some Soviet Bloc
countries allowed more and more ex-USSR citizens to use the confer-


















































Figure 4.1: Acquisitions of Polish nationality via the conferment procedure, by year of
acquisition
Source: Author’s own compilation based on data provided by the Polish President’s Chan-
cellery
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and it is likely to continue growing in the future. In 2004, newly-
naturalised Polish citizens from the Ukraine constituted 29 per cent of
the total. For all ex-USSR countries as a whole, the respective ratio
amounted to 52 per cent.
Certainly, data on the conferment procedure describe only part of
the phenomenon of naturalisations in Poland, but in my opinion, they
quite accurately provide a snapshot of national groups interested in
Polish nationality, especially for the 2000s. In the 1990s, the number
of applicants for the acknowledgement procedure was slightly higher
than for the conferment procedure; by the 2000s, the acknowledge-
ment procedure almost totally lost its importance due to the dissolu-
tion of conventions on avoiding dual nationality. In fact, between 2002
and 2004, fewer than 200 people were naturalised through any proce-
dure other than conferment.26
The remaining procedure, marriage, played a secondary role in the
1990s and is still of rather marginal importance. In 1997, for example,
only 52 foreign women used this path. In the Warsaw voivodeship in
the period 1992-1998, it was 73 women. At the same time, the annual
numbers of mixed weddings in Poland were much higher – between
3,000 and 3,500 in the 1990s and 2000s respectively. This procedure
gained more importance after 1999, when it started to apply not only
to women but also to men and when conditions regarding applications
became more ‘reasonable’. It is likely to further grow in importance,
since ex-USSR citizens no longer have to relinquish their foreign na-
tionality upon naturalisation in Poland. In 2002, for example, from
among 3,552 mixed marriages celebrated in Poland, over 40 per cent
involved citizens of post-Soviet countries.
4.4.3 Repatriation
Repatriation procedures were introduced amid much discussion. On
the one hand, speculation about thousands of people of Polish descent
(not always genuine) who would take advantage of the repatriation pro-
cedure, was aired in the media and Parliament. On the other hand, vir-
tually nobody dared to question Poland’s obligation to take care of its
exiles in faraway Asiatic republics of the former Soviet Union. The con-
troversies around repatriation influenced the final shape of the 2000
Repatriation Act by limiting repatriation to a very small group of peo-
ple. As a rule the repatriation procedure only applies to persons who
have lived permanently in some Asiatic republics prior to 2000. Thus,
it is designed for those who did not manage to repatriate themselves in
the 1940s and 1950s. The requirement that a would-be repatriate has
to be invited by an official institution or a private person further limits
the accessibility of the repatriation procedure.
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All in all, in 1997-2003, only 3,255 repatriation visas were issued and
4,259 persons arrived via the repatriation programme. The actual num-
ber of persons who were naturalised in Poland is somewhere between
these two numbers, since new arrivals include non-Polish members of
repatriate families. In 2001-2003, 2,053 people acquired Polish nation-
ality as repatriates. As demonstrated in Table 4.2, nationals of Kazakh-
stan represent the majority among repatriates (visas issued). Citizens
of other former republics of the Soviet Union are in the minority and
this relationship will persist due to the structure of the Repatriation
Act.
According to the fragmented data on acquisitions of Polish national-
ity, naturalisation is a limited phenomenon in Poland. In the 1990s
and 2000s, the annual number of persons granted Polish nationality,
did not exceed 3,000, although the beginning of the 1990s brought
about a visible increase in the volume of naturalisations. For example,
in the Warsaw voivodeship, 26 and 80 applicants had been granted
Polish nationality in 199027 and 1991 respectively, whereas in 1992,
the number amounted to 203, with no decrease evident in subsequent
years.
4.5 Conclusions
There have been surprisingly few and small changes in Polish legisla-
tion on nationality since 1951, when the second Act on Polish National-
ity was introduced. Neither did the 1989 formation of the post-commu-
nist Third Republic of Poland pass a new law on nationality in spite of
expectations of the kind. All this does not mean, however, that nothing
Table 4.2: Repatriation visas to Poland in 1997-2003, by repatriates’ previous country of
residence
Previous country of residence 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total 316 281 278 662 804 613 301
Belarus – 10 15 45 140 127 43
Czech Republic – – – – 2 4 1
Georgia – – – – – 1 3
Kazakhstan 316 245 172 361 216 194 156
Lithuania – – 11 16 20 3 –
Latvia – 1 1 10 – – –
Moldova – 1 2 10 9 5 2
Russian Federation – 7 8 10 36 31 11
Ukraine – 15 69 210 381 245 77
Uzbekistan – 2 – – – 2 8
Source: Central Statistics Office, from Kępińska (2004)
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changed in practice regarding Polish nationality and the political atti-
tudes to it. The most prominent example of the policy changes was the
President’s decision to restore Polish nationality by way of the confer-
ment procedure, to those who had lost it during the communist era.
In general, the characteristic feature of law on Polish nationality is
its great latitude for discretion by ministry officials, provincial voivods,
and especially by the President of the Republic. Consequently, chan-
ging policy in nationality matters does not necessarily require changes
in written law. At the same time, uncovering the mechanisms of this
policy in practice requires looking beyond the written law. Even though
the 1962 Act on Polish Nationality makes acquisition of Polish nation-
ality conditional only on the duration of an applicant’s stay in Poland,
civil servants take into account also other factors encompassing a for-
eigner’s social and cultural integration as well as his or her family and
financial situation.
Poles living abroad and/or returning to Poland, and their right to
Polish nationality, were the focus of the debate on reforms to Polish na-
tionality law in the 2000s. It is important to remember that only some
of the applican ts for Polish nationality are immigrants. A large pro-
portion – about half in the 1990s – of new citizens are people who had
lost Polish nationality under communism, and repatriates. This is un-
doubtedly a temporary phenomenon. The proportion will diminish as
the pool of individuals interested in reacquiring their Polish nationality
wanes and as the number of ‘typical immigrants’ who qualify for acqui-
sition of Polish nationality, already relatively high, gradually grows.
Polish accession to the European Union boosted discussions on im-
migration to Poland in the context of the eastward shift of the EU bor-
der, i.e. to Poland’s eastern frontier. However, it did not affect discourse
on Polish nationality, which was absent from political and public plat-
forms in pre- and post-accession periods. The absence was probably
due to the post-communist majority in the Polish Parliament between
2001 and late 2005, which was not eager to tackle nationality (and
other) issues pertaining to how to ‘deal with the communist past’. The
present Parliament has put nationality legislation on the political agen-
da again but has not yet discussed it.
Another consequence of Polish accession to the EU is the visible in-
crease in the number of applications for Polish nationality submitted
to Polish consulates abroad, especially outside Europe in the 2000s. In
2000, only 765 such applications were registered whereas, in 2004,
their number reached 3,807. In 2000-2002 the highest number of ap-
plications was from Germany. Then, Argentina took first place with
505 in 2003 (Centre of Migration Research 2005).28 Certainly, we do
not talk here of acquisitions of Polish nationality, but about situations
whereby people, usually descendants of Polish emigrants, entitled to ci-
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tizenship but who are not registered citizens (not having a national reg-
istry number and passport, possibly due to a lack of interest on their
part) take advantage of this right.29
All in all, it seems that interest in Polish nationality matters, rather
moderate in the 1990s and at the beginning of 2000s, has been grow-
ing recently. This growth of interest is likely to continue in the light of
the on-going immigration to Poland and the fact that Polish nationality
became a European Union nationality in 2004.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Poland
Date Document Content Source
1920 Act on Nationality of the
Polish State
Regulated modes of




1938 Act on Deprivation of
Polish Nationality




1946 Decree Concerning the
Exclusion of Persons of
German Ethnicity from the
Polish Society
Defined the framework for
the exclusion and finally
deportation of persons of
German ethnicity living on




1946 Act on Polish Nationality of
Persons of Polish Ethnicity
Inhabiting the Regained
Territories










1947 Act on Polish Nationality of
Persons of Polish Ethnicity
Inhabiting the Former City
of Gda sk
Defined the conditions for
entitlement to Polish
nationality for persons




1951 Act on Polish Nationality Regulated modes of




1956 Decree of the Council of
Ministers No. 37/56
Concerning the Permission
for German Repatriates to
Renounce Polish
Nationality (unpublished)




1958 Decree of the Council of
Ministers No. 5/58
Concerning the Permission
for People Leaving to Israel
to Renounce Polish
Nationality (unpublished)
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Date Document Content Source
1962 Act on Polish Nationality Regulated modes of







1997 Amendment of the Act on
Polish nationality
Extended required time of
residence in Poland (5
years) by introducing the
clause that only the stay on









1999 Amendment of the Act on
Polish nationality
Introduced equality in
treatment of husbands and
wives of Polish citizens
with regard to acquisition
of Polish nationality;




dependent on the will of its
holder.





Government and the USSR
Government Concerning
the Avoidance of Cases of
Dual Nationality, signed in
Warsaw on 31 March 1965
Expressed the will of the
Polish party to terminate
the Convention on
Avoidance of Dual















Warsaw on 17 May 1965
Expressed the will of the
Polish party to terminate
the Convention on
Avoidance of Dual
Citizenship being in force









Expressed the will of the







Date Document Content Source
People's Republic
Concerning Regulations on
Dual Nationality, signed in
Ulan Bator on 23 May 1975
Citizenship being in force
between Poland and
Mongolia.









Warsaw on 17 May 1965
Expressed the will of the
Polish party to terminate
the Convention on
Avoidance of Dual











Government and the USSR
Government Concerning
Avoidance of Cases of Dual
Nationality, signed in
Warsaw on 31 March 1965
Expressed the will of the
Polish party to terminate
the Convention on
Avoidance of Dual






2000 Amendment of the Act on
Polish nationality
Presented the full version
of the changed act with
minor changes.
2000 Repatriation Act Defined a framework for
the repatriation of people
of Polish descent from the







2000 Ordinance by the President





Nationality and on Samples
of Certificates and
Applications
Defined the documents to
be submitted and the exact
procedures for the





2001 Amendment of the Act on
Polish nationality
Introduced rules relating to
registration of acquisitions
and losses of Polish
nationality.
2003 Amendment of the Act on
Polish nationality
Procedural changes.
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Nationality; the Decree of the Council of Ministers 5/58, 1958, (unpublished).
12 In fact, very few people took advantage of this procedure, as it lacked appropriate
directives as to its implementation.
13 It would be also a great oversimplification to look for origins of that action only in
the anti-Semitic attitudes of the Polish elites and society. For example, not all Jews
were made to leave Poland. Moreover, some of them remained not only in Poland
but also in the Polish political structures.
14 Act on Polish Nationality, Journal of Law 128, 2003, 1175.
15 Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Journal of Law 78, 1997, 483.
16 Children of Polish citizens are immediately entitled to a permanent residence
permit; foreigners married to Poles can be entitled after two years, whereas
foreigners having ‘tolerated status’ have to wait ten years for a permanent residence
permit.
17 Ordinance of the President of the Polish Republic on Detailed Procedures Regarding
Acquisition or Agreement for Relinquishing Polish Nationality and on Samples of
Certificates and Applications, Journal of Law 18, 2000, 231.
18 They include conventions signed with: the Soviet Union (1965), Czechoslovakia
(1965), Bulgaria (1972), Mongolia (1975), and the German Democratic Republic
(1975) (Albiniak & Czajkowska, 1996).
19 At the time of writing, only the Ukrainian Government has not ratified the
termination of the convention.
20 In fact, being entitled to a repatriation visa does not necessarily imply immediate
repatriation. Financial and organisational constraints have been slowing down the
repatriation process. Some people entitled to repatriation have to wait several years to
be invited by Polish authorities to Poland.
21 This problem is discussed in more detail in Górny, Grzymała-Kazłowska, Koryś &
Weinar (2003).
22 They had not expressed their will to decline Polish nationality (deprivation on the
basis of the Act of 1920) or they were ‘forced’ to relinquish Polish nationality
(deprivation on the basis of the Acts of 1951 and 1962).
23 For more see Górny, Grzymała-Kazłowska, Koryś & Weinar (2003).
24 For 1997, data from regional departments were collected in one ad hoc action. For
2002-2004, I do not have exact data on the acknowledgement and marriage proce-
dures but on the total for all three procedures. Aside from this, I have separate data
only on the conferment procedure.
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25 I worked on personal data files and created a database of 1,483 applicants, among
whom 1,314 were granted Polish nationality.
26 According to a short interview with a civil servant dealing with acquisitions of Polish
nationality, the number of people naturalising by way of the acknowledgement
procedure is fewer than twenty people per annum.
27 The number for 1990 may be slightly underestimated, as files were checked
according to the year of application. I started from 1989 and it is likely that
somebody applying before 1989 and having received Polish nationality in 1990 was
not registered in my database.
28 In 2004, by 18 November – 259 applications were submitted in Argentina.
29 Data collected by Agnieszka Weinar in the research project: ‘New Poles, new
Europeans – dual nationality among descendants of Polish emigrants in Argentina’.
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Chapter 5: Kin-state responsibility and ethnic
citizenship: The Hungarian case
Mária M. Kovács and Judit Tóth
The preference for the naturalisation of ethnic Hungarians has been
considered a counterbalance to the troubled history of a nation artifi-
cially split among various states and as a tool for preserving cultural
identity in the twentieth century. The principle of ethnicity has been
observed directly in nationality legislation and migration law through
regulations for visa, residence and employment permits, and asylum
status (Tóth 1995). Due to the ideology of a ‘threatened Hungarian eth-
nic identity’ the relationship between the social and economic integra-
tion of migrants, migration law, naturalisation and citizenship has
never been publicly discussed (Fullerton, Sik & Tóth 1997). Hungarian
authorities need not give reasons for refusing an application for natura-
lisation and there is no legal remedy against a negative decision. This
is justified by referring to the sovereign power of state and, in cases of
rejection, by a presumption of the applicants’ missing ethnic, cultural
ties to Hungary. An extension of preference in naturalisation to Eur-
opean Union citizens was smoothly passed in 2003, partly because of
the supposed ethnic proximity of applicants in adjacent states.1 Provi-
sions supportive of family unity in nationality law are widely accepted
and so are the discretionary powers in naturalisation proceedings that
determine who is to be allowed to join this rather homogeneous society
(Tóth 2005).
On the other hand, there are some contentious components of the
nationality regulations in contemporary Hungary.
– Naturalisation and its precondition, the authorisation of permanent
residence, are criticised as being too time-consuming and expen-
sive, and the requirements for documentation as too bureaucratic.
In other words, ethnic Hungarians, being the largest group of appli-
cants, do not see themselves as preferential beneficiaries when it
comes to the attitude of the authorities or to procedural provisions.
– Moreover, certain privileges of Hungarian citizenship were extended
to EU nationals and migrants under the scope of Community law
in the accession process (Tóth 2004a).
– The role of naturalisation in the process of migrant integration has
been unclear. While the applicant is required to be highly integrated
in a cultural, economic and social sense, integration programmes
do not exist at all, which means that integration can only be
achieved by individual effort. The applicant must also not endanger
public order and is investigated in this regard in various ways.
– Nationality as a basket of various rights and obligations is basically
considered by the general public as a historical, cultural, ethnic and
emotional issue without awareness of its existing legal and norma-
tive status and its neutral significance in a democratic rule-of-law
system. For this reason, public opinion is strongly divided into ‘nor-
mativists’ and ‘nation-builders’, representing different standpoints
concerning voting rights, principles for the acquisition of national-
ity, dual citizenship and never-ending citizenship for emigrants in
the diaspora.
– As for ethnic Hungarians, the right to have the family and given
name and the name of the applicants’ prior place of residence and
birthplace in their original ethnic language was finally introduced
in amendments related to the naturalisation and registry process.2
This causes certain confusion in the registration of foreigners and
nationals since registration is, in theory, based on the authenticity
and unaltered nature of existing identity documents. Moreover, this
right is exclusively reserved for ethnic Hungarians; it does not apply
to the non-Hungarian version of names of, for instance, naturalised
refugees or stateless migrants belonging to a linguistic minority,
which would be registered in the dominant language in their coun-
tries of origin.
5.1 History of Hungarian policies on nationality since 1945
Although the first Act on Hungarian Nationality (1879) became in-
creasingly restrictive through amendments adopted during the wars,
its ius sanguinis principle has remained dominant up to the present
day. This Act was in force until 1948. The history of Hungarian poli-
cies on nationality since 1945 can be divided into the following periods:
1945-1948: The Armistice Agreement concluded in Moscow (1945)3
annulled all the modifications of nationality that had come about as a
result of the territorial changes of the Hungarian state between 1939
and 1945. Millions of former Hungarian citizens who ended up under
the jurisdiction of neighbouring states lost their Hungarian nationality.
The Peace Agreement fixed the borders of the Hungarian state along
the frontiers as they had existed on the last day before the war began.4
Between 1945 and 1948 temporary regulations on nationality consid-
ered all persons residing in Hungary in 1945 as nationals except for
those holding the nationality of another state. Bilateral agreements on
population exchange initiated by Czechoslovakia and the expulsion of
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Germans resulted in the deprivation of nationality for those falling un-
der these measures.5 Individuals who had not returned to Hungary fol-
lowing the conclusion of the war were deprived of their citizenship
and, between 1946 and 1948, their property was confiscated.6 Finally,
the citizenship status of communists who had fled Hungary during the
interwar years was settled.7
1948-1956: In 1946 a reform of the legal status and civil rights of
children born out of wedlock established their full equality,8 but only
the new Act on Hungarian Nationality of 19489 provided a coherent le-
gal framework for the acquisition of nationality through changes in fa-
mily and personal status. The Act provided for the equal treatment of
children born out of wedlock and stipulated that all nationals residing
abroad should be registered, without, however, creating techniques for
registration in the absence of consular relations. The Act recognised
the pending Hungarian nationality of undocumented persons who had
been residing in Hungary for a given number of years.
1956-1989: This period witnessed the emancipation of spouses on
the basis of the New York Convention of 1957 on married women10 the
principles of which were inserted into the third Act on Nationality
adopted in 1957.11 The executive rules of the Act were not published
and were implemented by confidential order, such as the one requiring
emigrants to renounce their nationality and social insurance rights.
Following the 1956 revolution and the mass emigration it triggered, a
broad amnesty was proclaimed for returnees and a registry of nationals
permanently abroad was established.12
1989-1993: After 1989, Hungary started reforms to establish the rule
of law and constitutionalism. In 1989 the prohibition of deprivation of
nationality was regulated in the modified Constitution.13 At the same
time the nationality of expatriate nationals who had been deprived of
their nationality arbitrarily was restored upon request.14 The Geneva
Convention of 195115 inspired the preferential naturalisation of refugees
that was inserted into the nationality law. The fourth Act on Nationality
passed in 1993 made preconditions for naturalisation more restrictive
but preferences based on ethnic and family ties were intended to com-
pensate for this.16 Between 1989 and 1993 Hungary terminated bilat-
eral agreements with former socialist states that excluded dual citizen-
ship.
1994-2005: This period is marked by Hungary’s accession efforts to
the EU and by political debates on the status of ethnic Hungarians liv-
ing outside Hungary’s borders. During this time the Act on Nationality
was amended three times,17 due to the ratification of the European
Convention on Nationality (1997) and the UN Convention on Stateless
Persons (1954).18 Eligibility for preferential naturalisation was extended
to EU citizens and a super-preference was adopted in favour of ethnic
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Hungarians in the shadow of the upcoming Schengen restrictions
(Tóth 2003).
In the period under discussion there were three major breaks in ba-
sic principles. Although from 1879 onwards Hungary tolerated multi-
ple nationality, between 1946 and 1989 the main rule was the exclu-
sion of dual citizenship through bilateral agreements with socialist
states. Mixed couples had to choose one of their nationalities for their
child. Following 1989 the modified Constitution abolished the arbitrary
deprivation of nationality. International principles of human rights re-
levant to nationality were inserted into the law, while a growing circle
of preferences was defined as a core element of domestic legislation.
5.2 Current nationality legislation
5.2.1 Current principles in nationality legislation
The Constitution contains a guarantee relating to citizenship, i.e. the
prohibition of its arbitrary deprivation (art. 69). Other rules are to be
settled in legislation to be adopted by a two-thirds voting majority. The
two-thirds rule, however, does not apply to the ratification of interna-
tional agreements on citizenship.
The Nationality Act ensures the equality of rights of citizens. It guaran-
tees that all citizens have identical legal standing irrespective of the le-
gal title of acquisition of citizenship. The 1997 European Convention
on Nationality obliges participating states to refrain from discrimina-
tion between their citizens, whether they are nationals by birth or have
acquired nationality subsequently.
Discrimination is forbidden among Hungarian nationals, irrespective
of the legal title under which their citizenship was granted. The Act
contains only one exception with regard to withdrawal of citizenship
which only applies to citizens by naturalisation.
The right to change citizenship is also included in the Nationality Act.
Withdrawal of citizenship is an exception. The more common proce-
dure is renunciation by a person who lives abroad and thus would pre-
sumably not become stateless. Measures aimed at the prevention of sta-
telessness restrict the right of the individual to self-determination and
the sovereignty of the state in accordance with the conventions of the
UN and the European Convention. The only legitimate reason for the
withdrawal of citizenship is if it was acquired in a manifestly fraudu-
lent manner. Moreover, in the case of renunciation the person must
prove that he or she has obtained another citizenship.
Domestic law ensures the granting of citizenship at birth by descent
(ius sanguinis) while ius soli is applied as an auxiliary principle for
abandoned or stateless children. The Act on Nationality supports family
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unity (with respect to legal status) by various preferences for the natur-
alisation of spouses and (adopted) minors. Refugees and stateless per-
sons are also given priority for admission to citizenship. Hungarian
regulations are special in granting preferential treatment to persons
who are former Hungarian nationals and to ethnic Hungarians in the
process of acquiring citizenship.
Hungary tolerates multiple citizenship, and the state strives to create
rules and enter into agreements to avoid conflicts between different le-
gal systems. A person acquiring Hungarian nationality by naturalisa-
tion need not renounce his or her prior citizenship. The circle of bilat-
eral agreements and the European Convention regulate several legal re-
lationships with respect to persons of multiple citizenship (e.g. with
regard to military service or taxation). Furthermore, persons having an-
other citizenship are entitled to the same rights and obligations in the
territory of Hungary as other nationals, with the exception of employ-
ment in the police or security services (Tóth 2004b). On the other
hand, the principle of genuine link19 requires a factual, effective and
close relationship between Hungary and the applicant for naturalisa-
tion or other modes of acquiring citizenship, regardless of his or her
existing other citizenship. However, for those in possession of Hungar-
ian nationality and living abroad the genuine and effective link to Hun-
gary is irrelevant. Since 1929 millions of (lawful) emigrants and their
descendants have preserved their Hungarian nationality despite acquir-
ing a second or third nationality, and despite the absence of close rela-
tions, or cultural and ethnic affiliation to Hungary.
Hungarian citizenship shall be certified with a valid document (iden-
tity card, passport, citizen’s certificate). In case of doubt it will need to
be either attested by the authorities or a certificate issued. Upon re-
quest, the responsible minister issues a certificate on the existence of
citizenship or its cessation, or verifies that the person concerned has
never been a Hungarian national. The certificate is valid for one year
from the date of issuance. The certificate’s contents may be contested
before the Municipal Court by the person concerned, his or her lawful
representative, the public prosecutor as well as the person’s guardian.20
The regulatory principles and essence of the citizenship system in
Hungary are in harmony with international legal norms. Hungary is a
signatory to all conventions of import which define the framework of
the development of the law. However, some shortfalls in procedural
guarantees are still apparent.
5.2.2 Current modes of acquisition and loss of nationality
There are seven legal titles of acquisition of Hungarian nationality with
different requirements:
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1. The child of a Hungarian national obtains Hungarian citizenship
by birth (ius sanguinis) regardless of the place of birth.
2. The child of a stateless immigrant in possession of a permanent re-
sidence permit or an abandoned child of unknown parents shall be
considered as a Hungarian national unless or until this presump-
tion is rebutted (e.g. when he or she obtains a foreign citizenship
due to the clarification of his or her parent’s identity and national-
ity). There is no time limit for rebuttal; presumption of Hungarian
nationality on the basis of ius soli is therefore conditional.
3. Hungarian nationality of exiled nationals who were deprived of
their nationality between 1945 and 1989 shall be restored upon re-
quest. A declaration addressed to the President of the State rein-
states the nationality of the exiled national immediately when it is
made. Acquisition of nationality is also possible by declaration in
case the applicant was born in Hungary and has not acquired an-
other nationality through his or her parent by birth, provided that
at the time of the person’s birth he or she resided in Hungary, he or
she has lived without interruption in Hungary for a period of at
least five years by the time of submission of the declaration and he
or she is not older than nineteen years. Another ground for acquisi-
tion applies if the applicant was born from a Hungarian national
mother and a foreign father before 1 October 1957 and did not be-
come a Hungarian national by birth.
4. Presumptive paternity ensures nationality by law for a child born
out of wedlock if a parent who declares paternity or a judgement re-
cognises paternity/maternity, or if the parents marry subsequently
(family law facts).
5. Upon request the restitution of citizenship is ensured if the appli-
cant could not obtain a new citizenship within one year of his or
her renunciation of Hungarian citizenship.
6. Naturalisation implies a long procedure and is conditional on var-
ious preconditions. Basic, non-preferential cases of naturalisation
shall meet all of the following requirements:
L permanent residence in Hungary for eight years in possession of
a permanent residence permit or EEA citizens’ residence permit,
L clean criminal record and no current criminal proceedings,
L proven means of stable livelihood and residence in Hungary,
L naturalisation must not violate national interest of the state, and
L successful examination taken on basic constitutional issues in
the Hungarian language. If the applicant attended a Hungarian
language secondary school or university, or obtained a diploma
in Hungary, he or she is exempt from the exam.
The requirements for preferential naturalisation differ from basic
ones as follows:
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L The permanent residence requirement is reduced to five years if
the applicant was born on Hungarian territory or has established
residence in Hungary before reaching legal age or is stateless.
L The permanent residence requirement is reduced to three years,
if the applicant has been married to a citizen for three years, or
he or she has a minor child who is a Hungarian citizen, or if the
applicant has been adopted by a Hungarian citizen or is an offi-
cially recognised refugee.
L There is a residence requirement, but no permanent residence
requirement at all, if any of the applicant’s ascendants was a
Hungarian national and he or she declares himself or herself to
be an ethnic Hungarian.
The permanent residence requirement can also be waived
L in case of the extension of naturalisation to a minor child, i.e. if
the applicant is a minor and his or her application was sub-
mitted along with that of a parent who qualifies for naturalisa-
tion,
L if the applicant is a minor and has been adopted by a Hungarian
citizen,
L if the President of the State or the Minister of Foreign Affairs de-
termines that the applicant’s naturalisation is of ‘overriding inter-
est’ to the Republic of Hungary (for instance, if he or she is a
top level artist, athlete, or scientist).
7. Requirements for re-naturalisation include a permanent residence
permit of the applicant whose nationality has ceased, a clean crim-
inal record and no current criminal proceedings, proven means of
stable livelihood and residence in Hungary, and the assurance that
his or her naturalisation does not violate Hungarian national inter-
ests.
Loss of nationality shall be based on
1. Renunciation: A national residing abroad may renounce his or her
nationality if he or she possesses another nationality or relies on
the probability of its acquisition.
2. Withdrawal: Hungarian nationality may be withdrawn only if a per-
son who has acquired nationality by naturalisation has violated the
law on nationality, in particular by misleading the authorities by
submitting false data or omitting data or facts. In practice, however,
there have not been actual cases in which this provision would have
been applied to persons that would have become stateless as a re-
sult. Ten years after naturalisation, Hungarian nationality may no
longer be withdrawn.
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5.3 Current political debates on (dual) citizenship
5.3.1 The Hungarian Status Law and the referendum on dual citizenship
Minority protection for ethnic Hungarians and nation building has in-
spired dabate in contemporary Hungary. There are numerous ramifica-
tions of the political discussions on legal development but we will de-
scribe only two aspects briefly here and give a concrete example in or-
der to highlight the interrelations between nationality law, migration
law, external relations, European integration and nation building.
Although the list of states and criteria for visa obligations became part
of Community control, bilateral agreements on visa-free travelling were
maintained up to Hungary’s accession to the EU. Issuing visas, includ-
ing a national visa (in the terminology of the Schengen regime), has
just been reformed in favour of Hungarian minorities living in adja-
cent third countries. In 2006 a visa allowing its holder to stay in Hun-
gary and a multi-entry visa for ethnic Hungarian visitors has been in-
troduced. This visa may be issued for five years to a foreign applicant
who is capable of sustaining himself or herself, and wishes to use his
or her stay in Hungary for practising the Hungarian language and cul-
tural activities. Under this visa, employment or study in Hungary is
not allowed. The text of the visa agreements is neutral but there are
plans to reform them to reflect certain ethno-national priorities towards
Romania, Ukraine and Serbia-Montenegro.21 In brief, the visa policy
intends to secure the possibility for individuals belonging to the Hun-
garian external kin-minorities to freely visit and enter Hungary in order
to compensate for Community law and security requirements (Tóth
2004b).
The Act on Benefits for Ethnic Hungarians living in Neighbouring
States of Hungary (usually called the Status Law) was adopted in 2001
after stormy political debates. It introduced a specific certificate for eth-
nic Hungarians living in Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine, Slovenia, Serbia-
Montenegro and Croatia. Because of constitutional inconsistency and
international protests (Kántor 2004), the law was modified in 2003
ending some of the individual benefits (employment, social insurance
and public health) that were available in Hungary to holders of the Eth-
nic Hungarian Certificate (identity card).22 In December 2004 a
further support system (Homeland Fund) for community building was
adopted.23 Naturally, this set of direct ethnically-based assistance by dia-
spora law (Tóth 2000) can legalise and inspire migratory movements
toward Hungary.
On 5 December 2004 Hungary held a referendum on whether it
should offer Hungarian citizenship to Hungarians living outside the
borders of the Hungarian state.24 The novel aspect of the proposal was
not the introduction of dual citizenship itself, since the option of ob-
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taining a Hungarian second citizenship had long been available for per-
manent residents within the country. The innovation would have been
to remove all residency requirements from the pre-conditions for ob-
taining a Hungarian second citizenship. Ethnic Hungarians in neigh-
bouring states, and possibly living elsewhere outside Hungary, were to
be granted the opportunity of obtaining Hungarian citizenship merely
by declaring themselves to be of Hungarian linguistic affiliation, at a
Hungarian consular office, or if they hold a Hungarian Certificate, con-
firming their Hungarian nationality. The proposal was thus directed at
external co-ethnic minorities living in neighbouring states and at mem-
bers of the Hungarian diaspora elsewhere in the world.
The text of the referendum question was as follows: ‘Do you think
that Parliament should pass a law allowing Hungarian citizenship with
preferential naturalization to be granted to those, at their request, who
claim to have Hungarian nationality, do not live in Hungary and are
not Hungarian citizens, and who prove their Hungarian nationality by
means of a ‘‘Hungarian Identity Card’’ issued pursuant to Article 19 of
Act LXII of 2001 or in another way to be determined by the law which
is to be passed?’25
Although the referendum question left the criteria of eligibility open
for future lawmaking, an approximation of potentially eligible clai-
mants can be made on the basis of the size of the Hungarian popula-
tion in the neighbouring states numbering around three million.26 As-
suming that the majority of those made eligible by the reform would
actually claim citizenship, the proportions of the resulting change
would exceed the growth of Germany’s citizenry after unification, but
of course, without the corresponding territorial enlargement. This then
points to the second specificity of the Hungarian situation, namely that
the dimensions of Hungary’s kin-minority problem are unusually large
even for Europe. Nearly a quarter of all ethnic Hungarians live outside
Hungary’s borders in neighbouring states.
Political debates on the referendum within Hungary were tremen-
dously polarised. Indeed, in 2003 the initiative to call a referendum
had not come from within the Hungarian political establishment, but
from a radical and somewhat marginal organisation not well integrated
into Hungarian politics, the World Federation of Hungarians (Debrec-
zeni 2004).27 The Federation had contested the policies of the Hungar-
ian Government on citizenship matters for years and had also set itself
on a collision course with the more moderate Hungarian minority par-
ties across the borders, especially when it mounted opposition against
the Orbán Government’s (1998-2002) efforts, supported by external
Hungarian minorities, to provide an alternative solution to dual citizen-
ship through the creation of the Status Law of 2001.28 The law estab-
lished the certificate for ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring
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states,29 entitling its beneficiaries to a set of cultural and economic
rights, including seasonal working permits in Hungary. However, the
Federation insisted that the benefits provided by the law were no sub-
stitute for what the Hungarians really needed, which was full Hungar-
ian citizenship.30
The Status Law provoked angry response in neighbouring states.
Hungary was accused of irredentist nationalism, of creating a ‘veiled
form of dual citizenship’ the ultimate effect of which was to call the so-
vereignty of the neighbouring states into question. Hungary was also
criticised by the European Union for the unilateral adoption of the law,
for not having consulted with the states in question, and for the extra-
territorial aspects of the law. But despite this negative response, the
World Federation of Hungarians insisted that Hungary must proceed
with the unilateral creation of non-resident trans-border citizenship for
ethnic Hungarians.31 Responding to arguments that such a step would
not be compatible with the terms of Hungary’s accession to the Union,
in the spring of 2003, the federation called on Hungarian voters to say
no to Hungary’s accession. Hungary should only join the EU if it could
take trans-border Hungarians into the Union even if the state in which
they live remains outside of it (Csergő & Goldzeiger 2004). So, in Oc-
tober 2003, the Federation began collecting signatures for a referen-
dum on establishing non-resident citizenship for trans-border Hungar-
ians.
This points then to the third specificity of the Hungarian story,
namely that the initiative for citizenship reform came from outside the
Hungarian political establishment. Only this feature can explain the
puzzle of why any political actor would take the risk of launching an
initiative that has only limited support within Hungary itself and there-
fore carries the prospect of its own defeat.
Initially, mainstream Hungarian parties on all sides reacted very cau-
tiously to the initiative, along with the more moderate groups of trans-
border minorities. Only after a few months did mainstream right wing
parties (FIDESZ and MDF) along with the President of the Republic
declare their support for the referendum, while the socialists and liber-
als turned against it.32 What followed was an agitated, occasionally hys-
terical, campaign leading up to the referendum that fulfilled the pro-
phecy of its own failure ending up invalid on account of the low num-
ber of participants. Eventually 63.33 per cent of eligible voters stayed
away from the referendum. Among those who cast their ballots, 51.57
per cent voted in favour of the reform, 48.43 per cent against.33
No research is available on the question of what precisely motivated
Hungarian voters in their choices. Welfare protectionism could well
have played a role, given the fact that, apart from Slovakia, the living
standards of trans-border Hungarians are way below those of Hungar-
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ians, and that the arguments of the Socialist Party against dual citizen-
ship relied primarily on the costs of the reform. An equally important
motive may have been the fear of instability at the borders resulting
from conflicts with Hungary’s neighbours. Voters may also have been
influenced by the perception that dual citizenship would eventually
lead to voting rights. What is sufficiently clear, however, is that, at least
for now, trans-border dual citizenship could only be created in Hun-
gary without the popular mandate of the Hungarian electorate, the
mandate that the supporters of the initiative had hoped to obtain in the
referendum. To quote one liberal opponent of the initiative (Kis 2004a:
4): ‘The offer was made to a nation of ten million to enlarge its home-
land beyond the state-borders to the entire Carpathian basin. The na-
tion refused to take the risk and accept the costs.’
But given the enormous disappointment of trans-border Hungarians
with the result, the issues raised during the campaign will remain on
the agenda of Hungarian politics for quite some time to come.
5.3.2 Implications of trans-border dual citizenship
The arguments for the Hungarian trans-border dual citizenship initia-
tive are fundamentally different from those advanced in favour of dual
citizenship in the major immigration states of Western Europe. In the
immigration states dual citizenship is an instrument used to integrate
labour migrants into their country of immigration. Dual citizenship in
this case works towards the decoupling of citizenship from ethnicity.
In contrast, the Hungarian initiative is part of an opposite trend pre-
sent in a number of European countries of re-linking citizenship with
ethnicity.
The Hungarian suggestion associates eligibility for extraterritorial
dual citizenship with membership in an ethnically defined community.
Dual citizenship would thus purposefully reaffirm the connection be-
tween ethno-cultural nationality and citizenship, which is precisely the
connection that most immigration states have been trying to weaken
when tolerating dual citizenship (Fowler 2002).
Advocates of the reform wish to overcome this difficulty by present-
ing their plan as based on a traditional ius sanguinis concept rather
than on ethnicity. In this view, trans-border citizenship is not some-
thing that would be newly granted to ethnic Hungarians. Trans-border
Hungarians would only ‘regain’ the citizenship of their ancestors who
had been citizens of the Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy before
the First World War.34 However, there are several difficulties with this
approach.35
The first difficulty is political. After the First World War those Hun-
garians who ended up as minorities in neighbouring states were ob-
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liged by the Peace Treaties to opt for the citizenship of their new home
state, or, if they declined to do so, to move to Hungary. Therefore, in
the eyes of Hungary’s neighbours, any unilateral change in the citizen-
ship status of minority Hungarians would amount to a unilateral
breach of treaty obligations, to a revision of the terms of the peace
treaty that still serves as the basis of international legitimacy for the
current borders of these states. It was for a similar reason that the Ita-
lian law of 2000 that offered Italian citizenship to the Italian diaspora
did not extend this offer to the descendants of Italians in Dalmatia, Is-
tria and Fiume, i.e. those regions that were ceded by Italy to Yugoslavia
in the post-war treaties.
Second, trans-border populations whose ancestors bore the citizen-
ship of a larger Hungarian state in the Dual Austro-Hungarian Monar-
chy before the First World War include millions of non-Hungarians. So
even if the ius sanguinis view was applied, the only way to narrow
down eligibility for Hungarian dual citizenship to those with a Hungar-
ian ethno-cultural affiliation would be to apply an ethnic definition.
A third feature of dual citizenship that emerged from the referen-
dum initiative was the potentially weak distinction between active and
inactive citizenship for dual citizens. In most immigration states, trans-
national dual citizenship implies that only the citizenship of the cur-
rent country of residence is active, so that the rights associated with
the external citizenship are dormant (Faist 2005). However, in the case
of Hungarian trans-border citizenship such clear-cut distinctions be-
tween periods of active and inactive citizenship would be hard to make
(Vizi 2003).36 Therefore, with regard to the potential content of non-re-
sident trans-border citizenship, the general perception that has
emerged in Hungary is that even if dual citizenship would initially be
created without voting rights, it would only be a matter of time before
large numbers of trans-border voters would cast their ballots. In view
of these implications, it is hardly surprising that the proposal created
passionate debates both within Hungary and among the Hungarian
minorities in the neighbouring states. For many participants the ques-
tion at stake was whether Hungary should experiment with ideas that
are pulling it away from, rather than bringing it closer to ‘mainstream’
Europe. As János Kis summarised it, the victory of ‘yes’ votes would
mean nothing less than putting Hungarian parliamentarianism in dan-
ger and transforming the nature of Hungarian democracy. Since elec-
tions in Hungary are usually won by a narrow margin, the appearance
of trans-border voters would most likely mean that ‘the outcome of
Hungarian elections would regularly be decided by voters who do not
pay taxes in Hungary and who are, in general, not subject to its laws’.
A further element of ‘organised irresponsibility’ inherent in such a so-
lution would be that those casting the swing votes may be people who
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had never even lived in Hungary so that their political choices would
be made on a highly selective image of issues and candidates. For all
these reasons, he concluded, ‘the victory of ‘‘yes votes’’ would pull us
back to the murky nationalism of past ages, it would lock up Hungar-
ian politics in the prison of revisionist nostalgia, it would poison public
life within Hungary as well as our relationship with neighbouring
states and with trans-border Hungarians, and it would damage the le-
vel of our acceptance within the European Union’.37
In stark contrast to the liberals, advocates of the initiative argued that
their proposal is modelled on concepts and processes that are part and
parcel of an integrated Europe of the future, a de-territorialised world
in which individuals with multiple identities are entitled to a legal ex-
pression of the free choice of their nationality. Advocates argued that
all European states accept ethnicity as part of the basis of citizenship,
most even making provisions for the acquisition of benefits, including
citizenship, for co-ethnics who are citizens of another state. The pro-
blem with European norms and practices, they argued, is not that there
is no connection between ethnicity and citizenship but that Europe is
in a process of denial about this connection, treating ethnicity as
though it was a disreputable relative on whom we rely secretly, but
whom we hide from others (Schöpflin 2004). They pointed to plans or
existing legislation on non-resident citizenship for co-ethnic kin within
the European Union in Italy, Greece, Slovakia and the Czech Republic.
A particularly relevant example is Silesian Germans who, from the
early 1990s, were able to obtain German passports in addition to their
Polish ones and, by implication, European citizenship, without having
to take up residence in Germany. These precedents, they argued, point
to the legitimacy, even within the core nations of the European Union,
of using dual citizenship for the inclusion of trans-border co-ethnics in
the citizenry of the homeland.
Liberal opponents challenged this interpretation of larger European
processes and insisted that the EU would regard the ethnicist turn in
Hungarian legislation as a breach of common principles laid down in
European agreements (Tóth 2004c).38 Secondly, they criticised the con-
frontational attitude towards Hungary’s neighbours promoted by this
policy. The problem with unilateral action is not so much that it vio-
lates international law, but that it is self-defeating. To quote the above
mentioned newspaper article by János Kis again: The unilateral crea-
tion of Hungarian citizens in the territory of other states is nothing but
a ‘mirage’ that provokes ‘phony wars over phony questions and phony
answers’.
Thirdly, opponents argued, that the creation of dual citizenship can-
not be justified by reference to the approval by trans-border minorities
either, because these groups are themselves divided over the issue and
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do not speak with a single voice.39 In the end, any unilateral move by
Hungary to create dual citizenship would remain ‘a game of illusions
played between Hungarian nationalists and a minority within the Hun-
garian minority’ in a useless, but ‘ritual display of imagined political
togetherness’ (Kis 2004b).
Fourthly, critics objected that dual citizenship is incompatible with
claims of autonomy raised by trans-border minorities.40 Concurring
with Rainer Bauböck they maintained that parallel ‘claims of multiple
citizenship and territorial autonomy should be seen as mutually in-
compatible. They would create fears in the host society about irreden-
tist threats to its territorial integrity that cannot be easily dismissed as
unreasonable’ (Bauböck 2006: 159-160).
Therefore, according to the socialists and the liberals, Hungary must
take a new look at its homeland policies regarding kin-minorities. The
discourse advocated by the two mainstream right-wing parties aims at
recreating a ‘unitary Hungarian nation’ over and above existing state-
borders by means of creating legal bonds between parts of the Hungar-
ian nation living in several countries (Stewart 2004). Hungary should
step back from this confrontational approach because it relies on out-
right ignorance about the sensitivities of other states. Instead, it should
clearly articulate its policies in the conceptual framework of minority
protection. Hungary must accept that trans-border Hungarians are the
citizens of other states and should promote the protection of Hungar-
ian minorities in their efforts to secure equal individual and collective
rights in their home states.
Finally, there are obvious ambiguities in the arguments of both sides
in the debate. The idea of dual citizenship emerged in Hungary with
reference to a larger international trend of increasing toleration of dual
citizenship, partly within the European Union and partly within the
East-Central European region. However, while in the immigration
states of Europe the idea of dual citizenship is not associated with na-
tionalist policies, in Hungary, as in many other states of the region, the
demand for dual citizenship has mostly migrated to the nationalist
right. In the Hungarian referendum debate, the battle over dual citi-
zenship has been cast as a debate between the nationalist right as sup-
porters, on the one hand, and the Europe-oriented liberals, as oppo-
nents, on the other. However, this representation of the debate is, to
some extent, self-made and arbitrary. In fact, in their support of dual ci-
tizenship the nationalists have mainly been drawing on the arguments
of European liberals. At the same time, liberals relied on counter-argu-
ments they claimed to have extrapolated from relevant European
norms and practices, but these practices are much too diverse to form
the basis of a coherent interpretation. Unsurprisingly, at the end both
sides failed to present a fully convincing, coherent interpretation of
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those international norms and practices that would support their re-
spective positions. In the final analysis it is quite possible that the con-
flicting stances of the two sides in the debate may stem from concerns
that are only remotely connected to the problems of trans-border Hun-
garians, namely from conflicting opinions, and concerns about the
long-term stability of Hungary’s transitional democracy. After all, par-
liamentary practices have not been firmly established in Hungary for
much more than a decade. Yet in the Hungarian context the creation
of trans-border non-resident dual citizenship would most likely amount
to a mass enfranchisement of a new electorate that, similar to all epi-
sodes of mass enfranchisement in the past, would introduce new un-
certainties into the system and could lead to an internal destabilisation
of Hungarian democracy itself. In this respect, both sides share the
same intuition, namely that if instituted, trans-border citizenship
would most likely have the effect of freezing the regular rotation of par-
liamentary forces for some time to come in favour of the nationalist
right: a prospect that is as welcome on one side as it is feared on the
other.
5.4 Trends in statistics
Data on trends of acquisition and termination of citizenship is infor-
mation of public interest.41 Nevertheless relevant data is only partially
available and only since 2001 in more detail. Available data contain
numbers on naturalisation, re-naturalisation and on the termination of
nationality. Between 1958 and 1984 there were more cases of emigra-
tion than immigration (Tóth 1997), and the total number of (re-)natur-
alised persons is 16,156 while at least 24,082 persons left the country.
The yearly average of naturalisations and re-naturalisations is 622
while the average of terminations of nationality is 926. During this
time there has been no change in citizenship law, so it is only by exam-
ining legal and political practices that we can find an explanation for
the growth in the rate of nationality loss after 1967. A substantial pro-
portion of removal-upon-request came from female Hungarian spouses
marrying husbands from any European state that prohibited dual citi-
zenship.
Between 1985 and 1989 the number of terminations was still higher
than the number of (re-)naturalisations, but the difference between
them decreased. The major groups of applicants for naturalisation are
from the adjacent and socialist states (Romania, Czechoslovakia, Soviet
Union, and East-Germany) while the direction of emigration/marriage
migration is towards Austria and Yugoslavia.
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Czech/Slovak 63 Czech/Slovak 2
Yugoslav 21 Yugoslav 18
Austrian 11 Austrian 169
Romanian 2,661 Romanian 1
Soviet 156 Soviet 1
East-Germ. 35 East-Germ. 70
non-European 96 non-European 1
1991 5,893 441
Czech/Slovak 25 Czech/Slovak 2
Yugoslav 22 Yugoslav 3
Austrian 18 Austrian 80
Romanian 5,114 Romanian –
Soviet 306 Soviet –
stateless 13
non-European 186 non-European 1
1992 21,880 1,149
Czech/Slovak 249 Czech/Slovak 7
Yugoslav 1 Yugoslav 3
Austrian 7 Austrian 211
Romanian 20,624 Romanian –
Ex-Soviet 569 Ex-Soviet –
stateless 7
non-European 60 non-European 3
1993 11,521 2,084
Czech/Slovak 55 Czech/Slovak 5
Yugoslav 309 Yugoslav –
Austrian 20 Austrian 314
Romanian 9,956 Romanian –
Ex-Soviet 843 Ex-Soviet –
stateless 7
non-European 75 non-European 3
1994 9,238 1,688
Czech/Slovak 40 Czech/Slovak 7
Yugoslav 888 Yugoslav –
Austrian 1 Austrian 346
Romanian 6,254 Romanian –
Ex-Soviet 1,730 Ex-Soviet –
stateless 1
non-European 120 non-European 2





Since 1990 the number of naturalisations has increased. This is not
only due to the larger number of ethnic Hungarian applicants but also
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to the changing interpretation of the legal rules in force. The constitu-
tional reform aimed at establishing rule of law influenced the practice
of the Ministry of the Interior. If an applicant met the legal require-
ments the discretionary power of naturalisation had to be interpreted
such that a positive decision on naturalisation was to be granted by the
President. However this practice of ‘self-limitation’ could not compen-
sate for the more restrictive preconditions of naturalisation adopted by
the Act on Hungarian Nationality in 1993. The number of non-Eur-
opean applicants is growing, but has still remained marginal since the
1990s.
Table 5.2: Distribution of nationality law cases in Hungary, 1998-2004
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
applications for
(re-)naturalisation
3,593 3,160 3,963 4,282 4,453 4,916 5,761
applicants with citizenship of (%):
Romania 61 60 63
Yugoslavia/Serbia 17 15 13
Ukraine 11 15 13
Other European 6 14 14
non-European 5 5 3
Stateless 1 1 1
naturalised and
re-naturalised persons










3,934 4,264 3,935 3,924 4,401 4,803 5,984
reinstatement of
nationality (persons)
– – – 1 1 1 1
applications for renuncia-
tion of nationality (cases)
893 728 748 684 609 463 236
accepted renunciations of
nationality (persons)
1,070 995 955 791 857 n.d. n.d.
Source: www.bmbah.hu
Over the past years Hungary has become an immigration country for
large numbers of ethnic Hungarians and, increasingly for others com-
ing from more distant regions. There are three major channels for im-
migrants to become nationals: (1) naturalisation, (2) prior nationals,
mainly expatriates re-obtaining Hungarian nationality by declaration or
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re-naturalisation, (3) expatriates or their descendants living abroad who
can prove Hungarian citizenship through a verification procedure of
existing citizenship (Certificate of Nationality). This restoration of legal
ties with Hungary was made possible by political changes and new
rules on rehabilitation and compensation for damages or harm com-
mitted against nationals by the socialist regime. In 2005 the number
of (re-)naturalised persons was 9,981 while the number of issued citi-
zenship cards certifying the holder’s Hungarian nationality has risen to
between 5,000 and 6,000 per year.
The ratio of naturalisations according to legal titles is available only
for the year 2002. The total number of persons naturalised was 3,890
(100 per cent). Its sub-groups were as follows.
Table 5.3: Ratio of naturalisation decisions in Hungary in 2002
Type of legal titles Act on Nationality Persons %
no preference (‘basic decision’) 4 § (1) 244 6.27
weak preference (‘applicant was born in
Hungary’)
4 § (4) a. 3 0.0
weak preference (‘applicant immigrated as
minor to Hungary’)
4 § (4) b. 2 0.0
medium preference (‘applicant’s spouse is
Hungarian national’)
4 § (2) a. 325 8.35
medium preference (‘applicant’s minor child
is Hungarian national’)
4 § (2) b. 49 1.25
medium preference (‘applicant is a recognised
refugee’)
4 § (2) d. 17 0.4
strong preference (‘applicant is a minor’) 4 § (5) 9 0.2
strong preference (‘applicant is a minor
adopted by a national’)
4 § (6) 30 0.7
strong preference (‘ethnic Hungarian’) 4 § (3) 2,447 62.9
re-naturalisation 5 § 764 19.6
Source: www.bmbah.hu
Table 5.3 indicates that, beyond the ethnic immigration from the Car-
pathian basin, family reunification and repatriation of prior nationals
have added the largest numbers of new nationals.
5.5 Conclusions
In Hungary the term ‘nation’ is interpreted and used in law as a con-
cept referring to membership in the cultural, ethnic and linguistic
community. But the substance of the term remains indefinable by law.
This reveals contradictions between existing laws and the Constitution.
On the one hand, art. 6 of the Constitution refers to the kin-state’s re-
sponsibility for kin-minorities living across the borders. However, the
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definition of membership in the minority or ethnic community is va-
gue, and various preferential provisions legally discriminate against
certain categories of people despite the fact that the state is party to
dozens of international treaties aimed at avoiding such discrimination.
Furthermore, minorities living in Hungary are distinct participants in
the state, in possession of subjective and collective constitutional
rights, although, in their case as well, membership of a specific ethnic
or national entity cannot be defined. Due to this problem neither statis-
tics on membership of minorities living in Hungary, nor hard data on
immigrants entering Hungary and enjoying legal preferences in the
country are available. According to Rainer Bauböck, ‘[h]istoric tradi-
tions and the distinction between ethnic and civic nationhood are in-
creasingly irrelevant for explaining legislative changes’.42 Despite a
standard level of immigration, in the case of Hungary Bauböck’s sug-
gestion is less evident than among the old EU Member States (Tóth &
Sik 2003). The recently failed referendum of 5 December 2005 on ex
lege citizenship being granted to ethnic Hungarian minorities living in
adjacent states is a case in point as it would have used ethnic prefer-
ences for granting non-resident citizenship to trans-border Hungar-
ians. The role of nationality law in the integration process of migrants
has not been discussed publicly and the need to harmonise Hungarian
citizenship with that of other Member States of the European Union
has not been put on the agenda.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Hungary
Date Document Content Source
1946 Act XV on Czech-Slovak-
Hungarian Agreement





1947 Government Decree 12.200 Deprived expelled Germans
of Hungarian nationality.
1947 Act X Deprived those who had
not returned to Hungary
following the conclusion of
the war of Hungarian
nationality.
1948 Act LX on Hungarian
Nationality
Based on ius sanguinis like
the previous Act of 1879.
Provided for the equal
treatment of children born
out of wedlock; stipulated
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Date Document Content Source
nationality of
undocumented persons.
1949 Constitution (excerpts) www.legislationline.org





such as the one requiring
emigrants to renounce
their nationality and social
insurance rights.










nationals who had been
deprived of their nationality














1993 Government Decree 125/
1993 on the Execution of








2001 Legislation on Kin-











2001 Act XXXII amending Act LV
of 1993 on Hungarian
Nationality
Provided for ethnic
Hungarians to have the





nationals by declaration to
the President of State.
2001 Government Decree 103/
2001 amending
Government Decree 125/
1993 on the Execution of
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Date Document Content Source






2003 Act LVII amending Act LXII




benefits and allowances for
ethnic Hungarians.
2003 Government Decree 128/
2003 amending
Government Decree 125/
1993 on the Execution of
Act LV of 1993 on
Hungarian Citizenship
Introduced new formats in
nationality procedures.
2005 Act XLVI amending Act LV










geographical name of birth
in ethnic versions.
2005 Act LXXXIII amending Act




of Certificate for ethnic
Hungarians with the new
Code on Public
Administration Process.
2005 Government Decree 119/
2005 amending
Government Decree 125/
1993 on the Execution of
Act LV of 1993 on
Hungarian Citizenship
Determined the fee for the
examination on basic
constitutional issues in the
naturalisation process (20
€); clarified family
unification rules in related
immigration rules.





citizenship of individuals to
the population and defence
registry of the Central
Statistical Office.
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Notes
1 Act LVI of 2003 amending Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Nationality. It entered into
force with the accession of Hungary to the European Union on 1 May 2004.
2 Act XXXII of 2001 amending Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Nationality, Government
Decree No. 125 of 22 September1993, Decree of the Minister of the Interior No. 6 of
7 March 2003.
3 Concluded in Moscow on 20 January 1945 and published in Act V of 1945.
4 The Peace Agreement was concluded in Paris and published in Act XVIII of 1947. It
entered into force by Government Decree 11.800 of 1947.
5 See details in Czech-Slovak-Hungarian Agreement published in Act XV of 1946 and
Government Decree 12.200 of 1947.
6 In particular Act X of 1947 and Act XXVI of 1948.
7 For instance, Prime Minister Decree 9.590 of 1945.
8 Act XXIX of 1946.
9 Act LX of 1948.
10 Published in Law-Decree No. 2 of 1960.
11 Act V of 1957.
12 Law-Decree No. 11 of 1955, No. 7 of 1956, No. 11 of 1956; Ministerial Decree of the
Interior 2 of 11 January 1956.
13 Act XXXI of 1989 introduced a substantially new Constitution but formally it was
only an amendment.
14 Provisions of Act XXVII of 1990 and Act XXXII of 1990 were inserted into the third
Act on Nationality in 1993.
15 Published in Law-Decree No. 15 of 1989.
16 Act VL of 1993.
17 Acts XXXII of 2001, LVI of 2003 and XLVI of 2005.
18 Published in Acts II and III of 2003.
19 This principle is a legal expression of the fact that the individual who obtains this
citizenship – directly through the law or as a result of the action of the authorities –
is in actual fact more closely related to the state whose citizen he or she is than to
any other state (Lichtenstein v. Guatemala, 1995 WL 1 (International Court of Justice)
generally known as the Nottebohm case).
20 Act on Hungarian Nationality, arts. 10-12.
21 Before accession Hungary had agreements on visa-free travel with six neighbours,
and a voucher system was defined with the Ukraine. For the sake of legal
harmonisation these agreements were modified. Visa requirements were introduced
for Ukrainian and Serbian citizens, while the agreement with Romania introduced a
maximum length of stay.
22 Act LXII of 2001 on Ethnic Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries. It was
amended by Act LVII of 2003. Its administrative rules on financial, technical and
procedural issues are laid down in ten Government and Ministerial Decrees.
23 Act II of 2005 on the Homeland Fund covers various community-building projects
for kin-minorities living in adjacent states.
24 In Hungary a referendum is valid if at least 25 per cent of the electorate returns
identical votes, or if participation is higher than 50 per cent of the total number of
eligible voters. In this case neither criterion was fulfilled.
25 Official translation provided by the Government’s Election Office (Országos Választási
Bizottság), www.election.hu, last accessed 5 May 2005.
26 According to the statistics published in 2004 by the Hungarian Government office
for trans-border Hungarians (Határon Túli Magyarok Hivatala), the number of Hun-
garians living in Romania, Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Croatia and
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Slovenia as provided by the official censuses in these countries between 2000 and
2002 amounted to 2,429,000, among these in Romania 1,435,000; Ukraine
156,000; Serbia and Montenegro 293,000; Slovakia 516,000; Croatia 16,000 and
Slovenia 8,500 (see www.htmh.hu, last accessed 5 May 2005). The estimate for the
number of trans-border Hungarians potentially eligible for Hungarian citizenship
based on ethnic identification is higher than these numbers, which is explained by
the assumption that more people would be able to fulfil the criteria of Hungarian af-
filiation than those who actually declare themselves Hungarian in government cen-
suses. The number of potential claimants on such grounds globally was estimated at
around five million by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, András Bársony (‘Ha-
tárok nélkül’, Kossuth Rádió, 16 January 2003. www.hhrf.org, last accessed 5 May
2005). Also see note 34.
27 J. Debreczeni, ‘Hazárdjáték’ [Gambling], Népszabadság [daily newspaper], 27 Novem-
ber 2004.
28 The Hungarian name of the federation is Magyarok Világszövetsége.
29 Since its adoption, approximately a quarter of all trans-border Hungarians applied for
the Hungarian ID. There are about 850,000 card-holders today.
30 As a result of the conflict around the Status Law, the Orbán Government withdrew
public funding from the Federation.
31 Soon after the announcement of the plan for the referendum it became clear that
any legislation on dual citizenship would have to happen unilaterally, as the
Romanian president promptly announced his country’s opposition.
32 On 12 November 2004 President Ferenc Mádl, in a speech addressed to the
Hungarian Permanent Assembly (MÁÉRT), spoke of the perception of the referen-
dum initiative by external minorities as an act of ‘historical justice’ and added: ‘I call
upon Hungarians to use their votes to assume a sense of community with Hungar-
ians outside of our borders’ (www.martonaron.hu, last accessed 17 February 2005).
33 ‘A kettős állampolgárságról, Adatok, állásfoglalások, elemzések’ [On dual citizesnhip,
data, opinions and analyses]. www.martonaron.hu, last accessed 17 February 2005.
34 Hungarian citizens who had emigrated from Hungary retained their Hungarian
citizenship. This however did not apply to former citizens of Hungary in the
neighbouring states who had lost their Hungarian citizenship as a result of the peace
treaties that redrew the borders of the Hungarian state. The possibility of inheriting
Hungarian citizenship applies only to people whose right to Hungarian citizenship is
derived from their connection to the territory of the state of Hungary as delineated in
the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947.
35 B. Nagy (2004), ‘Kettős Állampolgárság: Nemzet, állam, polgár: kisérlet a fogalmi
rendteremtésre’ [Dual Citizenship: Nation, State and Citizen: An Attempt at
Conceptual Clarification]. www.martonaron.hu. The dimension of the population
potentially affected by the ius sanguinis transmission of citizenship is difficult to
assess. Given the fact that in 1920, Hungary’s population had been reduced to half
of what it had been before the war (with a corresponding reduction of two-thirds of
its territory), the idea that ius sanguinis transmission could automatically create dual
citizens after any number of generations would amount to the obligation to re-
activate the ‘dormant’ citizenship of people whose numbers may surpass half of
Hungary’s current population. The peace treaty of 1920 reduced Hungary’s
population from 18.2 million to 7.9 million and its territory from 282,000 km2 to
93,000 km2. Trans-border Hungarians are estimated to number about 3.5 million,
while people (with their offspring) who retain a ius sanguinis right to Hungarian citi-
zenship (e.g. those who emigrated after 1939) are estimated to be about 1.5 million.
36 Hungarian trans-border citizenship, if ever instituted, is more likely to be in line
with that of Croatia where trans-border dual citizens retain some of their rights
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associated with Croatian citizenship, including voting rights in Croatian elections,
even at times when their alternate citizenship is active. But while trans-border Croats
vote for a quota of expatriate seats, trans-border Hungarians would find it easy to
vote for regular seats without putting their alternate citizenship to rest. This is
because Hungarian regulations on the declaration of residence are extremely lax,
requiring only three months of residence for a citizen to activate his or her right to
vote. Moreover, in order to avoid the disenfranchisement of the homeless, voters can
be admitted to the voters’ registry without actually possessing an address or
residence permit by simply making a declaration of residence at a given locality at
the municipal office. According to recent changes in Italian law, Italian non-resident
citizens may also vote in referenda and national elections for a fixed number of seats.
However, the numerical dimensions of the Italian case are radically different from
that of Hungary. There are altogether 2.7 million non-resident Italian citizens, which
is equivalent to about 3 per cent of the resident citizenry of Italy, as opposed to the
size of the trans-border Hungarian population that represents 30-35 per cent of
Hungary’s current citizenry.
37 J. Kis, ‘Miért megyek el szavazni?’ [Why am I taking part in the voting?], Népszabad-
ság, 20 November 2004.
38 Especially in the European Convention on Nationality (1997) ratified by Hungary in
2002 which stipulates in art. 2/a that ‘‘‘nationality’’ means the legal bond between a
person and a State and does not indicate the person’s ethnic origin’, and restricts the
‘recovery of former nationality’ of a given state to those residing on its territory.
39 For example, the biggest Hungarian party of the large Hungarian minority of
Romania, which has substantial representation in the Romanian Parliament and
Government, has traditionally been, at best, lukewarm about dual citizenship.
However, the most vocal advocates of trans-border Hungarian citizenship also come
from Romania and they also rely on a substantial constituency. Minorities them-
selves do not speak with a single voice because the attitudes of the different groups
of which they are composed are derivative of the long-term view each of these groups
takes on the possibilities of negotiating a better status for themselves in their host
states. Even if the idea of dual citizenship enjoyed the support of the majority of
trans-border Hungarians, this support would be based on a demagogic-populist
misrepresentation of what is actually possible.
40 T. Bauer, ‘Kettős Kapituláció’ [Dual Capitulation], Népszabadság, 8 January 2004.
41 Art. 61 of the Constitution provides a fundamental right to free expression and
obtaining as well as freely disseminating information of interest to the general
public. A separate law regulates its implementation (Act LXIII of 1992).
42 See ‘Western European Countries Tend to Follow a Liberalizing Trend towards
Citizenship Policies. Interview with Rainer Bauböck’. www.migrationonline.cz.
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Tóth, P. P. (1997), Haza csak egy van? Menekülők, bevándorlók, új állampolgárok 1988-1994
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állampolgárság kiterjesztése az ezredfordulón’ [From trans-border Italians to Italian
citizens living abroad], Kisebbségkutatás 4: 685-694.
HUNGARY: KIN-STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHNIC CITIZENSHIP 159

Part III: Post-partition states

Chapter 6: Czech citizenship legislation between
past and future
Andrea Baršová
The main contours of the Czech (formerly Czechoslovak) citizenship
laws were shaped by momentous historic events. Administrators,
judges and lawyers smoothed over rough outlines made by political
forces, adding to them exceptions, interpretations and remedies. Con-
sequently, Czech citizenship legislation has always been complex.1 This
paper follows the main trends of its development and gives a brief ac-
count of Czech citizenship legislation and the politics and policies
linked with it since 1918. It focuses on responses to unprecedented so-
cial changes and challenges in the last sixteen years, which may be sti-
mulating for the current debates on citizenship policies in the Eur-
opean and transnational context.
6.1 History of Czechoslovak citizenship policies
6.1.1 History of Czechoslovak citizenship policies from 1918 to 1993
Czechoslovak citizenship came into existence with the creation of Cze-
choslovakia on 28 October 1918. It was linked to the municipal right of
domicile that had been an important instrument regulating migration
within the Habsburg monarchy.2 Former Austro-Hungarian nationals,
who had a right of domicile in municipalities that became part of the
Czechoslovak territory after the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire, acquired Czechoslovak citizenship. The basic rule was modified
by peace treaties3 and constitutional laws4 which regulated the issue of
citizenship in order to protect ethno-national minorities and provided
options to choose the citizenship of an ethnic kin state. The creation of
Czechoslovakia led to massive remigration of ethnic Czechs and Slo-
vaks, in particular from Austria (Vaculı́k 2002: 38-39; Kristen 1989:
83). Apart from specific provisions linked to the creation of the new
state, provisions of old Austrian laws on citizenship remained in force
in the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia.5 This was the case, for in-
stance, with the ius sanguinis principle laid down in the 1811 Austrian
Civil Code.
The end of the Second World War6 and the restoration of Czechoslo-
vakia led to the adoption of ad hoc laws that introduced the criterion of
ethnicity into citizenship legislation. The new legislation was linked to
post-war (both forced and voluntary) migration. Under the President’s
Constitutional Decree No. 33/1945 Coll. Concerning Czechoslovak Citi-
zenship of Persons of German and Hungarian Ethnicity, Czechoslovak
nationals of German and Hungarian ethnic origin were deprived of
Czechoslovak citizenship.7 On the other hand, Constitutional Act No.
74/1946 Coll. Concerning the Naturalisation of Compatriots Returning
to the Homeland and its implementing regulations provided for facili-
tated naturalisation of ethnic Czechs, Slovaks and members of other
Slavonic nations who (re)settled in Czechoslovakia. Naturalisation was
often linked to changes of names to Czech or Slovak ones (Vaculı́k
2002: 40-49). In the post-war years more than 200,000 Czechs, Slo-
vaks and members of other Slavonic nations immigrated to Czechoslo-
vakia while more than 2,820,000 inhabitants of German ethnicity
were expelled.
After the communists seized power in Czechoslovakia in February
1948, deprivation of citizenship was introduced as a supplementary
penalty for certain political offences. A complex new citizenship legisla-
tion was adopted in 1949. Act No. 194/1949 Coll. on Czechoslovak Ci-
tizenship modified by Act No. 72/1958 Coll., replaced the old legisla-
tion, but preserved many of its features, such as the ius sanguinis prin-
ciple and the principle of a single citizenship. Both in the communist
ideology and in legal theory, citizenship meant not only legal but also
factual bonds between a citizen and the society. A legal textbook pub-
lished in 1963 defines ‘socialist citizenship’ in the following way: ‘So-
cialist citizenship is not only a legal bond between a citizen and the
state, but it means also belonging to a community of working people,
who participate in the building of socialist (communist) society and in
the building and defence of the socialist state; it means belonging to
the community connected by shared dreams and ideals’ (Černý & Čer-
venka 1963: 19).
The law also provided for depriving people of Czechoslovak citizen-
ship. It was applied as penalty to those citizens who lived abroad and
had engaged in activities ‘which might endanger state interests’, those
who had left the territory of Czechoslovakia ‘illegally’, those who had
not returned to Czechoslovakia when requested to do so by the Minis-
try of the Interior and those who lived abroad for more than five years
without a ‘valid passport permitting its holder to live abroad’. These le-
gal provisions existed until 1990.
The Prague Spring of 1968, a movement towards the liberalisation
of communist rule, was accompanied by the Slovak national move-
ment.8 This movement demanded the introduction of a federal system
within a multiethnic, but centralised, Czechoslovakia. As of 1 January
1969 the unitary Czechoslovak state was transformed into a federal
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state, composed of the Czech and the Slovak Republics.9 At the level of
citizenship legislation, this change was reflected by the adoption of
Federal Act No. 165/1968 Coll. on the Principles of Acquisition and
Loss of Citizenship, which was followed by the Act of the Czech Na-
tional Council No. 39/1969 Coll. on the Acquisition and Loss of Citi-
zenship of the Czech Socialist Republic, adopted in April 1969.10 The
new legislation introduced, in addition to the (federal) Czechoslovak ci-
tizenship, citizenship of the two (Czech and Slovak) Republics as the
constituent entities of the Federation.11 Under this legislation, Czecho-
slovak nationals automatically acquired the citizenship of either the
Czech or Slovak Republic, based on their place of birth and some sup-
plementary criteria.
The new legislation gave people a right to change the republic-level
citizenship at their discretion but this right was rarely exercised. The
reason was trivial: the republic-level citizenship had no practical conse-
quences whatever. In fact, most citizens were not even aware of their
republic-level citizenship.12 In addition, the freezing period of ‘normali-
sation’ in the 1970s and 1980s, which followed the suppression of the
Prague Spring, pushed most people into private and family life as the
only remaining space for meaningful activities, where the question of
citizenship had no significance.
The fall of the communist regime in November 1989 prompted new
developments in all spheres, including citizenship legislation. The first
task for the new democratic Government was to remedy injustices
caused by deprivations of citizenship under the communist rule. In re-
sponse to communist abuses of power, a constitutional provision was
introduced, to stipulate that, ‘no one shall be deprived of his or her citi-
zenship against his or her will’.13 In 1990, Act No. 88/1990 Coll. was
adopted, which provided for the reacquisition of the Czechoslovak citi-
zenship by emigrants who had lost it in the period of communist rule.
The law, which was not free of certain restrictions and shortcomings,14
identified one strand of future development in the field of citizenship
legislation that I will call restitution legislation.
6.1.2 Break-up of Czechoslovakia and creation of the Czech citizenship
The demise of the communist regime opened a space for the resur-
gence of nationalist feelings and politics.15 In Czechoslovakia, the re-
birth of the Slovak nationalist movement led to a consensual break-up
of the federal state. As in the fall of 1992 the break-up of Czechoslova-
kia was increasingly becoming a realistic option (negotiated and carried
through by the ruling political elite),16 many Czechoslovaks started to
think about their future in terms of citizenship.17 The dormant provi-
sions of the existing citizenship legislation, which allowed for a simple
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switch between the Czech and the Slovak republic-level citizenships,
started to be widely invoked. Until the end of 1992, some 65,000 Slo-
vak republic-level citizens applied for the Czech republic-level citizen-
ship.
On 1 January 1993, the Czech and the Slovak Republics were estab-
lished as successor states to the former Czechoslovakia. In the Czech
Republic, citizenship issues were regulated by the hastily drafted and
adopted Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on the Acquisition and Loss of Citizen-
ship of the Czech Republic.18 The primary aim of the law was to identi-
fy nationals of the new state and to prevent dual (Czech and Slovak) ci-
tizenship.19
The provisions of the new legislation fell into two main categories.
The first was a set of transitory provisions regulating initial determina-
tion of nationals of the new state,20 complemented by provisions gov-
erning the option for Czech citizenship. The other category involved
rules of permanent nature, regulating e.g. acquisition of the Czech citi-
zenship by birth, naturalisation or loss of Czech citizenship.
Table 6.1: Conceptual scheme of Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on the Acquisition and Loss of Citi-
zenship of the Czech Republic
Norms regulating initial determination of citizenship Norms regulating
standard procedures for
acquisition and loss of

















core of nationals of the
new state, the category
was established by




takes into account the
will of individuals
concerned
plurality of cases, not to
be defined in advance
As regards the initial overall determination of citizenship, Act No. 40/
1993 Coll. stipulated that, ‘natural persons, who were citizens of the
Czech Republic as of 31 December 1992, are citizens of the Czech Re-
public as of 1 January 1993.’ Leading Czech jurists explain the estab-
lishment of Czech citizenship in the following way. ‘As a consequence
of the disappearance of Czechoslovakia and the establishment of the
Czech Republic as an independent entity under public international
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law, the Czech republic-level citizenship acquired as of 1 January 1993
an international dimension and turned into full-fledged state citizen-
ship.’ (Černý & Valášek 1996: 99). The same approach as regards over-
all (collective) initial determination was adopted by Slovak legislators.
This prevented de iure statelessness in the wake of the break-up of
Czechoslovakia.21
The primary rule was supplemented with a set of transitory provi-
sions regulating the right of option and facilitating naturalisation for
certain Slovak citizens. In the period from 1 January 1993 to 30 June
1994, 240,000 former Czechoslovak citizens acquired Czech citizen-
ship under the option clauses.
The criteria for exercising this right of option, however, included not
only two years of permanent residence in the territory of the Czech Re-
public, but also a clean criminal record.22 The application of the latter
condition had a disproportionate impact on members of the Roma
(Gypsy) minority.23 It was criticised by Czech human rights activists as
well as by the international community. The criticism led to piecemeal
adjustments and softening of Act No. 40/1993 Coll. in relation to for-
mer Czechoslovak (now Slovak) nationals.24
In the decade following the establishment of the independent Czech
Republic, public and political discourse on citizenship matters was
dominated by one issue: intentional and accidental consequences of the
break-up of Czechoslovakia. In the shadow of this central theme, some
problems related to the restitution of Czechoslovak (now Czech) citizen-
ship for emigrants were also discussed. In the autumn of 1998, with the
change of Government (from liberal-conservative to social-democratic),
a more profound reform of citizenship legislation was put on the Gov-
ernment agenda. This led to (a) significant alterations of the transitory
provisions of the 1993 Citizenship Act, and (b) the adoption of Act No.
193/1999 Coll. on the Citizenship of Some of the Former Czechoslovak
Citizens, which was another piece of restitution legislation.
(a) The former legislation mitigated the harsh consequences of the
break-up of Czechoslovakia for some groups of former Czechoslovak
nationals. A ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic
of 5 May 199725 also fostered this development. The Court held that
one does not lose citizenship of the Czech Republic by one’s declara-
tion of option for the citizenship of the Slovak Republic. (These indivi-
duals became dual nationals.)26 Major amendments to the 1993 Citi-
zenship Act were implemented by Act No. 194/1999 Coll. which not
only transformed this ruling into a statutory provision, but also allowed
all Czech citizens who were former nationals of Czechoslovakia to ac-
quire Slovak citizenship without losing their Czech citizenship. (This
is an exception to one of the declared principles of the Czech citizen-
ship legislation, i.e. the prevention of dual citizenship.)
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The law also introduced a simplified procedure for acquisition of
Czech citizenship by declaration for former Czechoslovak nationals
who had been living continuously in the territory of the Czech Repub-
lic since the break-up of Czechoslovakia. This was a corrective provi-
sion. It provided for acquiring Czech citizenship by those who for var-
ious reasons (legal or personal) could not opt or apply for Czech citi-
zenship before. The necessity of the remedy is demonstrated by this
figure: 6,278 former Czechoslovak citizens acquired Czech citizenship
in 1999 alone, by invoking the new provision.27
A subsequent amendment to Act No. 40/1993 Coll. adopted in 2003
(Act No. 357/2003 Coll.) introduced further remedial provisions. It gave
former Czechoslovak nationals who were granted Slovak citizenship (i.
e. were naturalised in Slovakia) in the period from 1 January 1994 to 1
September 1999 the right to (re)acquire the lost Czech citizenship by
declaration. The amendment also gave the right to acquire the Czech
citizenship by declaration to certain groups of Slovak nationals who
were minors at the time of the break-up of Czechoslovakia.28
(b) Act No. 193/1999 Coll. on the Citizenship of Some of the Former
Czechoslovak Citizens, reintroduced and broadened the right of reac-
quisition of Czech citizenship by declaration. It applied to emigrants
who had lost Czechoslovak citizenship under communist rule, but for
legal or practical reasons had not been able to make use of the first res-
titution act of 1990. Originally, the applicability of the law was limited
to five years after its entry into force.
6.2 Basic principles of acquisition and loss of Czech citizenship
As stated above, the citizenship legislation has gone through a series of
adjustments since 1993. While the greater part of the fine-tuning was
related to the situation of former Czechoslovak nationals, there have
been other changes, such as acquisition of citizenship by children or
naturalisation. Some changes reflected reforms of the administrative
structures. This section describes the main principles of Czech citizen-
ship legislation in force as of 1 January 2007. It does so only selectively
in so far as they reflect topical political discussions or indicate new
trends.
6.2.1 Acquisition of citizenship
There are four ways of acquiring Czech citizenship: a) acquisition of ci-
tizenship by former Czechoslovak citizens by option, declaration or fa-
cilitated naturalisation (as described above), b) acquisition of citizen-
ship by descent, adoption, and establishment of paternity, c) acquisition
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of citizenship by being found in the territory of the Czech Republic
and d) acquisition of Czech citizenship by naturalisation.
Under the ius sanguinis principle, one acquires Czech citizenship if
at least one parent is a Czech citizen. The place of birth is not relevant.
Ius soli applies if the parents are stateless and at least one of them is a
permanent resident (i.e. a green-card holder).29 A natural person found
in the territory of the Czech Republic is a Czech citizen unless it is
proved that he or she acquired the citizenship of another state by des-
cent.
The conditions for naturalisation are strict:30 permanent residence
for at least five years, clean criminal record,31 passing a Czech language
test, renunciation of the previous citizenship,32 no infringement of im-
migration law, and fulfilment of certain statutory duties, such as pay-
ing taxes, health, social and retirement insurance. The permanent resi-
dence status is an eligibility criterion that may not be waived. Under
the immigration legislation in force until recently an immigrant could
apply for permanent resident status (i.e. a green-card) only after ten
years of continuous legal residence in the Czech Republic and after
eight years in cases of family reunion. Exemptions were made only for
those related to Czech citizens or permanent residents and on humani-
tarian grounds. Thus, the waiting period for naturalisation for many
immigrants was in fact fifteen years and more. 33
There are statutory exemptions for certain categories (such as recog-
nised refugees and stateless persons). For instance, refugees are eligi-
ble for naturalisation without having to renounce their original citizen-
ship. (They acquire permanent resident status by virtue of being
granted asylum.) Most of the requirements can be waived at the discre-
tion of the Ministry of the Interior if certain conditions are met. For in-
stance, the Ministry may waive the five-year duration of permanent re-
sidency (but not the permanent resident status as such) for applicants
born in the Czech Republic, former Czech (or Czechoslovak) nationals,
spouses of Czech nationals, children of Czech nationals, stateless per-
sons or refugees.
There is a long list of discretionary exemptions from the require-
ment to renounce one’s original citizenship. This list was extended re-
cently by Act No. 357/2003 Coll. partly because of an initiative by the
Human Rights Council (see below). Applicants may keep their pre-
vious citizenship (and become dual or multiple nationals) if they are
permanent residents, have stayed legally in the territory for at least five
years, have a genuine link to the Czech Republic and, in addition, satis-
fy one of the prescribed conditions. These are for example situations
when the applicant’s renunciation of the previous citizenship involves
unreasonable fees or other demands not acceptable in a democratic
state, when naturalisation is in the interest of the Czech Republic be-
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cause of the expected significant contribution to the Czech society in
science, societal life, culture or sports or when the applicant is a former
Czech (or Czechoslovak) national.34 There is also an exemption for ap-
plicants who have resided legally in the Czech Republic for at least
twenty years and have held permanent resident status for five years or
more.
The relatively simple language test is waived for all Slovak nationals
and for any one else at the discretion of the authorities.
6.2.2 Loss of citizenship
Since the Czech Constitution prohibits deprivation of citizenship
against one’s own will, it may not be imposed as a penalty. In confor-
mity with the principle of ius sanguinis even later generations of
Czech descent born and living abroad cannot lose Czech citizenship by
mere operation of law.
A Czech national can lose citizenship in two ways: by a declaration of
renunciation and by acquisition of foreign citizenship at his or her re-
quest. A Czech citizen may lose his or her citizenship by a declaration
of renunciation if he or she stays abroad and at the same time pos-
sesses the citizenship of a foreign state (cases of dual and multiple citi-
zenship).35 A Czech citizen automatically loses Czech citizenship as a
consequence of acquiring a foreign citizenship if the latter citizenship
is acquired at his or her own request. (This does not apply if the acqui-
sition of a foreign citizenship is automatic, for example by descent.)
This mode of automatic loss of citizenship was introduced by the 1993
Citizenship Act and did not exist before 1 January 1993.36 This provi-
sion became controversial in practice.37 Its constitutionality was also
challenged with reference to the ban on deprivation of citizenship
against one’s will but was eventually confirmed by the Constitutional
Court.38
The recent amendment to the 1993 Citizenship Act (Act No. 357/
2003 Coll.) introduced an exemption from the loss of citizenship in re-
lation to marriage. If a Czech national acquires the citizenship of his
or her spouse during the marriage, he or she will not lose Czech citi-
zenship.39
6.2.3 Dual and multiple citizenship
The Czech legislation is becoming generally more tolerant about dual
(and multiple) citizenship. This trend is clearly visible in spite of the
fact that the official citizenship policy still follows the principle of pre-
vention of dual citizenship. In reality, there are numerous dual and
multiple nationals who acquired the status legally. These are e.g. for-
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mer Czech and Czechoslovak citizens who reacquired Czech citizen-
ship by declaration under the restitution laws, people who became dual
Czech and Slovak nationals due to the break-up of Czechoslovakia, ap-
plicants for naturalisation for whom the Ministry of the Interior waived
the requirement for them to renounce their former citizenship (includ-
ing cases of achievement-based naturalisation), naturalised refugees,
and Czech spouses of foreign citizens. There are those who acquired
dual citizenship by descent and emigrants who acquired foreign citi-
zenship but never lost their Czech (or Czechoslovak) citizenship.
Moreover, there are many cases in the grey zone. For instance, if the
Czech authorities are not informed of the acquisition of a foreign citi-
zenship by a Czech citizen or by the foreign state concerned, which is
often the case, they still treat the person as a Czech citizen (e.g. they
will grant him or her a passport).
6.2.4 International treaties
The Czech Republic is party to certain bilateral and multilateral treaties
concerning citizenship. The current trend is toward accession to multi-
lateral treaties40 as most bilateral treaties were terminated in the late
1990s, primarily because they were not compatible with the provisions
of the 1997 European Convention on Nationality as regards the preser-
vation of dual citizenship for children whose parents have different citi-
zenship. These terminated bilateral agreements were with the former
Soviet Union and some of its successor states as well as Hungary, Po-
land, Bulgaria, and Mongolia.
Politically, the most controversial of the bilateral agreements was the
1928 Naturalisation Treaty between the United States and Czechoslova-
kia, which precluded dual citizenship of emigrants.41 The Treaty was
valid until 20 August 1997. The application of the Treaty excluded
many former Czechoslovak citizens from restitution of their property
lost during the communist regime.
6.2.5 Procedure
The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for citizenship issues. The
Ministry decides on naturalisations. It maintains a central register of
persons who have acquired or lost Czech citizenship. A decision by the
Ministry may be appealed. In this case, the Minister of the Interior de-
cides. The Minister receives the opinion of a special consultative com-
mission, but is not bound by it.42 Decisions on citizenship are open to
judicial review.43 Fees are relatively high – 10,000 Czech crowns (330
euros) for granted naturalisation. The acquisition of citizenship by de-
claration is free of charge.
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6.3 Current political debates
The gradual solution of the problem of the break-up of Czechoslovakia,
which dominated the citizenship agenda until recently, opened space
for fresh approaches to the fundamental issues of citizenship legisla-
tion. The shift of perspective was also due to a new phenomenon: in-
creasing migration to the Czech Republic and evolving integration poli-
cies (Baršová 2005; Baršová & Barša 2005: 231-238).
An impetus for an overall revision of the citizenship legislation came
from the Government Council for Human Rights.44 Following an Ana-
lysis of Dual Citizenship Issues submitted to the Government and the
adoption of the latest amendments to the 1993 Citizenship Act in
2003, the Government decided that the Ministry of the Interior should
prepare a comprehensive analysis of the citizenship legislation based
on broad public consultation and submit it to the Government by 30
June 2005. The Ministry circulated a consultation paper in the autumn
of 2004 and subsequently, in May 2005, a draft Analysis of the Legisla-
tion on the Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship.45 .
The Analysis discusses the fundamental principles of the new citi-
zenship law. It suggests the following crucial moves towards liberalisa-
tion: a) full toleration of dual (multiple) citizenship on both the entry
and exit sides and b) facilitated acquisition of citizenship by second
and third generation migrants.
a. As regards the grounds for this profound reform, the Ministry re-
fers to both the prevailing trends toward liberalisation abroad and
practical aspects. There are countries which do not allow, in legisla-
tion or in practice, renunciation of one’s citizenship. This is a
source of undue administrative burden, according to the Ministry.46
b. The Ministry suggests that foreign nationals born in the territory of
the Czech Republic should have the right to acquire Czech citizen-
ship by declaration within two years after the age of majority if they
are permanent residents and have a clean criminal record. The
same should apply to those who have lived continuously in the
Czech Republic since early childhood. Even if this proposal is not a
very favourable solution in comparison with other options (such as
the application of ius soli at birth), it is still a positive change in the
national context. At present the Czech citizenship legislation does
not have any provisions specifically addressing the issue of second
and third generation immigrants. The proposed rule would at least
eliminate the need to apply for membership in the community
where the applicant was born and grew up.
On the other hand, the Ministry states that the strict conditions for nat-
uralisation should be maintained or even be tightened.47 It proposes to
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exclude from naturalisation applicants who are likely to become a pub-
lic burden. The Analysis also contemplates some changes in language
testing: the testing should be more professional.48
In July 2005, the Government approved the Analysis.49 A year later,
in June 2006, the Ministry of the Interior circulated the first frame-
work draft of the new legislation. In addition to the changes mentioned
above, the Ministry proposes to amend the Constitution so as to allow
the withdrawal of citizenship in cases of false acquisition of citizenship
(e.g. fraudulent use of documents). Another controversial proposal of
the draft concerns an amendment to the Constitution introducing the
clause that there is ‘no legal right to be granted citizenship’. This pro-
posal can be regarded as the Ministry’s response to the criticism that it
was making extensive use of discretion in naturalisation cases (see be-
low).
The draft framework was scheduled to be submitted to the Govern-
ment in December 2006. However, because of the change in Govern-
ment after the 2006 parliamentary elections, the date was postponed.
At the time of writing, the future of the draft was hardly predictable.
There was also a public debate concerning the situation of those
who emigrated under the communist regime. An amendment to Act
No. 193/1999 Coll. on the Citizenship of Some of the Former Czecho-
slovak Citizens, introduced as a private bill in the Senate, abolished the
deadline for making a declaration on the reacquisition of Czech citizen-
ship.50
More controversies arise in the context of the property restitution
laws. As one of the conditions for the restitution of property was Cze-
choslovak (Czech) citizenship, the application of the post-war decrees
by which persons of German ethnic origin were deprived of Czechoslo-
vak citizenship is a topical issue.51
Among the practical problems repeatedly brought to the attention
of the Government by non-governmental organisations and other ac-
tors, such as the Ombudsman, is the extensive discretion of the Min-
istry of the Interior in decisions on naturalisation and the way it is
exercised. In practice, the Ministry’s negative decisions do not often
constitute grounds for rejection of an application, but refer vaguely
to administrative discretion as such and to the fact that there is ‘no
legal right to be granted citizenship’. Until recently the courts con-
ducting the judicial reviews have sustained the practice.52 Only some
legal scholars expressed doubts whether ‘granting citizenship is, in-
deed, an act of mercy, exercised by the state at its own good will’ or is
rather in the interest of society (Chlad 2004: 350; Molek & Šimı́ček
2005: 142-144). A cautious shift in the jurisprudence regarding the use
of discretion in naturalisation procedures was brought about by the Su-
preme Administrative Court (established in 2003).53 The idea that dis-
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cretionary naturalisation should be completed or replaced by granting
a right to naturalisation once the specified conditions are met is not on
the agenda at all.
6.4 Statistics54
If we exclude Slovak nationals, the numbers of persons naturalised an-
nually in the Czech Republic have been surprisingly stable in the last
decade, with a maximum of 2,000 persons and a minimum of 837 per
annum, as shown in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Naturalisations (excluding Slovak nationals) in the Czech Republic, 1993-2005
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total
number 1,469 1,412 2,000 1,380 837 1,128 1,031 1,059 1,121 1,150 1,267 1,495 1,177
Source: Ministry of the Interior
The number of Slovak nationals granted Czech citizenship based on
supplementary and corrective initial rules (see Table 6.1) is still signifi-
cant (Act No. 40/1993 Coll., Sections 18a, 18b and 18c).
Table 6.3: Number of Slovak and other nationals acquiring Czech citizenship from 2001-
2005
year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total 6,321 4,532 3,410 5,020 2,626
Declaration based on Act No. 139/1999 Coll. 1,607 1,273 1,154 1,784 190
Act No. 40/1993 Coll. – total 4,714 3,259 2,256 3,236 2,436
Slovakia – Act No. 40/1993 Coll. – total 3,593 2,109 989 1741 1,259
Slovakia – declaration section 18a* 3,378 1,862 850 627 565
Slovakia – declaration section 18b** – – 55 364 123
Slovakia – declaration section 18c*** – – 5 573 325
Slovakia – naturalisation section 7 215 247 79 177 246
Other naturalisations (section 7) –
Act No. 40/1993 Coll.
1,121 1,150 1,267 1,495 1,177
Source: Czech Statistical Office
* former Czechoslovak nationals who had lived continuously in the territory of the Czech
Republic since the break-up of Czechoslovakia
** former Czechoslovak nationals who were naturalised in Slovakia in the period from 1
January 1994 to 1 September 1999
*** former Czechoslovak nationals born in Slovakia who were minors during the break-up
of Czechoslovakia, but with at least one parent a Czech republic-level citizen
In 2005, the total number of persons naturalised was 1,423. This num-
ber included 246 Slovak nationals, 239 Ukrainian nationals, 167 Polish
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nationals, 143 Romanian nationals, 134 Russian nationals, 63 nationals
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 62 Vietnamese nationals, 48 Bulgarian na-
tionals and 43 nationals of Kazakhstan.55
Table 6.4: Slovak nationals who acquired Czech citizenship by declaration (Section 18a of
Act No. 40/1993 Coll.)
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
6,278 5,377 3,378 1,862 850 627 565
Source: Ministry of the Interior
Table 6.4 shows that at the end of 1990s there were still a number of
former Czechoslovak citizens living in the Czech Republic whose sta-
tus was not adequately regularised. The decreasing numbers indicate
that the problem is diminishing.
Table 6.5: Former Czechoslovak nationals who (re)acquired Czech citizenship by declara-
tion under Act No. 193/1999 Coll.
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004* 2005
798 1,899 1,607 1,273 1,154 1,784 190
Source: Ministry of the Interior
* The deadline for making the declaration expired on 2 September 2004. The Act No. 46/
2006 Coll. deleted the deadline and thus made the law operational again. It was published
and entered into force on 27 February 2006.
Act No. 193/1999 Coll. concerns those who emigrated during the com-
munist regime. As they live all over the world, the process requires
time both for spreading the information on the right to reacquire the
Czech citizenship and for the actual exercising of that right. The steady
numbers show that the deletion of the deadline for making the declara-
tion is fully warranted.
6.5 Conclusions
The consensual division of Czechoslovakia caused many problems re-
garding citizenship. The new legislation did not generate de iure state-
less persons, as was sometimes mistakenly contended by its critics.
Rather, the consequence of the restrictive and inadequate citizenship
legislation was that some former Czechoslovak citizens ended up with
the citizenship of a successor state in which they did not live and to
which they were only formally attached.56 This revealed the need to
clarify international rules concerning cases of state succession.57 It also
CZECH CITIZENSHIP LEGISLATION BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 175
raised a more puzzling question: Does the right to a citizenship imply
a right to choose one’s own citizenship?
By the application of remedial provisions introduced in the period
1993-2003, most of the problems related to the break-up of Czechoslo-
vakia have been solved. Nonetheless, the original intention of the legis-
lators to avoid dual Czech and Slovak citizenship has not been fully
achieved. On the contrary, the precarious position of some groups of ci-
tizens shows that there are situations in which it is not justified to
deny a person the right to dual citizenship. Cases of dual Czech and
Slovak citizenship are numerous.
Conditions are unfavourable as regards naturalisation except for for-
eign nationals with strong family links to Czech citizens (spouses, chil-
dren). They involve long waiting periods to fulfil the eligibility criteria
as regards the residence requirement. Longer periods of absence are
not tolerated and only formal continuous legal status counts. There is
also a Czech language test (although kept at a reasonably easy level).
As a rule, applicants have to relinquish their original citizenship and a
number of additional criteria are tested. There are no specific provi-
sions for automatic acquisition of the Czech citizenship by second and
third generation immigrants (not even at the age of majority) or facili-
tated naturalisation for this category. Decisions denying naturalisation
are open to judicial review but both in theory and practice administra-
tive discretion is applied very broadly in naturalisation cases. On the
other hand, the legal status of naturalised citizens is secure as a ban
on the deprivation of citizenship is guaranteed under the Constitution.
At present, the Czech citizenship legislation is at a crossroads. Issues
related to the break-up of Czechoslovakia, which have dominated the
political debates, are losing their topicality. New challenges are linked
to increasing immigration. In particular, the restrictive nature of cur-
rent naturalisation provisions, which reflects the surviving parochial
character of Czech society, is in conflict with the declared need for ef-
fective integration policies. The proposed comprehensive citizenship
reform will have to address the issue. At a more general level, the pro-
posed reform can be seen as a key element in the transformation of
the Czech self-image from an ethnic to a civic nation.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Czechoslovakia/ the Czech Republic
Date Document Content Source
1920 Act of 29 February 1920,
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who are Czechoslovak





Decree No. 33/1945 Coll.
Concerning Czechoslovak











1946 Constitutional Act No. 74/





returnees who were ethnic
Czechs, Slovaks or
members of other Slavonic
nations.
1949 Act No. 194/1949 Coll. on
the Acquisition and Loss of
Czechoslovak Citizenship,
amended by the Act No.
72/1958 Coll. Modifying
the Regulations on the




communist coup d'etat in
February 1948.
1968 Constitutional Act No. 143/




federation of two entities,
the Czech Republic and the
Slovak Republic.
1968 Federal Act No. 165/1968
Coll. on the Principles of
Acquisition and Loss of
Citizenship




1969 Act No. 39/1969 Coll. of
Czech National Council on
Acquisition and Loss of




1990 Act No. 88/1990 Coll.
Amending and
Supplementing Legislation





by emigrants who had lost
it in the period of the
communist rule and
deleted the provisions on
withdrawal of citizenship.
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Date Document Content Source
1993 Constitution of the Czech
Republic
Contains the provision that,
'no one shall be deprived of
his or her citizenship
against his or her will'.
www.psp.cz
1993 Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on
Acquisition and Loss of
Citizenship of the Czech
Republic
New citizenship code
which entered into force in




1993 Act No. 272/1993 Coll.,
Amendment of the Act No.
40/1993 Coll.
Introduced changes to the
right to opt for Czech
citizenship with regard to
certain Czechs born on the
territory of Slovakia before
31 December 1939
www.legislationline.org
1995 Act No. 140/1995 Coll.,
Amendment of the Act No.
40/1993 Coll.
Facilitated the
naturalisation of those who
immigrated to the Czech
Republic upon invitation by
the Government; the
provision concerned in
particular the members of
the Czech minority from
the Chernobyl area.
www.legislationline.org
1996 Act No. 139/1996 Coll.,
Amendment of the Act No.
40/1993 Coll.
Introduced discretionary
waiver of the clean criminal
record requirement in
naturalisation procedures
with regard to Slovak
citizens who were former
Czechoslovak citizens and
had been living in the




1999 Act No. 194/1999 Coll.,




relation to the situation of
former Czechoslovak
citizens living in the Czech
Republic since the break-up
of Czechoslovakia.
www.legislationline.org
1999 Act No. 193/1999 Coll. on






who had lost it in the
period of the communist
rule and were not able to
make use of Act No. 88/
1990 Coll.
www.legislationline.org
2003 Act No. 357/2003 Coll., Introduced further remedial
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Date Document Content Source
Amendment to the Act No.
40/1993 Coll.
provisions with regard to
former Czechoslovak
nationals and certain liberal
changes, in particular with
regard to dual nationality.
2006 Act No. 46/2006 Coll.,
Amendment to Act No.
193/1999 Coll. on the
Citizenship of Some of the
Former Czechoslovak
Citizens.
Deleted the deadline for
making declarations on
reacquisition of Czech




1 See the leading handbook on Czech citizenship law Černý & Valášek 1996.
2 Domicile (domovské právo, Heimatrecht) refers to membership in a municipal commu-
nity. In the Czech lands (Bohemia and Moravia) as parts of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, domicile was regulated by Act No. 105/1863 Coll. [Collection] of Acts of the
Empire, as amended by Act No. 222/1896 Coll.
3 E.g. Treaty of Versailles (1919), Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1919) and Treaty of
Trianon (1920).
4 Constitutional Act of 4 April 1920, No. 236, Supplementing and Amending Existing
Provisions on the Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship and on Domicile in the
Czechoslovak Republic and Act of 29 February 1920, No. 121 Coll. of Acts of the
Czechoslovak Republic, introducing the Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak
Republic. The basic principles of the Czechoslovak citizenship were thus regulated
by constitutional laws and treaty provisions. The system, however, failed to achieve
the declared aim of protecting minorities and preventing statelessness.
5 In Slovakia provisions of former Hungarian laws remained in force. See also Kusá in
the present volume.
6 In October 1938, Czechoslovakia lost parts of its territory inhabited mainly by a
German population. In March 1939, after the secession of Slovakia, the rest of the
Czech lands were turned into the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia. The complex
legal consequences in terms of citizenship are described by Verner (1947, Appendix
II: 227-270).
7 The Presidential Decree exempted from withdrawal of citizenship those citizens of
German and Hungarian ethnicity who had joined the fight for liberation or were
persecuted by the Nazis. The legislation also established a possibility to apply for the
(re)granting of Czechoslovak citizenship within six months after the entry of the
Decree into force. Most Czechoslovak citizens concerned actually had acquired
German or Hungarian citizenship in the period 1938-1945.
8 See also Kusá in this volume.
9 Constitutional Act No. 143/1968 Coll. on the Czechoslovak Federation.
10 The corresponding law regulating the same issue in the Slovak Republic was the Act
of the Slovak National Council No. 206/1968 Coll.
11 In this paper, the term republic-level citizenship is used to denote membership in the
constitutive entities of the federal state. The term (state) citizenship is used exclusively
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to indicate membership of a sovereign state. In Czech language and legal terminol-
ogy, the term state citizenship (státnı́ občanstvı́) is used for both legal statuses.
12 The republic-level citizenship was not recorded in any official documents, such as
birth certificates, ID cards or passports. On the other hand, the ID and other
documents recorded the ethnic origin (národnost), (e.g. Czech, Slovak, Hungarian),
which was based, in principle, on one’s own declaration.
13 Constitutional Act No. 23/1991 Coll. introducing the Charter of Fundamental Rights
and Freedoms. The Act amended art. 5 of Constitutional Act No. 143/1968 Coll. on
the Czechoslovak Federation. The Act came into force on 8 February 1991. Later, it
was transformed into art. 12(2) of the Czech Constitution. The provision offers
stronger protection against deprivation of citizenship than art. 15(2) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which bans arbitrary deprivation of citizenship only.
14 Act No. 88/1990 Coll. provided for the reacquisition of Czechoslovak citizenship by
former Czechoslovak citizens who had lost Czechoslovak citizenship in the period
between 1 October 1949 and 31 December 1989. The reacquisition took effect in
certain cases through a simple declaration. However, two issues are important. First,
the law did not go back to before 1948 to cover former Czechoslovak citizens who
were deprived of Czechoslovak citizenship by the post-war Presidential Decrees
(Germans and Hungarians). Second, the law provided a relatively short period to
exercise the right to request the reacquisition of citizenship. It expired on 31
December 1993.
15 See Kusá in the present volume.
16 The Constitutional Act No. 542/1992 Coll. on the Dissolution of Czechoslovakia on
31 December 1992, was adopted by the Federal Assembly on 25 November 1992.
17 Since the establishment of Czechoslovakia in 1918, there has been much intrastate
migration. For instance, in the period 1918-1938 many Czechs went to Slovakia as
part of a new Czechoslovak administration. After 1945, there was continuous
economic emigration from Slovakia to Bohemia and Moravia. One important
element of the post-war internal movements of inhabitants was (both spontaneous
and state-organised) resettlement of Slovak Roma in industrial towns and cities of
Moravia and Bohemia.
18 The drafting and the adoption of the law took place in exceptional circumstances.
The whole process was finished within two months.
19 The possibility of dual (Czech and Slovak) citizenship was the most divisive issue
between the ruling political elites – Slovak nationalists and Czech pragmatists. It was
favoured by the former and denied by the latter. Since an agreement on state
succession regarding citizenship had not been reached, two separate citizenship laws
regulated the citizenship of the successor states.
20 For the concept of the initial determination (Erstabgrenzung), see the work by Krom-
bach (1967).
21 The same criterion, i.e. republic-level citizenship, was used in some countries of
former Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia), while the countries of the post-Soviet Eurasia
applied a permanent residency criterion instead.
22 The right to opt for Czech citizenship was restricted by the requirement that the
person had not been convicted in the last five years for an intentional criminal
offence.
23 Most Roma migrated to Czech lands from Slovakia after 1945. Consequently, many
Czech Roma became Slovak citizens by the application of the general rules of initial
determination.
24 The first significant change was introduced by Act No. 139/1996 Coll., which
allowed for exceptions from the clean criminal record requirement for former
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Czechoslovak citizens who had resided in the territory of the Czech Republic since
the break-up of Czechoslovakia.
25 File No. IV US 34/97.
26 The ruling was confirmed by a subsequent ruling on 14 November 2000 (File No. I.
US 337/99). The Court argued that exercising the right of option does not mean that
a person acquired foreign, i.e. Slovak citizenship at his or her own request, which
would lead to automatic loss of Czech citizenship. In practical terms, this ruling con-
cerned mostly ethnic Czechs living in Slovakia.
27 See also below Table 6.4.
28 See below Table 6.3, sections 18b, 18c.
29 The situation of children born to a stateless parent without permanent residence is
not regulated adequately.
30 I do not distinguish between eligibility and conditions for naturalisation. In Czech citi-
zenship legislation, the conditions for naturalisation fall into two categories: a) condi-
tions sine qua non, which cannot be waived, and b) conditions, which can be waived
at the discretion of the authorities.
31 The applicant has not been convicted for an intentional crime in the last five years.
32 The applicant has to submit a certificate of the loss of his or her previous citizenship
or a certificate that by the acquisition of Czech citizenship he or she will lose his or
her previous citizenship.
33 Act No. 326/1999 Coll., as amended (Aliens Act). The amendment of the Aliens Act,
Act No. 161/2006, which entered into force on 27 April 2006, cut the waiting period
for permanent resident status to five years (in order to implement EU Directive
2003/109/EC Concerning the Status of Third-country Nationals who are Long-term
Residents).
34 This does not apply to Slovak citizens.
35 In order to avoid statelessness, there is no provision allowing for the renunciation of
Czech citizenship if the person concerned is not a citizen of another state.
36 We assume that the intention of the drafters of the law was to reduce the cases of
Czech citizens living abroad transferring Czech citizenship over several generations.
37 It had particularly precarious consequences for Czech women who married citizens
of some Islamic countries. The status of non-citizens put them at a disadvantage
with regard to e.g. inheritance rights, whereas the potential loss of Czech citizenship
in the case of naturalisation would deprive them of diplomatic protection. Another
category adversely affected are citizens who applied for a foreign citizenship before
the law entered into force but were granted a foreign citizenship after 1 January
1993.
38 In the Court’s opinion, there is a distinction between deprivation of citizenship, pro-
hibited by the Constitution, and loss of citizenship. Those who apply for a foreign citi-
zenship should be aware of the legal consequences attached to the act, which are pro-
vided for by law. Thus, the loss of citizenship based on the acquisition of foreign citi-
zenship does not constitute deprivation of citizenship against one’s will. See Ruling
published under No. 6/1996 Coll. Concerning the Proposal to delete Section 17 of
Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on the Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship of the Czech Re-
public.
39 This provision existed previously, but the wording was not clear and, in practice, it
was applied only to rare cases of automatic acquisition of citizenship through
marriage.
40 The Czech Republic is party to the following multilateral treaties: 1997 European
Convention on Nationality (No. 76/2004 Collection of International Treaties,
henceforth Coll. of I. T.), date of accession: 1 July 2004; 1961 UN Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness (No. 43/2002 Coll. of I. T.), date of accession: 19 March
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2002; 1954 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (No. 108/
2004 Coll. of I. T), date of accession: 17 October 2004.
41 Published as Act No. 169/1929 Coll. The treaty established a rule that in the case of
naturalisation, the citizenship of the state of origin is automatically lost.
42 In 2004, the Ministry issued 677 negative decisions regarding naturalisation. 369
unsuccessful applicants appealed. In 134 cases the Minister of the Interior over-
turned the negative decision (Ministry of the Interior 2005: 145).
43 Act No. 150/2002 Coll. on Judicial Reviews of Administrative Acts. For judicial
review in naturalisation cases see part 3 of this chapter.
44 The Council for Human Rights is an advisory body to the Government. See
Resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic No. 493/2002 Related to the
Communication by the Council for Human Rights on the Citizenship of the Czech
Republic. The communication concerned certain urgent issues, such as the
incompatibility of the remaining bilateral agreements with the requirements of the
European Convention on Nationality. It also brought to the attention of the
Government certain problems of interpretation and practice in the field of
citizenship law.
45 Ministry of the Interior, Document No. VS – 473/50/2-2004.
46 The fundamental incentives for the switch towards toleration of multiple citizenship
thus seem to be those described by Hagedorn (2003). Obviously, citizens and
immigrants campaign for dual citizenship for different reasons. Dual citizenship
corresponds to the needs of both expatriates and immigrants and offers them a
greater scope for individual choice.
47 However, implementing EU Directive 2003/109/EC Concerning the Status of Third-
country Nationals who are Long-term Residents would de facto reduce the overall resi-
dence requirement.
48 At present, the state authorities processing applications for naturalisation carry out
the testing. This does not guarantee uniform standards of testing.
49 Ministry of the Interior, Analýza úpravy nabývánı́ a pozbývánı́ státnı́ho občanstvı́. [Ana-
lysis of the regulation on acquisition and loss of state citizenship] Adopted on 13 July
2005 by Government Resolution No. 881.
50 The Chamber of Deputies passed the bill on 23 November 2005. 102 deputies voted
for the bill and 49 against. The Senate confirmed the bill on 26 January 2006. The
Act No. 46/2006 Coll. was published and entered into force on 27 February 2006.
51 Some of the judicial cases concern citizenship of deceased persons, as the right to
restitution by heirs depends on the issue. In certain cases, the Ministry of the
Interior had to complete legal proceedings started in the late 1940s, using the then
valid citizenship legislation (see e.g. Decision of the Supreme Administrative Court
of 27 November 2003, ref. no. 6 A 90/2002-82 (www.nssoud.cz).
52 See Molek & Šimı́ček 2005.
53 Resolution by the Supreme Administrative Court of 23 March 2005, ref. no. 6A 25/
2002-42 and Decision by the Supreme Administrative Court of 4 May 2006, ref. no.
2As 31/2005-78. (www.nssoud.cz). In the former case the Court decided that negative
decisions on naturalisation can be reviewed by administrative courts. (The Ministry
of the Interior as well as some courts were of the opinion that naturalisation cases,
unlike other citizenship cases, can not be reviewed by courts because of the non
existence of the legal entitlement to citizenship.) In the latter case the Court
confirmed its opinion on the possibility of administrative review of naturalisation
cases and rejected the whole theory of unlimited administrative discretion in these
procedures.
54 As part of a new, more active approach to the issues of immigration and integration,
the Czech Statistical Office started to gather and analyse data on naturalisation in a
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systematic manner. These statistics however only cover the period since 2001. They
can be found at www.czso.cz.
55 There is a Czech minority living in Kazakhstan.
56 In many cases, Slovak citizens living in the Czech Republic had even difficulties to
acquire permanent resident status (Boučková & Valášek 1999).
57 The variety of solutions adopted in the numerous cases of state succession made it
difficult to prove the presence of a concrete and detailed customary law on state
succession and citizenship. It was only the 1997 European Convention on Nation-
ality that introduced certain generally applicable rules on citizenship in cases of state
succession.
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Bauböck, R. (1994), Transnational Citizenship. Membership and Rights in International Mi-
gration. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
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Chapter 7: The Slovak question and the Slovak
answer: Citizenship during the quest for national
self-determination and after1
Dagmar Kusá
Citizenship is both a status and a praxis. As a status, it is defined by a
collection of laws and regulations. In Slovakia, these have been shaped
by both principles of ius soli and ius sanguinis, the latter gaining im-
portance especially after the First and the Second World War. The
praxis involves the civic and political participation by citizens as well as
the policies of governments concerning the implementation of the law
in relation to its citizens as well as to non-citizens. The latter depend
strongly on the political situation of the times. The first two turbulent
decades of the Czechoslovak Republic were marked by attempts to eth-
nically homogenise the ‘Czechoslovak’ nation, targeting primarily the
German and Hungarian minorities (but also Roma and others) as un-
wanted elements, culminating in three years of ‘homelessness’ after
the end of the Second World War. Only the communist Government
restored their civil and political rights. Yet it was unable to do away
with the national sentiments of the Slovaks, striving to achieve national
self-determination within or without Czechoslovakia. The Federation of
1968 (and the Warsaw Pact tanks that preceded it) quieted the national-
ist voices until 1989, when they echoed through the public squares
with all the more vigour. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia, which fol-
lowed in 1993, made for a messy transition period in citizenship policy
with the need to address both issues related to the end of the commu-
nist regime and its victims, as well as to the status of Czech nationals
in Slovakia.
The last decade has also brought new challenges connected to the in-
tegration of Slovakia into the European Union and marked by general
globalisation processes. Slovakia is figuring out its relationship towards
an influx of newcomers from parts of the world with which it had no
cultural contact in the past. International institutions shape these poli-
cies to a large degree, although the careful observation of Hungary’s –
the closest neighbour and historic adversary – citizenship policies
seems to have just as much impact on shaping the public debate and
legal provisions taken in Slovakia. While we will be focusing in this
chapter primarily on citizenship as a status, the political praxis of gov-
ernments does need some attention to complete our understanding of
what shaped citizenship policies at different times.
7.1 History of Slovak citizenship
7.1.1 History of citizenship policies since the first Czechoslovak Republic
Czechoslovak citizenship was created with the first Czechoslovak Re-
public on 28 October 1918. The collective identity to which it referred
was cumbersome, to say the least, and was a result of the historical
path of the Czech and Slovak nation-building processes as well as of
the peculiar nature of the new state that had resulted from the dissolu-
tion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and from the peace treaties fol-
lowing the First World War. The Wilsonian principle of self-determina-
tion influenced the understanding of the concept of citizenship and
contributed to the growing role of ethnicity in its legal definition. Con-
cepts of citizenship and ethnic nationality are often difficult to set apart
neatly. They influence each other, and both depend heavily on political
interpretations. The Czechoslovak Republic consisted of a multitude of
ethnic groups and the leadership struggled with asserting the domi-
nant position of the Czech and Slovak nations in their newly estab-
lished Republic. National minorities, especially the three million Ger-
mans and close to a million Hungarians, formed 44 per cent of the to-
tal population. The Czechoslovak Government thus enforced an official
Czechoslovak nationality2 (instead of separate Czech and Slovak na-
tionalities).
The sovereign nation needed to be propped up by some ‘objective’
quantifiable measures of dominance. Population censuses helped to
provide these measures and also allowed citizens to be distinguished
from foreigners.3 The power of numbers as represented in the census
was becoming apparent to national leaders prior to the foundation of
Czechoslovakia. With the growing turbulence over what was then
called the ‘nationality question’ within the Habsburg Empire the cen-
sus was becoming more and more powerful as an expression of ‘real’
power, as a ticket to future control over territory and as one of the de-
terminants of state formation and boundaries. In 1900, for example,
the German newspaper in Bohemia appealed to its readers: ‘Dear fel-
low citizens! Please pay close attention to column 13 (Umgangssprache)
in the census form. The future of our nation depends on this minor
entry. 1. What is the language used on a daily basis? It is the language
most commonly used by an individual. Daily use means the communi-
cation in the family, among people that live together, in their employ-
ment, with an employer. Wherever this communication happens in the
German language, no other language should be entered into column
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13. Is the language used on a daily basis identical with the mother ton-
gue? Absolutely not. Czech employees […] use in their German employ-
ment the German language instead of their mother tongue. German is
their language of everyday use.’ (Zeman 1994: 37). In a similar manner
Czech, Slovak and Ruthenian leaders appealed to their respective con-
stituencies to enter their mother tongue. Data were collected by census
officials, often with the aid of the army and police and accompanied by
threats, blackmail or violence.
The census remained important, especially in border disputes after
1918. The northern part of the Czech Teschen-Silesia region as well as
the southern part of the Slovak borderlands with Hungary were heavily
disputed after the war and nationality was used as a tool for demarca-
tion policies. Polish representatives based their arguments on census
data from before 1918, which showed a clear majority of ethnic Poles
in those territories. As the populations here were ethnically mixed and
their mother tongue was often Polish or Hungarian, the question in
the 1921 census carried out by the Czechoslovak Government was
promptly changed to ask directly about nationality. A Silesian national-
ity was created (besides Polish and Czechoslovak). Respondents in this
category were then automatically counted among Czechoslovak na-
tionals. This resulted in a complete change of population proportions.
While the percentage of Poles fell to 25 per cent (from 139,000 to
69,000), the percentage of Czechoslovaks grew from 40 per cent to 65
per cent (from 123,000 to 177,000) (Paul 1998: 163).
The fate of Teschen-Silesia was decided at the Paris Peace Confer-
ence. Polish representatives succeeded in their demand for a plebiscite.
If this had been carried out, Czechoslovakia might have lost some of
these economically strong territories. However the international com-
mission overseeing the plebiscite could not agree on the conditions,
the Red Army was quickly invading Poland, and legal norms in Cze-
choslovakia were confusing due to the existing state of legal dualism
where Czech lands inherited the legal system from Austria, and Slova-
kia that of Hungary. A plebiscite was to be carried out not only in Sile-
sia, but also in the northern Slovak areas of Spiš and Orava, which
would result in implementing two plebiscites regulated by differing
sets of laws. The northern boundary was therefore finally decided upon
the recommendation of the Allied Powers. Poland was compensated
for much of Silesia with 25 settlements in Orava and Spiš (Klimko
1980; Peroutka 1991).
Legal dualism was caused by differing practices in granting citizen-
ship and domicile before 1918 following the Austro-Hungarian Com-
promise of 1867. While in Austria domicile, i.e. a legal title of resi-
dence in a municipality (Heimatrecht), was closely registered, it was not
in the Hungarian part of the empire that included Slovakia.4 Even
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though domicile was granted to all those born and residing in a muni-
cipality, the gentry had a right to deny some people domicile even if
they were born or had resided in the locality for a long time. Jurová
(2002) maintains this was the fate of many Roma who moved from vil-
lage to village. This was due to arts. 8-15 of the municipal law (XXVII/
1886) that tied the acquiring of domicile of those who move and/or
marry to fulfilling certain duties towards the municipality, thus giving
the authorities opportunities for convenient interpretation. Further-
more, Act No. 222/1896 amended some provisions of the 1863 munici-
pal law that specified conditions under which a Roma could be granted
domicile.
The Roma and Hungarians were groups that succeeding Czechoslo-
vak governments sought to minimise statistically after 1918. The cen-
sus of 1921 shows a remarkable number of ‘foreigners’ without Cze-
choslovak citizenship that still have domicile on Slovak territory. The
extent to which these groups were affected by citizenship policies has
unfortunately not been extensively researched and quantitative data in
this area are missing (Jurová 2002).
Czechoslovakia’s citizenship regulations were further disturbed by
the events of the Second World War. Slovakia experienced its first (de-
batably) independent statehood as a Nazi puppet state, while the Czech
lands were occupied under the Third Reich’s Protectorate. The end of
the Second World War and the restoration of Czechoslovakia led to the
adoption of ad hoc laws that introduced the criterion of ethnicity into
citizenship legislation. The new legislation was linked to the post-war
massive emigration and population exchange. Under the President’s
Constitutional Decree No. 33/1945 Coll. (Collection), Czechoslovak citi-
zens of German and Hungarian ethnic origins were deprived of Cze-
choslovak citizenship.5 This also meant their exclusion from official in-
stitutions (Order 99/1945 of the Slovak National Council), as well as
from reimbursement for war damages, and implied other practical con-
sequences.6 Further decrees also disbanded German and Hungarian
associations and organisations.
The transfers of ethnic Germans were agreed to by the Allied Powers
at the Potsdam Conference in 1945. They did, however, not approve of
applying the same policy based on a principle of collective guilt to
Hungarians. The alternative solution found by the Beneš Government
was a ‘voluntary exchange of populations’ between Czechoslovakia and
Hungary. This plan resulted in the removal of 89,660 ethnic Hungar-
ians, who were moved into Hungary, in return for receiving 73,273 eth-
nic Slovaks (Vadkerty 2002: 32). Oral history projects document that
the nature of the exchange was in many cases coercive. Another wave
of transfers, labelled by the Czech historian Karel Kaplan as an ‘inter-
nal colonisation’ (Kaplan, 1993: 9), was based on the Presidential De-
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cree No. 88/1945 on universal labour service. Ethnic Hungarians were
recruited for ‘voluntary agricultural work’7 into the then vacant Sude-
tenland. Age limits imposed by the Decree were also frequently ig-
nored and property left behind was confiscated (in direct violation of
the Decree) (Kusá 2005). These policies were accompanied by a pro-
gramme of re-Slovakisation, passed by the Slovak National Council in
June 1946. This policy gave ethnic Hungarians an opportunity to ‘re-
claim’ Slovak citizenship (based on the premise of previous coercive
Magyarisation of Slovaks) within the time span of one year. Some
320,000 Hungarians were granted Slovak citizenship on this basis.
However, as the census of 1960 shows, many returned to claiming
Hungarian ethnicity in the census as soon as the political situation al-
lowed for it.8
This era has been dubbed by the Hungarian authors as the ‘home-
less years’. Citizenship was eventually restored to the Germans and
Hungarians remaining in Czechoslovakia in 1948 by the newly estab-
lished communist government; most Hungarians who had been trans-
ferred to Sudetenland have returned. Many, however, never recovered
lost properties. The Beneš Decrees and their legal and practical conse-
quences remain a painful open wound in Czech and Slovak political
memory to this day and have been repeatedly debated, especially in
connection with possible compensation for those affected and their
descendants. Representatives of German and Hungarian communities
sometimes call for an annulment of the Beneš Decrees, yet due to the
complexity of the political situation of interwar and post-Second World
War years and a lack of political will in the Czech and Slovak Repub-
lics, it is unlikely that such a measure would be adopted. Some conci-
liatory steps were taken by the Czech and Slovak Governments in the
past decade on the level of bilateral declarations (the Czech-German
Declaration of 1997) or public speeches (e.g. Hrušovský 2003).
7.1.2 Regulation of Czechoslovak citizenship in 1949-1968 and the ‘Slovak
Question’
The rise of communist monopoly rule meant, ironically enough, the
end of ‘homelessness’ for the Hungarians and Germans in Czechoslo-
vakia. Citizenship laws were, however, misused for other political pur-
poses, as one of the tools to keep the lid on the population, as a sort of
preventive blackmail of those who might think of publicly voicing their
disapproval of the communist regime.
The legal process of acquisition and loss of Czechoslovak citizenship
in the period following the February putsch of 1948 was governed by
the Act on the Acquisition and Loss of Czechoslovak Citizenship No.
194/1949, as amended by the Act No. 72/1958 Modifying the Regula-
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tions on the Acquisition and Loss of Czechoslovak Citizenship.9 The
Czechoslovak citizenship could be acquired in four ways: 1) by birth:
Czechoslovak citizenship was transferred to the child by his or her par-
ent citizens regardless of whether the child was born in the territory of
the Czechoslovak Republic or abroad. If the child was born in the terri-
tory of the Czechoslovak Republic, it was sufficient if one of the par-
ents was a Czechoslovak citizen;10 2) by marriage: A foreigner could ac-
quire Czechoslovak citizenship on demand upon marrying a Czecho-
slovak citizen. This acquisition needed to be investigated and approved
by a district National Committee within six months; 3) by grant: A for-
eigner could be granted Czechoslovak citizenship upon request after
meeting two principal conditions: residing in the Czechoslovak terri-
tory for five consecutive years and abandoning his or her previous citi-
zenship. There was no legal entitlement to be granted citizenship; 4)
by reacquisition: This applied to the acquisition of citizenship by the
‘homeless’ persons of German and Hungarian nationality ex lege after
taking a citizenship oath without the need to apply or to fulfil other
conditions.11
The loss of Czechoslovak citizenship was possible by 1) renunciation
upon request,12 2) revocation by the state due to hostile acts against the
Republic, illegal emigration, or not returning to the homeland for the
period of five years or upon request of the Ministry of the Interior, 3)
marrying and acquiring citizenship in another country (with a possibi-
lity to request retention of Czechoslovak citizenship), 4) a court deci-
sion as a penalty for ‘high treason, espionage, desertion of the Repub-
lic, military subversive activities, war treason, assassination of a state
official’,13 5) naturalisation in the United States of America, and 6) as a
consequence of agreements on dual citizenship.14
During this period of time, and especially during the détente period
of the 1960s, when literature and arts were flourishing after the de-
nunciation of the Stalinist doctrine, Slovak leaders and intellectuals
voiced their desire for self-determination of the Slovak nation in a fed-
erative arrangement. They did not wish to be Czechoslovak citizens,
but Slovak citizens of Czechoslovakia. While the Czech elite focused on
market liberalisation and democratisation of the regime, Slovaks called
for ‘first federalisation, then democratisation’ – a slogan that reap-
peared repeatedly in public squares after 1989 in a much more malevo-
lent form. This issue divided Czech and Slovak intellectuals during the
entire duration of the communist regime, as the Czech cultural leaders
failed to see the urgency of this issue for the Slovaks. The Soviet leader-
ship, however, duly noted Slovak aspirations for federation. Thus when
the tanks rolled into Prague and Bratislava on the 21 August 1968 it
brought with it different realities for the two nations. While the oppres-
sion following the Warsaw Pact invasion was equally suffocating in
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both parts of the country, it also brought the desired federation for the
Slovaks. Dissent in Slovakia was therefore more muted compared to
the Czech region. The Soviets poured investment into the Slovak in-
dustry in the post-1968 era further contributing thereby to different
perceptions of the ‘normalisation’ period between the two nations.
What was an era of darkness for most Czechs, was seen by many Slo-
vaks as a repressed society, but with real industrialisation and federa-
tion at least on paper. While this reality itself may not have had an im-
mediate impact on citizenship laws and practice, it certainly reverber-
ated on the political scene after 1989, when the cultural divide
between Czechs and Slovaks escalated into the ‘Velvet Divorce’.
7.1.3 Regulation of Czechoslovak citizenship in 1969-1992: Czechoslovak
Socialist Federative Republic
Until 1968, when the Czechoslovak Federation was established, Cze-
choslovakia was a unitary state with a single Czechoslovak citizenship.
The establishment of a federation also resulted in the creation of Czech
and Slovak citizenships. Constitutional Law No. 143/1968 Coll. on the
Czechoslovak Federation, which came into force on 1 January 1969, is
based on the principle of individual preference when determining the
citizenship of the two constituent republics.15
The original text contains a provision according to which every citi-
zen of one of the republics is also a citizen of Czechoslovakia (art. 5).
Citizenship was regulated by the Constitutional Act of the National
Council of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic No. 165/1968 Coll. on
the Principles of Acquisition and Loss of Czech and Slovak Citizenship,
followed by the Act No. 206/1968 Coll. of the Slovak National Council
on Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship of the Slovak Socialist Republic.
Normally citizenship at the level of the two republics was deter-
mined by the place of birth or by the citizenship of the parents, if that
could be identified. Czech or Slovak citizens could however choose a
different citizenship until 31 December 1969. The Act precluded dual
citizenship, one had to choose one or the other. The Slovak National
Council passed Act No. 206/1968 Coll. to apply these rules in domes-
tic legislation.
Between 1969 and 1992 it was possible to acquire Slovak and Czech
citizenship by birth,16 by choice (within one year after the establish-
ment of the federation), by marriage, or by grant (after five consecutive
years of residence for foreigners and two years for Czech citizens with
permanent residence in Slovakia).
Loss of citizenship in the ‘normalisation’ era was similar to previous
regulations. It could be renounced, lost due to acquiring Czech citizen-
ship, or one could still be deprived of it on the basis of art. 7 of Act No.
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194/1949 Coll., naturalisation in the US, or according to agreements
on dual citizenship.
After the fall of communism, both Czech and Slovak national elites
struggled to assert the position of their nations within Europe. National
identity had to be reconstructed and to a large extent even re-invented.
Both elites turned to their past to seek linkages and justification for
steps towards self-determination. Czechs and Slovaks, however, sought
friendship with very different animals from their past. Czechs built on
Masaryk’s democratic ideals from the first interwar republic, while Slo-
vaks viewed this era suspiciously with a memory of the Czech ‘Prago-
centrism’17 and of the refusal of the Czechoslovak Government to grant
Slovakia a right to self-determination or autonomy in a federation. In-
stead, Slovaks referred to the legacy of the Slovak puppet state created
by the Nazis.18 The discrepancy in perceptions of the post-1968 era
added to the rift between the two nations. This ‘failure to find a decent
past’ together, as Igor Lukes (1995) coined it, contributed to the choice
of separate paths for the future by the political elites, whose sentiments
were, however, not reciprocated by the majorities of populations on
either side of the new border.
In the confused atmosphere of rampant nationalism that had anti-
Czech, anti-Hungarian, anti-Semitic, and even anti-Western traits in
the years prior to the Velvet Divorce, Slovak representatives raised
many issues that seemed to be frivolously escalating the conflict into
what popularly became known as the ‘hyphen war’, i.e. the war about
the spelling of ‘Czechoslovakia’. Slovak delegates claimed that the term
Czechoslovakia was discriminatory to the Slovaks, who are commonly
mistaken for Czechs abroad. Claims were backed by invoking the
myths of one thousand years of suffering by the Slovaks under the
Hungarian yoke, only to be replaced by the Czech yoke in 1918. The
Federative Assembly finally settled on ‘Czech and Slovak Federative Re-
public’ as the name for the post-communist state.
The Slovak Prime Minister Vladimı́r Mečiar conducted a policy of
blackmail, threatening the Czech leadership with the possibility of se-
cession over each major political issue. The Czech Prime Minister
Klaus eventually called his bluff and startled Mečiar by accepting the
proposal for separation. The divorce was decided at the top political le-
vel without being ratified by popular participation, but also without
strong protests from the Czech and Slovak public. Over half of the re-
spondents in public opinion surveys voiced their desire to remain in
the common state and/or to have an opportunity to decide its fate in a
referendum (Nemcová 1992). It was instead decided by political elites.
On 1 January 1993 the two nations started a new period in their history
and had to determine their identities and related policies anew. Even
before the dissolution, the citizenship laws had been growing in signif-
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icance, and many Czechs and Slovaks were using their right to choose
their republic-level citizenship.
In Slovakia, the nationalist craze played out directly in many legal
provisions that concerned anybody ‘other’ than ethnic Slovaks.19 Such
was the case with the ‘Sign Law’ (a law regulating public inscriptions
such as topographical names of towns, villages, streets and store signs),
the Act on the Official State Language, which was passed without any
provisions for the use of languages of the national minorities (which
were adopted only in 1997), the ‘Territorial Arrangement’ that redrew
district boundaries to lessen the percentage of ethnic Hungarians in
areas where they were concentrated, and other legislation. This policy
has also affected the practice of allowing access to those seeking asy-
lum, with possible hopes for eventually acquiring citizenship in the
Slovak Republic. While the legislation regulating the asylum proce-
dures was not markedly different from other countries, the political en-
vironment was palpably hostile. During the war in Bosnia and Herze-
govina Slovakia, just as many other countries, received an influx of re-
fugees. The Migration Office of the Ministry of the Interior was at that
time particularly untoward in granting anyone the status of a refugee.
Many, if not most, displaced persons had to contend with a protective
status of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees office
in Slovakia, and most were turned back after a few months, not always
into safe conditions.
7.2 Current regulations of acquisition and loss of Slovak
citizenship
In the first years of the Slovak Republic, Slovak citizenship was either
determined by law or could be individually chosen. Those who were ci-
tizens of the Slovak Republic before 31 December 1992 automatically
became citizens of independent Slovakia, as stipulated in Act No. 40/
1993 Coll. on Citizenship of the Slovak Republic. Czech citizens could
apply for Slovak citizenship until 31 December 1993 by way of a written
request to the District Office in the territory of the Slovak Republic or
to the Diplomatic Mission or Consular Office of the Slovak Republic
abroad. This option was open freely to all citizens of the former Czech
and Slovak Federative Republic. Those applying for Slovak citizenship
had to provide proof that they were Czechoslovak citizens as of 31 De-
cember 1992 and state their place of birth and permanent residence
(art. 7).
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7.2.1 Acquisition of citizenship
Slovak citizenship can be currently acquired by birth, by adoption, or
by grant. The laws regulating citizenship are comparatively generous
towards individuals with Czech or Slovak roots, allowing for a plural ci-
tizenship and extending considerable citizenship rights to the Slovak
expatriates living abroad.
Acquisition of citizenship by birth is firmly based on ius sanguinis
except in those cases where a child would otherwise become stateless.
In current legislation a child acquires Slovak citizenship only if at least
one of the parents is a citizen of the Slovak Republic or if the child
was born in the territory of the Slovak Republic to parents who are sta-
teless or whose citizenship is not transmitted to the child iure sangui-
nis.20 If citizenship cannot be established, a child is considered to be a
citizen of the Slovak Republic if he or she was born or was found in
the territory of the Slovak Republic and his or her parents are not
known. If one of a child’s parents is a citizen of another country and
the other is a citizen of the Slovak Republic, then the child is a citizen
of the Slovak Republic even if it is later established that the child’s par-
ent who is a citizen of the Slovak Republic is not the child’s natural
parent. A child can also acquire citizenship when he or she is adopted
by a Slovak citizen. In case of disagreement between the parents, Slo-
vak citizenship can be determined by a court judgement on the basis
of one parent’s or a legal guardian’s request.
Citizenship of the Slovak Republic can also be granted upon request
to a foreigner. This requires consecutive permanent residence and phy-
sical stay in the Slovak territory for at least five years immediately prior
to submitting an application for citizenship. Slovak law also requires
sufficient basic proficiency in the Slovak language. Applicants must
also have a clean criminal record, which means that they must not
have been prosecuted for an intentional crime during those five years
before the application, must not be under an administrative expulsion
order from the country of residence or subject to extradition proceed-
ings.21
Facilitating factors in the application procedure are if an applicant is
stateless or voluntarily renounces his or her previous citizenship.
Furthermore, citizenship can be granted upon request to those who
have entered into marriage with a Slovak citizen (after living in the Slo-
vak Republic for a period of three consecutive years), or those who have
made special contributions to the Slovak Republic through their
achievements in the field of economy, science, culture or technology.
There are also special provisions for the restoration of citizenship to
those who lost it according to previous legislation. A person whose for-
mer Czechoslovak citizenship expired or who lost the Czechoslovak ci-
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tizenship due to a long absence or on the basis of citizenship law dur-
ing the communist regime, may be granted citizenship of the Slovak
Republic even if the above-mentioned condition of five years consecu-
tive permanent residence has not been met. Former Slovak citizens re-
turning to live in Slovakia have to have permanent residence in the Slo-
vak Republic for two years prior to filing an application for citizen-
ship.22
7.2.2 Loss of citizenship
Slovak citizenship can be lost, only upon the holder’s own request, by
releasing the person from the state bond. Only those can be released
who already possess another citizenship, or who will acquire another
citizenship as soon as they are released from Slovak citizenship.
A Slovak citizen cannot be released if he or she is being prosecuted,
is currently serving a sentence or is due to serve a sentence or has out-
standing taxes or other debts to pay to the state. The District Office,
Diplomatic Mission or a Consular Office of the Slovak Republic makes
the final decision on the loss of citizenship. Citizenship is lost on the
day of receipt of the document stating his or her release from the state
bond of the Slovak Republic.
7.2.3 Procedure
Slovak citizenship acquired by naturalisation is awarded by the Minis-
try of the Interior of the Slovak Republic based on a written applica-
tion. This application has to be filed in person at a District Office, Dip-
lomatic Mission or Consular Office of the Slovak Republic. It must in-
clude personal data about the applicant and must be accompanied by a
dossier of documents including a brief curriculum vitae, an identifica-
tion card, a birth certificate, a personal status certificate, and a certifi-
cate of residence in the Slovak Republic. Former Czechoslovak citizens
that qualify for restoration of citizenship have to provide a document
stating the release from the state bond of the Czechoslovak Republic,
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic or the Slovak Socialist Republic
(whichever applies). Former Slovak citizens applying for citizenship
after two years of residence in Slovakia can submit a Slovak Status ID
as a form of identification. The Ministry of the Interior can ask for
other documents if required to render a decision.
The application is accompanied by a questionnaire on the basis of
which the authorities evaluate the applicant’s Slovak language skills.
Verification has to be done in a way that takes the applicant’s circum-
stances into account. The District Office has the right to request a
statement from the police and will then forward the complete applica-
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tion with all documents and statements to the Ministry of the Interior
for a final decision. When making its decision, the Ministry of the In-
terior has to take into account the public interest as well as statements
of state institutions and of the police. It has nine months from receipt
of an application to issue a decision. If statements of state institutions
and of the police are required, the processing period is prolonged to
one year.
Slovak citizenship is acquired by obtaining a Certificate of Acquisi-
tion of Slovak Citizenship at the District Office, Diplomatic Mission or
Consular Office of the Slovak Republic and after taking the obligatory
oath. The citizenship oath reads: ‘I promise on my honour and con-
science that I will be loyal to the Slovak Republic, I will respect the Slo-
vak Constitution, laws and other legal rules and will duly fulfil all du-
ties of a Slovak citizen.’23
If the applicant doesn’t pick up the Certificate of Acquisition within
six months of receiving a written notification the Ministry will stop the
procedure. If the Ministry rejects the application then the applicant can
apply again after a minimum waiting period of one year.
7.2.4 International treaties
Slovakia is party to many international multilateral and bilateral trea-
ties that impact on domestic citizenship regulations. International trea-
ties take precedence over domestic law – if they differ from the provi-
sions in the Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on Citizenship of the Slovak Repub-
lic, the legal regulations of international law outweigh domestic law
(art. 17).
As in the case of the Czech Republic, the treaty with the United
States that precluded naturalised American citizens of Czech and Slo-
vak origin from holding dual citizenship (the 1928 Naturalisation
Treaty) expired in 1997. This allowed many former citizens and their
descendants to restore their Slovak citizenship and to file claims for
restitution of property with the Slovak state.
Among the other important bilateral treaties was the Agreement on
Slovak-Hungarian Neighbourly Relations from 1995, which had impli-
cations for the practical implementation of certain cultural and educa-
tional rights of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia. Many international pro-
visions – including this one – were passed only due to extensive pres-
sure from European institutions dangling the carrot of EU accession in
front of the Slovak leadership. The Slovak-Hungarian Treaty was
passed at the peak of the Mečiar Government era, to the bewilderment
of his followers and perhaps of himself, after Slovakia had received de-
marches from the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities
and other international institutions regarding its practices concerning
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national minorities and foreigners. The international community thus
played a key role in shaping domestic policies in this transition period
keeping the ugly dragon of nationalism and xenophobia on a some-
what shorter leash.
7.2.5 Dual and multiple citizenship
Slovak legislation tolerates dual citizenship. Regulations of dual and
multiple citizenship on a European level are, however, developing
slowly and with obstacles. The regime changes and successive creation
of new states after 1989 created a need to come up with common regu-
lations regarding citizenship policies that resulted in the European
Convention on Nationality (ETS No. 166), which entered into force on
1 March 2000. It was the first international document to establish core
principles and rules applying to all aspects of citizenship to which the
domestic law of the parties to the treaty should conform. The Conven-
tion was opened for signature to Member States of the Council of Eur-
ope as well as non-members on 6 November 1997. Slovakia signed
and ratified the Convention, as did the Czech Republic.
Among other issues the Convention covers questions of multiple ci-
tizenship. Art. 14 directly stipulates the right to dual citizenship in the
case of acquiring citizenship of another country by marriage. The force
of the Convention is however softened by arts. 15 and 16, which give
the parties the right to determine whether their nationals who acquire
or possess the nationality of another state retain or lose their citizen-
ship; and the right of state parties to make the acquisition or retention
of their citizenship conditional upon renunciation or loss of another ci-
tizenship (unless it is not possible or cannot reasonably be required).
These articles are often used in practice to preclude multiple citizen-
ship. There have been speculations as to whether Slovakia could use
them in this way if the Hungarian Parliament passes the law on dual
citizenship for ethnic Hungarians living abroad (see Kovács and Tóth
in this volume). This would not be possible without amendments to
the current law, which stipulates that the loss of Slovak citizenship re-
sults only from a person’s own request to be released from the state
bond. The state cannot on its own initiative deprive any person of their
Slovak citizenship. It is, however, possible that some ethnic Hungar-
ians residing in Slovakia could be released from the state bond upon
their own request after gaining Hungarian citizenship, thus becoming
Hungarian foreign nationals living in Slovakia. This status would, how-
ever, bring more inconveniences than benefits to the applicants. It is
far more probable that, if Hungary passed the dual citizenship law,
most ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia would hold on to their Slovak citi-
zenship.
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As was already mentioned, Czech and Slovak nationals could choose
their citizenship for a period of one year after the dissolution of the
Czechoslovak Federative Republic. This situation was not without com-
plications. It rendered tens of thousands of Roma living in the Czech
Republic stateless due to improper documentation, permanent resi-
dence in Slovakia (many migrated from Slovakia to Czech lands before
1989), lack of information about the procedure (and the need to apply),
a criminal record or other reasons.24 Furthermore, from 1994 it be-
came harder for Czech or Slovak citizens to live and work in the other
part of the former common republic. In 1999, after years of continu-
ous pressure from European institutions and non-governmental orga-
nisations, and following a Czech Supreme Court decision of 1997,
which ruled that the Czech citizens who chose Slovak citizenship in
1993 did not lose their Czech citizenship, the Czech citizenship laws
were amended to allow for reacquisition of the Czech citizenship for
certain groups of people within a stipulated period. Further revisions
of the Czech law were passed in September 2005 to allow for dual citi-
zenship for Czechs living in Slovakia, who had lost their Czech citizen-
ship by acquiring the Slovak nationality between 1 January 1994 and
September 1999.25 Applications for dual citizenship can be submitted
to the Consular Office of the Czech Embassy in Bratislava. The applica-
tion process takes up to two months. Approximately five thousand peo-
ple requested dual citizenship in 2005.26
7.3 Current political debates and reform plans
7.3.1 The Hungarian Status Law and referendum on dual citizenship
Slovak-Hungarian relations have been an inflammable issue on the
Slovak political scene since the fall of communism. Much nationalist
rage was directed against the former dominant nation, the Hungarian
part of the dual monarchy. Policies of forceful Magyarisation in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century and the turbulent dissolution of
the empire that left one third of the ethnic Hungarians outside the bor-
ders of the Hungarian state, provide historical memories that shaped
mutual relations in a controversial fashion. The myth of a thousand
years of suffering under the Hungarian yoke has long been nurtured
by Slovak nationalists and after 1989 it often served as a useful rallying
point.
The question of Hungary’s relationship with ethnic Hungarians liv-
ing abroad, especially in the areas immediately bordering on Hungar-
ian state territory, was therefore watched closely and suspiciously. The
issue exploded in the Slovak media in 2001 when Hungary passed the
Status Law (the law on Hungarians living abroad) and again in 2004
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when a referendum was held on allowing ethnic Hungarians to acquire
dual citizenship. The content and impact of these Hungarian initiatives
are described in detail in Mária M. Kovács’s and Judit Tóth’s chapter on
Hungarian citizenship in this book, so I will focus here only on the re-
percussions in Slovakia.
The Hungarian Status Law
The question of ethnic Hungarians living abroad was not used for a na-
tionalist agenda in Slovakia alone. It also polarised the political scene
in Hungary and deepened the left-right divide. Viktor Orbán’s FIDESZ
played on national sentiments of Hungarians about co-ethnic minori-
ties in neighbouring countries and produced a bill on benefits for eth-
nic Hungarians living abroad, passed by the Hungarian Parliament in
2001.
The first version of the law, which entered into force on 1 January
2002, provided for financial stipends for students of Hungarian eth-
nic origin abroad. Members of Hungarian minorities could also ap-
ply for Hungarian identity cards (Status ID), with which they can ac-
cess further benefits such as discounts in Hungary for public trans-
portation and entrance fees for museums and cultural and
educational events. The Status ID was handed out on the basis of a
recommendation from local cultural organisations representing Hun-
garian minorities abroad by the newly established Office for Hungar-
ians living abroad with its seat in Budapest. After the refusal of the
Slovak and Romanian Governments to allow implementation of the
Status Law in their states’ territories and after criticism by the Ve-
nice Commission that was asked by the Council of Europe to exam-
ine the matter,27 the law was amended in summer 2003. Since then
the education stipend is no longer addressed to individuals, but to in-
stitutions that offer education in the Hungarian language or on Hun-
garian culture. The financial aid is thus accessible not only to ethnic
Hungarians but to anybody who wishes to study Hungarian culture
and history.
The amended version was approved by a majority of the Hungarian
Parliament, with the exception of the FIDESZ party, the originator of
the law, and the FKGP, the Smallholders’ Party, which had lost seats
due to a large corruption scandal involving its president. It was also
accepted by the Venice Commission and Romanian Government. Slo-
vak representatives, however, remained opposed to it, and the political
parties of the ruling coalition (apart from the Party of Hungarian Coa-
lition SMK) contemplated passing an ‘anti-law’, which would prevent
the implementation of the Status Law in the territory of the Slovak
Republic. The lengthy, emotionally charged squabble between Slovak
and Hungarian leaders was finally resolved in December 2003 by the
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Slovak-Hungarian Agreement on Support for the National Minorities
in the Areas of Culture and Education. An article on the Slovak-Hun-
garian Agreement in the daily paper SME summarises its key
points.28 The treaty identifies two specific cultural foundations that are
permitted to distribute financial aid to cultural and educational institu-
tions only (some university students qualify as an exception). It estab-
lishes a principle of reciprocity, and the distribution of funds will be
subject to annual control by a Slovak-Hungarian commission of ex-
perts.
The crux of the tensions, however, was apparently not in the law it-
self. Old historical grievances were voiced in the circles of the law’s
critics, accusing the political representation of Hungary of ‘soft irre-
dentism’, i.e. attempts to recreate the Hungary of the times of the Hun-
garian kingdom on a psychological level, and of lurking historic revi-
sionism among the Hungarian minorities themselves.
František Mikloško, one of the most prominent Christian Democrats
and the former Speaker of the National Council of the Slovak Republic,
expressed views that can be attributed to Slovak representatives in gen-
eral: ‘I voiced my opinion even on TV, and my Hungarian Colleagues
hold it against me. I would say that the Status Law psychologically cre-
ates the concept of a Great Hungary. The Slovak side made mistakes
too, when the Law was debated we were sleeping and suddenly we
were confronted with a done deed. There is one serious problem how-
ever: Hungary is passing a law that is implemented in the territory of
the Slovak Republic. We don’t mind if Hungarians have some advan-
tages, but it seemed to be a precedent that would not be good, and the
Venice Commission has also denounced it.’29
The representatives of the Party of the Hungarian Coalition in Slova-
kia, which had seats in the Slovak coalition Government, found them-
selves between the grindstones as it were of the two national leader-
ships. Both sides looked to them for resolution and they drew fire from
Slovak nationalists for being ‘irredentist Hungarians’, as well as from
Hungarian leaders in Hungary for being too passive. László Nagy,
member of the SMK Presidium and chair of the Committee for Hu-
man Rights, Nationalities, and Status of Women of the NCSR, laments:
‘One problem of the Law is that it became a part of the internal politi-
cal game. We are not affected by it, but Dzurinda and others assume
that the voter expects rejection of the Status Law by the Slovak political
leaders, which may be an erroneous assumption. It has played a nega-
tive role in Slovak-Hungarian relations that got decidedly chilly in
2002.’’30
The subject of the Hungarian Status Law is divisive among the Slo-
vak-Hungarian population of the Slovak south as well. Although ten-
sions between Slovaks and Hungarians in this ethnically mixed region
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are usually less than in the rest of the country, they have been palpable
in the topics related to the quasi-citizenship of the Status Law and the
question of dual citizenship, which emerged shortly afterwards.
The question of dual citizenship for ethnic Hungarians
The question of dual citizenship for ethnic Hungarians living abroad
emerged as a hot political issue in 2003. The first requests to the Hun-
garian leadership came from the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, la-
ter accompanied by similar demands from Hungarians in Romania.
The World Federation of Hungarians prepared a petition for a referen-
dum about dual citizenship. Its goal was to achieve Hungarian citizen-
ship for all applicants who already were holders of a Status ID under
the Hungarian Status Law.
This initiative was supported by the opposition political parties in
Hungary – the Young Democrats (FIDESZ) and the Hungarian Demo-
cratic Forum (MDF), which managed to rally enough support to get
the required number of signatures on the petition for a referendum
that would decide whether to grant Hungarian citizenship to ethnic
Hungarians from abroad. The referendum took place on 5 December
2004, but, since over 60 per cent of eligible voters decided to stay at
home, the referendum results (in favour of dual citizenship by a small
margin) were invalid.31
Dual citizenship for ethnic Hungarians was justified mainly on the
basis of empathy with ethnic kin. The press again debated attempts to
repair the ’Trianon Injustice’ that truncated the Hungarian nation after
the First World War. On the other hand, the initiative was also de-
signed to give practical advantages resulting from Hungarian national-
ity. This would be relevant especially for Hungarians living outside of
the EU borders. The ruling parties MSZP and SZDSZ stood firmly
against the referendum, appealing mostly against the costly conse-
quences that implementation of the law would have. The situation was
further complicated by the fact that Romanian and Ukrainian legisla-
tions preclude dual citizenship, thus ethnic Hungarians acquiring
Hungarian citizenship would have to renounce their original citizen-
ship, which could lead to an untenable situation for the Hungarian
Government.
The Slovak leadership watched the development leading to the refer-
endum with a heightened sense of insecurity and antagonism. Accord-
ing to diplomatic sources (report of Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Slova-
kia was prepared to protest in the EU if the referendum was successful,
based on its inconsistency with the Agreement on Slovak-Hungarian
Neighbourly Relations from 1995, as well as with the principles of the
EU of non-discrimination and democratic governance.
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The SMK was once again caught in the middle. While the executive
Vice-President of the SMK, Miklós Duray, supported the idea of the re-
ferendum, the official SMK position, as represented by its chairman
Béla Bugár, was to support policies that will help ethnic Hungarians to
stay in the country where they were born. He warned that the initiative
might antagonise Hungarians living in Hungary and members of
Hungarian minorities. ‘We find ourselves unwillingly amidst the Hun-
garian internal political struggle and are receiving one slap after an-
other. We have not received such slaps even in our native country. We
want to remain in our native country, pay taxes there, etc.’32
The heated debate ended up in Court in Slovakia. The Slovak Na-
tional Party (SNS) sued the Vice-Chairman of the SMK, Miklós Duray
(one of the more radical leaders of the Hungarian minority in Slova-
kia), for treason because of his speech in favour of the dual citizenship
initiative in the Hungarian Parliament.33 The ethnically charged de-
bates about the Status Law and the referendum on dual citizenship
have probably also contributed to support for Slovak nationalist and po-
pulist platforms, which has grown over the past two years.
7.3.2 Comparison of the Slovak Act on Expatriate Slovaks with the
Hungarian Status Law
The Hungarian Status Law is not a unique invention without parallel
(as it sometimes appeared to be from the indignant reactions in the
Slovak press). In 1997 the Slovak Republic passed Act No. 70/1997
on Expatriate Slovaks. Prior protection of Slovak nationals living
abroad was guaranteed by a declaration of support in the Slovak Re-
public’s constitution. The House of Expatriate Slovaks, founded by the
Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic, has also been in existence
since 1995 focusing on cultural cooperation and support of expatriate
Slovak institutions. According to the Act No. 70/1997, it is sufficient
to apply for the status of an expatriate Slovak or to be a direct descen-
dant of a Slovak national. If the applicant cannot provide any documen-
tation certifying his or her ethnic origin, a letter from an institution re-
presenting Slovaks abroad or two witnesses that have the status of ex-
patriate Slovaks will do. Application is submitted to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the Slovak Republic and the application pro-
cess takes two months. If it is successful the MFA issues an Expatriate
Slovak Certificate. Among the benefits that this status brings is the per-
mission to reside ‘for a long time’ in the territory of the Slovak Repub-
lic and the opportunity of applying for permanent residence in Slova-
kia. It is likewise possible to apply for studies at any of the Slovak uni-
versities or to apply for a job without the permanent residence in
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Slovakia or employment authorisation required by other foreign na-
tionals.34
The Hungarian Status Law has inspired changes in the Slovak Status
Law. In 2005 the National Council of the Slovak Republic passed an
Amendment to the Act on Expatriate Slovaks35 (now properly labelled
‘Slovaks living abroad’) that established the Office for Slovaks Living
Abroad, which is funded from the state budget and is responsible for
carrying out the official state policy towards Slovakia’s external citizens.
The Office also issues Certificates of Ethnic Slovaks Living Abroad (Slo-
vak Status IDs) that make the process of claiming benefits related to
the status easier. Financial support is tied to the areas of culture, edu-
cation and research, information, and media. Individuals and institu-
tions can apply for funding in ‘activities that further the development
of Slovak identity, culture, language, or cultural heritage in these coun-
tries.’36
Hopefully the amended law will help to provide assistance to Slovaks
living abroad at the place of their residence. Some representatives of
the Slovak institutions abroad complain that the direct result of the Slo-
vak Status Law is a brain drain of young people who leave to study and
work in Slovakia rather than financial support for Slovak publications
and cultural events in the areas where Slovaks living abroad are con-
centrated.37 The most remarkable difference between the Slovak and
Hungarian Status Law in their current form is the territorial limitation
of the latter, which restricts the implementation of the law to neigh-
bouring countries with a large proportion of Hungarian minorities.
The Slovak counterpart has no such stipulation. This is easily explained
by the fact that most of the Slovaks living abroad reside in the United
States (over 1,200,000 Slovaks).
7.4 Statistical trends (acquisition of Slovak citizenship since
1993)
After the fall of communism, Slovakia experienced tumultuous shifts
in population, largely in connection with the dissolution of the Czech
and Slovak Federative Republic, but undoubtedly also as a result of its
strategic position as a bridge between Western and Eastern Europe.
There have been shifting migration trends, too. In the early 1990s, the
Slovak Republic was losing its citizens to the Czech Republic. This
trend ceased after 1994 when Slovakia started gaining population from
abroad and increasingly so, from the East. Most migration is temporary
and circular with migrants returning after short stays in Slovakia. The
number of those who actually ask for Slovak citizenship changes with
domestic and international events, circumstances and legislation. The
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following tables and graphs show the numbers of successful applicants
who acquired Slovak citizenship.
Table 7.1: Number of persons who acquired citizenship of the Slovak Republic (1993 –
2005)
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Czech
citizens
64,834 20,612 1,379 575 416 399 849 3,903 175 805 942 2,262 2,439
Other
citizens
1,550 1,393 910 768 1,519 535 417 623 1,362 3,539 3,100 1,508 539
Total 66,384 22,005 2,289 1,343 1,935 934 1,266 4,526 1,537 4,344 4,042 3,770 2,978
Source: Ministry of the Interior, Slovak Republic
As can be seen from Table 7.1, in 1993 and 1994, the vast majority of
those who acquired Slovak nationality were Czech nationals. Due to
the possibility to choose citizenship in 1993, the proportion of Czech
nationals among the successful applicants for citizenship was over-
whelming. This proportion has gradually declined thereafter and was
lowest in 1996 to 1998, which is probably due to the political situation
in Slovakia. The numbers of Czech applicants rose again especially
after the amendments to the citizenship law in 1999, and have also
been growing in recent years.
For other than Czech nationals the trends in the acquisition of citi-
zenship are quite different. Notable is again the decline in numbers in
the years 1995 and 1996, followed by an increase due to the influx of
refugees fleeing from the countries of former Yugoslavia. There is a
marked increase in the naturalisation of foreigners from outside for-
mer Czechoslovakia especially since the year 2000, when more appli-
cants from Asia and the Near East sought to settle in the Slovak Re-
public.
Figure 7.1 illustrates the diverse trends in the two populations who
have acquired Slovak citizenship over the past decade. (The years 1993
and 1994 have been excluded here due to the high number of Czech
applications for citizenship resulting from the dissolution of Czecho-
slovakia.) We can clearly see the impact of the Czech amendments to
the citizenship law in 1999 in the resulting increase of Czech nationals
applying for and receiving Slovak citizenship. The rapid increase in ci-
tizenship granted to other foreign nationals cannot be readily explained
on the basis of legislative changes, but rather on the basis of new mi-
gration patterns. Compared to previous times, many more foreigners
looking both for asylum and for citizenship have settled in Slovakia.
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Among those that seek Slovak citizenship are people fleeing from per-
secution, violence, civil war, or other conditions threatening their lives
and security in their home countries. Close to 46,000 foreigners have
applied for asylum in Slovakia since 1992. However, asylum status had
been granted only to 575 of them by the end of August 2005. This ten-
dency makes Slovakia a country with one of the lowest rates of refugee
recognition in Europe (Vaňo 2005: 60). The highest number of appli-
cants was recorded in 2004. Increasingly, they come from countries
such as India, Russia (especially Chechnya), Pakistan or China.
Table 7.2: Refugees and asylum seekers in the Slovak Republic
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Asylum applications 359 415 645 506 1,320 1,556 8,151 9,734 10,358 11,395
Persons granted
refugee status
68 129 65 49 27 11 18 20 11 15
Refugees granted
Slovak citizenship
0 4 14 22 2 0 11 56 40 15
Source: Vaňo 2005: 59
7.5 Conclusions
The evolution of policies relating to the definition, granting and with-
drawal of citizenship in Central Europe was closely tied to turbulent





































Figure 7.1: Czechs and other foreign nationals who acquired citizenship of the Slovak Re-
public in 1995-2005
Source: Ministry of the Interior, Slovak Republic
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the West, the ideals and practices of citizenship were marked by strug-
gles for national self-determination, as well as power struggles between
the small neighbouring states squeezed in between the warring super-
powers during the Cold War period.
Slovak national development had not run its course in the period be-
fore 1948. The Slovaks had not achieved a truly independent statehood
and were not content to be submerged in a centralised Czechoslovak
state after the Second World War. The Slovak Question emerged as a
dominant issue at several turning points in history. It impacted on citi-
zenship policies within the common state of Czechs and Slovaks in
1968, when the Slovaks received the gift of federation from the invad-
ing Soviet troops, and then again after 1989, when it led to the Velvet
Divorce between the two nations.
Citizenship practices as well as the understanding of what citizen-
ship entails and should entail were murky due to frequent changes in
policies prior to 1989, due to their ad hoc nature and inconsistencies
in the first years of the post-communist regime, as well as because of
the tumultuous political scene in Slovakia and new challenges result-
ing from Slovak independence in 1993.
Slovak citizenship policies were strongly shaped by international in-
fluences, especially by pressures from the European Union and bind-
ing treaties with the Council of Europe. On the other hand, they also
reacted to the heated, historically and emotionally charged political de-
bates on the status of Hungarians living abroad and the possibility of
their acquiring dual citizenship in Hungary. Central European reality
shows us how closely citizenship and identity are intertwined and how
easily they are misused for political machinations that further the ego-
istic agendas of parties and leaders.
Citizenship policies are being gradually simplified and fitted to the
new migratory trends that result from membership in the EU. Central
European neighbours have not quite yet abandoned nationalist appeals
and contentious policies that seek easy enemies to rally supporters. At
the same time, they have to quickly figure out how to absorb inflows
from parts of the world very different from theirs. All these develop-
ments occur in the context of an enlarging European Union with the
common citizenship of the Union linking the nationality policies of its
Member States to each other.
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Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Czechoslovakia/the Slovak Republic
Date Document Content Source
1945 President's Constitutional
Decree No. 33/1945 Coll.
Concerning Czechoslovak
Citizenship of Persons of
German and Hungarian
Ethnicity
One of the ``Beneš
Decrees'' that deprived
most ethnic Germans and
Hungarians of
Czechoslovak citizenship.




1948 Act No. 245/1948 on the





Czechoslovak citizens on 1
November 1938 and were
not subject to the
``voluntary exchange of
population'' between
Slovakia and Hungary in
1946.
In the Slovak language:
www.centrum.usd.cas.cz
1949 Act No. 194/1949 on the
Acquisition and Loss of
Czechoslovak Citizenship,
amended by the Act No.
72/1958 Modifying the
Regulations on the




communist coup d'etat in
February 1948.
In the Czech language:
www.portal.gov.cz
1952 Act No. 59/1952 on
Contracting Marriage with
a Foreigner
Stipulated a requirement to
obtain permission from the
Ministry of the Interior to
marry a person of non
Czechoslovak citizenship.
In the Czech language:
www.lexdata.cz







deprived of it by the
Presidential Constitutional
Decree No. 33/1945 and
are permanent residents of
the Czechoslovak Republic.
In the Czech language:
www.centrum.usd.cas.cz





communist coup d'etat in
February 1948.
See a brief description on
Wikipedia: en.wikipedia.org
1968 Act No. 165/1968 Coll. on
Acquisition and Loss of
Czech and Slovak
Citizenship




1968 Act No. 206/1968 Coll. of
Slovak National Council on
Acquisition and Loss of
Citizenship of the Slovak
Introduced republic-level
Slovak citizenship.
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Date Document Content Source
Socialist Republic
1990 Act No. 88/1990 Coll.
Amending Regulations on
Acquisition and Loss of
Czechoslovak Citizenship
Setting regulations for re-
acquisition of Czech or
Slovak citizenship by
emigrants or others who
were deprived of Czech or
Slovak citizenship prior to
1989.
In the Slovak language:
www.zbierka.sk
1991 Constitution of the Slovak
Republic
Contains the provision that,
'no one shall be deprived of
his or her citizenship
against his or her will', and
the Bill of Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms,
including the 'right to
choose one's nationality'
In the Slovak language:
www.government.gov.sk
Excerpts in English: www.
legislationline.org
1993 Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on
Citizenship of the Slovak
Republic
New citizenship code
which entered into force in





In the Slovak language:
www.minv.sk





Slovak status law defining
rights and benefits of the
Slovaks living abroad.
In the Slovak language:
www.gszs.sk
2002 Act No. 480/2002 Coll. on
Asylum, amended by Act
No. 1/2005 Coll.
Law defining key terms and
regulating asylum
acquisition procedure.
In the Slovak language;
www.unhcr.sk
2005 Act. No. 265/2005 Coll.
Amending the Act on
Citizenship of the Slovak
Republic
Introduced remedial




citizenship by Slovaks living
abroad.
In the Slovak language:
www.zbierka.sk
2005 Act. No. 474/2005 Coll. on
Slovaks Living Abroad and
on Amendments and
Additions to Certain Laws
Established the Office for
Slovaks Living Abroad and
regulates the competencies
of the state administration
regarding state support for
Slovaks living abroad.




1 The author and the editors thank Lucia Mokrá for her research contributions on legal
and statistical developments.
2 Nationality in this context is not a synonym for citizenship, but refers to
membership of an ethnic nation. The idea of a Czechoslovak nation did not take root
– it was popular neither with Czech and Slovak political representatives nor with the
general population and was eventually abandoned in favour of separate Czech and
Slovak nationalities.
3 For a detailed history of census taking and practices see Kertzer & Arel 2002.
4 For a more detailed description of the development in the Czech part of
Czechoslovakia see Baršová in this volume.
5 The Presidential Decree exempted from loss of citizenship those citizens of German
and Hungarian ethnicity who had joined in the fight for liberation or were victims of
Nazi persecution. The legislation also established a possibility to apply for the (re-)
granting of Czechoslovak citizenship (a policy called ‘Re-Slovakisation in Slovakia’)
within six months after the Decree entered into force.
6 For decades, the topic of the transfers of ethnic Hungarians was taboo in Slovak
literature. The few texts that were written were from the pen of Hungarian authors
in Slovakia – Zoltán Fábry’s The Accused Speaks Out (written in 1946) was published
in the 1960s, and in 1982 Kálmán Janics’s Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian
Minority, 1945-1948 was published in the US in a small edition of a few hundred co-
pies. After 1989 the topic was grudgingly picked up. The most comprehensive analy-
sis and documentation was published by Vadkerty (2002).
7 The voluntary part was secured by leaflets promising return of Czechoslovak
citizenship in return for being recruited as agricultural labourers. Leaflets also
reiterated that this was the very last chance for Hungarians to reacquire
Czechoslovak citizenship.
8 The Czechoslovak census of 1947 records 390,000 Hungarians in Slovakia, the 1961
census records 518,782 (data from Kocsis & Kocsis-Hodosi 1998).
9 See also Baršová in this volume for the same pieces of legislation from a Czech
perspective.
10 Children born from mixed marriages, where one parent was a Czechoslovak citizen
and the other was the citizen of the Soviet Union, Poland or Hungary, represented
an exception. In that case citizenship was determined by an agreement of the
parents at the time of inscription in the book of births. In case agreement wasn’t
reached, the child acquired the citizenship of the parent in the state of birth. If the
child was born in the territory of a third state, it acquired citizenship of the state on
whose territory the child’s parents had resided before they went abroad.
11 Act No. 34/1953 Coll. Concerning the Acquisition of Czechoslovak Citizenship by
Particular Persons and Act No. 245/1948 on the Nationality of Hungarian Nationals.
12 Stipulated by art. 6 of the Act on Czechoslovak Citizenship.
13 This provision was defined by Act No. 86/1950 of the Penal Code. Such penalty
included the loss of citizenship rights, expulsion from the army, and forfeiture of
property. Act No. 63/1965 abrogated this penalty and the next codification of the
Czechoslovak Penal Law did not include this kind of penalty.
14 Most socialist states had concluded bilateral agreements that excluded dual
citizenship among them.
15 See also Baršová in this volume.
16 A child whose parents were Slovak citizens acquired Slovak citizenship. If one of
them was Slovak and the other Czech, and the child was born in the Slovak territory,
then the child acquired Slovak citizenship. If the child was born abroad, it acquired
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the mother’s citizenship. Parents could also agree on the child’s citizenship by
statement until six months after birth.
17 Pragocentrism was a term used by the Slovak leaders to denote the tendency of the
Czech representation to rule the country from a strong unitary centre, Prague.
Slovak elites had qualms with Pragocentrism ever since the creation of the first
republic in 1918.
18 This claimed heritage is a controversial and complex one. Though perhaps only the
Slovak National Party would fully claim the legacy of the Slovak Republic of the war
period, together with the persona of its President, Jozef Tiso, responsible for
sweeping anti-Semitic measures, all parties and most leaders do recognise at least its
partial validity as the first form of official Slovak statehood.
19 For a description of the developments in the Czech Republic see Baršová in this
volume.
20 Art. 5 of Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on Citizenship of the Slovak Republic.
21 Art. 7 of Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on Citizenship of the Slovak Republic.
22 Art. 7 of Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on Citizenship of the Slovak Republic.
23 Art. 8a, sect. 9 of Act No. 40/1993.
24 See European Roma Rights Center report ‘Personal Documents and the Threat to the
Exercise of Fundamental Rights Among Roma in Former Yugoslavia’, www.errc.org,
retrieved in May 2006.
25 See also Baršová on Czech citizenship in the present volume.
26 Embassy of the Czech Republic in Slovakia, www.mzv.cz.
27 Among the main objections was the charge of ethnic discrimination concerning
access to the benefits of the law. The Status Law is also territorially limited in
implementation to certain neighbouring countries where the Hungarian minority is
numerous and where the standard of living is not higher than within Hungary itself.
Austria was therefore not included among the countries where the Status Law was to
be implemented.
28 I. Stupňan, ‘Schválili dohodu s Maďarskom’ [Agreement with Hungary Approved],
SME, 12 December 2003.
29 The interview with František Mikloško was conducted by the author in Bratislava on
13 June 2003.
30 The interview with László Nagy was conducted by the author in Bratislava on 18 June
2003.
31 Only 37.5 per cent of registered voters participated in the referendum. 51.5 per cent of
the voters were in favour of dual citizenship, 48.5 per cent against. 50 per cent of
eligible voters have to participate for a referendum to be valid in Hungary (or an
equivalent of over 25 per cent of all eligible voters must select the same answer on
the referendum). Source: ‘Neplatné maďarské referendum o dvojitom občianstve
[Invalid Hungarian Referendum on Double Citizenship], BBC Slovak.com, 6
December 2004. www.bbc.co.uk.
32 Peter Stahl, ’Maďari hlasujú o dvojitom občianstve’[Hungarians Vote on Double
Citizenship], Hospodárske noviny [daily newspaper], 3 December 2004. hnonline.sk.
33 The SNS sued Miklós Duray many more times afterwards for treason, libel,
damaging the name of the Republic, and more. Each charge was dismissed by the
court. SNS leader Jan Slota called the representatives of the Hungarian minority
‘radioactive extremists’ (Slota: ‘Politici z SMK sú rádioaktı́vni extrémisti’ [Politicians
from the Party of Hungarian Coalition are Radioactive Extremists], 6 June 2005,
www.sns.sk). Shortly before the parliamentary elections of June 2006 SNS popularity
climbed to almost 10 per cent in public opinion polls. In the June 2006 elections,
the populist left-leaning party SMER-SD came out on top with 29 per cent of the
votes. SNS came in third with almost 12 per cent of the votes. The former leader of
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the Government coalition SDKÚ received 18 per cent of the votes (Source: SITA
[Slovak Press Agency], 18 June 2006).
34 Arts. 5 and 6 of the Act No. 70/1997 Coll. on Expatriate Slovaks and Changing and
Complementing Some Laws.
35 Act No. 474/2005 Coll. on Slovaks Living Abroad and on Amendments and
Additions to Certain Laws.
36 Art. 5 of the Act No. 474/2005 Coll. on Slovaks Living Abroad and on Amendments
and Additions to Certain Laws.
37 Ondrej Štefanko, ‘Slovenská republika a zahraničnı́ (dolnozemskı́) Slováci’ [Slovak
Republic and Foreign (Hungarian) Slovaks],Český a slovenský svet [Czech and Slovak
World], www.svet.czsk.net, accessed in May 2006.
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Chapter 8: From civic to ethnic community? The
evolution of Slovenian citizenship
Felicita Medved
This chapter focuses on državljanstvo of the Republic of Slovenia, i.e.
on citizenship or nationality as a legal bond between a person and a so-
vereign state. After tracing the history of citizenship in the territory of
present day Slovenia, it gives a brief description of the evolution of the
Slovenian citizenship legislation, both in terms of the initial determina-
tion of its citizenry at the inception of the state in June 1991 and the
rules governing the acquisition and loss of citizenship. In fifteen years
of statehood the legal regime on citizenship has undergone several
changes. The Constitutional Law on citizenship was supplemented and
changed five times, with the first supplement already adopted in De-
cember 1991 and the latest amendments made in November 2006.
These developments have, on the one hand, implied an opening to-
wards certain groups, either in response to international standards or
for national interests. On the other hand, they have slowly supplanted
the civic conception of citizenship that governed the initial determina-
tion of Slovenian citizenry in 1991 with a concept of nation as a com-
munity of descent.
8.1 History of citizenship policies
8.1.1 History of citizenship up to 1991
Citizenship legislation in the territory of Slovenia first evolved within
the framework of the Habsburg Empire. The 1811 Austrian Civil Code,
which established a link between unified citizenship status and civil
rights and other regulations concerning citizenship, operated in the
Slovenian lands until the collapse of the monarchy, except for in Pre-
kmurje, where Hungarian citizenship law was in force after 1879. In
close relation to citizenship, the right of domicile in municipalities (do-
movinska pravica, Heimatrecht), as a form of local citizenship, which
gives rights to unconditional residence and poverty relief, was regu-
lated on similar principles in both parts of the Austro-Hungarian mon-
archy in the second half of the nineteenth century (Radmelič 1994:
207; Kač & Krisch 1999: 607-613).
On 1 December 1918 most of the Slovene lands, the Croat lands and
Bosnia and Herzegovina joined Serbia and Montenegro to form the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS), later to be named the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The Saint-Germain-en-Laye Peace Treaty,
which came into force in July 1920, and the Trianon Treaty, which
came into force one year later, established that a person who had right
of domicile outside of Austria and Hungary from then on acquired the
citizenship of one of the successor states. The Saint-Germain treaty
postulated, inter alia, that such persons could opt for the citizenship of
that successor state in which they once had domicile or the successor
state where the majority was of their ‘race’ or spoke their language.
However, not all persons who had domicile (pertinenza) in the Slovene
Littoral and part of Carniola that thereafter belonged to Italy automati-
cally acquired Italian citizenship. Those who were not born there or ac-
quired domicile after 24 May 1915 or once had domicile in this territory
could opt for Italian nationality. On 25 November 1920 the provincial
Government of Slovenia issued the executive regulations to the Treaty
on the acquisition and loss of Yugoslav citizenship by option and re-
quest.1 The option was based on previous domicile or nationality, i.e.
ethnicity. According to the Rapallo treaty between the Kingdom of SHS
and Italy of 12 November 1920, Yugoslavia provided a one-year right of
option for Italian citizenship for ethnic Italians in the from then on Yu-
goslav territory (Kos 1994).
At the level of Yugoslav internal legislation, the 1928 Citizenship
Act2 introduced a unified citizenship, primarily based on ius sanguinis
a patre and the principle of a single citizenship. In the early 1930s pro-
visions of Austrian and Hungarian regulations concerning the right to
domicile were replaced by membership of a municipality.
In the Slovenian Littoral the Italian citizenship legislation was in
force from 7 June 1923 until mid-September 1947. Italy did not apply
any special regulations concerning citizenship in the occupied territory
during the Second World War, whereas the German and Hungarian oc-
cupying forces granted citizenship to certain groups of people by regu-
lation and law respectively, which were subsequently nullified (Radme-
lič 1994: 222-223).
The post-war regulation of Yugoslav citizenship started on 28 August
1945 before the final organisation of the second Yugoslavia was clear.3
The following persons became Yugoslav citizens: 1) all persons who, on
the date of the enforcement of the Act, were citizens under the then va-
lid 1928 Act; 2) persons who had domicile in one of the municipalities
in the territory, which according to international treaties became part
of Yugoslavia; and 3) persons who belonged to one of the Yugoslav na-
tions and resided in its territory without right to domicile, unless they
decided to emigrate or to opt for their previous citizenship. An excep-
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tion to this regulation was added in 1948, excluding from citizenry
with retroactive effect those persons of German ethnicity who were
abroad and were Yugoslav citizens as of 6 April 1941, having domicile
in one of the municipal communities and were, according to art. 35a
disloyal ‘to the national and state interests of the nations of Yugoslavia
during and before the war.’4 Another Act adopted in 1945 (and nulli-
fied in 1962) concerned officers of the former Yugoslav army who did
not wish to return to Yugoslavia and members of various military for-
mations who served occupying forces and escaped abroad. They lost ci-
tizenship ex lege, followed by the sequestration of their property.5
According to the Paris Treaty with Italy which came into force in
September 1947 persons who had permanent residence on 10 June
1940 in the territory that became Yugoslavia lost Italian citizenship. As
obliged by the Treaty, Yugoslavia adopted a special Act on the citizen-
ship of these persons in December 1947.6 The Italian speaking popula-
tion had a one-year option for Italian citizenship and Yugoslavia could
demand emigration of these persons within one year of the date of the
option. In 1947, an option for Yugoslav citizenship was also given to
persons whose citizenship issue was not solved by the Treaty, i.e. to
some 100,000 emigrants from the Littoral to Yugoslavia or other coun-
tries before June 1940, who ethnically belonged to one of the Yugoslav
nations. The Paris treaty also established the Free Territory of Trieste, a
project that lasted for seven years until it was divided between Italy
and Yugoslavia by the 1954 London Memorandum of Understanding.
The latter did not regulate citizenship directly, but gave guarantees for
the unhindered return of persons who had formerly held domicile
rights in the territories under Yugoslav or Italian administration, which
the Yugoslav law interprets as a qualified option.7 Remaining unsolved
questions were settled by the 1975 Osimo agreements, which con-
firmed that both states regulate citizenship and provided the possibility
of migration for members of minorities (Kos 1994).8
Yugoslav citizenship was unified and excluded other citizenship. Ac-
quisition of citizenship remained based on ius sanguinis. A victorious
revolutionary communist and national spirit of the immediate post-war
period was expressed in legal provisions concerning naturalisation for
members of Yugoslav nations and those foreign citizens who actively
cooperated in the national liberation struggle on the one hand and ex-
clusion and deprivation of citizenship for certain ethnic groups or mili-
tary formations who really or supposedly worked against Yugoslav in-
terests on the other. The 1964 reform, following the new constitution,
abolished loss of citizenship on grounds of absence (as in previous
Austrian and Yugoslav legal arrangements), relaxed naturalisation of
expatriates (emigrants) and abolished the oath of loyalty upon admis-
sion. An odd characteristic of Yugoslav legislation was that in the areas
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which did not pose a threat to the regime, such as the equality of
spouses, introduced in 1945, gender equality and the position of min-
ors the legislator was already progressive during the period when inter-
national standards were only in the making. Yugoslavia was also party
to certain multilateral treaties concerning citizenship such as the Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 1954, the Interna-
tional Convention on the Nationality of Married Women of 1957, the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination of
1966, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion against Women of 1979 and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child of 1989.9
To better understand the problems related to succession in the field
of citizenship it is important to emphasise that Yugoslavia was a feder-
al state with a so-called mixed system of citizenship. Jurisdiction to
adopt citizenship legislation existed at two levels simultaneously, at the
level of the federal state and at the level of the constituent federal units,
i.e. republics. From the point of view of international public and private
law, the primary citizenship was Yugoslav (Kos 1996a). Internally, how-
ever, all Yugoslav citizens also had republic-level citizenship.10 Chan-
ging the place of residence to another republic or abroad did not affect
the republic-level citizenship. Access to another republic-level citizen-
ship was relatively easy though. At first it was conditional on three
years of residence, but already in 1946 one year of residence sufficed.
In the 1960s a simple declaration was enough for a change of repub-
lic-level citizenship, reflecting a high level of centralised decision mak-
ing.11 The 1974 Constitution however brought decentralisation of
power. According to the 1976 Citizenship Act of the Socialist Republic
of Slovenia12 citizens of other republics received citizenship of Slovenia
upon application if they had permanent residence in Slovenia. Resi-
dents from other republics however had the same rights as Slovenian
citizens, except for those reserved only for citizens of the republic, such
as voting rights.
8.1.2 Succession and initial determination of citizens of the new state
Since the developments of the late 1980s and early 1990s showed that
it would not be possible to reach a consensual agreement on some
other organisational form for Yugoslavia or on succession, the Republic
of Slovenia unilaterally declared its independence on 25 June 1991. Slo-
venia had no historical heritage of independent statehood or concept of
political membership beyond republic-level citizenship within the for-
mer federation to fall back on. In that respect, Slovenia differs from
some states which came into being following the break-up of former
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federations, such as the USSR. Notably Estonia and Latvia restored
their citizenship laws of half a century earlier, emphasising state conti-
nuity broken by ‘lost’ or ‘occupied’ sovereignty (see Jaerve and Krūma
in this volume). Some other new states adopted a ‘zero-option’ policy,
granting their citizenship to all people actually residing in the republic
either at the time of independence or at the moment the new citizen-
ship law was passed. This policy was more acceptable in those states
where the proportion of the ‘titular’ ethnic population was very high
(Medved 1996; Ziemele 2001; Mole 2001).
At the international level, citizenship in the context of state succes-
sion is addressed by binding and non-binding international instru-
ments, such as the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Stateless-
ness and the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in
Respect of Treaties, containing large principles but lacking comprehen-
sive regulations.13 The primary concern of the international coverage of
law on citizenship in cases of succession remains focused on reduction
of dual citizenship and the avoidance of statelessness and deals less
with the initial determination of citizens, which is not a concern of the
established (old) states. Although there has been substantial develop-
ment in human rights law, laws concerning the acquisition or loss of
citizenship continue to be primarily considered a sovereign prerogative
of the state.14
In this context, Slovenia regulated citizenship issues through the
Citizenship Act adopted within the scope of the legislation relating to
Slovenia’s gaining of independence. The constitution was adopted six
months later, on 23 December 1991, and does not regulate citizenship,
but leaves it to the law. Since then the citizenship law has gone
through several changes. The first supplement was already adopted in
December 1991, followed by further changes in 1992, 1994, 200215
and most recently in 2006.16 Conceptually, the 1991 Act contains two
main categories. The first category includes provisions of a transitional
nature, which refer to the initial collective and automatic determination
of the citizens of the new state, complemented by provisions governing
the option for Slovenian citizenship.17 The second category regulates
the acquisition and loss of citizenship of a standard (permanent) nat-
ure.
As regards the initial overall determination of citizenship the basic
principle is the continuity of previous citizenship upon state succes-
sion. Art. 39 stipulates that any person, who held citizenship of Slove-
nia and of Yugoslavia according to existing valid regulations, was con-
sidered ex lege to be a citizen of Slovenia on the day when the Act came
into force. This provision established the continuity with the previous
legal order, meaning that all laws and regulations which due to various
legal orders were in force in the territory of Slovenia in the past, in-
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cluding international agreements, are applied within the framework of
this provision. The period in which a person was born determines
which regulations apply for ascertaining citizenship.
The primary rule of the initial determination of citizens was comple-
mented with the optional acquisition of Slovenian citizenship for citi-
zens of other former Yugoslavian republics who had permanent residence
in Slovenia on the day of the Plebiscite for the Independence and
Autonomy of Slovenia on 23 December 1990, and who actually lived in
Slovenia. These two cumulative conditions determined what was con-
sidered the genuine link with Slovenia: the permanent residence con-
nected with social, economic and certain political rights and the actual
living there expressing the criterion of integration, which in practice
meant that the person had to reside in Slovenia, not only have a formal
residence there (Mesojedec-Pervinšek 1999: 656-659; Medved 2005:
467). In dimensions of time ‘actual living’ was established by the Su-
preme Court to be at least the period between 23 December 1990 and
the date of issuance of a final decision on citizenship. As for the con-
tent of this notion, which is not legally defined, administrative court
practice did not interpret it to mean continuous physical presence but
also considered living activities in a certain territory, such as where a
person earns a living, resides and fulfils obligations to the state to qua-
lify as such (Polič 1993).
The December 1991 supplement on art. 40 specified a further re-
striction, stating that the person’s application is to be turned down if
that person has committed a criminal offence directed against the Re-
public of Slovenia since Slovenian independence or if the petitioner is
considered to form a threat to public order, the security and defence of
the state.18
The legal period for the submission of the application was six
months and expired on 25 December 1991. More than 174,000 per-
sons, or 8.7 per cent of the total population, of which around 30 per
cent were born in Slovenia, applied for citizenship on the basis of art.
40 and 171,125 became Slovenian citizens.
The registration of the former republican citizenship was not carried
out very thoroughly and some persons who firmly believed themselves
to be Slovenian citizens were not considered as such and could not
prove their former republican citizenship in order to acquire Slovenian
citizenship. To address this problem two corrections were made in
1994, concerning the recognition and declaration of Slovenian citizen-
ship. Art. 39a stipulates that a person is considered a Slovenian citizen
if he or she was registered as a permanent resident on 23 December
1990 and has permanently and actually lived in Slovenia since that
date. However, this only applies if the person in question would have
acquired the citizenship of Slovenia according to the previous legal or-
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der. On the other hand, according to the new art. 41 persons younger
than 23 and older than eighteen years who were born in Slovenia can
declare themselves Slovenian citizens if one of their parents was a citi-
zen of Slovenia at the time of their birth, but the parents later agreed
on adopting the citizenship of another republic.
The registered permanent residency posed a problem for those im-
migrants who were not registered, but had a long-time factual resi-
dence in Slovenia. They could not apply for Slovenian citizenship since
they were not legally considered as residents.19 The problem of perma-
nent residency also arose for those who were registered, but did not ap-
ply for or did not acquire Slovenian citizenship. Becoming aliens, they
had to apply for residency status irrespective of how long they had
been resident. The Aliens Act20 did not contain any special provisions
concerning this group of people.21 It only provided that with respect to
the said persons provisions of the Law should start to apply two
months after the expiry of the time period within which they could ap-
ply for Slovenian citizenship or on the date of issuance of a final deci-
sion on citizenship. On 26 February, when the Aliens Act started to ap-
ply to these persons, administrative authorities transferred those who
did not apply for residency status from the register of the permanent
population to the record of foreigners without any decision or notifica-
tion addressed to the persons concerned instructing them of their new
legal position.22 This secret ‘erasure’ became known to the public only
much later and the number of persons affected is not exactly known.
The state admits that 18,305 persons had been deprived of their legal
residence. In spite of several appeals by the Ombudsman for human
rights,23 non-governmental organisations and some individuals, it was
only in 1999 that the Constitutional Court found that the Aliens Act
had failed to regulate the transition of the legal status of this group of
people to the status of foreigners.24 The Constitutional Court decided
that the error should be corrected by the legislator within six months
which resulted in the Settling of the Status of Citizens of Other SFRY
Successor States in the Republic of Slovenia Act.25 However, in 2003
the Constitutional Court also found this regulation unconstitutional
and ordered the Ministry of the Interior to immediately issue decisions
to retroactively return the status of permanent residence to those who
already had had their status changed. Moreover, it asked the legislator
to pass a new law within six months, clarifying the criteria for those
persons who, in the period between 1992 and 2003, left Slovenia for
shorter or longer periods.26 The polarisation of the political scene as
well as public opinion led to various interpretations of the Constitu-
tional Court decision. This resulted in a number of initiatives for refer-
enda, supported by right-wing parties, as well as in the preparation of
two separate acts. After the adoption of the so-called ‘technical law’ in
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October 2003, opposition parties succeeded in calling a referendum on
4 April 2004. The voter turnout was less than a third of the 1.6 million
electorate, and the Act was rejected by almost 95 per cent. This devel-
opment succeeded in thwarting the adoption of any law to comply with
the decisions of the Constitutional Court.27 The current right-centre
Government is now trying to prepare a special Constitutional Law.
In the meantime, in order to settle the position of some of the peo-
ple who could not or did not wish to apply for Slovenian citizenship in
1991, or whose applications were rejected and who subsequently be-
came aliens or were even ‘erased’, the Citizenship Act was amended in
2002. The new ‘transitional and final provisions’ facilitated acquisition
of Slovenian citizenship for citizens of other republics of the former
Yugoslavia who were registered as permanent residents on 23 Decem-
ber 1990 and who have been living in Slovenia continuously from that
day. Duration of residence, personal, family, economic, social and other
ties with Slovenia, as well as the consequences a denial of citizenship
might have caused, were also taken into consideration. The deadline
for a cost-free application expired on 29 November 2003. 1,676 per-
sons were naturalised under this provision.
Apart from the two main categories – initial determination of citizen-
ship and optional naturalisation – the Citizenship Act contained a third
category of transitional provisions that were of compensatory or restitu-
tional nature. These provided for reacquisition of citizenship, which was,
according to art. 41, made possible for those who were deprived of Yu-
goslav citizenship and Slovenian citizenship on the basis of prior 1945/
46 federal law on the deprivation of citizenship or on the grounds of
absence.28 They and their children could acquire Slovenian citizenship
if they filed an application within one year of the enforcement of the
Act. Since most of these people were living abroad the application peri-
od was prolonged to two years in 1992. At the same time a new art.
13a in the section concerning exceptional naturalisation stipulated that,
notwithstanding the conditions for regular naturalisation, an adult may
obtain Slovenian citizenship if of Slovenian descent through at least
one parent and if his or her citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia
ceased due to release, renunciation or deprivation or because the per-
son had not acquired Slovenian citizenship due to historical circum-
stances. The article also granted the Government the right to give a
preliminary opinion on the applications. Due to this extensive discre-
tion and, inter alia, the violation of the principle of equality before the
law, arts. 41 and 13a were nullified in 1993.29
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8.2 Basic principles of acquisition and loss of Slovenian
citizenship
The characteristics of current legislation are the principle of ius sangui-
nis and only limited application of ius soli, the prevention of stateless-
ness, gender equality in acquisition of citizenship, equality of parents
in deciding the citizenship of their minor children, equality of children
born in wedlock with children born out of wedlock, will of the person
concerned in the process of acquisition and loss of citizenship and pro-
tection of personal data. Further principles are the relative tolerance of
multiple citizenship and the validity of the Slovenian citizenship in
these cases, meaning that a dual or multiple citizen is treated as a citi-
zen of the Republic of Slovenia, while in the territory of Slovenia, un-
less otherwise stated by an international agreement. Foreign citizens
may acquire Slovenian citizenship by naturalisation on basis of resi-
dence or of family ties or because of special interests of the state.30 Fa-
cilitated naturalisation is provided for immigrant children born and
raised in Slovenia and for Slovene emigrants and their descendants.
Discretionary power is provided for in all cases of naturalisation, how-
ever may only be exercised if the reasons, including the proof thereof,
are recorded in the written decision.31
8.2.1 Acquisition of citizenship
Slovenian citizenship is acquired by descent, by birth in the territory of
Slovenia, by naturalisation (through application) and in compliance
with international agreement (which is applicable only in cases where
borders changed).
Under the ius sanguinis principle there are two modes of acquiring
Slovenian citizenship: ex lege and by registration. The registration has a
constitutive character and retroactive effect (ex tunc).
At birth a natural person obtains Slovenian citizenship ex lege: i)
when both parents are Slovenian citizens, ii) when the child is born in
Slovenia and at least one parent is a Slovenian citizen (in the latter case
the acquisition of the citizenship ex lege is combined with the territorial
principle)32 and iii) when the child is born abroad and one of the par-
ents is a Slovenian citizen while the other parent is unknown, of non-
determined citizenship or stateless.
Children born abroad with one parent of Slovenian citizenship at the
time of the child’s birth can acquire Slovenian citizenship by registra-
tion. Registration can be initiated within eighteen years after birth by
the Slovenian parent without consent of the other parent or if a minor
is a ward by his or her guardian, who must be a Slovenian citizen.33 As
of 1994 children older than fourteen years have to give their consent.
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Persons above the age of eighteen years can acquire Slovenian citizen-
ship based on a personal declaration for registration. The age limit for
this procedure was extended from 23 to 36 years of age in 2002. The
November 2006 Act amending the Citizenship of the Republic of Slo-
venia Act, further clarifies the procedure and adds the condition that
persons who register their Slovenian citizenship should not previously
have lost it due to release, renunciation or deprivation after they
reached majority.
Acquisition of citizenship by adoption follows the principle of citizen-
ship by descent when at least one of the adoptive parents is a Slovenian
citizen. An adoptee foreigner older than fourteen years has to give his
or her consent.
Ius soli applies for a foundling or a new-born infant in the territory
of Slovenia with no known parentage or if the parents are of unknown
citizenship or stateless. If it is discovered prior to the child reaching
the age of eighteen that the parents are foreign citizens, then Slovenian
citizenship shall cease at the parents’ request.
Persons who acquire Slovenian citizenship under above described
principles are regarded as citizens of the Republic of Slovenia by birth.
Foreign citizens may acquire Slovenian citizenship by regular, facili-
tated and exceptional naturalisation.
The conditions that must be fulfilled for regular naturalisation are
very strict. The applicant has to submit a release from current citizen-
ship or a proof that such a release will be granted if he or she acquires
Slovenian citizenship unless the applicant is stateless or can submit
evidence that his or her citizenship is cancelled by naturalisation by
the law of his or her state of origin or that such a release was not
decided upon by this state in a reasonable period of two years.34 In
cases where applicants cannot present proof of expatriation, e.g. be-
cause the voluntary acquisition of a foreign citizenship is considered
an act of disloyalty, the declaration by an applicant that he or she will
renounce his or her current citizenship if granted Slovenian citizen-
ship suffices. However, the applicant usually has to present proof of ex-
patriation before he or she can be naturalised. This may lead to tem-
porary statelessness which can become permanent if after release from
the previous citizenship an applicant is no longer eligible for naturali-
sation, e.g. due to loss of means of subsistence or a prison penalty.
Since the authorities have to check if other conditions are still fulfilled
after the prescribed period within which an applicant must present
proof of release, the 2006 amendments specify that only those condi-
tions that can be verified administratively will suffice. The condition of
a release from current citizenship is waived for citizens of those EU
Member States where reciprocity exists.
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A second condition is that the applicant must have lived in Slovenia
for ten years, of which the five years prior to the application must be
without interruption, and, as added in 2002, the person should have
the status of foreigner. This imprecisely defined status is clarified in
the 2006 amendments as describing those people who have either a
temporary or permanent residence permit, which in practice prolongs
the waiting period for naturalisation. In addition, the applicant should
not have had his or her residence in Slovenia curtailed.
Further requirements are that the person does not constitute a threat
to public order or the security and defence of Slovenia, has fulfilled his
or her tax obligations and has a guaranteed permanent source of in-
come.35 In fact, the latest amendments state that the applicant is re-
quired to have such means of subsistence as will guarantee material
and social security to the applicant and persons he or she has an obli-
gation to support i.e. a basic minimum income for each person. More-
over, the law demands a clean criminal record, meaning, inter alia, that
the applicant should not have served a prison sentence of more than
three months or have been sentenced to a conditional prison term of
more than one year.36 The applicant will also be obliged to take an oath
of respect for the free democratic constitutional order of Slovenia,
which replaces the requirement to sign a declaration of consent to the
legal order of the Republic of Slovenia introduced in 2002. Finally,
there is a requirement for the knowledge of the Slovene language,
which has changed substantially. In the early 1990s it sufficed that the
person could communicate. From 1994 an obligatory examination was
demanded. Many people could not pass the examination even if they
had been educated in Slovenia. Currently an obligatory examination at
elementary level is required unless the applicant went to school or ac-
quired education at higher or university level in Slovenia or is older
than 60 years and has actually lived in the country for fifteen years or,
as added in 2006, has acquired elementary or secondary education in
the Slovenian language in neighbouring countries where there are
autochthonous Slovene minorities. Exceptions are provided for illiter-
ates or due to health reasons.
Facilitated naturalisation reflects specific interests of the state and
more recently, the will of the state to better comply with the standards
of the 1997 European Convention on Nationality. This mode of naturali-
sation affects particular groups of persons: Slovenian emigrants and
their descendants, foreigners married to Slovenian citizens, minors and
since 2002 persons with refugee status, stateless persons and persons
born in Slovenia and living there since their birth. To these groups of
persons, the 2006 amendments added foreigners who have concluded
their university education in Slovenia. Exemptions from certain require-
ments are provided for these groups of applicants, in particular regard-
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ing the release from current citizenship and the required duration of re-
sidency with a foreign status in Slovenia. For example, an individual of
Slovenian descent or a foreign spouse of a Slovenian citizen can become
a Slovenian citizen after one year of uninterrupted residence. However,
the 2006 amendments show that these two groups of persons are not
treated equally. While the generational criterion (up to the third genera-
tion for direct descent) for descendants of Slovenian emigrants was ex-
tended up to the fourth generation, the period of marriage before a for-
eign spouse of a Slovenian citizen is eligible to apply for naturalisation
was prolonged from two to three years in order to dissuade marriages
of convenience. For persons who lost Slovenian citizenship in accor-
dance with the present Act or prior Acts valid in the territory of Slove-
nia, the residence requirement is limited to six months. Acknowledged
refugees and stateless persons may be naturalised after five years of ac-
tual and uninterrupted residence in the country. For persons born in
Slovenia and living there since birth (mainly citizens of successor
states of the SFRY), personal, family, economic, social and other con-
nections with Slovenia as well as the consequences a denial of naturali-
sation may cause are taken into consideration. Foreigners who have
concluded their university education in Slovenia will be eligible to ap-
ply for naturalisation after seven years of residence. For all these cases
release from current citizenship is not necessarily required.
A minor acquires Slovenian citizenship upon the request of one or
both naturalised parents if the child has lived with that parent in Slove-
nia for at least one year prior to the application. If the child is born in
Slovenia, Slovenian citizenship can be acquired before the age of one
year. Citizenship may also be granted to a child having no parents or
whose parents have lost their parental rights or functional capacity and
who has lived in Slovenia since birth on the grounds of a petition by
the guardian who is a Slovenian citizen and who lives with the child.
The Ministry for Family and Social Affairs has to confirm that the ac-
quisition of citizenship is for the benefit of the child. In all above cases
the consent of the child above the age of fourteen is also necessary.37
In the case of adoption, where there is no such relation between the
adoptive parent and adoptee as between parents and children, a child
not older than eight years, living permanently in Slovenia, can acquire
citizenship upon the request of the adoptive parents.
In cases of exceptional naturalisation, the interests of the state for ex-
ample in the field of culture, economy, science, sport, and human
rights are decisive and must be confirmed by the Government. A per-
son qualifying for exceptional naturalisation may remain a double or
multiple citizen, but has to actually live in Slovenia without interrup-
tion for at least one year with a foreigner’s status before applying for ci-
tizenship. The latter condition does not have to be fulfilled when his or
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her naturalisation benefits the state for national reasons, i.e. when the
person is of Slovene ethnicity. The 2006 amendments clarify the con-
ditions for exceptional naturalisation of persons of Slovene descent, in-
cluding persons belonging to Slovene minorities in neighbouring
countries. Neither residence in Slovenia nor other conditions such as
material and social security or fulfilled tax obligations in a foreign
country are required in these cases.
8.2.2 Loss of citizenship
A Slovenian citizen cannot lose citizenship by mere operation of law.
There are five modes of loss of Slovenian citizenship: release, renuncia-
tion, deprivation and loss of citizenship through international agree-
ments, the latter only being applied in cases of changes to state bor-
ders. Citizenship can also be lost by the nullification of naturalisation.
Release is the regular way of losing citizenship by application. It is
the right of any Slovenian citizen who fulfils the stipulated conditions,
such as actual residence abroad and proof that he or she will be
granted a foreign citizenship. Release has to be approved by a public
authority, but discretionary power is limited to specific reasons such as
national security and national interests, reciprocity or other reasons de-
rived from relations with a foreign country.
Renunciation is a qualified option for dual citizens, meaning that
such a person has the right to renounce Slovenian citizenship. It is ac-
corded to individuals up to 25 years of age, born in a foreign country,
residing there and holding a foreign citizenship. Other conditions have
not been foreseen. The Ministry of the Interior has no discretionary
power and may issue a decree stating that Slovenian citizenship of
such a person ceased on the day that such a statement of renunciation
was filed. Minors, up to the age of eighteen years, enjoy a substantially
higher degree of protection regarding the release from and renuncia-
tion of citizenship, in comparison to the acquisition of citizenship. The
consent of both parents is required, regardless of their citizenship. In a
case of dispute, the Ministry for Family and Social Affairs decides in
the best interests of the child. Furthermore, children older than four-
teen years must give their personal consent.
Deprivation of citizenship is the only type of citizenship loss that the
state may initiate. A Slovenian citizen, actually residing in a foreign
country and in possession of a foreign citizenship may be deprived of
citizenship if it is ascertained that this person’s activities are contrary to
the international and other interests of the Republic of Slovenia. Proof
of the existing conditions must be given in the decree on the depriva-
tion of citizenship, which may be issued by exception in the absence of
the party concerned.
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Cancellation of a decree on naturalisation may occur if it is discovered
that naturalisation was granted based on false declarations or deliberate
concealment of essential facts or circumstances on the side of the indi-
vidual in question. It may also be nullified if the person acquired citi-
zenship on the grounds of a foreign state’s guarantee that the person’s
foreign citizenship will cease to exist if the person acquires the Slove-
nian citizenship and evidence of the loss of the previous citizenship
has not been submitted within the prescribed period. Nullification is
not possible if such a person would become stateless.
8.2.3 Dual and multiple citizenship
In general, Slovenian legislation is relatively tolerant of plural citizen-
ship on both entry and exit sides. The ius sanguinis and gender equal-
ity principles contribute to dual citizenship for citizens by birth, both
in Slovenia and abroad, since ius sanguinis transmission of Slovenian
citizenship is not limited to the first or second generation or by any
other requirements. Multiple citizenship is even possible for adopted
persons. Acquisition of the citizenship of another country does not
mean that the Slovenian citizenship is automatically forfeit, neither is
release from current citizenship required for certain groups that qualify
for facilitated and exceptional naturalisation, nor in cases of regular
naturalisation where expatriation would have harsh consequences.
The number of dual and multiple citizens is unknown. In June 1991
there were 15,000 registered dual citizens residing abroad (Končina
1992). After independence the number of dual and multiple citizens
substantially increased, both in the country and abroad. In 2005 it was
estimated that around 60,000 Slovenes permanently residing abroad
had Slovenian citizenship. Slovenia grants substantial political rights to
citizens abroad, including franchise in local, parliamentary and presi-
dential elections. The number of dual citizens in Slovenia is much lar-
ger and is mainly the consequence of specific historical circumstances
in which the new state was created and was partially dependent on the
citizenship legislation of other countries, notably Italy.
The transitional provisions regulating the option for Slovenian citi-
zenship did not touch upon dual citizenship and it is estimated that al-
most all people from other republics of the former Yugoslavia are dual
citizens. In 1991, it was also objectively impossible to make this type of
naturalisation conditional on a release from current citizenship. The
outcome of the Yugoslav crisis was unknown and the possibility of a bi-
lateral or multilateral regulation of citizenship did not bear fruit. The
break-up of Yugoslavia did not lead to de iure statelessness, since all
successor states applied the principle of continuity of former republic-
level citizenship (Kos 1996b; Mesojedec-Pervinšek 1999: 655). Never-
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theless, the interest in Slovenian citizenship was much higher than ex-
pected in 1991 when the authorities estimated that approximately
80,000 persons would apply for Slovenian citizenship (Mesojedec-Per-
vinšek 1997: 32-34). Reasons for such a response are various and have
so far not been well researched. Public discussions emphasise utilitar-
ian motives, in particular the possibility to purchase socially owned
housing which was only open to Slovenian citizens. Suspicions that
holders of dual citizenship may be disloyal and that they pose a poten-
tial threat to state security led to a change in political and public mood
and to legislative attacks on this status, mainly supported by the Slo-
vene National Party and the Peoples’ Party in the period from 1993 to
1996. While the Liberal Democratic Government also proposed the
abolishment of dual citizenship in 1993, some other proposals openly
called for the retroactive nullification of all decrees under art. 40. In
1995, there even was an official initiative for a referendum on the is-
sue, which was only stopped by the Constitutional Court38 (Cerar 1995;
Dujić 1996; Medved 2005: 470-474).
8.2.4 Jurisdiction and procedures
Up to the end of 2006, the Ministry of the Interior had jurisdiction
over naturalisation and loss of citizenship. Following the concept of ter-
ritorial de-concentration of state administration, the 2006 amend-
ments to the Citizenship Act transfer this competence from the Minis-
try of the Interior to local administrative units. Only cases of excep-
tional naturalisation remain under the Ministry of the Interior.
Moreover, the Ministry still has a ‘controlling’ role in the obligatory re-
vision procedure for decisions on naturalisation and loss of citizenship
as well as documents related to the release from prior citizenship. In
this procedure the Ministry can either confirm decisions made at the
local level or take a new decision. A period of nine months is envisaged
for the transfer of decision-making.
Legislative competence lies with the Government, which specifies
the requirements for regular naturalisation regarding, inter alia, resi-
dence, income and threat to public order, security and defence of the
state, and defines the criteria for the naturalisation on the grounds of
national interest and for the refusal of release from citizenship. A deci-
sion of the Ministry may be appealed and is open to judicial review
(see Polič 1997a, 1997b). Fees are relatively low (30,000-35,000 SIT, i.
e. 125-150 euros).
Local administrative units have the authority to establish and register
citizenship.39 Record keeping of citizenship is done in compliance with
the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registry Act at the register of
births.40 The Ministry of the Interior keeps the central citizenship reg-
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ister. Since this register does not constitute a separate database but is
part of the permanent population register, the 2006 amendments pro-
vide that the Ministry of the Interior and local administrative units
shall keep a register of persons who acquired citizenship by naturalisa-
tion and those who lost Slovenian citizenship. This register shall be
computerised and connected to the registers of foreigners and of
births, deaths and marriages. Personal data from this register may be
used by the employees of internal affairs when performing their duties
defined by law and can be forwarded to other users only if these are
authorised by law or upon the consent or request of the individual to
whom they relate. The Ministry of the Interior can forward personal
data of an individual to other states under the condition of reciprocity
only if such data are used for clearly defined purposes (such as settling
citizenship issues or realisation of penal proceedings) and that in that
state personal data protection applies also to foreigners. Slovenian citi-
zenship can be proven by attestation or any other public document of
citizenship issued by an agency with the authority for administering
the official register in which the citizenship of the person is entered, or
by the administrative unit where the person permanently resides. Ac-
cording to the latest change any administrative unit can issue attesta-
tions of citizenship.
8.3 Current political debates
Until recently the citizenship agenda has been dominated by the heri-
tage from the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Subsequently, the citizenship
legislation went through a series of adjustments related to the admis-
sion of citizens of other successor states of the former Yugoslavia. As
already pointed out above, the issue of plural citizenship prevailed in
the mid-1990s. After unsuccessful legislative attempts to abolish dual
citizenship there is an acceptance of plural citizenship for this group of
people as a reflection of the historical experience. In the late 1990s
and thereafter, the political scene was dominated by the issue of the
‘erased’. Up to now, there have only been partial solutions to settle the
problems of this group of people, either by regulating their status as
foreigners or enabling them to naturalise. Moreover, despite the more
recent criticism by the Commissioner for Human Rights at the Council
of Europe and by the Commission against Racism and Intolerance
(ECRI) of the Council of Europe, it is not expected that further at-
tempts, including the current Government’s attempt to introduce a
special Constitutional Law, which requires a two-thirds parliamentary
majority, will bear any fruit before the next parliamentary elections.
Current political debates thus shifted the focus to societal integration
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of naturalised ‘foreigners’ and political participation and representation
for these ‘new minorities’. This debate is further enhanced by the reali-
ties of more recent immigration and reforms necessary as a result of
joining the European Union in May 2004.
In the pre-accession period the eurocompatibility was influenced
more by international trends, such as the 1997 European Convention
on Nationality of which Slovenia is not a party, than by indirect pres-
sure from the EU. This applies in particular to the amendments in
2002, refining and relaxing access to citizenship for recognised refu-
gees, stateless persons and second- and third-generation immigrants.
On the other hand, conditions for naturalisation have been maintained
and tightened. Since 2002 applicants must have the status of foreigner,
as explained above. This status is an eligibility criterion that may be
waived only in some exceptional cases of naturalisation. Further
changes concern the question of loyalty. In 2002 the declaration of
agreement with the legal order of Slovenia was introduced, which in
2006 was supplanted by an oath of loyalty. In July 2005 the Govern-
ment also further specified national interest as a reason for exceptional
cases of naturalisation, in other words criteria for cultural i.e. ethnic-af-
finity based naturalisation of Slovenes living abroad. The Governmen-
tal Office for Slovenes around the world may give an opinion on the
applicant, which has led to criticism and protest from members of the
Slovene diaspora.
In line with this protest, the political discussion focused on legisla-
tion regulating relations between Slovenia and Slovenians abroad, in
particular concerning the legal position of autochthonous minorities
living in neighbouring countries and emigrants and their descendants
with or without Slovenian citizenship. In April 2006 the National As-
sembly passed the Republic of Slovenia and Slovenians Abroad Act.41
The Act is based on art. 5 of the Constitution, the 1996 Resolution on
the Position of Autochthonous Slovene Minorities in Neighbouring
Countries and the Related Tasks of State and Other Institutions in the
Republic of Slovenia42 and the 2002 Resolution on Relations with Slo-
venes Abroad.43 The objectives of this legislation are to arrange rela-
tions of the ‘homeland’ with Slovene diasporas in order to strengthen
national identity and consciousness and promote mutual ties in the
fields of culture, care for the Slovene language, education and science,
sports, economy and regional cooperation. It introduces a new status of
a Slovene without Slovenian citizenship, regulates its acquisition and loss
and provides certain advantages to its beneficiaries. Acquisition of this
status would primarily depend on descent, activity in Slovenian organi-
sations abroad and active ties with the ‘homeland’. The Governmental
Office for Slovenes around the world will be responsible for issuing
this status. When in Slovenia, the holders of this status will enjoy pre-
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ferential enrolment at institutions of higher education, equal access to
research projects and public cultural goods, such as libraries or ar-
chives, as well as equal property rights. They will also enjoy priority in
employment over other third-country nationals. Until present no one
has applied for, let alone acquired, this ‘quasi-citizenship’ status. The
Act also supports the return of Slovenian expatriates and their children
and also provides for repatriation, meaning immigration of Slovenes,
organised and financed by Slovenia in cases when there is, according
to the assessment of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, a severe political
or other crisis in the states where they reside, and if their repatriation
contributes to the development of the ‘homeland’. The Council for Slo-
venians Abroad and the Council for Slovenians in Neighbouring Coun-
tries will function as permanent advisory bodies. The councils are headed
by the Prime Minister, who appoints their members, composed of re-
presentatives of state bodies, institutions, political organisations and ci-
vil society organisations from Slovenia and abroad.44
There are certain parallels between the Slovenians Abroad Act and
the famous and controversial 2001 Hungarian Status Law, the 1997
Law on Expatriate Slovaks and the 1999-2001 failed Polish move to in-
stall a similar law (see Liebich, Kovács & Tóth, Kusá and Górny in this
volume). However, the Slovenian Government claims that the Slove-
nian law cannot be equated with the Hungarian Status Law since it
does not interfere with competences of other EU Member States or the
free movement of workers, nor does it establish Identity Cards valid in
the territory of any other EU Member State.
The most recent political discussion concerned the future develop-
ment of citizenship legislation. A working group was set up to analyse
current citizenship legislation and its implementation and prepare
changes to the Citizenship Act. Due to the complexity of current citi-
zenship legislation there was a tentative suggestion for an overall revi-
sion, but this was hardly to be expected. In fact, when in July 2006 the
Act amending the Citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia Act was pro-
posed, the Government claimed that it would not change the aims and
principles of the existing legislation, but focused on requirements for
naturalisation and some practical aspects, such as clarifications of im-
precisely defined provisions, and on harmonisation with other legisla-
tion, specifically concerning immigration and record keeping.
Nevertheless, the Act was not adopted in a short parliamentary pro-
cedure as initially proposed by the centre-right Government but caused
extensive discussion, particularly regarding the 89-word long oath of
loyalty, suggested by the Ministry of Justice. While the Liberal Demo-
crats proposed that the text of the oath should be simplified, the Social
Democrats, another opposition party, argued that the text confuses the
concepts of ‘state’ and ‘homeland’ as the latter is not a legal concept
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and that taking an oath of loyalty ‘to my new homeland’ shames a civi-
lised and modern society and is reminiscent of nineteenth century pa-
triotism. Moreover, the Liberal Democrats opposed the transfer of the
jurisdiction over naturalisation and loss of citizenship from the Minis-
try of the Interior to local administrative units, which in the Govern-
ment’s view is the main novelty of the amended Act. They argued that
such an arrangement could lead to arbitrary decisions in spite of the
revision procedure by the Ministry. While none of the political parties
opposed relaxed naturalisation for ethnic Slovenes, the Liberal Demo-
crats criticised that conditions, such as residence in Slovenia or materi-
al and social security, are waived in these cases.
The Act amending the Citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia Act
was passed by the National Assembly on 24 November 2006. Since
the National Council did not veto the adopted Act in the prescribed se-
ven-day period, the Act was enacted at the end of the year 2006.
8.4 Statistics
At the end of 2005 there were 201,919 naturalised citizens or approxi-
mately one tenth of the total population of Slovenia. Roughly 85 per
cent of the total of persons naturalised acquired citizenship according
to the optional provisions in the immediate post-independence period,
with the corrective provision of 2002 contributing to less than 1 per
cent. The great majority (98.5 per cent) of naturalised citizens origi-
nated in other successor states of the Social Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia, of these 46 per cent from Bosnia and Herzegovina and only
1.46 per cent from other countries. In respect to naturalisation by stan-
dard provisions the share of the latter rises to 10 per cent. These were
mainly citizens of Western European countries and of overseas OECD-
states. For example, 1,677 were citizens of the EU States and Switzer-
land, among them 736 of Italy and 445 of Germany. These are followed
by previous citizens of the Russian Federation (249) and of Ukraine
(162).
A quarter of all persons naturalised according to standard provisions
acquired Slovenian citizenship by fulfilling all conditions. Almost 58
per cent of the persons were naturalised according to facilitated proce-
dure. Exceptional naturalisations present a rather large share of 17 per
cent.
Almost 90 per cent of facilitated naturalisations refer to extension of
citizenship to family members, i.e. to spouses and minor children. Eth-
nic-affinity based naturalisations are also significant.
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Table 8.1: Admission to Slovenian citizenship based on supplementary and corrective initial
determination rules (art. 40, 1991, art. 19, 2002) and on standard provisions for naturalisa-
tion by country of origin, 25 June 1991–31 December 2005
Country of origin Art. 40, 1991 Art. 19 , 2002 Standard provisions
No. % No. % No. %
Bosnia & Herzegovina 78,918 46.12 780 46.54 14,049 48.25
Croatia 58,528 34.20 307 18.32 6,397 21.97
Serbia & Montenegro 28,531 16.68 519 30.96 4,472 15.36
Macedonia 5,150 3.00 48 2.86 1,259 4.32
Other countries 22 1.32 2,939 10.10
Total 171,127 100 1,676 100 29,116 100
Source: Ministry of the Interior45
















7,385 8,256 6,774 1,700 68 5 5 1 16,809
*from 2002
Source: Ministry of the Interior
Table 8.3: Regular and facilitated naturalisations in Slovenia per year, 1991-2005
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Granted*
25,870 303 320 2,539 1,233 1,781 926 544 2,747 1,893 2,102 1,101 2,092 2,860 2,989 2,440
*including art. 19, 2002
Source: Ministry of the Interior
The numbers of persons naturalised annually reflect changes in legisla-
tion with a minimum of 303 persons in 1991 and a maximum of
2,989 in 2004. The increasing trend after 2001 can mainly be ex-
plained with the corrective measure added in 2002 to incorporate those
whose status was not adequately regulated in 1991. The decreasing
number in 2005 indicates that this problem is diminishing.















3,647 605 165 153 97 94 82 63 6 6 2 2
Source: Ministry of the Interior
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Ethnic affinity is the dominant ground of national interest for excep-
tional naturalisations, with birth in Slovenia representing the second
largest interest. All other state interests play only a secondary role,
comprising a modest 14 per cent share.
Table 8.5: Exceptional naturalisations in Slovenia per year, 1991-2005
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Granted
4,922 47 45 159 218 391 150 628 571 444 274 245 716 446 344 244
Not granted
1,185 3 19 68 36 88 66 14 88 35 27 32 130 57 16 506
Source: Ministry of the Interior
Since the peak in 2002, there is a decreasing trend of exceptional nat-
uralisations per year. On the one hand this is the effect of the 2002
supplements to the Citizenship Act whereby second- and third-genera-
tion immigrants can be granted citizenship according to a facilitated
procedure. On the other hand a strikingly high number of refusals for
naturalisation in 2005, mainly ethnic Slovenes living abroad, can be at-
tributed to the Government’s redefinition of national interest in citi-
zenship acquisition. This is expected to drop again in the coming years
due to the changes in 2006 concerning the naturalisation of ethnic
Slovenes.
Table 8.6: Release from Slovenian citizenship per year, 1991-2005
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Granted
4803 12 263 432 365 307 888 423 311 249 352 227 350 304 217 103
Source: Ministry of the Interior
The development of release from citizenship is relatively modest, show-
ing an increase until 1996 and since then a steady decrease to a low
figure of 103 in 2005. In the period analysed 103 persons altogether
were not released from Slovenian citizenship.
8.5 Conclusions
As a new state, Slovenia went through a process of initial determina-
tion of citizenry. The question of the initial ‘body’ of citizens and si-
multaneously of legal integration of the majority of ‘non-ethnic’ Slo-
venes was resolved early in the process of independence and interna-
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tional recognition, and without great controversy. Several factors con-
tributed to such a development. Firstly, although the establishment of
Slovenia as a nation-state can be considered as a product of the so-
called eastern type of ethno-cultural nationalism, asserting the right to
self-determination and self-governance of the Slovenian ‘nation’, the in-
itial policy of citizenship was rather in support of democratic statehood
than of ‘nationhood’. Citizenship was defined in territorial terms, close
to ‘zero-option’ policies, in order to ensure an even jurisdiction over the
territory and people within the boundaries of the new state. By adopt-
ing such an approach Slovenia could exercise ‘effective governance’,
which supported its claim for international recognition, in combination
with other elements of external conditionality attached to international
recognition, notably democracy and respect for minorities. This meant
that though some political groups had favoured, at this juncture, a
more restrictive definition of citizenry and consequently of polity based
primarily on ‘ethnic’ criteria, the timing would have worked against it.
What mattered was the very fact of instituting an autonomous citizen-
ship, a highly visible claim to external sovereignty. Secondly, such an
approach afforded all persons affected by state succession the possibi-
lity to participate in the building up of Slovenia, reflecting confidence
in a harmonious relationship between ‘titular’ nation and ‘other’ citi-
zens. The promise given to permanent residents from other former Yu-
goslav republics that they would receive the Slovenian citizenship, if
they so wished, was seen as fulfilled.46 In order to satisfy émigré com-
munities, which largely supported the independence process and to re-
medy injustices caused by deprivation of citizenship under the pre-
vious regime, they were granted preferential treatment regarding natur-
alisation.
What might initially have appeared as a progressive principle of
membership based on a civic conception, which could serve as a refer-
ence point for the evolving statehood and an opportunity for defining
national identity by embracing the multiethnic reality, took an ambigu-
ous turn after independence was achieved. There were attempts to
abolish dual citizenship for people from other Yugoslavian successor
states and only reluctantly was it eventually tolerated. Furthermore,
some of those who did not apply or were not admitted to Slovenian citi-
zenry were deprived of their legal residence. At the same time, how-
ever, citizenship policy and supplementary or changed provisions on
naturalisation throughout the fifteen-year statehood functioned as in-
struments for regulating the status of immigrants and citizens of other
Yugoslavian successor states whose status had not adequately been
regulated in 1991. In this process, the judiciary, in particular the Con-
stitutional Court, played an important role.
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At the same time, Slovenia responded to international standards in
the field by introducing facilitated naturalisation for certain categories
of persons such as second and third generation immigrants or recog-
nised refugees. Nevertheless, state interests in naturalisation prevail
over those of the individual. The concept of a nation as a community
of descent means that the principle of ius sanguinis prevails in defin-
ing those entitled to citizenship at birth, that ethnic criteria play a ma-
jor role in naturalisation procedures and that Slovenia is attempting to
establish a special connection with Slovenes residing abroad. It also
supports a notion of imagined community by, for example, explicit re-
quirement of proficiency in the Slovenian language for naturalisation.
Furthermore, even naturalised citizens are often seen as foreigners in
most areas of public life. Current debates point to a need for a stronger
public sense of citizenship in the democratic polity, but do not suggest
any substantial change of the basic philosophy guiding citizenship pol-
icy nor – after the recent amendments – a comprehensive legislative re-
form.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Slovenia
Date Document Content Source
1991 Citizenship of the Republic
of Slovenia Act (Official
Gazette of the Republic of
Slovenia, No. 1/1991-I)
Constituted the initial body
of citizens and basic
principles of acquisition
and loss of citizenship. It
also provided for optional
naturalisation of residents
from other republics of
SFRY (art. 40) and
reacquisition of citizenship
for those who were
deprived of it on the basis
of prior federal law (art. 41)







1991 Act Amending the
Citizenship of the Republic
of Slovenia Act (Official
Gazette of the Republic of
Slovenia, No. 30/1991-I)
Supplemented art. 40 and
stipulated that the person's
application for citizenship
is to be turned down if that
person is considered to
form a threat to public
order, security and defence
of the state or has
committed a criminal








1991 Constitution of the
Republic of Slovenia
(Official Gazette of the
Republic of Slovenia, Nos.
Postulated in art. 12 that
citizenship shall be
regulated by law and in art.
5 (2) that Slovenes not
In Slovenian
www.dz-rs.si
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may enjoy special rights
and privileges in Slovenia,
the nature and extent of




1992 Act Amending the
Citizenship of the Republic
of Slovenia Act (Official




descent through at least
one parent, if their
Slovenian citizenship
ceased due to release,
renunciation or deprivation
or because they had not
acquired Slovenian








41 and 13.a of the
Citizenship of Slovenia Act
(Official Gazette of the










28 of the Citizenship of
Slovenia Act (Official





Provided that the reasons
for a discretionary decision
must be stated in such a
way that it is evident
whether the administrative
authority in exercising its
discretionary power of
decision has acted ``within
the limits of authorisation
and in accordance with the






1994 Act amending the
Citizenship of the Republic
of Slovenia Act (Official




of citizenship for residents
from other former Yugoslav
republics; extended the age
limit for citizenship by
registration; tightened the
naturalisation criteria,
specifically as to language
proficiency; introduced






1994 Decree on Criteria for
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the Citizenship of the
Republic of Slovenia
(Official Gazette of the
Republic of Slovenia, No.
47/1994)
1996 Resolution on the Position
of Autochthonous Slovene
Minorities in Neighbouring
Countries and the Related
Tasks of State and Other
Institutions in the Republic
of Slovenia (Official
Gazette of the Republic of
Slovenia, No. 35/1996)
Envisages various forms of
aid for these minorities,
taking into account their
specific needs and interests
and providing them with








1999 The Settling of the Status of
Citizens of Other SFRY
Successor States in the
Republic of Slovenia Act
(Official Gazette of the






of permanent residence for
citizens of other SFRY
successor states who had
permanent residence
registered in the territory of
Slovenia on 23 December
1990 or who were residing
in Slovenia on 25 June 1991







2002 Act amending the
Citizenship of the Republic
of Slovenia Act (Official
Gazette of the Republic of
Slovenia, No. 96/2002)




naturalisation, such as the







2002 Resolution on the Relations
with Slovenes Abroad
(Official Gazette of the
Republic of Slovenia, No.
7/2002)
Envisages cooperation with
Slovenes abroad in fields of
culture, language,
information, economy,
science and foreign policy;
declares interest in
repatriation, a status of
Slovenes without
citizenship and citizenship




2002 Constitutional Court Found The Settling of the In Slovenian
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Date Document Content Source
Decision: U-I-246/02-28
(Official Gazette of the
Republic of Slovenia, No.
36/2003)
Status of Citizens of Other
SFRY Successor States in
the Republic of Slovenia
Act unconstitutional.
odlocitve.us-rs.si
2006 Relations between the
Republic of Slovenia and
Slovenians abroad Act
(Official Gazette of the
Republic of Slovenia, No.
43/2006)





2006 Act amending the
Citizenship of the Republic
of Slovenia Act (Official





and social security, clean
criminal record, oath of









1 Official Gazette of the Provincial Government for Slovenia, 147/1920 and 122/1921.
2 Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 254/1928.
3 Official Gazette of the Democratic Republic of Yugoslavia (DRY), 64/1945; Official Gaz-
ette of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY), 54/1946, 90/1946, 88/1948
and 105/1948.
4 Official Gazette of the FPRY, 105/1948. In 1997 the Constitutional Court of the Re-
public of Slovenia found that the use of this provision is not unconstitutional in pro-
cedures concerning the ascertainment of citizenship. Constitutional Court Decision,
U-I-23/93 of 20 March 1997.
5 Official Gazette of the DRY, 64/1945; Official Gazette of the FPRY, 86/1946 and 22/
1962.
6 Official Gazette of the FPRY, 104/1947.
7 The Memorandum includes a special statute that guarantees for both sides the rights
of minorities. It is the first international document that regulates the protection of
the Slovene ethnic minority (‘Yugoslav ethnic group’) in Italy – for the Trieste region.
8 Also see Slovenia, Italy, White Book on Diplomatic Relations published in 1996 by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia.
9 Official Gazette of the FPRY, 9-96/1959, 7-115/58; Official Gazette of the Socialist Feder-
al Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), 7-35/1971, 31-448/1967, 11-48/1981 and 15-65/1990.
Slovenia is a party to these instruments by succession.
10 In this paper, the term republic-level citizenship is used to denote the membership in
constituting entities of the federal state. The term citizenship is used to indicate mem-
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bership of a sovereign state. In the Slovenian language and legal terminology, držav-
ljanstvo is used for both legal concepts.
11 Official Gazette of the SFRY, 38/64.
12 Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, 23/1976.
13 Moreover, most of these instruments such as the European Convention on
Nationality, which was opened for signature on 6 November 1997 and entered into
force on 1 March 2000, and the relevant provisions of the 1999 draft articles on the
Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States, were drafted
after the changes that had reshaped the European political landscape at the end of
the twentieth century. The former contains a chapter on state succession which
focuses on principles and general rules but does not provide for specific rules which
states should respect in cases of state succession.
14 In this regard, it must also be noted that the European Union does not consider
nationality matters to be in its sphere of competence.
15 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 1/1991-I. Amendments and Supplements
to this Act were published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 30/1991-I,
38/1992, 13/1994 and 96/2002. The officially revised text was published in the Offi-
cial Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 7/2003. www.mnz.gov.si.
16 The Act amending the Citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia Act was adopted by
the National Assembly on 24 November 2006. Official Gazette of the Republic of Slove-
nia, 127/2006.
17 For these concepts also see Baršová in this volume.
18 In 1999 the Constitutional Court repealed the paragraph related to the public order
risk. Constitutional Court Decision, U-I-89/99 of 10 June 1999.
19 That immigrants from other republics did not register their permanent residence
was partly due to the fact that they did not know of this possibility or simply did not
care; partly it can be attributed to the concept of migration registration and
registration of permanent residency in the former state. Slovenia was the sole
republic of the SFRY which registered in- and out-migration.
20 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 1/1991-I, 44/1997 and 50/1998 – Constitu-
tional Court Decisions.
21 Under the then valid Aliens Act they could obtain a one-year temporary residence
permit and after three years of uninterrupted residence a permit for permanent
residence. Later this condition was prolonged from three to eight years. Cf. the
controversial 1993 Estonian law on aliens, which declared that anybody living in
Estonia without Estonian citizenship, which had no legal status in Estonian law in
1992/1993, would have to apply for residency status. The Council of Europe experts
criticised that the status of persons already resident in Estonia was equated with that
of non-citizens not currently resident there (see Day & Shaw 2003; also see Jaerve in
this volume).
22 Only upon the request of applicants themselves did administrative authorities issue a
certificate of removal from the register.
23 The Ombudsman in his first yearly report of 1995 refers to the so-called ‘aliens sur
place’ (zatečeni tujci) using a label which resembles the term ‘refugees sur place’.
24 Constitutional Court Decision, U-I-284/94 of 4 February 1999.
25 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 61/1999 and 64/2001.
26 Constitutional Court Decision, U-I-246/02-28 of 3 April 2003.
27 The Ministry of the Interior, however, issued decisions on residency from 26
February 1992 to those ‘erased’, who already had permanent residence permits.
4,107 such decisions were issued until mid-January 2005, while 8,470 were still in
the procedure.
SLOVENIA: FROM CIVIC TO ETHNIC COMMUNITY? 239
28 1,278 Slovenes were deprived of citizenship based on collective decisions by federal
authorities, of which the individuals were never notified, and 67 due to absence.
29 Constitutional Court Decision, U-I-69/92-30 of 10 December 1992.
30 Decree on Criteria for Establishing the Compliance with Specified Conditions for
Acquiring the Citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia through Naturalisation, Official
Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 47/1994.
31 Constitutional Court Decision, U-I-98/91 of 10 December 1992.
32 Under the principle of equality of children born in wedlock and children born out of
wedlock a child of a foreign mother is a Slovenian citizen if the fatherhood of a
Slovenian citizen is acknowledged, declared or otherwise established. The legal effect
of fatherhood is retroactive and as such affects the citizenship of the child.
33 The registration is not necessary if the child would otherwise become stateless or if
the child moves to Slovenia, together with the Slovenian parent, before he or she is
eighteen years old.
34 Before 1994 an applicant did not have to submit this evidence.
35 The condition of a guaranteed residence was dropped in 2002.
36 Before the 2006 amendments the requirements did not include conditional prison
sentences. Moreover, the accepted period of imprisonment was decreased from a
maximum of one year to three months.
37 See also Constitutional Court Decision, U-I-124/94-8 of 9 February 1995. odlocitve.
us-rs.si.
38 Constitutional Court Decision on the request for holding a referendum on Article 40
of the Citizenship Act of the Republic of Slovenia, U-I-266/95-8 of 20 November
1995, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 69/1995.
39 Until 1995 this function was performed by municipalities and then transferred to
local administrative units by the Act on the Takeover of State Functions Performed
until 31 December 1994 by Municipal Bodies, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slove-
nia, 29/1995, 44/1996 – Constitutional Court Decision.
40 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 37/2003 and 39/2006. The officially conso-
lidated text was published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 59/2006.
41 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 44/2006.
42 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 35/1996.
43 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 7/2002.
44 The Council for Slovenians in Neighbouring Countries is composed of six
representatives of the Slovenian minority in Austria, four from Italy and two from
Hungary and Croatia. The Council for Slovenians Abroad consists of four
representatives of Slovenians living in European states, three from South America
and North America respectively, two from Australia and one from Slovenians
residing in other countries around the world.
45 The Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia does not gather and analyse data on
naturalisation. Tables in this section draw on data provided by the Ministry of the
Interior.
46 This promise was given by all political parties and in the Letter of Good Intent (Offi-
cial Gazette of the Republic Slovenia, 40/1990) adopted by the Slovenian Assembly
prior to the plebiscite on the autonomy and independence on which all permanent
residents could vote. Furthermore, the Constitutional Act Implementing the Basic
Constitutional Charter on the Independence and Sovereignty of the Republic of
Slovenia (Official Gazette of the Republic Slovenia, 1/1991-I) in art. 13 specially provided
that citizens of other republics having permanent residence registered in Slovenia on
the day of the plebiscite and who actually lived there should have equal rights and
duties as Slovenian citizens during the transitional period with regards to the acquisi-
tion of Slovenian citizenship. Questions concerning the correct interpretation of this
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document, however, have arisen specifically concerning the implementation of the
Aliens Act.
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Part IV: Mediterranean post-imperial states

Chapter 9: Malta’s citizenship law:
Evolution and current regime1
Eugene Buttigieg
Malta’s legal regime on citizenship is relatively young as it came into
being on the day of Malta’s acquisition of independence from British
rule forty-two years ago. Yet throughout these years, particularly over
the past two decades, it has undergone extensive alterations marking
changes in the governing principles. This chapter first traces the evolu-
tion of the citizenship laws during these years, noting the important
policy changes, their possible causes and implications. It then explores
the different modes of acquisition and loss of citizenship under the
current regime. Finally, statistical data is produced to highlight the ex-
tent to which persons seeking to acquire or reacquire Maltese citizen-
ship by registration or naturalisation benefited from these legislative
changes, apart from the non-quantifiable number of persons who
through these legislative changes acquired or reacquired citizenship
automatically.
9.1 Historical background
Malta was a British colony from 1800 until 21 September 1964 when it
acquired independence from British rule. All persons born in Malta
during this period were automatically British subjects according to Brit-
ish law. It was thus only on Independence Day, 21 September 1964,
that Malta acquired its first provisions conferring and regulating Mal-
tese citizenship. The Constitution of Malta, that entered into force on
Independence Day, contained provisions conferring Maltese citizenship
that were typical of independence constitutions drafted by the British
for their colonies. The Constitution contained a section, chapter III, on
citizenship, that conferred Maltese citizenship automatically on all per-
sons who were born in Malta and were citizens of the United Kingdom
and Colonies before 21 September 1964, provided that one of the par-
ents was also born in Malta; thus a combined application of the ius soli
and ius sanguinis principles. This was necessary to avoid imposing
Maltese citizenship on children born in Malta to British military per-
sonnel families and British nationals stationed in Malta, while Malta
was a British colony. Persons born abroad also acquired Maltese citi-
zenship on 21 September 1964 provided the father and a paternal
grandparent were both born in Malta.
On the other hand, persons born on or after the date of indepen-
dence acquired Maltese citizenship by mere birth in Malta irrespective
of whether or not any of their parents were born in Malta; in other
words on the strength of the ius soli principle only. In practice, this
meant that children born of foreign parents in Malta acquired Maltese
citizenship by birth though they were not of Maltese descent.
Chapter III of the Constitution also established that a Maltese citizen
should have no other citizenship. Adults in possession of another citi-
zenship had to renounce it by 21 September 1967. If a minor who was
a Maltese citizen possessed any other citizenship, on reaching his or
her eighteenth birthday, he or she would have had to renounce any
other citizenship within a year if he or she wished to retain Maltese ci-
tizenship. Moreover, Maltese adults who acquired the citizenship of
any other country would have automatically forfeited Maltese citizen-
ship while foreigners who acquired Maltese citizenship by registration
or naturalisation would have had to renounce any other citizenship
held by them within six months from registration or three months
from naturalisation.
As was the policy generally in most jurisdictions world-wide at the
time, in the case of children born abroad, the question whether the
child would acquire Maltese citizenship or not depended on whether it
was the father or the mother who possessed Maltese citizenship at the
time of birth. If the father were Maltese (by birth in Malta, by registra-
tion, or by naturalisation) though not the mother, the child would ac-
quire Maltese citizenship but if the father were non-Maltese even
though the mother was Maltese the child would not acquire Maltese ci-
tizenship. Thus, a Maltese mother could not transmit her citizenship
to her child born outside Malta unless she was unmarried. Likewise,
consistent with the international trend at the time, while the foreign
wife of a Maltese citizen was entitled to become a citizen of Malta by
registration, a foreign husband of a Maltese citizen was not.
The first law that complemented the Constitution on citizenship
matters was the Maltese Citizenship Act (chapter 188 of the Laws of
Malta) that was enacted the following year in 1965. This regulated in
particular the acquisition of Maltese citizenship by registration and nat-
uralisation. The law was prejudiced in favour of Commonwealth citi-
zens as the latter could acquire Maltese citizenship by registration after
five years of residence in Malta, while other foreigners required six
years of residence in Malta to acquire Maltese citizenship by naturalisa-
tion. The next development in this field was the enactment of the Im-
migration Act (chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta) in 1970 that laid
down rules providing for the control of immigration into Malta.
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9.1.1 The 1989 amendments
Although throughout the years various amendments were made to all
these laws, necessitated inter alia by Malta’s transformation into a re-
public on 13 December 1974, the first major reform in the citizenship
laws took place in August 1989 when chapter III of the Constitution,
the Maltese Citizenship Act and the Immigration Act (via Acts XXIII,
XXIV and XXV of 1989 respectively) were radically amended to indi-
cate a clear change of policy regarding citizenship by (i) making an ex-
ception to the prohibition against dual citizenship for emigrants born
in Malta and who had spent at least six years abroad2 – this had signifi-
cant implications as, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, well over
100,000 Maltese citizens (more than one fourth of the current popula-
tion) had emigrated to countries such as the United Kingdom, Austra-
lia, Canada and the United States to seek employment and thereby ob-
tained a second citizenship (ii) shifting to a rule based more on ius
sanguinis than on ius soli (iii) allowing Maltese mothers to transmit
their citizenship to their children born abroad (iv) granting the same
rights to foreign husbands of citizens of Malta as foreign wives of citi-
zens of Malta by allowing them to be registered as citizens of Malta
and (v) reintroducing acquisition of citizenship by adoption.
This change in policy was due to the influence of changing interna-
tional trends favouring ius sanguinis over ius soli and a greater inter-
national acceptance of dual and multiple citizenship as well as the in-
creasing recognition at the international level of the need to safeguard
gender equality in the citizenship laws. Malta has always participated
actively in international fora and endorsed international instruments in
this field and has moulded its policy accordingly. Moreover, the Gov-
ernment had been elected in 1987 on the strength of an electoral man-
date that included the promise to allow expatriates to regain their lost
citizenship retrospectively by acquiring dual citizenship and that citi-
zenship laws would guarantee gender equality. A number of overseas
associations representing expatriates also exerted pressure for this con-
cession to expatriates to be extended to further generations.
As a result of these amendments Maltese emigrants were now al-
lowed to hold dual citizenship. Art. 27(3) of the Constitution was
amended to enable Maltese emigrants born in Malta to hold dual citi-
zenship, provided of course that the country of which they were citi-
zens recognised the concept of dual citizenship. This applied retrospec-
tively. A Maltese citizen born in Malta who, as the law stood at the
time, had automatically lost his Maltese citizenship having emigrated
and acquired the citizenship of the country to which he had emigrated,
would now be deemed never to have lost his Maltese citizenship, pro-
vided he had spent at least six years in that country. Thus, his dual citi-
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zenship would be backdated to the date when he acquired the foreign
citizenship. This also affected children born of a Maltese emigrant
father who had lost his Maltese nationality because he had acquired an-
other nationality. Since the dual nationality would be backdated so that
the father is deemed never to have lost his Maltese citizenship, chil-
dren who were born of fathers who had ‘lost’ their Maltese citizenship
at the time of their birth and who were therefore deemed not to be
Maltese citizens, also acquired Maltese citizenship with this amend-
ment, effective from their date of birth, once their fathers were rein-
stated in their previous status as citizens of Malta.
It should be noted that under the current legislation, only Maltese
persons habitually resident in Malta have voting rights in national gen-
eral elections and voting may not take place abroad in Malta’s embas-
sies or consulates. So this extension of citizenship to expatriates does
not signify any right to participate in the process of democratic self-
determination of the country.
As stated above, under the Constitution, anyone born in Malta auto-
matically became a citizen of Malta by mere birth in the country. How-
ever, with the 1989 amendments to the Constitution this has changed,
as these amendments limit such acquisition by adding the ius sangui-
nis to the ius soli criterion in establishing that, as from the coming
into force of these amendments on 1 August 1989, a person born in
Malta will acquire Maltese citizenship only if at least one of the parents
is a citizen of Malta or was born in Malta and emigrated and enjoys
freedom of movement in Malta in terms of art. 44 of the Constitution.
The amendments also removed gender inequality in two respects: (i)
in relation to Maltese mothers of children born abroad and (ii) in re-
spect of foreign men married to Maltese women.
While prior to 1989 Maltese citizenship was transmitted to the chil-
dren only if the father was a Maltese citizen, with these amendments it
now suffices that either of the parents is a Maltese citizen (by birth in
Malta, by registration, or by naturalisation). The Maltese mother just as
the Maltese father may now transmit citizenship to her children born
abroad.
Before the 1989 amendments to the Constitution, while a foreign
woman married to a citizen of Malta or to someone who became a citi-
zen of Malta was entitled to acquire Maltese citizenship by registration,
a foreign husband of a female Maltese citizen was not. This was there-
fore discriminatory against foreign husbands as compared to foreign
wives. The amendments extended this right to foreign husbands of
Maltese citizens so that they are now on a par with foreign wives of
Maltese citizens. Moreover, this right now extends even to the widow
or widower of a person who was a citizen of Malta at the time of death
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or would have been on 21 September 1964 had he or she lived till that
day.
Another significant change in policy related to the acquisition of citi-
zenship by adoption. Until 1976 it was possible under Maltese law to
acquire Maltese citizenship through adoption, i.e. a person lawfully
adopted by a citizen of Malta would acquire Maltese citizenship by that
adoption. This was no longer possible following a legislative amend-
ment on 1 January 1977. In 1989 the amendments to the Constitution
reintroduced this facility for the acquisition of citizenship through
adoption, subject to the proviso that the child adopted must be under
ten years of age on the date of adoption.
In 1989 the distinction made in the Maltese Citizenship Act between
Commonwealth citizens and other foreigners for the acquisition of
Maltese citizenship by residence in Malta, a remnant of British influ-
ence, was abolished, so now any person may be naturalised as a citizen
of Malta if he or she has resided in Malta for at least five years. The
1989 amendments to the Maltese Citizenship Act also extended natura-
lisation to any person who, being descended from a person born in
Malta, is a citizen of a country other than the one in which he or she
resides and whose access to the country of which he or she is a citizen
is restricted.
9.1.2 The 2000 amendments
In 2000 further changes were made to the citizenship laws (via Acts
III and IV of 2000) building on and fine-tuning the 1989 amend-
ments, in particular by now completing the shift in policy towards dual
and multiple citizenship.3 One major legislative change was designed
to dissuade marriages of convenience whereby foreigners were marry-
ing Maltese persons simply to acquire the benefits of Maltese citizen-
ship since, according to the prevailing law, marriage with a Maltese citi-
zen immediately entitled the foreign spouse to apply for Maltese citi-
zenship.
The detailed provisions on citizenship in chapter III of the Constitu-
tion were transferred to the Maltese Citizenship Act that thereby be-
came the main law regulating citizenship while the Constitution now
only contains the general principles on citizenship in art. 22.
Dual citizenship that was hitherto permitted only exceptionally in
the case of Maltese emigrants has now become the rule, following the
amendments of 2000, as Maltese citizens are now allowed to hold dual
or even multiple citizenship.4 Thus, as from the coming into force of
the amendments on 10 February 2000, Maltese citizens who acquire
another citizenship do not lose their Maltese citizenship. Moreover,
since minors holding another citizenship only lost their Maltese citi-
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zenship if they did not renounce the foreign citizenship by their nine-
teenth birthday, all citizens of Malta having another citizenship who
were minors on that date or had not reached their nineteenth birthday
by that date were able to retain both citizenships after their nineteenth
birthday. Likewise, foreigners who acquire Maltese citizenship by natur-
alisation or registration are no longer required to renounce their other
citizenships.
Not only was there this complete shift in policy in favour of multiple
citizenship but these provisions were made applicable retrospectively to
persons born in Malta or abroad and who had Maltese citizenship by
birth or descent but had lost this citizenship when they acquired an-
other citizenship, provided they had resided outside Malta for an aggre-
gate period of at least six years. In such a case, such persons would be
deemed never to have lost their Maltese citizenship; with this provision
they regained their lost citizenship automatically.5 On the other hand,
persons who had lost their Maltese citizenship because they had ac-
quired another citizenship before this date but had not resided abroad
for such an aggregate period of time or their Maltese citizenship had
been acquired by registration or naturalisation not by birth or descent
may regain Maltese citizenship only by registration (and so not auto-
matically).6 Irrespective of where they are currently residing they may
submit an application to be registered as citizens of Malta.
Building on the reform of 1989 that had extended citizenship to chil-
dren born to Maltese mothers abroad, the law was further changed to
entitle such children born between 21 September 1964 (date of inde-
pendence) and 1 August 1989 (date of coming into force of the 1989
amendments) to be registered as Maltese citizens, irrespective of
whether or not they reside or resided in Malta while allowing them to
retain their other citizenship.
As stated above, with a view to discouraging marriages of conveni-
ence, the law was amended to provide that foreigners married to Mal-
tese citizens may apply for Maltese citizenship on the strength of their
marriage only if they have been married for at least five years and no
longer immediately following the marriage.7
Another legislative change related to the position of foundlings. Un-
til 2000, a new-born infant found abandoned in Malta was deemed to
have been born in Malta but could not acquire Maltese citizenship as
the identity and nationality of the parents would be unknown. As sta-
ted above, since 1989 it has become an essential requisite for Maltese
citizenship that at least one of the parents must be a citizen of Malta.
So the child would be stateless. But in 2000 the Maltese Citizenship
Act was amended to the effect that, notwithstanding that the national-
ity of the parents be unknown, such a child would be deemed to be a
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citizen of Malta until his or her right to any other citizenship is estab-
lished.8
Malta’s accession to the European Union in 2004 did not necessitate
nor lead to any changes in the country’s laws and policies on citizen-
ship.
9.2 Current modes of acquisition and loss of citizenship
9.2.1 Modes of acquisition of citizenship
Acquisition by ius soli and/or ius sanguinis9
Every person born in Malta before the date of independence (21 Septem-
ber 1964), who until then was a citizen of the United Kingdom and
Colonies and either of whose parents was born in Malta, automatically
acquired Maltese citizenship on the date of independence. Moreover,
even a person born outside Malta before the date of independence auto-
matically acquired Maltese citizenship on the date of independence if
he or she was a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies until the
date of independence and his or her father and a paternal grandparent
were both born in Malta.
On the other hand, for persons who were born in Malta on or after
the date of independence but before 1 August 1989, the mere fact of
birth in Malta was enough to entitle that person to automatically ac-
quire Maltese citizenship at birth. The only exception is in the case of a
person born in Malta in this period of parents who are both non-Mal-
tese with the father enjoying diplomatic immunity. Persons born out-
side Malta during this period acquired citizenship at birth only if at the
time of birth the father10 was a citizen of Malta whether by birth in
Malta, by registration or by naturalisation.
However, following the 1989 amendments, for persons born on or
after 1 August 1989, birth in Malta no longer sufficed to entitle the per-
son to acquire Maltese citizenship at birth: either of the parents must
also have been a citizen of Malta at the time of his or her birth. For
persons born outside Malta on or after 1 August 1989 citizenship is
also acquired automatically at birth if, at the date of birth, either of the
parents was a citizen of Malta whether by birth in Malta, by registra-
tion or by naturalisation. Thus, the essential requirement now is des-
cent, not birth on Maltese territory.
An exception to this rule is made in the case of new-born infants
found abandoned in any place in Malta who would as a result be state-
less. Such infants are deemed to have been born in Malta and are con-
sidered citizens of Malta, even though the identity and citizenship of
the parents are unknown, until such time as their right to any other ci-
tizenship is established.
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A person who became a citizen of Malta on 21 September 1964 or at
birth but subsequently lost this citizenship, having acquired or retained
the citizenship of another country, reacquired citizenship automatically
and retrospectively following the entry into force of the amendments of
2000 on 10 February 2000, that removed the prohibition of dual and
multiple citizenship for Maltese citizens, if he or she resided outside
Malta for an aggregate period of at least six years. By virtue of these
amendments such persons are deemed retrospectively to never have
lost their Maltese citizenship.11
Acquisition by adoption12
Since 1 August 1989, Maltese citizenship may also be acquired automa-
tically by adoption when a person is lawfully adopted (under Maltese
law) on or after this date with one of the adopting parents being a citi-
zen of Malta at the time of adoption, provided that the person adopted
is under ten years of age on the date of adoption.
For persons whose adoptions took place prior to this date but after 31
December 1976, adoption did not automatically lead to acquisition of
Maltese citizenship even if the adopters were citizens of Malta. This
was because during this period adoptions were considered by law as
without effect as far as Maltese citizenship is concerned. Persons
adopted during these years would have to apply to be naturalised as ci-
tizens of Malta, a mode of acquisition that is discussed below.
Although the granting of citizenship in these cases is subject to the dis-
cretion of the Minister responsible for matters related to Maltese citi-
zenship (hereinafter ‘the Minister’), it has, since 1987, been generally
granted on humanitarian grounds as a matter of policy.
Adoptions that took place before 1 January 1977 did lead to auto-
matic acquisition of Maltese citizenship by the adopted person on
adoption but, in the case of a joint adoption, as in the case of any other
birth outside Malta at the time, it had to be shown that at least the
male adopter was a citizen of Malta. It would not have sufficed if only
the female adopter were a citizen of Malta.
Spousal transfer of citizenship13
A non-Maltese person married to a citizen of Malta may, after five years
of marriage, acquire Maltese citizenship by applying to be registered as
a citizen of Malta, provided the spouses are still married and living to-
gether (if the Maltese spouse is still alive) at the time the application
for citizenship is made. However, if the couple were to separate de iure
or de facto after five years of marriage the foreign spouse may still ap-
ply for Maltese citizenship provided the spouses had lived together dur-
ing those five years of marriage. Moreover, if the Maltese spouse dies
before the fifth year of marriage, the foreign spouse may still apply for
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Maltese citizenship following the lapse of the fifth year from the date
of marriage, provided that up to the time of death the spouses were liv-
ing together.
Citizenship may also be acquired, if, although at the time of mar-
riage both spouses were non-Maltese, subsequently one of the spouses
acquires Maltese citizenship through some other mode of acquisition.
The other spouse would now be entitled, subject to the conditions
mentioned above, to apply to be registered as a citizen of Malta on the
strength of the marriage.
A foreign spouse is entitled to apply to be registered as a citizen of
Malta even where the marriage took place before the date of indepen-
dence so that at the time of marriage neither of the spouses was a citi-
zen of Malta, if on independence the other spouse either (i) became, or
would have become were it not for his or her death, a citizen of Malta
on the date of independence or (ii) became a citizen of Malta after the
date of independence.
Acquisition by registration14
Apart from the special case of spousal transfer of citizenship, there are
other instances where a person may acquire Maltese citizenship by re-
gistration.
Former citizens who, having lost their citizenship before 2000 be-
cause of the possession or acquisition of another citizenship as pre-
scribed by the law prevailing at the time, fail to qualify for automatic
reacquisition of this citizenship either because they had not spent the
requisite six years abroad or because they were formerly citizens of
Malta by registration or naturalisation and not by birth, may neverthe-
less apply to be registered as citizens of Malta.
Furthermore, an emigrant who was formerly a citizen of Malta by
birth or descent but ceased to be a citizen of Malta after emigrating
may also reacquire citizenship by registration if he or she returns to
Malta and takes up permanent residence.
Likewise, persons born outside Malta before 1 August 1989 who are
not citizens of Malta because their mother rather than their father was
a citizen of Malta by birth, registration or naturalisation, may also ac-
quire Maltese citizenship by registration.
Citizenship is acquired by registration only if the applicant takes an
oath of allegiance to the country and in some instances, such as in the
case of the spousal transfer of citizenship, provided the granting of citi-
zenship to the applicant is not contrary to the public interest. With this
mode of acquisition, citizenship takes effect from the date of registra-
tion and not retrospectively.
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Acquisition by naturalisation15
Any person, including stateless persons, may apply to acquire Maltese
citizenship by naturalisation if he or she has resided in Malta during
the year immediately preceding the date of application and for a
further aggregate period of at least four years over the past seven years
immediately preceding the date of application, provided he or she has
an adequate knowledge of the Maltese or English language, is of good
character and is deemed to be a suitable citizen of Malta.
In practice, however, unless the applicant is of Maltese descent, as
described below, the Department for Citizenship and Expatriate Affairs
follows a strict policy of granting naturalisation only where the appli-
cant has resided in Malta for quite a number of years and has children
born in Malta. Every case is dealt with on its own merits and the Minis-
ter enjoys a non-reviewable discretion as explained below; but while in
the past residence alone would not have been a ground for naturalisa-
tion, today the general policy is to consider favourably requests for nat-
uralisation by residents who have been residing in Malta for a substan-
tial number of years and have formed a family here. Income and prop-
erty are not determining factors. Nor is any exception made to this
long-term residence rule for labour migrants.
However, no residence conditions apply where the applicant was
born abroad of a father that was likewise born abroad but the paternal
grandfather and great-grandparent were both born in Malta. In such
cases the person born abroad may apply for naturalisation merely on
the strength of his or her Maltese descent. It should be noted, though,
that the policy is that applications under this category would normally
be accepted only if the applicant resides in Malta.
Likewise, no residence conditions apply where the applicant had
been a citizen of Malta by birth before he or she emigrated from Malta
and ceased to be a citizen of Malta or if he or she had emigrated before
the date of independence and failed to obtain Maltese citizenship on
independence merely because he or she had ceased to be a citizen of
the United Kingdom and Colonies on the date of independence. There
have been few applications under this category as most persons that
fall under this category already enjoy dual citizenship.
Again no residence conditions apply to persons who prove descent
from a person born in Malta and who are citizens of a country other
than the country of their residence and who are denied access to the
country of which they are citizens. They may apply to acquire Maltese
citizenship by naturalisation merely on the strength of their Maltese
descent. However, there have been few instances of naturalisation un-
der this category because not many persons would qualify under this
category that requires the applicant to produce all the birth and mar-
riage certificates starting from his or her own birth on up to the ances-
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tor who was born in Malta. If the link is broken or cannot be proven
by documentary evidence or if the birth certificate of the ancestor born
in Malta cannot be traced, the application for citizenship would not be
successful. Persons in this category are usually persons of Maltese des-
cent residing in North African countries who may generally encounter
great difficulties to trace the documents in these countries that would
prove this descent.
Special rules apply for persons who are and have always been state-
less but were born in Malta of parents who are not citizens of Malta.
In such cases the person is entitled to naturalisation as a citizen of
Malta only if he or she has been ordinarily resident in Malta for a peri-
od of five years up to the date of his or her application and has not
been convicted in any country of an offence against the security of the
state or sentenced to a punishment depriving personal liberty for a
term of not less than five years.
If the stateless person was not born in Malta but either of his or her
parents was a citizen of Malta at the date of his or her birth, he or she
is entitled to naturalisation as citizen of Malta only if he or she has
been ordinarily resident in Malta for a period of three years up to the
date of his or her application and has not been convicted in any coun-
try of an offence against the security of the state. So once again where
Maltese descent can be shown the conditions for naturalisation are less
stringent than where only connection by birth on Maltese territory can
be proved.
As in the case of citizenship by registration, where citizenship is ac-
quired by naturalisation, it takes effect from the date on which the ap-
plicant was naturalised.16 All applications are made to the Minister and
there is no right of appeal against the decision of the Minister on any
such application nor is such a decision subject to review in any court.17
However, in the Cabinet Citizenship Guidelines that were issued in
1987, it is stated that all applications for citizenship by the following
persons are given favourable consideration:
a. former citizens of Malta;
b. children born abroad of returned migrants;
c. foreign citizens born in Malta to a parent who is a citizen of Malta;
d. children born to parents who were non-Maltese but who later ac-
quired Maltese citizenship; and
e. persons born abroad but of Maltese descent.
It is stated that, on the other hand, applications from persons who do
not fall under any one of these categories will only be given favourable
consideration if there are humanitarian grounds.18
Since the drawing up of these guidelines in 1987, significant
changes have been made to the Maltese Citizenship Act in 1989 and
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2000, as shown above. Hence the persons falling in categories (a) and
(b) have practically all been re-instated as Maltese citizens or are now
Maltese citizens automatically in view of the dual citizenship amend-
ments to the law. Moreover, following these amendments, persons fall-
ing under category (c) may re-acquire Maltese citizenship simply by re-
gistration.
Though refugees in Malta are granted some rights they have no right
to Maltese citizenship nor are there any provisions in the law that facil-
itate the granting of citizenship to refugees.19
Since, as stated above, the law prescribes that one of the conditions
for naturalisation is that there should be evidence of the applicant’s
good character and suitability for citizenship, apart from being sup-
ported by documents attesting to the applicant’s place of residence,
birth and Maltese descent, the application in question must also be
sponsored by persons that are deemed trustworthy (such as lawyers,
notaries, magistrates, judges, members of parliament, police officers,
medical practitioners, parish priests etc.) who, having had occasion to
assess the applicant in the course of exercising their profession or voca-
tion, are thereby able to vouch for his or her integrity. As in the case of
citizenship by registration, the applicant is required to take an oath of
allegiance to the country before he or she may be naturalised.
9.2.2 Modes of loss of citizenship
Acquisition or retention of another citizenship no longer leads to the
denial or forfeiture of Maltese citizenship as dual and multiple citizen-
ship is now fully acknowledged by Maltese law.20 This also means that
in the case of mixed marriages, the children can acquire the citizenship
of both parents. The only ways in which citizenship may be lost are de-
tailed below.
Renunciation of citizenship21
Any citizen of Malta who is also a national of another country may re-
nounce citizenship by making a declaration to this effect and upon re-
gistration of this declaration he or she would cease to be a citizen of
Malta. It is a condition for renunciation that the Maltese citizen should
also be a national of another country so that acceptance of the renun-
ciation would not lead to the person becoming stateless. Such renun-
ciation may be refused if it is made during any war in which Malta is
engaged or if in the opinion of the Minister it would otherwise be con-
trary to public policy.
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Deprivation of citizenship acquired by registration or naturalisation22
A citizen of Malta who acquired his or her citizenship by registration
or naturalisation may be deprived of this citizenship by order of the
Minister if the Minister is satisfied that:
a. the registration or naturalisation was obtained by means of fraud,
false representation or the concealment of any material fact; or
b. the citizen has shown himself or herself by act or speech to be dis-
loyal or disaffected towards the President or the Government of
Malta; or
c. the citizen has, during any war in which Malta was engaged, unlaw-
fully traded or communicated with an enemy or been engaged in or
associated with any business that was to his or her knowledge car-
ried on in such a manner as to assist an enemy in that war; or
d. the citizen has within seven years after becoming naturalised or
being registered as a citizen of Malta, been sentenced in any coun-
try to a punishment depriving personal liberty for a term of not less
than twelve months; or
e. the citizen has been ordinarily resident in foreign countries for a
continuous period of seven years and during this time has neither
been at any time in the service of Malta or of an international orga-
nisation of which the Government of Malta was a member nor gi-
ven notice in writing to the Minister of his or her intention to retain
citizenship of Malta.
However, in all such cases a person shall be deprived of his or her citi-
zenship only if the Minister is satisfied that it is not conducive to the
public good that the person should retain his or her citizenship and in
the case referred to in (d) above only if it appears to the Minister that
that person would not thereupon become stateless.
Before the Minister issues an order depriving a person of his or her
citizenship, the person concerned must be given notice in writing in-
forming him or her of the ground on which the order will be issued
and of his or her right to an inquiry. If the person requests an inquiry
the Minister will have to refer the case to a committee of inquiry ap-
pointed by the Minister but presided over by a person with judicial ex-
perience.
9.3 Statistical developments
These legislative amendments, particularly the shift to dual and multi-
ple nationality are reflected in the statistical developments in the period
1990-2004. Statistics from the annual reports of the Department for
Citizenship & Expatriate Affairs for the years 1990-2004 show that the
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number of citizenships acquired by registration rose sharply from the
year 2000 onwards (see Figure 9.1 below which also shows that the
change in policy regarding dual and multiple citizenship in 2000 had
a greater effect on registrations than naturalisations). From an annual
average of 111 in the 1990s the number of registrations shot up to 512
in 2000 and 1,062 in 2001 and has remained in the region of 500 a
year ever since.
The figure of 1,062 in 2001 remains the highest figure ever recorded
for citizenship registrations in Malta. This increase is attributed by the
National Statistics Office (NSO) in the Demographic Review 2001 to the
removal of the prohibition against dual and multiple nationality by the
legislative amendments that entered into force in February 2000. The
figure remained high in 2002 when 684 registrations were recorded.23
This might be attributed to the fact that until 2002 Australian law pro-
hibited dual and multiple nationality24 and this prevented the many
Maltese emigrants residing in Australia from taking advantage of the
changes in the Maltese legislation in 2000 and registering for Maltese
citizenship. When Australia changed its law on 4 April 2002 and re-
moved the prohibition, this resulted in a surge of registrations in 2002
by persons who were now able to retain both Maltese and Australian ci-
tizenship.25 In 2003 and 2004 the number of registrations decreased








































Figure 9.1: Number of naturalisations and registrations in Malta, 1990-2004
Source: Annual Reports of the Department for Citizenship & Expatriate Affairs published in
the Annual Reports of Government Departments
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registrations will probably stabilise itself at the year 2000 level of ap-
proximately 500 new registrations annually.
Table 9.1 gives a breakdown of the figures for acquisition by registra-
tion for 1998-2004 according to the grounds for registration and
shows that it was mostly (i) foreign spouses; (ii) children born abroad
to female citizens of Malta; and (iii) former citizens of Malta who had
lost their citizenship because of the possession or acquisition of an-
other citizenship that took advantage of the change in policy regarding
dual and multiple citizenship to acquire citizenship by registration.
Table 9.1: Acquisition of Maltese nationality by registration for 1998-2004 according to the
grounds for registration
Acquisition by registration 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
By virtue of marriage via Arts 4 or 6 107 75 162 682 354 240 267
Resettling permanently in Malta after
having emigrated and ceased to be
citizens of Malta via Art 4(4)
4 4 – – – – –
Being children born abroad to female
citizens of Malta via Art 5(2)(a)
– – 173 241 221 192 210
Being former citizens of Malta via Art 8 – – 177 139 109 64 37
TOTAL 111 79 512 1062 684 496 514
Source: Abstract of Statistics 2000, NSO 2003 and Department for Citizenship & Expatriate
Affairs
9.4 Conclusions
Acknowledgment of dual and multiple citizenship has done justice to
the thousands of Maltese citizens who had lost their citizenship when,
due to economic circumstances, they had been forced to emigrate to
seek work overseas and acquired a foreign citizenship. Not only have
Maltese diaspora regained their legal ties to their or their ancestors’
homeland but, following Malta’s accession to the European Union,
they may now also partake of the benefits of European citizenship.
Throughout the years, through its participation in international fora
debating nationality issues Malta has regularly reviewed and revised its
nationality policies in line with evolving concepts so that gender in-
equalities and other forms of discrimination prevailing in the law have
now been mostly redressed bringing the legal regime in line with inter-
national trends.
However, although Malta has signed, though not yet ratified, the
European Convention on Nationality, the Maltese Citizenship Act has
yet to fully embrace the principle of non-discrimination between its na-
tionals incorporated in art. 5(2) of the Convention as the provisions on
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deprivation of citizenship in art. 14(2) of the Act discriminate against
persons who acquired citizenship by registration or naturalisation.
Maybe this is one reason why Malta has yet to ratify the Convention
that it signed on 29 October 2003, though it should be noted that art.
5(2) of the Convention does not have a mandatory effect but only con-
stitutes a ‘declaration of intent’ by the signatories.27 This discrimina-
tory issue has not been the subject of any public debate or controversy
in Malta.
Following accession to the European Union, although accession it-
self did not necessitate changes in Maltese citizenship laws as the laws
were already in consonance with internationally accepted norms, the
fact that Maltese citizenship now automatically confers European citi-
zenship rights on holders of Maltese citizenship means that Maltese
authorities must now consider the wider implications of any policy
changes relating to the acquisition and loss of citizenship, particularly
in relation to its immigration policy.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Malta
Date Document Content Source
1964 Constitution of Malta Chapter III contained
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by adoption no longer
allowed.
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Act XXIV amending the
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citizenship at birth but
must be accompanied by
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naturalisation purposes;
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1 The author would like to thank Mr J Treeby Ward and Mr Joseph Mizzi, Director and
Assistant Director respectively at the Department for Citizenship and Expatriate
Affairs, for valuable information and for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
2 Hitherto only minors were allowed to have dual citizenship until their nineteenth
birthday.
3 These legislative changes were preceded by the White Paper on Proposed Legislation
to Amend the Citizenship and Immigration Laws, Office of the Prime Minister
(OPM), 10 August 1998 that explained the proposed amendments.
4 Art. 22 of the Constitution and art. 7 of the Maltese Citizenship Act.
5 Maltese Citizenship Act, art. 9.
6 Ibid., art. 8.
7 Ibid., arts. 4 and 6.
8 Ibid., art. 5.
9 Ibid., arts. 3-5, 17.
10 Except in the case of illegitimate children where the national status of the mother
becomes relevant – ibid. art 17.
11 Ibid., art. 9.
12 Ibid., art. 17.
13 Ibid., arts. 4 and 6.
14 Ibid., arts. 8 and 9.
15 Ibid., art. 10.
16 Ibid., art. 12.
17 Ibid., art. 19
18 These guidelines currently appear on the website of the relevant ministry, the
Ministry for Justice and Home Affairs, www.mjha.gov.mt.
19 However, recently a Government minister (Minister for the Family and Social
Solidarity, Dolores Cristina, as reported in The Times of 18 June 2005 on p. 19) an-
nounced that the Government is considering a change in policy in this regard in fa-
vour of granting citizenship to refugees who have been living in Malta for ten years
so as to enable them to integrate better into society. So far, however, there has been
no official change in policy on these lines.
20 Maltese Citizenship Act, art. 7 and art. 22(2) of the Constitution.
21 Maltese Citizenship Act, art. 13.
22 Ibid., art. 14.
23 Demographic Review 2002, National Statistical Office (NSO) 2003.
24 Art. 17 of Australia’s law on citizenship did not allow dual citizenship so that citizens
of Australia would lose citizenship if they acquired another citizenship voluntarily
through registration.
25 Ministry for Justice and Home Affairs, Annual Report 2001-2002.
26 Demographic Review 2003, NSO 2004.
27 Explanatory Report to the European Convention on Nationality, point 45.
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Chapter 10: Nationality and citizenship in Cyprus
since 1945: Communal citizenship, gendered
nationality and the adventures of a post-colonial
subject in a divided country
Nicos Trimikliniotis
Mapping out the complex historical, structural, politico-legal and cul-
tural setting that has generated a specific mode of nationality in the
context of Cyprus is no easy task. In fact, we cannot speak of a nation-
ality policy as such; such a policy has never been formally declared or
publicly discussed, save for times in which the media hysterically criti-
cised the granting of nationality.1 It is however possible to deduce a
policy from the practices of the last 45 years (Trimikliniotis 2005).
In an area of 9,251 km2, the total population of Cyprus is around
754,800, of whom 666,800 are Greek-Cypriots (living in the Cyprus
Republic-controlled area). On independence in 1960 Turkish-Cypriots
constituted 18 per cent of the population, whilst the smaller ‘religious
groups’, as referred to in the Constitution, consisting of Armenians, La-
tins, Maronites and ‘others’ (such as Roma), constituted 3.2 per cent of
the population. It is the third largest island of the Mediterranean; its
geographical position, in the far eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea,
historically adjoining Europe, Asia and Africa has been both a blessing
and a curse. Invaders and occupiers for centuries sought to subordinate
it for strategic reasons, followed by British colonial rule.
It became an independent Republic in 1960. In post-colonial years,
there was inter-communal strife and constant foreign intervention of
one kind or another, until 1974 when a coup by the Greek junta and
EOKA B2 was used as a pretext for the invasion by the Turkish army
and the subsequent division of the island (Hitchens 1997; Attalides
1979). Turkey still occupies 34 per cent of the territory, whilst 200,000
remain displaced and 80,000 Turkish-Cypriots remain in the northern,
occupied territories. Attempts to resolve the Cyprus problem have not
been successful. Following the overwhelming rejection of the UN plan
to resolve the problem by the Greek-Cypriots and the overwhelming en-
dorsement on the 24 April 2004 by the Turkish-Cypriots, Cyprus has
entered the EU with the Cyprus problem in a state of limbo. Cypriot
policy makers still hope that the policy of accession to the EU will
eventually act as a catalyst in the effort to find a settlement, but the
two sides are divided over about how to proceed (Hannay 2005; Palley
2005).3
To evaluate the question of nationality/citizenship, one is forced to
view the ever-present ‘Cyprus problem’ in the historical and politico-so-
cial context of the island and the wider troubled region of the near
Middle East. While the ‘Cyprus problem’ persists and the de facto divide
continues, the politics of ‘citizenship’ has not been ‘frozen’ in time. Ci-
tizenship has played a central role in political discourse, both during
and following the referendum on the UN plan in April 2004. The par-
ticular construction of the Cyprus Republic was such that the conflict
for legitimacy was elevated to the primary struggle for control of the
state. In this conflict the two communal leaderships – the Greek-Cy-
priots and the Turkish-Cypriots – sought to materialise their ‘national
aspirations’: For Greek-Cypriots the aim for Enosis (union with Greece)
and for the Turkish-Cypriots the goal of Taksim (partition) would con-
tinue post-independence. The very concept of citizenship was not only
ethnically/communally defined by the Constitution, but it was also a
sharply divisive issue between the Greeks and Turks, acquiring strong
ethnic and nationalistic overtones (see Tornaritis 1982; Chrysostomides
2000; Trimikliniotis 2000, 2001).
10.1 History of nationality policy since 1945
10.1.1 The national subject under the colonial spell: ‘Modernising’ the millet
system, divide and rule and the rise of irredentist nationalism
Following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1864, the UK persuaded
the Ottomans to cede Cyprus to the UK.4 The British colonialists took
over from the Ottoman rulers by order of Council on 7 October 1878.
They immediately embarked on a programme of ‘modernisation’ from
above and from outside by introducing an administrative system super-
seding Ottoman law with English law. Britain formally annexed Cyprus
in 1914, following Turkey’s support for Germany in the First World
War; in 1923, under the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey formally relin-
quished all its claims to Cyprus and it became a Crown Colony in
1925.
In the historical setting prior to the modern era,5 ‘identity’ was not
based on ‘ethnicity’: The notion of ‘citizenship’ did not exist under Ot-
toman rule outside the millet system. This implied that the Ottomans
basically recognised the religious leaders of the flock and were co-oper-
ating with them in the administration (Katsiaounis 1996; Kyrris
1980).6 Cypriots became ‘natives of the colony’, but the essential char-
acteristics of the Ottoman millet system, a system that was based on
communal organisation and leadership along the lines of faith, were
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more or less kept intact. Hence, the Muslim community and Christian-
orthodox community millets were gradually ‘modernised’ by the British
administrator. There was a transformation of the quasi-medieval com-
munity elites into ‘ethno-communal’ elites: on the one hand, the tradi-
tional religious leader of the Christian Orthodox flock, the archbishop,
became the leader of the Greek community and, on the other, the old
Ottoman administrators, who represented the fusion of the political
and religious order of the sultanate-caliphate at local level, were trans-
formed into the new political leadership of the Turkish community.
The Cypriot ‘natives of the colony’ were thus gradually ethnocised.
Nevertheless, the leaders of the autocephalous Greek-orthodox Church
retained their ‘ethnarchic role’ (i.e. political leadership of the flock), and
the old Ottoman administrators were eventually transformed into the
Kemalist elite, following the rise of Mustafa Kemal to power in the
Turkish Republic (which succeeded the Ottoman empire).7
10.1.2 Moments of (in)dependence: Ethno-communal citizenship and the
nationalising of legally divided subjects (1959-1963)
The establishment of the Cyprus Republic marks an important devel-
opment in the history of Cyprus, as the island became an independent
republic for the first time since antiquity, albeit in a limited way (see
Attalides 1979; Faustmann 1999). The anti-colonial struggle had
started in the 1930s.8 The four-year armed campaign by the Greek-Cy-
priot EOKA (1955–59) for Enosis and the Turkish-Cypriot response for
Taksim brought about a regime of ‘supervised’ independence by three
foreign ‘guarantor’ nations (UK, Turkey and Greece). The Cyprus Con-
stitution, adopted under the Zurich-London Accord of 1959, contains a
rigorous bi-communalism, whereby the two ‘communities’, Greek-Cy-
priots, who made up 78 per cent of the population, and Turkish-Cy-
priots, who accounted for 18 per cent of the population, share power in
a consociational system. Citizenship is strictly ethno-communally di-
vided. There are also three other minority groups who have the consti-
tutionally recognised status of ‘religious groups’: the Maronites, the Ar-
menians and the Latins. In addition, there is a small Roma commu-
nity, registered as part of the Turkish-Cypriot community.
10.1.3 The ‘national’ rift: Collision and division between Greek-Cypriots and
Turkish-Cypriots (1963-1974)
In 1963, following a Greek-Cypriot proposal for amendment of the
Constitution, the Turkish-Cypriot political leadership ‘withdrew’ from
the Government. Since then, the administration of the Republic has
been carried out by the Greek-Cypriots. Inter-communal strife ensued
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until 1967. In 1964 the Supreme Court ruled that the functioning of
the Government must continue on the basis of the ‘law of necessity’,
or better the ‘doctrine of necessity’, in spite of the constitutional defi-
ciencies created by the Turkish-Cypriot withdrawal from the adminis-
tration.9 The short life of the consociation did not manage to generate
a strong enough inter-communal or trans-communal citizenship. This
brief period of peaceful inter-communal political co-existence was ten-
tative; we cannot therefore speak of a ‘nationality policy’ as such, above
and beyond the politics of the Cyprus conflict and the separate national
aspirations of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, who continued to work to-
wards Enosis and Taksim respectively, even after independence.
Although de iure the Republic continued to exist as a single interna-
tional entity, in practice there were two de facto regimes in the enclaves,
each group controlled, one for the Greek-Cypriots and one for the Turk-
ish Cypriots – a situation aptly called ‘the first partition’ by one scholar
(Droussiotis 2005). The fierce fighting between 1963 and 1967 was fol-
lowed by efforts to reconciliation until 1974, but these efforts failed.
10.1.4 The de facto partition: 1974-2003 following the invasion and
occupation
Since 1974 the northern part of Cyprus, some 35 per cent of its terri-
tory, has been under Turkish occupation and outside the control of the
Cyprus Government. Some 100 Greek-Cypriots inhabit the northern
territory, whilst only a few hundred Turkish-Cypriots continue to live in
the Government–controlled south (ECRI 2001; Kyle 1997) However,
since the end of May 2003 the regime in the occupied territories has
allowed Turkish-Cypriots to visit the Republic-controlled south on the
condition that they return before midnight and the Greek-Cypriots to
visit the north, on the condition of passport inspection and with restric-
tions on their stay.
During this 30-year long period the de facto partition meant that in
effect there were two separate ‘stories’ about nationality: the story of
the Greek-Cypriots, who lived in the reduced territory of the interna-
tionally recognised Republic of Cyprus, and that of the Turkish-Cy-
priots, who lived under an unrecognised regime, the ‘Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus’, which relied heavily on Turkey to maintain it.
Turkish-Cypriots are entitled to citizenship/nationality of the Cyprus
Republic and a few thousands obtained a passport. However, the vast
majority did not have access to the authorities and was not allowed to
cross over to the ‘other side’ by the occupying regime; up to April 2003
there were few opportunities for ordinary Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-
Cypriots to meet; while Greek-Cypriots did not have access to the occu-
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pied territories, Turkish-Cypriots were not allowed by the regime in the
north to enter the area controlled by the Republic.
The period between 1974 and 2003 was characterised by the at-
tempts of the break away regime to consolidate partitionism in Cyprus
(Dodd 1993). In spite of the efforts to reach an agreement on a solu-
tion based on the ‘High Level Agreements’ of 1977 and 197910 the
Turkish side continued its route towards separatism. The ‘Turkish Re-
public of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC), a regime only recognised by Tur-
key, was declared.
The constitution of the TRNC provides for an ethno-religious-based
nationality and citizenship to a large extent reproducing the provisions
of the Cyprus Republic (Dodd 1993). However, TRNC nationals cannot
make use of the nationality of an unrecognised state. Hence, many
Turkish-Cypriots sought passports of Turkey and the Republic of Cy-
prus – particularly after accession to the EU. In the late 1990s the
TRNC leadership attempted to criminalise the access to the passport of
the Republic of Cyprus, but such efforts were subsequently abandoned
as the numbers of Turkish-Cypriots seeking passports grew and there
was a reversal of this policy once the Annan Plan (version 1) was first
introduced in late 2002. In fact, many Turkish-Cypriot politicians now
criticised the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus for failing to re-
spond quickly enough to ensure the swift and full provisions of access
to citizenship, passports and the public goods that are available to the
nationals of the Republic of Cyprus.
During the post-1974 period the Republic of Cyprus attempted to re-
inforce its legitimacy claiming that Turkish-Cypriot citizens enjoy full
and equal rights under the Republic’s Constitution, such as general ci-
vil liberties and the rights provided by the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) as well as other human rights, save for those provi-
sions, that have resulted from (a) the ‘abandoning’ of the governmental
posts in 1963–64 and (b) the consequences of the Turkish invasion.
The ‘doctrine of necessity’ would apply to allow for the effective func-
tioning of the state, whilst the relevant provisions of the Constitution
would be temporarily suspended, pending a political settlement (for
more on this see Chrysostomides 2000; Loizou 2001). However, Turk-
ish-Cypriot citizens of the Republic had been denied their electoral
rights since 1964, a matter that was found to be in violation of the Eur-
opean Convention on Human Rights,11 save for the European Parlia-
ment elections in 2004. A new law was passed to at least partially re-
medy the situation before the Parliamentary elections in May 2006.
All Governments of the Republic of Cyprus have maintained that
Turkish-Cypriots are entitled to full citizenship rights and the national-
ity of the Republic. The children of Cypriots who now reside in the oc-
cupied territories or abroad and were born after 1974 are entitled to na-
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tionality (as with Greek-Cypriots and ‘others’). The bureaucratic ele-
ments involved are due to the non-recognition of any documentation
such as e.g. birth certificates from the TRNC.12 The policy regarding
the treatment of Turkish-Cypriots, who are Cyprus Republic nationals,
is rather contradictory. This reflects the complexity of the Cyprus con-
flict and the constant conflict for legitimacy and recognition. Inevitably,
‘the discourse of recognition’ (Constantinou & Papadakis 2002) spilled-
over into nationality politics, making a mess of the official policy of
‘rapprochement’. Ultimately, the consequences of the situation resulted
in failing to properly treat ordinary Turkish-Cypriots as ‘strategic allies’,
in the context of independence from the Turkish-Cypriots’ nationalistic
leadership, who are perceived as ‘mere pawns of Ankara’.
Even today, the Republic of Cyprus seems to be failing to address
certain basic matters: Since Turkish is an official language of the Repub-
lic, allowing Turkish-Cypriots to communicate with Government Offi-
cials in their own language and making the laws, regulations and
forms available in Turkish is a matter that could have been resolved,
without much difficulty, and would protect the Republic from claims
of discrimination and unconstitutionality. Moreover, the enjoyment of
all rights, including the right to property (of those Turkish-Cypriots
who fled their homes in 1963, 1967 and 1974), could have been
handled with greater sensitivity and care, so that the Turkish-Cypriots,
who are Cypriot citizens, would feel more welcome. At the same time
one has to appreciate the context, particularly the massive displacement
of 100,000 Greek-Cypriots from the north, many of whom are housed
in Turkish-Cypriot properties.
10.1.5 New issues for nationality/citizenship-policies
In the 1990s and early 2000 a number of key issues opening up the
issue of citizenship and nationality and requiring a declared and con-
sistent policy emerged.
First, the arrival of migrant workers, who today make up 15 per cent
of the total working population of the island, is a significant factor al-
tering the ethnic make up of the population. Although the initial de-
sign was that they be ‘temporary’, they seem to be a permanent feature
of Cypriot society (Matsis & Charalambous 1993; Trimikliniotis 1999;
Trimikliniotis & Pantelides 2003; Trimikliniotis & Demetriou 2005).
Second, the arrival of Turkish-Cypriot Roma from the poorer (occu-
pied) north in the south between 1999 and 2002 created a panic of
being ‘flooded’ with ‘gypsies’. In spite of the fact that we are dealing
with a group of Cypriots, who moved to the south, the reaction of the
authorities, the media and the public at large displayed a hostile atti-
tude as if they were ‘alien citizens’ and unwanted. Studies indicate that
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there is wide-spread resentment by the local Greek-Cypriot residents to
the Turkish-speaking Roma arriving in their neighbourhood in Limas-
sol and ‘causing trouble’. There is evidence of discrimination against
Roma in the Republic (Spyrou 2003; Trimikliniotis 2003), as they are
generally viewed with suspicion by Greek-Cypriots, even by Turkish-Cy-
priots. The arrival of large numbers in the south was greeted with fear
and suspicion,13 particularly when the then Minister of Justice and
Public Order alleged that they may well be ‘Turkish spies’,14 whilst the
Minister of the Interior assured Greek-Cypriots that the authorities
‘shall take care to move them to an area that is far away from any place
where any people are living’, in response to the racially motivated fears
of local Greek-Cypriot residents.15 The socio-economic position of this
generally destitute group renders them particularly vulnerable and de-
pendent on welfare; the rights that derive from their citizenship status
were thus mediated by the way various state authorities approached
them (e.g. their lifestyle and harassment means that many do not have
the necessary documents for claiming nationality such as birth certifi-
cates, identity cards etc.). Hence the failure to take into account the so-
cioeconomic conditions of the Roma may result in the denial of the
right to obtain a passport, as was found in cases investigated by the Cy-
prus Ombudsman.16
Third, the opening of the ‘borders’ which allowed many thousands
of Turkish-Cypriots to visit the south were generally greeted by both
Turkish-Cypriots and Roma residing in the south with relief and
optimism.17 However, there was a tense atmosphere generated in the
run up and aftermath of the referendum on the Annan plan to reunite
the island on the 24 of April 2004, the rejection of which by the
Greek-Cypriots has given rise to nationalist sentiments in the south
(see Hadjidemetriou 2006).
The fourth issue concerns the children of settlers who are married
with Turkish-Cypriots. This is a highly controversial issue as it brings
out the conflict over the nature of the Cyprus problem: the Turkish pol-
icy of colonising the north seems to be a major obstacle to a solution.
There is a misguided conflation of the inter-nationally condemned pol-
icy by an aggressor country, with the fact that we are also dealing with
some basic rights and humanitarian issues relating to the rights of
children and individuals who marry, found families and continue with
their lives. The granting of nationality rights to children and spouses
of Turkish-Cypriots is a major political issue which has increasingly ta-
ken up the headlines and is discussed in the last section of this paper.
Moreover, the condemnation of a war crime (colonisation) must not be
conflated and confused with issues regarding the conditions of sojourn
and living conditions of poor undocumented workers, who are primar-
ily present so as to be exploited as cheap foreign labour.
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Finally, the issue of gender has become an important issue as re-
gards citizenship. The position of women in the processes of nation-
building and nationalism raises the crucial question of a gendered Cy-
priot nationality, in what one scholar referred to as ‘the one remaining
bastion of male superiority in the present territorially divided state’
(Anthias 1989: 150). This last ‘bastion’ was formally abolished with an
amendment of the citizenship law in 1999 (No. 65/99), which intro-
duced entitlement to citizenship for descendants of a Cypriot mother
and a non-Cypriot father. The apparent reluctance of Cypriot policy-
makers to amend the citizenship law, allegedly due to the concern
about upsetting the state of affairs as it existed prior to 1974, cannot
stand closer examination. After all, there have been seven amendments
to the citizenship law prior to the amendment No. 65/99. It is appar-
ent that the issue of gender equality had not been a particularly high
political priority. Besides, in the patriarchal order of things, the role of
Cypriot women as ‘symbolic reproducers of the nation’, particularly in
the context of ‘national liberation’, as transmitters of ‘the cultural stuff’,
required that potential association and reproduction of women with
men outside the ethnic group be strictly controlled (Anthias 1989: 151).
10.1.6 The rise of trans-communal subjectivity: Challenging the ethno-
communal boundaries
On 23 April 2003 there was a sudden decision by the authorities of the
unrecognised TRNC, to partially lift the ban on freedom of movement.
This has taken most by surprise, as the TRNC was abandoning the
long-term vigorous opposition to Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot
contacts. The Turkish-Cypriot leadership allowed the possibility for a
course of action the peace and rapprochement movement had been ad-
vocating for years; yet the move was certainly a surprise. The issue of
‘passport control’ between the check points became an issue of tension
between Greek-Cypriot politicians and media and their Turkish-Cypriot
counterparts. However, this bureaucratic measure which attempts to
force on people the issue of ‘recognition’ has become part of the ‘strug-
gle for legitimacy and recognition’ between the two political regimes,
even though it is up to states and international organisations to recog-
nise them.
Cross-boundary contacts and interaction opened up new possibilities
for nationality policy, as the barbed-wire at last became penetrable. The
fluidity of the situation makes any sober analysis rather risky. The cur-
rent measures cannot be a substitute for a settlement; it is an awkward
state of limbo, whereby the ‘nationals’ are divided along ethnic lines,
even though all Turkish-Cypriots are entitled to citizenship in the Re-
public of Cyprus and many thousands have actually acquired citizen-
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ship and passports. The three years of contact have created a pattern
whereby a consistent number of persons cross over for work, leisure or
other activities, estimated at about 20 per cent of the population.18 The
Third ECRI Report on Cyprus notes that a large number of Turkish-Cy-
priots has been issued with Cyprus passports (35,000), identity cards
(60,000) and birth certificates (75,000), all of which are relevant fig-
ures as far as Cypriot citizenship is concerned (ECRI 2006: para. 78).
Interestingly, according to the Demographic Survey Report (PIO 2006:
12), the population of Cyprus is estimated at 854,300 at the end of
2005 (compared to 837,300 at the end of the previous year), of whom
766,400 live in the territories under the control of the Republic. Turk-
ish-Cypriots are said to be 87,000 persons, Greek-Cypriots 656,000
and foreign citizens 110,000. The same report estimates, on the basis
of data from Turkish Cypriot sources, that about 58,000 Turkish Cy-
priots have emigrated since 1974. The number of ‘illegal settlers from
Turkey’ is said to be ‘most probably in the range of 150-160 thousand,
which is estimated on information of significant19arrivals of Turks in
the occupied area’ (PIO 2006: 11). The study by Hatay (2005) shows
significantly lower figures for settlers and higher numbers for Turkish-
Cypriots.
10.2 Modes of acquisition and loss of citizenship
Following the annexation of Cyprus by the UK,20 all Ottoman citizens
who were born in or normally resided in Cyprus became British sub-
jects.21 From that day on the basic law regarding the granting of na-
tionality in Cyprus was the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act
of 1914 and later the 1948 British Nationality Act. Post-independence
art. 198 of the Constitution of the Cyprus Republic, and Annex D of
the Treaty of Establishment, which was annexed to the Constitution,
regulated the initial determination of the citizenry and the granting of
citizenship/nationality. Annex D was implemented with independence,
as required by art. 195, which provides for the general principle of in-
ternational law that all residents of the former colonial territory would
automatically become citizens of the Republic (Tornaritis 1982: 35; Loi-
zou 2001: 441).22 Art. 198.1(b) provided that ‘any person born in Cy-
prus, on or after the date of the Constitution coming into force, shall
become a citizen of the Republic if on that date his father has become
a citizen of the Republic or would but for his death have become such
a citizen under the provisions of Annex D of the Treaty of Establish-
ment’.
This was the case until the enactment of the main Law on Citizen-
ship (περί Πολίτου Νόμος) in 1967.23 In 2002, a new Law on the Popu-
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lation Data Archives No. 141(I)/2002 unified all provisions regarding
the archiving of births and deaths, registration of residents, registration
of constituent voters and the registration of citizens. It also introduced
special provisions for the issuing of passports/travel documents and re-
fugee identity cards to refugees. The new Law has so far been amended
four times; however none of these changes affected the acquisition and
loss of citizenship.24 Together with Annex D this law currently regu-
lates the acquisition and loss of Cypriot citizenship.
Cypriot policy-makers have followed the ‘mixed’ principle that com-
bines ius soli and ius sanguinis (Tornaritis 1982: 38-39). However ius
sanguinis is far more important in the regulations than ius soli, as Cy-
priot descent is the primary criterion for acquisition of citizenship as will
be shown further down. Citizenship can be acquired automatically, via
registration and naturalisation, but at the core of citizenship policy re-
mains the notion that all persons of Cypriot descent are entitled to apply.
10.2.1 Acquisition by descent
A person born in Cyprus or abroad on or after 16 August 1960 auto-
matically acquires Cypriot citizenship provided that at the time of his
or her birth either of the parents was a citizen of the Republic or, in
the case that the parent(s) were deceased at the time of his or her birth,
either of them was entitled to acquire citizenship had he or she not
been deceased. In cases of permanent residents abroad, this provision
is not applicable unless the child’s birth is registered in the prescribed
manner.25 Moreover, there are two exceptions to this general rule:
Firstly, the current law provides that children born to parents, one of
whom unlawfully entered or resides in the Republic, do not automati-
cally become citizens of Cyprus even if the other parent holds or would
have been entitled to Cypriot citizenship. They can become citizens
only following a decision of the Council of Ministers.26 This amend-
ment was apparently directed against Turkish nationals who settled in
the north at a time when it was deemed politically ‘necessary’ or ‘expe-
dient’ by policy-makers. However, it is obviously discriminatory against
persons who have Turkish-Cypriot descent from one parent and is con-
trary to the Constitution and international obligations of the Republic.
Whether children of Turkish nationals should be granted Cypriot ci-
tizenship is a hot political issue and there are conflicting accounts of
what categories of persons are affected. Media reports and right-wing
politicians seem to concur that the issue at stake is the granting of citi-
zenship to children who have one Cypriot parent and another who is a
settler. However, ministry officials claim that persons falling under this
category are invariably granted nationality, albeit in a manner that does
not cause strong reactions.27 In any case, making a child’s nationality
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conditional on the status of ‘legality’ or ‘illegality’ of the parents, or
even worse of one of the two parents, not only violates the rights of
children, as provided for in the UN Convention for the Rights of the
Child, but also constitutes discrimination against the children who are
victimised by the political situation and whom the Republic has an ob-
ligation to protect and respect. Due to the lack of transparency, it is not
possible to assess the implementation of this law. The Third ECRI Re-
port on Cyprus (2006: 8) notes that the Cyprus Ombudsman is cur-
rently investigating ‘the conformity of this procedure with national and
international standards’. Moreover, it notes that ‘citizenship has been
granted by this procedure to children whose Cypriot parent was a Turk-
ish Cypriot and whose other parent was a citizen of Turkey’; however,
it also states that ‘decisions to grant nationality have resulted in intoler-
ant and xenophobic attitudes in public debate’.
Secondly, sect. 109(3) of law 141(I)/2002 expressly prescribes that
the above provisions for acquisition of citizenship do not come into
force in cases where a person is born in Cyprus or abroad between 16
August 1960 and 11 June 1999, if his or her claim is based solely on
his or her mother’s citizenship, or the fact that she was entitled to citi-
zenship of the Republic. However, the law stipulates that the person
(or if the person is a minor, his or her father or mother) may submit
an application to the Minister to be registered as a citizen of Cyprus.
The Equality Body of Cyprus examined a complaint claiming discrimi-
nation on the grounds of sex/gender and nationality (and indirectly
ethnic or racial origin) for descendants of women of Cypriot origin
born between 16 August 1960 and 11 June 1999.28 The Equality Body
(the Ombudsman in its capacityas the Equality and Anti-discrimination
Body) considered that the said provision was indeed discriminatory;
however in a rather obscure decision, it refused to take any further ac-
tion, due to the ‘transitory nature of the provision, to counter the situa-
tion and the expectations that had formed up to 1999 on the basis of
the regimen of acquiring citizenship’.29 In any case these persons are
entitled to obtain nationality via registration.
Another mode of acquisition (sect. 109(3)) is provided for persons
born on or after 16 August 1960 and who are of Cypriot origin, i.e.
descendants of a person who:
a. became a British citizen on the basis of the Cyprus (Annexation)
Order-in-Council between 1914 and 1943; or
b. was born in Cyprus between 5 November 1914 and 16 August 1960
during which time his or her parents were ordinarily resident in Cy-
prus.
These persons are entitled to be registered as citizens provided that
they are adults and of sound mind,30 apply to the Minister31 via the de-
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signated means and provide an official confirmation of loyalty to the
Republic, according to the format provided in the Second Table an-
nexed to the law.32
10.2.2 Acquisition via registration
The following persons are entitled to be registered as Cypriot citizens
upon application to the relevant Minister:
1. citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies or a country of the
Commonwealth,33 who are of Cypriot descent,34 provided that they:
L ordinarily reside in Cyprus and/or resided for a continuous peri-
od of twelve months in Cyprus or a shorter period that the Min-
ister may accept under special circumstances of any specific case,
immediately before the date of the submission of their applica-
tion, or are serving in the civil or public service;
L are of good character;
L intend to remain in the Republic, or depending on the circum-
stances, continue serving in the civil or public service (sub-sect.
110(1)); and
L sign an official confirmation of loyalty to the Republic.
2. spouses or widowers/widows of persons who were citizens of the
Republic, or spouses of persons who, had they not been deceased,
would have become or would have the right to become citizens of
the Republic, provided that they:
L ordinarily reside in Cyprus and/or resided there for a period not
less than three years;35
L are of good character;
L intend to remain in the Republic, or depending on the circum-
stances, continue serving in the civil or public service of the Re-
public or the educational service of the Republic or the Police
Force of the Republic even after registration as citizens of the Re-
public (subsect. 110(2)); and
L sign an official confirmation of loyalty to the Republic.
3. underage children of any citizen. In this case the application for ci-
tizenship has to be submitted by the parent or the guardian of the
child.
A person who has renounced his or her citizenship of the Republic or
has been deprived of it may not be registered as citizen of the Republic
according to sect. 110, but may still be registered with the approval of
the Minister (subsect. 110(4)). Persons who have been registered under
this section become citizens of the Republic from the date of their re-
gistration (subsect. 110(5)).
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For this provision again Cypriot descent is at the core of the right to ac-
quire citizenship; spouses and under-age children who are resident in
Cyprus can apply but their application is treated as dependent on the
person of Cypriot origin. Moreover, there is an issue as to the way the
rights of spouses and dependents are implemented. In fact, the prac-
tice of the immigration authorities to deport migrants who have been
living in Cyprus for several years continued in spite of criticism from
legal circles, human rights NGOs, from the Ombudsman and from the
Commissioner for Legislation.36 Within a time span of only a few
weeks, the Court cancelled deportation orders on numerous in-
stances.37
10.2.3 Acquisition via naturalisation (πολιτογράφηση)
A non-Cypriot who resides lawfully in the Republic may acquire citi-
zenship via discretionary naturalisation if he or she fulfils all of the fol-
lowing conditions formulated in Table 3 annexed to the law (subsect.
111):
a. he or she has lawfully resided in the Republic of Cyprus for the en-
tire duration of twelve months immediately preceding the date of
application;
b. over and above the twelve months referred to above, an additional
continuous period of seven years in the period immediately prior to
this, the applicant must have ordinarily resided in the Republic, or
have been serving in the civil or public service of the Republic, or a
bit of both, for periods amounting in total to no less than four
years;
c. he or she is of good character; and
d. he or she intends to reside in the Republic.
The law also provides for acquisition of citizenship via naturalisation
for students, visitors, self-employed persons, athletes and coaches, do-
mestic workers, nurses and employees who reside in Cyprus with the
sole aim of working there as well as spouses, children or other depen-
dent persons. The prerequisites are that they must have ordinarily re-
sided in the Republic for at least seven years and one year in the period
immediately prior to the application their stay must be ‘continuous’.38
There are also exceptional situations where citizenship may be
granted.39
One must bear in mind that all of the above are based on the discre-
tion of the Council of Ministers and the Minister of the Interior. More-
over, given that there has been a policy that migrant worker permits
cannot be extended beyond four years, the chance of acquiring citizen-
ship for these groups is rather slim, unless they are married to a Cy-
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priot or are granted leave to stay on other exceptional grounds. Cypriot
authorities are very reluctant to grant citizenship to migrants. The Cy-
prus Government failed to transpose Directive 203/109/EC by 23 Janu-
ary 2006. The law was passed in February 2007; following criticism by
NGOs and strong trade union opposition, the restrictive criteria origin-
ally foreseen for granting long-term migrants this special status, which
included proficiency in Greek language, history and civilisation, were
eventually dropped by the Parliament.
The naturalisation procedure has been criticised in the Second ECRI
Report on Cyprus as the conditions apparently ‘leave a wide margin of
discretion to the Naturalisation Department as concerns decisions to
grant citizenship’; moreover the same Report claims that ‘there have
been complaints that these decisions are sometimes discriminatory’
(ECRI 2001: 9). The same practice was criticised by the Third ECRI
Report (2006: 8), which also notes that ‘decisions are still excessively
discretional and restrictive’ but that ‘this is reflected not only in the use
made of public order considerations, but also in the application of resi-
dency and language requirements’.
The ‘Cyprus problem’ is often quoted as a ‘national priority’ and is
invoked by Greek-Cypriot authorities as the reason for their reluctance
to open up citizenship rules so as not to alter the demography, particu-
larly in the context of the Turkish policy of settlement in the occupied
northern territories. However, this does not stand close examination as
numerous amendments were made to facilitate various population po-
licies that benefit what is perceived as ‘the Greek-Cypriot interest’.
Several decisions by the Ombudsman have criticised a number of
practices of the Population Data Archives regarding the process of
granting citizenship. In particular, criticism is directed at the restrictive
approach of the Director of the Population Data Archives as regards
the acquisition of citizenship via registration and naturalisation; parti-
cularly critical are the decisions regarding the rejection of applications
for citizenship based on marriage with Cypriots.40 Moreover, the deci-
sions also highlight considerable delay in processing the applications,
prejudice based on the religion of the applicant and the exercising of
administrative discretion in the interpretation of the regulation that ex-
cludes those who have entered the country illegally from acquiring citi-
zenship.41
Overall, the implementation of the rules on naturalisation and with
the wide margin of discretion provided for by the legislation, is an is-
sue of concern regarding the fairness of these policies. There is little
encouragement and information for persons entitled to be naturalised
and there are bureaucratic obstructions making the application for nat-
uralisation unattractive and cumbersome. One can explain this policy
as a mixture of the colonial legacy and the keenness of the authorities
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to hold on to their ‘sovereignty’ on the area of entry, sojourn, residence
and citizenship, particularly as the protracted Cyprus conflict is often
invoked as a pretext. The consequence is a restrictive regime that re-
quires reform if it is to observe international law standards on the sub-
ject.
10.2.4 Renunciation and deprivation of citizenship
Any adult citizen of sound mind who is also a citizen of another state
may renounce his or her citizenship by submitting a confirmation of
renunciation, and the Minister will take the appropriate action for the
registration of such confirmation (sect. 112).
Deprivation of citizenship is possible, only for citizens who acquired
citizenship via registration or naturalisation, via an Order of the Coun-
cil of Ministers (sect. 113) under the following circumstances:
a. When it is established that the registration or certification of citi-
zenship was obtained by deceit, false pretences or concealment of a
material fact (subsect. 113(2)).
b. If the Council of Ministers (subsect. 113(3)) is satisfied that:
L through deeds or words this person has demonstrated a lack of
loyalty to the laws of the Republic,42 or
L in a war fought by the Republic this person was illegally involved
in an exchange with, or contacted the enemy or was in any way
involved in any operation in which he knowingly assisted the en-
emy; or
L within five years from naturalisation, he or she is convicted in
any country for a crime carrying a sentence of one year or more.
c. If the Council of Ministers (subsect. 113(4)) is satisfied that the nat-
uralised citizen has ordinarily resided in foreign countries for a con-
tinuous period of seven years.
The Council of Ministers cannot deprive a person of citizenship unless
it is satisfied that it is not in the public interest that the said person re-
mains a citizen of the Republic (sub-sect. 113(5)).
It is apparent that the above is contrary to art. 5 of the 1997 Eur-
opean Convention on Nationality, which Cyprus is yet to sign. In fact
the Second and Third ECRI Reports on Cyprus recommend that Cy-
prus signs and ratifies this Convention. In any case, there is a com-
plaint before the Equality and Anti-discrimination Body arguing that
the above provision is contrary to the general prohibition of discrimina-
tion as laid down in art. 1 of Protocol 12 to the European Convention
on Human Rights, which has been ratified by the Republic of Cyprus.
It is apparent that the decisive element in the granting of citizenship
is Cypriot descent which is combined with birth to form the various ca-
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tegories of rights provided. First, we can identify the following cate-
gories of persons of Cypriot descent:
1. Greek-Cypriots (and the three religious groups) born in the area
controlled by the Republic of Cyprus: this category is not really an
issue as citizenship is granted automatically.
2. In principle, the same ought to apply to Turkish-Cypriots born in
Cyprus and to children who have at least one Cypriot parent. Turk-
ish-Cypriots born in the occupied territories are automatically en-
titled to citizenship provided that they submit documents of their
parents or grandparents issued by the Republic of Cyprus or the co-
lonial authorities (TRNC documents are not recognised). However
in practice art. 109 of the Law referred to above may result in a
more discretionary regime for persons, one of whose parents is a
Turkish national, even if they reside in the area under control of the
Republic.
3. Persons of Cypriot origin born abroad, who have one Cypriot par-
ent, are entitled to citizenship.
4. Persons of Cypriot origin born abroad between 16 August 1960 and
11 June 1999 and whose entitlement to Cypriot citizenship is solely
based on their mother being Cypriot (or being entitled to Cypriot ci-
tizenship) are not entitled to citizenship. They may however apply
to acquire citizenship via registration.
5. Children born in Cyprus to non-Cypriot migrants who legally en-
tered and reside in Cyprus and have acquired or would have been
entitled to acquire Cypriot citizenship via naturalisation are entitled
to citizenship.
‘Collateral’ policies have been developed to use tax incentives and na-
tional service ‘discount’ for men (six months if under 26 and three
months if over 26 instead of the 25 months of normal national service)
to attract Greek-Cypriots from abroad to live in Cyprus.
Second, persons who are not of Cypriot origin can only acquire citi-
zenship via naturalisation or registration. Therefore,
1. Non-Cypriots who legally entered and reside in Cyprus are not en-
titled to acquire Cypriot citizenship. But they can acquire citizen-
ship by discretionary naturalisation, providing that they fulfil the re-
quired qualifications.
2. Children born in Cyprus to migrants who do not hold Cypriot citi-
zenship or have a right to acquire it are not entitled to citizenship.
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10.3 Current debates: The challenges of gender equality,
migration, Europeanisation and reunification
10.3.1 Europeanisation
There is little doubt that the language of ‘Europe’ has become domi-
nant in Cyprus as there is an orientation of political discourse and
rhetoric towards Europe as a reference point.43 The question is whether
the process of Europeanisation has touched upon citizenship and na-
tionality. One issue is the European citizenship itself, which affects the
Cypriot divided citizenship.
European Citizenship has different aspects relevant to the potential
for transformation of the citizenship/nationality issue in Cyprus. First
it may provide an all encompassing identity that has the potential to
overcome the ethnic divide between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cy-
priots. It is argued that ‘shared cultural experience’ between Greek-Cy-
priots and Turkish-Cypriots – many times suppressed by nationalists in
the past ‘in order to focus on ethnic differences’ – could become a new
focus as there are common aspects of identity that can unite the two
communities. According to this optimistic view, EU membership may
emphasise the shared culture and help in finding a solution to the Cy-
prus problem (Botswain 1996: 94). Moreover, EU Citizenship may
have a positive impact on human rights as the EU is expected to act as
a guarantor of rights, such as the freedom of movement, settlement
and ownership of land as provided in the Treaty of Rome and in line
with the ‘acquis communautaire’. ‘Citizenship’ would underpin rights
(communal/individual) thus assisting in creating a better climate of
trust and security through the European Court of Justice, the European
Court of Human Rights, the Council of Europe and the EU in gener-
al.44 The European Conventions of the Council of Europe and other in-
ternational instruments for ‘minority rights’ (Thornberry 1994),
although technically outside the acquis, could arguably be a useful me-
chanism from which Turkish-Cypriots stand to gain;45 however, Turk-
ish-Cypriots are not a ‘minority’ but a ‘community’ in a consociation re-
gime.
Moreover, matters are, in practice, far more complicated. Since the
rejection of the UN plan in April 2004, the Europeanisation issues
have not acted as a constructive force: the issue of EU accession has be-
come yet another point of contestation between Greek-Cypriots and
Turkish-Cypriots and the question of what kind of future ‘European so-
lution’ there will be for the Cyprus problem, is becoming a dominant
question. Inevitably, the questions of citizenship have been more or
less put on hold as they are subordinate to the solution of the Cyprus
problem. It is however highly likely to return in the near future as it re-
mains one of the key issues in the Cyprus problem.
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10.3.2 Reunification, partition and settlers: Nationality turns into a hot
political issue
This is perhaps the greater challenge in the adventures of national-
ity in Cyprus. We have already referred to some of the issues as re-
gards the period 1974-2004 and the challenges of migration. How-
ever, the central question arises out of the latest efforts to resolve
the Cyprus problem, which resulted in the UN plan known as ‘the
Annan Plan’.
The issue of who is entitled to nationality is a hot political issue. In
the northern territories the policy of Turkey is to ‘replace’ Turkish-Cy-
priot émigrés with Turkish settlers from the mainland or to distort the
demographic balance of the Cyprus population by giving TRNC nation-
ality to a large number of settlers.46 In the area under the control of
the Republic of Cyprus there are between 15,000 to 20,000 Pontian
Greeks from the former Soviet Union, a few of whom were granted na-
tionality, after staying for a period of seven years in Cyprus.47
The UN proposal for resolution contains specific provisions over the
number of settlers who would be granted nationality. This has proved
to be a particularly sore point for the Greek-Cypriots, who eventually
rejected the plan. In fact, it is widely believed that one of the reasons
for the Greek-Cypriots ‘NO’ to the Plan was due to the fear over the
‘large numbers’ of settlers who would eventually be allowed to re-
main.48 Nevertheless, these provisions were seen by Greek-Cypriots as
problematic in that they were alleged to allow for a ‘perpetual inflow of
settlers’, in spite of the 5 per cent cap for any future migration from
Turkey and Greece.49
In the ‘main articles’ of the Foundation Agreement of the Annan
plan (art. 3) there is reference to ‘a single Cypriot citizenship’ regulated
under federal law as well as the ‘internal constituent state citizenship
status’ to be enjoyed by ‘all Cypriot citizens’; moreover, the plan lays
out a set of complicated rules about preserving the ‘identity’ (see ap-
pendix 1). The acquisition of citizenship is regulated by an agreed con-
stitutional law which essentially deals with the issue of settlers from
Turkey. Moreover the plan envisages a federal law on ‘aliens and immi-
gration’ (Foundation Agreement, Attachment 5, Law 1) as well as a fed-
eral law for international protection and the implementation of the
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967
Protocol on the Status of Refugees (Foundation Agreement, Attach-
ment 5, Law 2) which, in the event of a settlement, would replace the
current laws on immigration and refugees.
The plan was rejected by the Greek-Cypriots, but still remains on the
negotiating table as the basis for negotiating a future settlement. In the ab-
sence of a solution, prior to the referendum and soon after, a number
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of public debates erupted that centred on the question of nationality
policy. The question of moving towards an effective right to nationality
by providing passports for the Republic of Cyprus has been relevant
particularly since accession. For the Greek-Cypriot post-referendum po-
litical arena, an issue that became a hot political issue was the question
of granting the right of nationality to children of Turkish-Cypriots who
married Turkish settlers. Right-wing media and television channels at-
tacked the cabinet decision to grant nationality rights to 703 people
one of whose parents was a Turkish settler.50 The Government was
forced to go on the defensive with the Minister of the Interior claiming
that ‘the legislation does not allow the granting of nationality, either to
settlers or an alien from another country, who has entered the Republic
illegally.’51 The media as well as some members of the coalition part-
ners52 stated that because ‘invasion, colonisation and changing the de-
mographic character of a country’ is a ‘war crime’, granting nationality
to the offspring of colonisers is never justified. In fact there are allega-
tions that there is an unofficial moratorium on the subject to freeze
the applications of children of settlers married to Cypriots; a practice
that has been criticised by human rights organisations.53
The current situation in Cyprus leaves the nationality policy regard-
ing this category of persons in a state of limbo. In practice, pending a
resolution of the problem, the Cyprus problem will always predominate
and colour the nationality policy. The greatest challenge for Cypriot pol-
icy-makers is to adopt a nationality and citizenship policy that en-
hances the possibility for reunification and thus not consolidate and in-
directly officially endorse partition.
10.4 Statistical developments since 1985: The ‘politics of
numbers’ and the ‘numbers game’
Apart from the statistics on residence and migration cited above, statis-
tical figures are not easily available. Regarding the numbers of acquisi-
tions of Cypriot nationality, the Civil Registry Migration Department
and the Population Data Archives provide the following figures.54
The latest figures cover the period up to 2003, when the numbers of
acquisitions of citizenship were computerised for the purpose of pro-
viding accurate data in the run up to the final negotiations of the An-
nan plan in 2004. The figures are indicative of the overall picture of
acquisitions of citizenship in Cyprus; however some discrepancies in
the way they are categorised are apparent. As far as categories 1 and 2
of Table 10.1 are concerned, the total number of acquisitions of Cypriot
citizenship by naturalisation (2,295) is bigger than the number of per-
sons naturalised after having completed a seven years stay in Cyprus
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(2,135) because the total number includes persons of Cypriot origin
born in the Commonwealth prior to 1960 and who could only acquire
Cypriot citizenship via naturalisation and others who renounced or
were deprived of Cypriot citizenship to acquire another citizenship (e.g.
German).
There is a discrepancy between the figures of categories 3, 4 and 5 of
the Table as the total number of immigrants granted the citizenship of
Cyprus by marriage is said to be 9,018, but when we add up the num-
ber of women who became nationals on grounds of marriage with Cy-
priot men and men who became nationals on grounds of marriage
with Cypriot women, 7,304 and 1,126 respectively, we have a total of
8,510. Same sex marriage is not recognised in Cyprus, hence there is
no explanation for this discrepancy.55 Apparently, about half of the ap-
plications for naturalisation are from Greek Pontians residing in Cy-
prus; in 2004 there were about 400 approved and in 2005 about
500.56
As to persons who acquired citizenship based on their origin (ex-
patriate Cypriots), this figure is an estimation based on the yearly appli-
cations for citizenship and the number of people granted citizenship,
as there is no system of statistically recording this category, nor is there
a computerised system.57 It is estimated that the number of persons of
Cypriot origin who have acquired citizenship is 24,000 to 25,000.58
We are informed that after accession to the EU, the numbers of appli-
cations for citizenship more than doubled; for instance in 2005 there
was a total of 4,000 applications pending, as there is a backlog of three
years. 59
It is noteworthy that the number of Turkish-Cypriots who acquired
passports of the Republic of Cyprus since 1995 is 34,654, which is rele-
Table 10.1: Acquisitions of Cypriot citizenship by categories from 1985 until 31 December
2003
1 Persons who were naturalised after having completed a seven years
stay in Cyprus
2,135
2 Total number of immigrants granted the citizenship of Cyprus by
naturalisation
2,295
3 Foreign women married to Cypriot men 7,304
4 Foreign men married to Cypriot women (since 1999 when the Cyprus
Law changed allowing men married to Cypriots to naturalise)
1,126
5 Total number of immigrants granted the citizenship of Cyprus by
marriage
9,018
6 Estimated number of persons who acquired citizenship due to origin
(expatriate Cypriots)
24,000 - 25,000
7 Turkish-Cypriots who acquired passports of the Republic of Cyprus
since 1995
34,654
Sources: Civil Registry Migration Department and the Population Data Archives
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vant to the national specificity of Cyprus: nationality politics is an im-
portant dimension of the Cyprus problem.
10.5 Conclusions: Charting out the ‘nationality policies’
The mechanics of acquisition, renunciation and deprivation of citizen-
ship in the Republic of Cyprus revolves around Cypriot descent: per-
sons of Cypriot origin are basically entitled to citizenship, whilst per-
sons of non-Cypriot descent may be allowed to apply if they have re-
sided in Cyprus for seven years to acquire citizenship via registration
and naturalisation mechanisms. The reference of one of the very few
Cypriot legal scholars dealing with the subject, Criton Tornaritis (1982:
39), that Cyprus has adopted a ‘mixed principle combining ius soli and
ius sanguinis’ is not very helpful as Cypriot descent forms the core.
Although, we cannot locate a declared policy on citizenship/national-
ity as such in the Republic of Cyprus, what we do find instead is a
practice that derives from the long-standing Cyprus conflict as well as
international developments such as accession to the EU, economic de-
velopment and migration, and to some extent changing attitudes, parti-
cularly as regards the question of gender. Other factors are also of rele-
vance, such as population control, economic and welfare issues, social
policy etc. As for the unrecognised Turkish Republic of Northern Cy-
prus, the issue of citizenship is totally subsumed in its own ‘struggle
for recognition’ and it is a mirror image of the country it broke away
from and yet can never escape from, the Republic of Cyprus.
In the context of Cyprus, nationality policy is inevitably subordinated
to the unique historical conjunctures that perpetuate the island’s pro-
tracted ethno-national conflict. In fact, the question of nationality goes
to the heart of the existence of the country’s very own ‘nation-state dia-
lectic’ (see Trimikliniotis 2000, 2005): the challenge for a citizenship
that manages to transcend the ethno-national conflict and the ethno-
communal divide is perhaps the greatest challenge of all for this coun-
try’s European aspirations for a re-united and peaceful future.
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Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in the Republic of Cyprus
Date Document Content Source













1967 Citizenship Law No. 43/
1967





for acquisition is the










of citizenship, if the
Minister is of the opinion
that the aim of such a
declaration is to avoid






citizenship to persons born
in Cyprus prior to
independence and whose
father was of Cypriot
descent; deleted subsect. 4
(d) which entitled 'persons
born in Cyprus, who are not
entitled by birth to acquire





Extended the right to
citizenship via registration
to persons whose father
was a British subject on the
basis of the Annexation of
Cyprus Orders of Council






for persons of non-Cypriot
descent residing and
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Date Document Content Source
working in Cyprus;
conditions included: a total
of nine years of residence
out of the previous thirteen













Extended the right to apply
for naturalisation to




Deleted a section in the
Second Table of the main
law which empowered the
Council of Ministers to use
discretion for extending




Empowered the Minister to
grant citizenship to
spouses or widows/
widowers married to a




Extended the right to
citizenship to any person of
Cypriot descent (i.e.
regardless of whether the
father or the mother is
Cypriot); made automatic
acquisition of citizenship
conditional on lawful entry
and stay in the Republic
(effectively this covers
children one of whose





of the Interior to register as
citizens the wives or
widows of Cypriots
provided that he is satisfied
that they meet the required
conditions.
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Date Document Content Source
2001 Citizenship (Amendment)
Law No. 168(I)/2001
Extended the period of
marriage before spouses or
widows/widowers can
acquire citizenship by
registration to at least three
years.
2002 Population Data Archives
Law No. 141(I)/2002
Unified the Citizenship law
with various other
population issues such as
archives, elections,
registration, identity cards,
passports and deaths into
one law called Population
Data Archives Law No. 141
(I)/2002.








1 This occurred when the Government decided to grant citizenship to children of
Turkish-Cypriots married to settlers in 2004 and 2005.
2 This was an illegal terrorist organisation launched allegedly to campaign for Enosis, i.
e. union with Greece; it carried out bombings, murders of civilians and tried several
times to assassinate President Makarios (Droussiotis 1994).
3 These are two contrasting approaches as regards the refenda on 24 July 2004 and
they have implications on how to proceed if a solution is to be found.
4 In return for protection from the expansionist aims of Russia and an annual
payment to Turkey of the sum of £12,000.
5 The ‘modernisation’ began before the British arrived in Cyprus; however it was
intensified with the arrival of the British colonists at the end of the nineteenth and
the beginning of the twentieth century (see Katsiounis 1996).
6 Such were the privileges granted to the Cypriot Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus
that the archbishop of Cyprus had direct recognition from the Sultan, as Ethnarchic
leader, the ‘millet bashi’.
7 The beginning of the twentieth century saw a conflict between the ‘traditionalists’
and the ‘modernists’ in the Turkish-Cypriot community; a battle that was decisively
won by the modernists (Anagnostopoulou 2004).
8 In the 1940s, the Left had risen and competed with the church as to the leadership
of the anti-colonial movement (Katsiaounis 2000). By the mid 1950s the church re-
established its authority with EOKA. EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston –
National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) was the Greek-Cypriot nationalist organi-
sation which started a guerrilla campaign against British colonial rule aimed at self-
determination and union with Greece (Enosis). The political leadership of EOKA was
the church.
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9 The case was Attorney General of the Republic v Mustafa Ibrahim and Others
(1964), Cyprus Law Reports 195 (see also Nedjati 1970; Loizou 2001).
10 These agreements set the basis for a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal Republic
following the invasion.
11 See Aziz v. Republic of Cyprus, ECHR, Application No. 69949/01. The full text of
the judgement is available on the website of the European Court of Human Rights:
www.echr.coe.int.
12 Hence the requirements to produce documents relating to birth of their Cypriot
parents prior to 1974.
13 M. Hadjicosta, ‘Fears over gypsy influx’, The Cyprus Weekly, 13-19 April 2001. www.
domresearchcenter.com.
14 J. Matthews, ‘More gypsies crossing from north as Koshis warns about spies’, The Cy-
prus Mail, 3 April 2001. www.domresearchcenter.com.
15 Apparently, the Minister of the Interior at the time, Mr. C. Christodoulou, now
Governor of the Central Bank, said that he would not reveal the options discussed,
because, ‘in this country, when it comes to illegal immigrants or gypsies (moving
into an area), everyone reacts’. See ‘Our reaction to gypsies raises some awkward
questions’, The Cyprus Mail, 10 April 2001. www.domresearchcenter.com.
16 A Turkish-Cypriot woman filed a complaint because her application to be registered
in the Republic’s Citizens Record was rejected, on the basis that the birth of her
mother had not been recorded in the Republic’s archives. The complainant’s mother
had been born to Roma parents who failed to register her birth. It was also noted
that the complainant was inconvenienced for several months due to ill advice by
Government officers as to the procedure with regard to her registration. In addition,
she complained about the rejection of her application to enrol her child in school
because the child did not have a birth certificate from the Republic. Following the
Commissioner’s report on the matter, her child was finally enrolled in school.
17 They thought that they could no longer be singled out, targeted and harassed and
there was a general feeling of optimism and rapprochement (Trimikliniotis 2003).
18 Research by the college of Tourism in April 2004 is indicative.
19 The term ‘significant’ is not explained in the Demographic Report of 2005.
20 The Cyprus (Annexation) Order-in-Council 1914, No. 1629 Statutory Rules and
Orders Rev. (1948), vol. V, pp. 577-578. The order can also be found in Cyprus,
(1920), Handbook No. 65 in the series, London: HMSO.
21 The Cyprus (Annexation) Order-in-Council 1917, No. 1374 S.R & O. and The Cyprus
(Annexation) Order-in-Council 1914, No.1629 S.R & O. Rev. (1948), vol. V, pp. 578-
582.
22 The provisions of Annex D are quite detailed governing different categories of
persons and set out the basic structure of citizenship acquisition that was to follow
also in the subsequent legislation on the subject (Tornaritis 1982: 33-41).
23 Law No. 43/67, as amended by Laws No. 1/72, 74/83, 19(I)/96, 58(I)/96, 70(I)/96,
50(I)/97, 102(I)/98, 105(I)/98, 65(I)/99, 128(I)/99, 168(I)/2001.
24 With laws No. 65(I)/2003, 76(I)/2003, 62(I)/2004 and 13(I)/2006.
25 Sects. 109(1) and (2) of Law No. 141(I)/2002 provide for the procedure and the
appropriate forms. In cases where the applicant is under age, the application can be
made by a parent.
26 Art. 109 Population Data Archives Law No. 141(I)/2002. This clause was first
introduced by Law 65(I)/1999 that came into force on 11 June 1999.
27 This information was provided by the officer of the Population Data Archives of the
Ministry of the Interior, Christiana Ketteni, on 15 December 2006. She stated that
the standard practice of the Council of Ministers is to approve ten to fifteen
applications each time there is a meeting of the Council of Ministers. Moreover, she
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claimed that the people affected by the Council of Ministers’ discretion are ‘persons
who have a Cypriot grandparent’, but it remained unclear how this category could
fall under art. 109.
28 It was alleged that discrimination is ongoing as the specific provision has resulted in
the perpetual and future discrimination of this category of persons and their
descendants since the principle of anti-discrimination is not only momentarily
applied, but it is also forward looking. It is likely that this provision is in violation of
the laws against discrimination and in the particular Law No.142(I)/2004, which
transposes the antidiscrimination acquis and more importantly Protocol 12. See File
No. 62/2005 of the Ombudsman’s Report.
29 See File No. 62/2005 of the Ombudsman’s Report.
30 The Greek text refers to ‘πλήρης ικανότητα’, which literally translated means ‘full
ability’, but it must be construed as meaning of ‘sound mind’, which was the old
British formulation.
31 The relevant Minister is the Minister of the Interior.
32 A number of Tables are annexed to the Law. The First Table specifies the fees for
issuance of passports; the Second Table includes the format of making a formal oath
of allegiance to the Republic of Cyprus; the Third Table describes the conditions for
naturalisation.
33 For subsect. 110, ‘a country of the Commonwealth’ includes every country excluding
the Republic of Cyprus, on the date of entering into force of the Law, which is a
member of the British Commonwealth and includes the Republic of Ireland and any
other country that has been declared by an Order of the Council of Ministers as a
Commonwealth Country for the purposes of this section.
34 For the purposes of subsect. 110, a person of Cypriot descent is defined as any
person born in Cyprus and whose parents ordinarily resided in Cyprus at the time of
his or her birth and includes every person that descends from these persons.
35 There are also specific provisions allowing the Minister to take measures after less
than three years, but it is restricted to a minimum of two years. Also, for the
purposes of this subsection ‘ordinary residence’ requires at least six months stay in
Cyprus but in any case the total residence in Cyprus during the preceding three
years prior to submission of the application must not be less than two years.
36 L. Leonidou , ‘Authorities in the dock over treatment of immigrants’, The Cyprus
Mail, 15 January 2006.
37 Some indicative cases are the following: Lali Jashiashvili & Costas Hadjithoma v. The
Ministry of the Interior and the Immigration Officer and Nebojsa Micovic v. The
Republic of Cyprus through the Chief Immigration Officer, where the Supreme
Court cancelled the deportation order against nationals living with their families and
working in Cyprus since 1998. Another case involved the deportation order issued
against the Pakistani national Mahmoud Adil when his asylum application was
rejected. The deportation order was cancelled by the Court on 13 January 2006 based
on the argument that the immigration authorities should have taken into account the
fact that the appellant was married to a Polish (and therefore EU) citizen.
38 Introduced by amendment 58(1)/1996.
39 Introduced by amendment 70(1)/1996.
40 See relevant Ombudsman Reports, Files No. 2599/2005, 1958/2005, 2059/2005,
2368/2005, 2599/2005, 2780/2005.
41 See Ombudsman Report, File No. 727/2006.
42 The Greek term used is νομιμοφροσύνη.
43 One scholar termed this as ‘the Europeanisation of political thinking’ (Theophylactou
1995: 121), whilst another scholar interpreted this as the embracing of a ‘Euro-centric
ideology’ by the Greek-Cypriot political elite (Argyrou 1996: 43).
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44 It is sometimes assumed that possible ‘weaknesses’ in the settlement would
gradually be somehow eliminated by the operation of the acquis and via access to the
European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights.
45 Minority rights for ‘old’ ethnic minorities have a significantly long tradition of
protection under various treaties and authorities, even from the last century, though
these were very restricted and at the whim of the great powers (Hannum 1996: 50-
74). However art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees the
right to private and family life (which has been interpreted as to include ethnic
identity) and art. 9 guarantees ‘the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion’. More specifically, art. 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights refers
to the rights of ‘ethnic, religious or cultural minorities’ to ‘enjoy their own culture, to
profess and practice their own religion, or use their own language’, but these are set
to be extended in other areas of freedom (Hannum 1996: 62-63). However, the
European ‘regime’ on ethnic minority groups’ protection, is problematic, as there is a
distinct lack of enforcement mechanisms. These rights are heavily dependent on the
nation-states for implementation; in any case the mechanisms for implementation
are very weak if not irrelevant (Hannum 1996).
46 The veteran Turkish-Cypriot leader has often been quoted saying: ‘A Turk leaves,
another Turk comes’.
47 It appears that in the days of the collapse of the USSR, Greek-Cypriot policy-makers
toyed with the idea of bringing to Cyprus Greek-Pontians rather than other migrants,
due to their ethnic origin, in part to unofficially and quietly ‘redress’ the Turkish
settler policy. Officially this was never admitted by right-wingers, and nationalists
regularly referred to the Pontians as the alternative to ‘an Afro-Asian’ new minority
(see Trimikliniotis 1999).
48 Obviously there was scare mongering and exaggeration by the Greek-Cypriot ‘No
campaign’ about the figures and misinformation about the actual provisions. Palley
(2005) has a chapter devoted to the subject and puts forward the case for the Greek-
Cypriot side and the reasons for the Greek-Cypriot rejection as regards this issue.
49 The provisions were depicted by Greek-Cypriot anti-Annan critics as rewarding the
policy of colonisation. However, this is a highly complex issue which requires a
detailed analysis and a resolution that bears in mind the principles of justice and
international law, as well as the humanitarian, the individual rights and the personal
dimensions of the problem.
50 See G. Psyllides, ‘Citizenship for settler children: Christou hits back’, Cyprus Mail, 1
July 2004.
51 Minister Andreas Christou quoted in Politis, 7 June 2004. Also see the explanations
of the legal regulations in section 2.1 of this chapter.
52 See Cyprus Mail, 1 July 2004. Palley (2005) deals with the legal and political issues of
the settlers. Also see Hannay (2005).
53 In a press release dated 2 July 2004 the human rights NGO ‘KISA’ (Action for
Equality, Support and Antiracism) expressed concern over the intolerant and racist
attitudes developing around the issue of granting nationality to these children.
54 The figures were confirmed by the official of the Population Data Archives, Ministry
of the Interior, Christiana Ketteni, who was asked to comment on the categories,
figures and the underlying policies (15 December 2006).
55 Christiana Ketteni, who was asked to comment on the subject, could not provide any
explanation for this (15 December 2006).
56 Christiana Ketteni, 15 December 2006
57 Christiana Ketteni, 15 December 2006.
58 Christiana Ketteni, 15 December 2006.
59 Christiana Ketteni, 15 December 2006.
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Chapter 11: Changing conceptions of citizenship in
Turkey1
Zeynep Kadirbeyoglu
International migration and globalisation are factors which affect citi-
zenship practices throughout the world. Increasing tolerance of multi-
ple citizenship is, amongst other things, one of the results of these
trends. This paper analyses the Citizenship Law in Turkey and argues
that the most important changes in the law were made to accommo-
date the needs and wishes of the emigrants who – even up to the third
generation – maintain vibrant ties with their home countries. The pa-
per starts with the history of citizenship in Turkey. The following sec-
tion outlines the amendments to the current law that regulates the ac-
quisition and loss of citizenship. Subsequently the main forms of ac-
quisition and loss of citizenship in Turkey are mapped out. A final
section looks at the statistics of people acquiring and losing citizenship
in Turkey.
11.1 History of Turkish citizenship law
11.1.1 From the Ottoman Empire to the founding of the Republic
An analysis of the history of Turkish citizenship should begin with the
last period of the Ottoman Empire. Whereas prior to the 1869 Otto-
man Citizenship Law (Tabiyet-i Osmaniye Kanunu) the subjects of the
Ottoman Empire were divided along religious lines, the new law recog-
nised all residents of the Ottoman territories as nationals of the Em-
pire. It was based on the ius sanguinis principle, but allowed for non-
Ottoman children born in the Ottoman territories to apply for citizen-
ship in the Empire when they reached adulthood (İçduygu, Çolak &
Soyarık 1999).
The first constitution of the Republic of Turkey (1924) granted Turk-
ish nationality to all residents of the Republic irrespective of race or re-
ligion. The nationality law of the Republic was accepted in 1928 and,
like its Ottoman predecessor, it was based on ius sanguinis but was
complemented by a territorial understanding (İçduygu et al. 1999:
193). Aybay (2001: 45) argues that behind this decision was the desire
to extend Turkish nationality to as many people as possible.2
İçduygu et al. (1999: 195), for example, argue that the notion of na-
tionality was not defined solely in terms of ethnic background since
the new Turkish nationality was ‘open to non-Turkish Muslim groups
[…] so long as they were willing to assimilate culturally and linguisti-
cally into the Turkish culture.’ However, the analysis of groups that
were given the right to settle in Turkey reveals that in practice the abil-
ity to enjoy full citizenship rights was related to ethnicity and religion
(Kirişçi 2000: 1).
Specifically, in accordance with the Law on Settlement adopted in
19343, Turkey provided refugee and immigrant status to groups such
as Muslim Bosnians, Albanians, Circassians, Tatars, etc., but declined
to accept the settlement of groups such as Christian Orthodox Gagauz
Turks and Shi’a Azeris. This policy effectively pre-screened those apply-
ing for citizenship and helped Sunnis settle in Turkey, in spite of offi-
cial statements that only those of Turkish descent and culture would be
so favoured (Kirişçi 2000).4
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Anatolia (Asia Minor) was
a heterogeneous piece of land and was home to Rum (an Orthodox
Christian Greek speaking group), Armenian, Kurdish, Jewish, Circas-
sian, Laz and some other ethnic or religious groups. The spread of na-
tionalism from Western Europe, its birthplace, to the Ottoman lands
led to conflicts and to the disappearance of heterogeneity by way of the
forced migration of Armenians during the First World War and the po-
pulation exchange with Greece in 1923. During the War of Indepen-
dence there was a clear reference to the multicultural nature of Anato-
lia. However, after the Sheikh Said uprising of 1925,5 there was no
longer any reference made to the ‘peoples of Turkey’ and thus all citi-
zens of Turkey were expected to adopt Turkish identity (Ergil 2000:
125). This was a fabricated umbrella identity and was instituted
through education and cultural policies but carried the name of one of
the ethnic groups (the Turks). The group which was not willing to
identify with this were the Kurds. Their struggle for autonomy, and
sometimes secession, led to a battle between the PKK (Kurdistan Work-
ers Party) and the army. At the height of this armed conflict, the Presi-
dent at the time, Suleyman Demirel, began a discussion on constitu-
tional citizenship, which was intended to create a new common iden-
tity (İçduygu et al. 1999: 192). However, these discussions were short-
lived and did not lead to any policy changes.
11.1.2 The impact of Turkish emigration to Western Europe
The current law that regulates the acquisition and loss of Turkish citi-
zenship was put into effect in 1964.6 This period also marks the begin-
ning of the migration of guest-workers to Western Europe. As of 2005,
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3.1 million Turkish citizens were living in Europe. Together with an-
other 530,000 Turkish citizens living in other parts of the world, Tur-
key’s emigrant population numbers an approximate 3.6 million
(TCCSGB 2005).
In order to understand the economic significance of these emigrants
for Turkey, we should first examine the initial goals of the process of la-
bour force exportation to Western European countries. According to
Sayarı (1986) the main goals included fighting the rising unemploy-
ment within Turkey and bolstering foreign exchange reserves in order
to cover trade deficits. A secondary goal was to increase the skill level
of workers who would, then, through remittances, be able to increase
the level of investment in small and medium sized companies in the
emigrants’ home towns in Turkey (Sayarı 1986). The remittances were
very important for Turkey. During the 1980s, 24 per cent of Turkey’s
imports were covered by the cash remittances and foreign exchange de-
posits of Turkish workers abroad (Kumcu 1989).
Germany was the main destination for guest-workers from Turkey.
Turkish workers in Germany were encouraged to maintain their ties to
Turkey and not to undergo ‘Germanisation’7 so that a constant flow of
remittances could be guaranteed (Hunn 2001). Migrants were encour-
aged to remit their savings by means of special interest rates given to
foreign currency saving accounts in Turkey and by certain privileges
that were extended to emigrants who wished to import goods to Turkey
(Sayarı 1986). Lately, in addition to remittances, direct investments by
the second generation of Turkish emigrants, especially in the textiles
industry, are increasing in importance (Faist 1998: 213). In addition to
the economic investment, it is expected that Turkey will enjoy political
benefits thanks to the migrants living in Western Europe. The lobbying
potential of migrants living in European countries has been seen as an
asset by Governments in Turkey.8
The realisation that Turkish workers are not temporary guests in
their host countries has led to significant amendments to the citizen-
ship law in Turkey. The motives of politicians and bureaucrats have
been shaped by the demands of emigrants who faced problems related
to military service, property ownership, and lack of political rights in
their countries of immigration. A fairly organised and quasi-official
process was used to communicate the needs of citizens living abroad
to the Turkish officials.
The first amendment to the law took place in 1981 and legalised dual
citizenship as long as the person acquiring a second nationality in-
formed the Government (Keyman & İçduygu 2003); otherwise public
authorities could withdraw his or her Turkish citizenship. Further-
more, the amendment initiated gender equality in the transfer of citi-
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zenship to children; as a result women can also transfer their citizen-
ship to their children through ius sanguinis.
The change in article 23/III of the Citizenship Law made it possible
to release individuals from Turkish nationality if they wished to acquire
another country’s citizenship.9 In the following years, many indivi-
duals who acquired a new citizenship reacquired their Turkish citizen-
ship immediately after renouncing it. This was supported and encour-
aged by Turkish authorities and embassies. This method of circum-
venting German Citizenship Law – which prohibits dual citizenship –
was legally possible only until 2000. The pre-2000 law maintained
only that the person naturalising in Germany should not have another
nationality. Yet, the new law made it possible for German officials to
withdraw German citizenship from those who had taken up another ci-
tizenship following their naturalisation in Germany – hence those who
had become dual citizens ‘illegally’.10 Based on this clause, the German
Government declared that 48,000 people of Turkish origin who had
naturalised in Germany since 2000 had lost their German nationality
because they had become ‘illegal dual citizens’.11 These people were to
have their German nationality withdrawn but could stay in Germany
as permanent residents and reapply for naturalisation there provided
they were willing to renounce their Turkish nationality.12
This did not have a significant impact on the public debate in Turkey
but was strongly opposed by Turkish associations in Germany. These
associations blamed the Turkish Government for not responding even
though they had encouraged these 48,000 people to reacquire Turkish
nationality. Even though the spokesperson for the German Ministry of
the Interior claimed that they had compiled a list of those who were ‘il-
legal’ dual citizens from the records collected at borders and in govern-
ment offices, there were claims that the Turkish authorities had sub-
mitted the list because of threats that their EU application process
would not be supported.13 There is evidence that the German regional
authorities have been contacting those they suspect of holding two
passports by mail and asking them whether they had acquired a second
nationality. The results of these inquiries and bureaucratic confusion
are yet to be seen.
The 1981 change was debated in a secret session by the National Se-
curity Council because it was initiated by the Ulusu Government,
which was established following the military coup.14 The amendment
also facilitated the processes for stripping individuals of their citizen-
ship.15 The clause added to the law stated that those who are outside
the borders of Turkey and who have been charged with endangering
the internal or external security of the country will have their Turkish
citizenship withdrawn unless they return within three months during
regular periods and one month under emergency rule.16
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Following the coup, 227 people had their Turkish citizenship with-
drawn by means of this clause. However, in February 1992, the Parlia-
ment removed this clause after hearing arguments that the clause had
permitted a violation of human rights.17 Those who wished were able
to reacquire their citizenship and to have their property reinstated or
receive compensation for the value of confiscated property.18
Parliamentary debates on issues of citizenship and/or problems of
Turkish citizens living abroad have not been restricted to amendments
of the laws pertaining to citizenship. The events in Solingen, where
five Turkish emigrants died as a result of an arson attack on their
house, were debated in the Turkish Parliament on 8 June 1993. During
these debates, the ANAP (centre right party) group spokesperson em-
phasised the importance of having the right to vote in Germany. He
claimed that there are individuals who, despite having lived in Ger-
many for the last 30 years, are still denied the right to vote. According
to this argument, the right to vote is key to finding a long-term solu-
tion to the problems faced by Turkish persons residing in Germany.
He claimed that under the current circumstances dual citizenship
rights were of greater importance and the Turkish Government ought
to propose that Germany put this issue on its agenda.19
The SHP (centre left party) group spokesperson claimed that in addi-
tion to the security aspects surrounding the Solingen events, political
and legal issues should also be debated. He stated that obtaining equal
rights in the political, economic and social spheres by obtaining Ger-
man citizenship would not automatically prevent these attacks, but that
extreme right parties would be more cautious about taking an anti-im-
migration stance as immigrants would form part of the electorate. His
argument was that as long as Germany banned dual citizenship, the
goal of the Turkish State should be to encourage emigrants to natura-
lise in Germany while maintaining their rights in Turkey.20
Following this logic, the amendment to the Turkish Citizenship Law
in 1995 instituted what is known as the ‘pink card’ or the privileged
non-citizen status.21 In the statement giving reasons for this amend-
ment, the Government stressed the fact that it was a result, among
other factors, of the actions of countries that refused to accept multiple
citizenship.
The proposal for this amendment was drafted by Rona Aybay (a pro-
minent law professor specialising on citizenship issues) after he had at-
tended meetings in Germany at the invitation of the Türkische Ge-
meinde in Deutschland (TGD).22 Once accepted in 1995, the amend-
ment created a privileged non-citizen status. This status permits
holders of a pink card23 to reside, to acquire property, to be eligible for
inheritance, to operate businesses and to work in Turkey like any citi-
zen of Turkey. Pink card holders were only denied the right to vote in
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local and national elections.24 Aybay states that the head of the TGD,
Hakkı Keskin, a very old friend of his, invited him to find a solution to
citizenship-related problems faced by Turkish people living in Ger-
many.25 He makes it quite clear that the main issue was how to devise
a mechanism that would allow people living in Germany to acquire
German citizenship without losing their rights in Turkey.26 This was
the motivation behind the creation of the special non-citizen status.27
During the parliamentary debates when this amendment was dis-
cussed, the spokesperson of the ANAP group argued that this law was
what all factions of Turkish emigrants in Germany had been demand-
ing for years. He claimed that these emigrants wanted to have political
rights in Germany and that this amendment would ease their difficul-
ties in acquiring German citizenship. He also mentioned that Turkish
emigrants would become a key electoral group in Germany, with some
influence in the tight electoral competition between the two major par-
ties.28 Another MP emphasised the benefits of this amendment by re-
ferring to the possibility of Turkish people becoming elected represen-
tatives in Germany and, therefore, politically strengthening the posi-
tion of Turkey.29
Some MPs raised their concern as to whether this amendment
would enable the ‘Armenians, Jews, Rum, etc.’30 (who had renounced
their Turkish citizenship in order to acquire another citizenship) to
come back to Turkey and reclaim property that had been confiscated
when they changed their citizenship. This is telling in that it demon-
strates that the tolerance for dual citizenship and special rights for
those who had renounced their citizenship was intended to apply ex-
clusively to Turkish emigrants who had left the country under specific
conditions; the amendment was never intended to include the minori-
ties who left Turkey before 1981, and explicitly stated that the privileged
non-citizen status would apply only to those who had acquired Turkish
citizenship by birth and who had relinquished it by being granted per-
mission by the Council of Ministers.31 This way of renouncing Turkish
citizenship was made possible only after the amendments to the citi-
zenship law in 1981.
Despite good intentions, the special non-citizen status was criticised
by groups who were dissatisfied with its implementation. The TGD or-
ganised a summit in July 2000 and produced a declaration pertaining
to the problems and expectations of the Turkish citizens living in Ger-
many. The declaration stated that there were many problems in the
practical use of the pink card in Turkey as the bureaucracy was not in-
formed about it. Therefore, people who had renounced their Turkish ci-
tizenship were facing problems in their interactions with the bureau-
cracy in Turkey.
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During the same summit there was a call for Turkey to stop releas-
ing its citizens and to make it impossible for Turkish citizens to re-
nounce their citizenship through a new legislation. This would enable
Turkish citizens to enjoy dual citizenship through an exception in the
new German Law which states that in cases where the country of ori-
gin does not permit its citizens to relinquish their original citizenship,
Germany might allow dual citizenship. This instance shows how the
demands of immigrant organisations have changed depending on the
situation in Germany.
11.1.3 Policies towards historic Turkish groups abroad
Emigrants were not the only group that influenced the amendments to
the citizenship law in Turkey. The disintegration of the USSR and the
increasing numbers of arranged marriages in Turkey alerted authori-
ties and the amendment in 2003 requires spouses to wait for three
years before spousal transfer of nationality is possible.32 The second
amendment that same year made it possible for citizens of Northern
Cyprus to easily acquire Turkish citizenship.33 In 2003, a total of 2,403
Cypriots acquired Turkish citizenship.34 The latest amendment was
passed in 2004 and concerned a minor issue relating to the pink card.
As can be seen from the amendments that were outlined above,
apart from the one attempting to prevent arranged marriages, there is
no debate about immigrants in Turkey. The focus has been on emi-
grants from Turkey who live in Western Europe. Politicians in Turkey
feel little need to respond to immigrant issues because these are not
yet politicised, which is a common feature of countries that have only
recently begun receiving economic immigrants.
Prior to the 1980s, immigrants accepted to Turkey have been predo-
minantly from among peoples considered to be ‘of Turkish descent and
culture’ and they were settled using the Law on Settlement.35 The Law
on Settlement allowed for two types of migration to Turkey: those who
were settled by the state and those who settled themselves (Doğanay
no date). According to Doğanay this law was considered insufficient
during the last two decades and it was amended to accommodate those
forced to migrate to Turkey from Bulgaria in 1989. Many of the Bulgar-
ian Turks who arrived with the first wave of migration in 1989 were
granted Turkish nationality. When these migrants could reacquire their
Bulgarian nationality and passports in 2000 (hence become dual citi-
zens), Turkish politicians encouraged them to vote in the elections in
Bulgaria in order to strengthen the political party representing ethnic
Turks and play a positive role in establishing cooperation between two
countries on the way to EU membership. Some Bulgarian Turks, who
had not been able to naturalise in Turkey, were sent back to Bulgaria
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towards the end of the 1990s.36 Special laws were enacted in order to
regulate the settlement of other groups known to have ethnic Turkish
origin such as Afghan immigrants and Ahiska Turks who migrated
from Russia.37
There are not many organised immigrant groups in Turkey able to
place significant pressure on the Government. Two of the few immi-
grant groups that made it to the media, for instance, were the Network
of Foreign Spouses and Muslim immigrants such as Bulgarian Turks.
The Network of Foreign Spouses referred to ideals of fairness and de-
manded more rights for individuals who are foreigners in Turkey.38
The pragmatic nature of the debates on citizenship and the reactive
policy-style hinders the politicisation of, and reciprocation of tolerance
towards, immigrants in Turkey.39 In other words, if values that under-
lie the promotion of dual citizenship for Turkish emigrants were
brought into the public sphere, they could lead to demands of recipro-
city for immigrants in Turkey.
11.2 Modes of acquisition and loss of Turkish citizenship
The law currently regulating the acquisition and loss of Turkish citizen-
ship was put into effect in 196440 and was amended as described in
the previous section. There are three broad principles through which
Turkish citizenship can be acquired or lost: change of status can be
brought about ex lege, by a decision of the authorities and through op-
tion.
11.2.1 Ex lege acquisition of citizenship
The acquisition of citizenship for children of Turkish mothers or
fathers is automatic whether the child is born in Turkey or abroad.
This rule is clearly based on ius sanguinis. Children of non-Turkish ci-
tizens born in Turkey become Turkish citizens automatically if they
cannot acquire the citizenship of their parents (the ius soli exception).
Marriage with Turkish citizens does not automatically transfer citizen-
ship. There is a waiting period of three years after which the spouse
can acquire Turkish citizenship by option. However, those who lose
their original citizenship due to marriage automatically become Turk-
ish citizens. Turkish citizenship is extended to children of women who
marry a Turkish citizen, if the child’s father is dead, unknown or state-
less or if the mother has custody over the child.
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11.2.2 Acquisition of nationality through the decision of authorities
There are three types of acquisition within this category. The first is
the regular mechanism through which naturalisation takes place and
is regulated by art. 6 of the Law. The conditions for application are the
following. The person should:
a. be an adult (eighteen years or older)
b. have five years of residence in Turkey
c. have decided to settle in Turkey
d. have good moral conduct
e. not have a threatening illness
f. speak sufficient Turkish
g. have a job or revenue to support himself or herself and dependents.
The second mechanism, exceptional acquisition, can apply to the fol-
lowing categories of persons without enforcing requirements b) and c):
the adult children of those who have lost Turkish citizenship, those
who are married to a Turkish citizen and their adult children, those
who are of Turkish descent, their spouse and their adult children, those
who are residents of Turkey with the intention of marrying a Turkish
citizen and those who have or will serve Turkey as industrialists, scien-
tists or artists (achievement-based acquisition of nationality).
The third path, which is reacquisition, applies to all those who have
renounced their Turkish citizenship in the past for various reasons. In
all three types of acquisition the procedure for naturalisation is lengthy
and goes through the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prime Minis-
ter. The decision to grant citizenship is given by the Council of Minis-
ters.
11.2.3 Acquisition through option
Children who lost their Turkish citizenship when their parents re-
nounced their citizenship can choose to reacquire their citizenship
upon reaching adulthood. As mentioned above, foreign spouses also
can acquire their partner’s Turkish nationality by option three years
after the marriage. There is no residency requirement for the naturali-
sation of spouses as long as they remain married.
11.2.4 Loss of citizenship ex lege
This is valid only for women who wish, upon marriage, to automati-
cally receive the foreign citizenship of their husband. Although Turkish
nationality law calls this a loss by law, it is in fact an optional loss since
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it occurs only if there is a declaration by the individual to the relevant
authorities.
11.2.5 Loss through a decision of the authorities
The first method through which Turkish citizenship can be lost is to re-
nounce it (i.e. to ask for a permission to exit). This path of loss is
mostly used by citizens who wish to naturalise in countries that do not
accept dual citizenship. The release from citizenship may be granted
by the Ministry of the Interior by declaration if certain conditions are
satisfied. The procedures do not permit renunciation if it results in sta-
telessness.
The second method is the nullification of Turkish citizenship for peo-
ple who have acquired it in the last five years and who have submitted
false information in their application. The third method is the withdra-
wal of Turkish citizenship from individuals because of specific actions,
such as working against the interests of Turkey in a foreign country de-
spite warnings, acquiring another citizenship without informing the
Turkish authorities, working for a foreign state which is at war with
Turkey, not responding to a call to military service for three months
and residing abroad for more than seven years and not showing any in-
terest in maintaining ties with Turkey.
11.2.6 Loss through option
This mode of loss applies to children who acquired Turkish citizenship
when their mothers naturalised in Turkey. They can renounce their
Turkish citizenship within a year of reaching adulthood as long as this
does not result in statelessness. Furthermore, women who acquired
Turkish citizenship upon marriage can renounce it upon divorce.
11.3 Statistics
In this section I will undertake a preliminary analysis of the statistics
on the acquisition and loss of citizenship. The statistics on acquisitions
through the law are shown in Table 11.1. The data for the years 1997-
1999 are missing yet it is possible to conclude that following the disin-
tegration of the Soviet Bloc there has been a steady rise in the number
of women who acquired Turkish citizenship through spousal transfer.
Consequently, the change in 2003 of the law on spousal transfer of citi-
zenship led to a sharp decline in numbers in the following year.
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1990 187 – 5 491 683
1991 118 – 7 1,067 1,192
1992 339 – 7 1,057 1,403
1993 344 – 9 1,380 1,733
1994 434 – 25 1,590 2,049
1995 290 – 25 1,148 1,463
1996 104 – 3 933 1,040
2000 259 1 41 5,384 5,685
2001 230 n/a 57 7,630 7,917
2002 231 n/a 52 8,416 8,699
2003 659 n/a n/a 6,912 7,571
2004 885 n/a n/a 528 1,413
Source: General Directorate of Population and Citizenship, Ankara
The statistics on acquisition through the decision of authorities are
shown in Table 11.2 below.
Table 11.2: Acquisition of Turkish citizenship through a decision of the authorities, 1990-
2004
Year Regular Acquisition Exceptional acquisition Reacquisition Total
1990 119 785 N/A 904
1991 1,172 475 N/A 1,647
1992 888 452 N/A 1,340
1993 634 439 N/A 1,073
1994 949 467 N/A 1,416
1995 1,229 710 N/A 1,939
1996 955 3,927 N/A 4,882
2000 633 736 13,004 14,373
2001 1,161 3,917 28,317 33,395
2002 745 14,564 8,330 23,639
2003 1,236 12,938 3,040 17,214
2004 1,276 6,434 1,999 9,709
Source: General Directorate of Population and Citizenship, Ankara
The statistics provided by the General Directorate of Population and Ci-
tizenship reveal that in the category of regular acquisition by a decision
of the authorities, 60 per cent were Greek heimatloss41 in 1991 whereas
9 per cent were Iranian citizens. Between 2000 and 2003 approxi-
mately 50 per cent of this same category were Bulgarians. Between
1990 and 1993 the majority of those who acquired Turkish citizenship
on exceptional grounds had previously held Iraqi citizenship (31 per
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cent for 1990, 32 for 1991, 23 for 1992 and 34 per cent for 1993). The
largest group within this category were Bulgarians (they constituted 82
per cent of the total exceptional acquisition in 2002 and 84 per cent in
2003).
Table 11.3 shows the statistics on the numbers of withdrawals of
Turkish citizenship (the third method explained in section 2.5 above).
It should be noted that within the group of people who lost their Turk-
ish nationality between 2000 and 2005 there is no case of loss result-
ing from failure to reside in the country during the preceding seven
years. The majority of people whose citizenship was withdrawn were
those who did not return to the country to fulfil their military service
despite being called up by the authorities – for instance, out of 1,920
people who lost their Turkish citizenship in 2000, 1,868 were in this
category. This figure is 2,689 out of 2,735 in 2001, 2,193 out of 2,316
in 2002, 5,077 out of 5,489 in 2003, 1,975 out of 2,367 and 178 out of
464 in 2005.
The number of Turkish citizens whose nationality was withdrawn
because they did not inform the Turkish authorities that they were ac-
quiring another citizenship increased between 2000 and 2005. The
numbers are 42 for 2000, 24 for 2001, 81 for 2002, 272 for 2003, 246
for 2004 and 242 for 2005. The application of this rule is random at
best since there are many people in this situation who have maintained
their Turkish citizenship for many years. The increase in the numbers
in this category cannot really be explained with the available data or in-
formation. The only possibility is the sensitisation of the authorities as
a result of events that led to the withdrawal of the Turkish citizenship
of a Member of Parliament who had sworn allegiance to the US by be-
coming citizen there prior to the elections in Turkey.
Table 11.3: Loss of Turkish citizenship by a decision of the authorities, 2000-2004







Source: General Directorate of Population and Citizenship, Ankara
Statistics on loss of citizenship are also published for those who have
subsequently reacquired their Turkish citizenship (see Table 11.4 be-
low). Up until 2002 individuals who renounced their Turkish citizen-
ship could easily reacquire their original citizenship following naturali-
sation in Germany. However, the realisation that a new law can lead to
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nullification of their German citizenship if it is discovered that they
have reacquired their original citizenship has led to a sharp drop in the
number of individuals who reacquired Turkish citizenship thereafter.
Table 11.4: Previous loss of citizenship by those who have reacquired Turkish citizenship
according to three main categories, 2000-2004
Reason for Loss 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Permission to exit 12,635 27,576 8,027 2,874 1,828
Inappropriate conduct 29 71 58 85 121
Loss by option 340 670 245 81 50
Total 13.004 28.317 8.330 3.040 1.999
Source: General Directorate of Population and Citizenship, Ankara
11.4 Conclusions
The findings suggest that maintaining vibrant economic links with citi-
zens living abroad (especially those living in Germany) has been a con-
stant concern for Turkish Governments despite the severe neglect for
the social problems faced by these groups. The research results show
that there are a number of organisations and actors, especially within
Germany, that pressure the policy-makers in Turkey to accommodate
their need to integrate into their host country without having to relin-
quish their rights to land ownership and inheritance in Turkey. The
main amendments to the Law on Citizenship in Turkey were made as
a result of the realisation that the guest-workers were in fact perma-
nent residents in their host countries. The most interesting finding is
the interaction between the Turkish and German Governments and the
attempts of the former to formulate legislation based on the develop-
ments in Germany.
Turkish Governments have demonstrated a willingness to address
the practical problems faced by the Turkish people living abroad. In
many cases the intentions were sincere even though official actions to
solve the problems were either slow or non-existent. However, this in-
ability did not stem from apathy towards the real problems or the aim
of strategically using the issue for political gain. It was rather the result
of a general lack of political incentives, as those persons living abroad
who still possess the right to vote in Turkey cannot practically do so un-
less they return to Turkey during elections.42
As outlined in the sections above, there is a very pragmatic debate
concerning citizenship in Turkey. The principles of citizenship acquisi-
tion and loss are seldom discussed and immigrants have not been a
real concern of policy-makers, either because they are not mobilised or
because the issue is not politicised. Foreigners, like Bulgarian Turks or
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those coming from Central Asia, are not considered part of these im-
migrant groups since, in most cases, they acquired Turkish citizenship
based on their cultural, linguistic and religious background.
There are many cases of immigrants who find ways of working in
Turkey and leaving the country every three months (this applies to
many Bulgarian Turks who do not have citizenship). Many foreigners
who do not need a visa to enter Turkey are employed in Turkey illeg-
ally. Even some Western European citizens who reside in Turkey with-
out a work permit resort to this method. Very few of these immigrant
groups have organised and begun trying to pressure the Turkish state.
Brücke, a German-Turkish bridging organisation, and the Association
of Foreign Wives are exceptions. Hence, if in the next five to ten years
immigration issues become more important and appear in the public
sphere we might begin to see more pressure applied to Turkey.43
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Turkey
Date Document Content Source
1869 Ottoman Nationality
Regulation
Recognised all residents of
the Ottoman territories as
nationals of the Empire.
1924 Constitution of the
Republic of Turkey
Granted Turkish nationality
to all residents of the
Republic irrespective of
race or religion.
1928 Law No. 1312/1928:
Turkish Citizenship Act
Based on ius sanguinis but
complemented by a
territorial understanding.
1934 Law No. 2510/1934 on
Settlement
Provided refugee and
immigrant status to groups








coup. It stated that children
born to Turkish mothers or
fathers were Turkish and
that it was not possible to
revoke the citizenship of
individuals unless they had
been disloyal to the
country. Children born to
Turkish mothers and
foreign fathers were to
acquire citizenship based




1964 Law No. 403/1964: Turkish
Citizenship Act
The citizenship law was
formulated based on the
www.coe.int
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Date Document Content Source
principles outlined in
Article 54 of the 1961
Constitution.
1981 Law No. 2383/1981
amending Law No. 403/
1964
Dual citizenship became
legal provided that the




1982 Constitution of the
Republic of Turkey (as
amended in 1987, 1995,
2001)
Kept the same principles
regarding citizenship as the
1961 Constitution.
www.tbmm.gov.tr
1989 Law No. 3540/1989
amending Law No. 403/
1964
Amended two articles of
the law regulating the





who are supposed to fulfil a
requirement fail to do so
within two years following
naturalisation, they are
likely to lose their
citizenship.
1992 Law No. 3808/1992
amending Law No. 2383/
1981
Removed the clause added
to the law, stating that
those who are outside the
borders of Turkey and who
have been charged with
endangering the internal or
external security of the
country will be stripped of
Turkish citizenship unless
they return within three
months during regular
periods and one month
under emergency rule.
1995 Law No. 4112/1995




known as the pink card).
www.legislationline.org
1999 Law No. 4465/1999 Ratified an agreement
between the Turkish
Republic and the Republic
of Northern Cyprus on
facilitating the
naturalisation of Cypriots in
Turkey.
2003 Law No. 4866/2003
amending Law No. 403/
1964
Introduced a waiting period
of three years for
acquisition of citizenship
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Date Document Content Source
by spouses.
2003 Law No. 4862/2003




citizenship for citizens of
Northern Cyprus.
2004 Law No. 5203 amending
Law No. 403/1964
Clarified the rights linked to
the privileged non-citizen
status: 1) retention of
attained social insurance
rights; 2) loss of voting
rights and the ability to be
elected and employed in
the civil service.
Notes
1 The author wishes to thank Esra Derle, Selçuk Uğuz and Özlem Atikcan for their
help in facilitating access to resources.
2 It should not be forgotten that this was taking place in the context of sharp declines
in the size of the population of Anatolia as a result of the First World War.
3 Law No. 2510/1934 on Settlement.
4 Sunni Islam, which is considered to be the mainstream, differs from Shi’a Islam.
5 The Sheikh Said uprising was one of the first important rebellions against the state.
The Sheikh gathered support on the basis of tribal and religious allegiance, and
hence the insurgency was not exclusively one of Kurdish nationalism (Robins 1993:
660).
6 Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship.
7 Turkish authorities were counselling emigrants not to lose their socio-cultural
identity and to maintain ties with Turkey. Germanisation, according to this
perspective, would distance emigrants from Turkey.
8 Parliamentary Minutes, 7 June 1995, Period 19, Legislative Year 4, Volume 88, 89-
109.
9 Law No. 2383/1981 on Turkish Citizenship.
10 German Citizenship Law, art. 25. The only exceptions to the strict ban on dual
citizenship are those who have a second passport from a European Union country
and those who have applied for permission.
11 Y. Özdemir, ‘Ankara-Berlin Kıskacında: Çifte Vatandaşlık Gerçeği’ [Caught between
Ankara and Berlin: the Truth about Dual Citizenship], Evrensel [daily newspaper], 26
January 2005. This move came at a critical juncture in German politics whereby ex-
pelling these citizens impacted on the number of voters. According to one estimate,
approximately 20,000 out of 600,000 German-Turkish voters were disenfranchised
in the general elections of 2005 (Deutsche Welle, 17 September 2005, www.dw-world.
de).
12 Radikal [daily newspaper], 11 February 2005.
13 Y. Özdemir, ‘Ankara-Berlin Kıskacında: Çifte Vatandaşlık Gerçeği’ [Caught between
Ankara and Berlin: the Truth about Dual Citizenship], Evrensel [daily newspaper], 26
January 2005.
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14 After the military coup Bülend Ulusu was given the responsibility of forming a
technocratic Government (www.tbmm.gov.tr). Until the Advisory Council was formed
the National Security Council (NSC) sanctioned all decisions of the Government. The
members of the NSC were the four generals and one admiral who staged the coup.
The minutes of the 13 February 1981 meeting of the National Security Council (38th
Meeting, Volume 1, 1981) indicate that the members of the Council voted in favour
of debating all amendments related to Turkish Citizenship Law in a secret session.
The debate lasted for approximately two hours.
15 Cumhuriyet, 15 February 1981.
16 Law No. 2383/1981 amending Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship.
17 Law No. 3808/1992 amending Law No. 2383/1981. In between these two amend-
ments there is Law No. 3540/1989, which amended two articles of the law regulating
the process of acquisition of Turkish citizenship.
18 Parliamentary Minutes, 27 May 1992, Period 19, Legislative Year 1, Volume 12, 53-55.
19 Parliamentary Minutes, 8 June 1993, Period 19, Legislative Year 2, Volume 36, 189-
192.
20 Ibid., 203-206.
21 Law No. 4112/1995 amending Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship.
22 The Turkish Immigrants Union (later to become Almanya Türk Toplumu – TGD)
was established in 1985. It is an umbrella association with around 200 members,
including the German Turkish Academics Association Union, German Turkish
Students Association Union and various occupational organisations. TGD promotes
the interests of the Turkish population of Germany vis-à-vis both the German and
the Turkish Governments, attempts to influence public opinion, and to secure rights
through legislative changes (www.tgd.de/).
23 The pink card is the document given to the people who have the special non-citizen
status.
24 Law No. 4112/1995 amending Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship.
25 Interview with Rona Aybay, 20 August 2002.
26 People who have acquired Turkish citizenship by means other than birth do not have
the right to a pink card.
27 Parliamentary Minutes, 8 June 1993, Period 19, Legislative Year 2, Volume 36, 203-
206.
28 Parliamentary Minutes, 7 June 1995, Period 19, Legislative Year 4, Volume 88, 89-
90.
29 Ibid., 96.
30 Speaker of the RP (Refah Partisi – religious right wing party) group (Parliamentary
Minutes, 7 June 1995, Period 19, Legislative Year 4, Volume 88, 103). Many other
MPs voiced their concern on this issue as well.
31 Art. 29 of Law No. 4112/1995 amending Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship.
This provision is against the principle of non-discrimination between citizens by
birth and by naturalisation incorporated in the 1997 European Convention on
Nationality. Turkey has not signed this Convention.
32 Law No. 4866/2003 amending Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship.
33 Law No. 4862/2003 amending Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship. The
citizens of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) have always enjoyed
preferential treatment in Turkey. Law No. 4465/1999 further strengthened this by
attempting to provide TRNC citizens with all the social and economic rights of
Turkish citizens except voting rights. Since TRNC is not a recognised state (except by
Turkey) TRNC citizens could travel abroad only with a Turkish passport (except for
the UK and USA which recognised the TRNC passport as an identity card and issued
visas for TRNC citizens on a blank page and not the passport itself). TRNC citizens
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could obtain a Turkish passport without becoming a citizen of Turkey. They also had
the right to be dual citizens and Law No. 4465/1999 states that there shall be a fast-
track process for the citizenship applications of those TRNC citizens who want to
acquire the citizenship of the Republic of Turkey. Dual citizenship has also existed
for those Turkish citizens who settled in the TRNC. Those with five years residence
are granted TRNC citizenship provided that they fulfil certain conditions (Law No.
25/1993 TRNC Nationality Law). Yet the TRNC Council of Ministers can also grant
TRNC citizenship on a discretionary basis. The TRNC Government was accused of
such discretionary behaviour prior to the 2003 elections in order to influence the
election results (Hylland 2003).
34 Data used in this paper related to citizenship in Turkey were provided by the General
Directorate of Population and Citizenship, Ankara.
35 Law No. 2510/1934 on Settlement. The Council of Ministers was in charge of
determining which groups were considered to be of Turkish descent. Groups such as
Pomacks, Roma and Albanians have also been settled in Turkey by being assigned
this status (Şahin no date).
36 ‘Sofya’da bir Kurultay’, Milliyet [daily newspaper], 16 July 2000; ‘Soydaşa Green
Card’, Milliyet, 4 March 1997; ’Menderes: ‘‘Çifte Vatandaşlık Kolaylaştırılsın’’’, Milli-
yet, 24 February 1997.
37 Law No. 2641/1982 and Law No. 3835/1992 respectively.
38 The majority of the women in this association were Germans and they did not want
to naturalise in Turkey because they would lose their German citizenship.
39 For a classification of policy styles see Richardson (1982).
40 Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship.
41 The term Greek Heimatloss is used to refer to those Greek citizens of Western Thrace
(of Turkish origin) who were expelled from Greek citizenship.
42 Voting during general elections in Turkey has been a widely debated issue. Legally it
is possible for Turkish people living abroad to vote during elections from the country
where they reside. However, due to practical problems, such as setting up ballot
boxes in other countries and the insecurity of mail ballots, this has never been
practised. Fuat Boztepe, who is the head of the department in charge of workers
abroad at the Ministry of Labour, stated that the greatest problem occurs in countries
where there are a significant number of workers and the host country does not allow
ballot boxes to be put in public spaces. Given the number of people who could vote,
setting up ballot boxes only in the consulates and embassies does not provide a
solution (interview with Fuat Boztepe, Head of the Department of External Relations
and Services for Workers Abroad at the Turkish Ministry of Labour and Social
Security, 14 May 2003).
43 Ahmet İçduygu, Bilkent University, Department of Political Science, confirmed this
possibility (interview: 15 May 2003).
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